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On behalf of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, I would like to express our deep 
gratitude to Michael Schefczyk and Christoph Schmidt-Petri and their team at Karlsruhe for 
organizing such a wonderful conference, where a degree of humour was never very far from 
the surface. Michael and I talked about the organization of the conference while attending 
Malik Bozzo-Rey’s ISUS conference at Lille, and while we did not get quite so far as imple-
menting our idea of accommodating participants in a panopticon-style tent village, we did 
get to enjoy a panopticon dinner, where unseen ears listened to our conversations and 
noted bad behaviour (as one might expect in a company well-populated by moral philoso-
phers, there was no more than a modicum of that)—though the food was probably some-
what more appetising than that which Bentham would have served to his inmates. The pan-
opticon dinner took place at the famous Karlsruhe ZKM/Centre for Art and Media, where 
we were able to enjoy a tour of the fascinating ‘Open Codes: Living in Digital Worlds’ exhi-
bition—Bentham would have loved all that data. 
Karlsruhe was the fifteenth conference in the series since they began with a very modest 
affair, attended, as I recall, by about 30 person, at University College London in 1987. Sub-
sequent conferences (with regnal numbers) have been as follows: 
ISUS II (1989): King’s College, Cambridge 
ISUS III (1992): University of Western Ontario 
ISUS IV (1994): Chuo University, Tokyo 
ISUS V (1997): Tulane University, New Orleans 
ISUS VI (2000): Wake Forest University, North Carolina 
ISUS VII (2003): Lisbon, Portugal 
ISUS VIII (2005): Dartmouth College, New Hampshire 
ISUS IX (2006):  University College London:  
The John Stuart Mill Bicentenary 
ISUS X (2008): University of California at Berkeley 
Preface 
ii 
ISUS XI (2011): Lucca, Italy 
ISUS XII (2012): New York University 
ISUS XIII (2014): Yokohama National University 
ISUS XIV (2016): Catholic University of Lille 
All have been memorable in various ways (am I the only person to have attended all of 
them?), but Karlsruhe was the first that has included a ride on a narrow-gauge railway (fu-
ture conference organizers please note!). The train took our group around the grounds of 
Karlsruhe castle, which themselves are arranged on a semi-panoptic plan. 
I should add that experiencing the hospitality at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology made 
me a little more aware of why the good folk of Germany are renowned for their organiza-
tional efficiency. 
You might be forgiven for thinking that the conference was merely an excuse to have a good 
time and to meet up with old and the opportunity to make new friends, and you would not 
be wrong! However, I include in the idea of having a good time, the pleasure of hearing a 
selection of excellent lectures and papers, discussing ideas with people who have something 
to say, and experiencing, if not contributing to, the republic of scholarship.  The conference 
was characterized by the usual mixture of philosophical and historical, theoretical and ap-
plied, perspectives that makes ISUS so special. The current collection of essays reflects that 
mixture and is a worthy tribute to the vibrancy and vitality of utilitarian studies. 
The conference scheduled for 2020 at the University of Illinois at Chicago had to be can-
celled, due to circumstances beyond our control, but I fervently hope that we will meet 
again for ISUS XVI at Rome in 2022. 
Philip Schofield 
Honorary Secretary and Treasurer 
International Society for Utilitarian Studies 





Michael Schefczyk and Christoph Schmidt-Petri 
Organising the 15th conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies has been 
a great pleasure for us. We are honoured the ISUS committee trusted us with this project 
and sincerely thank all participants for joining us in Karlsruhe from all over the world.  
Legend has it that the founder of Karlsruhe, Margrave of Baden-Durlach Karl Wilhelm, fell 
asleep in the forest and dreamt of a palace. He had the palace of Karlsruhe built in 1715, in 
that very forest, as the epicentre of a new city. The absolutist idea reflected in the fan-
shaped map of Karlsruhe, with the ruler overlooking its streets from the tower’s castle, of 
course blended in well with the visionary plan of a panopticon-style tent camp (as men-
tioned in Philip Schofield’s preface), which subsequently gave way to more viable aspects 
of the conference taking equally peculiar shapes. 
Our conference theme, ‚Utility, Progress, and Technology‘ was intended to emphasise that 
any reflection on technology necessarily requires normative dimensions that even the best 
scientific education or training cannot provide. Does some innovation, useful as it may 
seem, actually constitute progress? Does it increase human happiness? We hope ISUS 2018 
has helped improving thinking on these (and other) philosophical problems.  
For financial support we thank the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft), the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, its Institute for Technology Futures, the 
KIT Fördergesellschaft, the Kursbuch Kulturstiftung, as well as the International Society for 
Utilitarian Studies and the German Society for Utilitarian Studies. 
The success of the conference required the commitment of many student assistants and 
helping hands. In particular, we thank Michael W. Schmidt, who coordinated the core or-
ganising group consisting of Marie-Claire Haag (née Baur), Dorothee Bleisch, Nico Brähler, 
Max Hagelstein, and Sina Schmitt – thank you all! During the event, we could not have done 
without the many helping hands: thanks to Alessa Auerswald, Sarah Schwarz (née Bous-
sard), Jonas Bühler, Johanna Gramacho Narloch, Jean Gras, Simeon Imhoff, Mona Meixner, 
Lilly Osburg, Andie Rothenhäusler, Nora Steinhäuser, Constantin Weeber, Kai Wieland, and 
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Utilitarianism and Responsibility for the 
Future1 
Dieter Birnbacher, University of Düsseldorf, Germany 
Abstract 
Differently from scientific contexts utilitarianism continues to be a stumbling-block in many public debates, partly 
because of misunderstandings, partly because of conflicts with widespread moral convictions. These concern both 
its axiology and its theory of normativity. On the other hand, there are several context of ethical and public 
discussion in which characteristic elements of utilitarianism and widely shared normative position come 
remarkably close, such as the growing recognition of the moral status of nonhuman animals and the recognition 
of the responsibility for a sustainable use of natural resources. Historically, representatives of utilitarianism had an 
important share in driving this development. Furthermore, there is a remarkable affinity between utilitarianism 
and the „principle of responsibility“ highlighted, among others, by Hans Jonas. First, there is an affinity between 
the concept of a prospective responsibility and the utilitarian conception of responsibility as directed at future 
events and states rather than at future actions and omissions. Another affinity is the utilitarian principle of 
extending responsibility to all foreseeable consequences instead of, as the theory of double effect has it, restricting 
responsibility to intended consequences. Finally, utilitarianism is more than its rivals able to satisfy the demands 
of universalizability implied by the moral nature of prospective responsibility by making the value of subjective 
well-being its one and only intrinsic value. There does not seem to be any other value on which the same degree 
of consensus gentium can be expected. 
 
I Utilitarianism – Between Academia and the Public  
Every practice-oriented ethicist knows the gap that from time to time requires an intellec-
tual balancing act between the culture of discussion in the academic world and that of the 
public sphere: on the one hand a disciplinary expert, on the other a moralist. Many ethical 
theories discussed objectively and dispassionately in philosophical or economic seminars 
are met by the public with rejection or outrage, for example, when they conflict with com-
mon sense notions of everyday morality or with fundamental political norms. 
 
1 Translated from German by Paul Lauer.  
Utilitarianism and Responsibility for the Future  
2 
Utilitarianism is the ethical doctrine that this characterization best fits. In numerous aca-
demic debates, and in particular in those about the big problems concerning our future, 
utilitarian premises are the more or less unquestioned starting point of the discussion. This 
is, for example, the case when in academic discussions about climate ethics the question is 
asked which strategies seem most promising to limit climate change and its consequences 
for all of those affected directly and indirectly. Utilitarianism is already, as it were, part of 
the question. The debate is less about whether utilitarianism or another ethical theory 
should be the basis of a search for an answer to the problem, but more about which version 
of utilitarianism is best able to do justice to the problem.  
Indeed some of the best known models for a successful climate politics are based on differ-
ent versions of a utilitarian ethics. A positive version is found in the so-called DICE Model, a 
dynamic integrated model of climate and the economy, proposed by the American econo-
mist William Nordhaus (2013). The goal of this model is to determine – by means of simu-
lating the consequences of different climate policy strategies – how it is possible to maxim-
ize the total utility of everyone in the world affected by climate change. This model makes 
use of a not entirely unproblematic methodological simplification, namely, the monetariza-
tion of all crucial dimensions of utility. This involves the assessment of all of the different 
positive and negative impacts of climate change and efforts to combat it – including climate-
induced migration and the erosion of social and political institutions – by means of compa-
rable monetary units. A comparable concept, which uses a ‘utility currency’ instead of mon-
etary units to evaluate the commensurability of many dimensions of positive and negative 
utilities, has been developed in the philosophy of Christoph Lumer (2002). By contrast, the 
so-called Stern Review – the report by a commission evaluating the economic consequences 
of climate change led by the former chief economist of the World Bank – makes use of a 
negative version of utilitarianism (Stern, 2006). Only the negative consequences of, on the 
one hand, a laisser-faire climate policy and, on the other, an ambitious future-oriented cli-
mate policy are compared with each other. Only those climate strategies that minimize 
long-term costs are worthy of consideration. Based on detailed calculations, the Stern Re-
view calls for a stronger and more rigorous climate policy to reduce emissions and provide 
more comprehensive support for adapting to climate change in affected regions. Yet an-
other version of utilitarianism is the basis of Bernward Gesang’s concept of climate ethics. 
Gesang (2011, 43) extends the classic utilitarian principles of long-term and universal max-
imization of utility by means of a catastrophe avoidance principle, which prohibits initiating 
processes with potentially catastrophic consequences, regardless of whether such an avoid-
ance strategy is economically viable over the long run.  
All of these models have considerable differences in their conclusions – which are however 
only partially due to the fact that they are based on different versions of a utilitarian ethics. 
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It is also due to their providing different answers to the open questions of this ethics, for 
example, the extent to which a utility calculation ‘discounts’ the value of benefits and harms 
lying in the distant future in comparison to their current value. That the Stern Report model 
arrives at completely different results than the Nordhaus model is largely due to the fact 
that it ‘discounts’ the future benefits at a very much higher rate than Nordhaus does. Unlike 
Nordhaus, the authors of the Stern Report do not consider it justified to value the benefits 
and harms of future generations at a considerably lower rate than the benefits and harms 
of currently living generations of human beings. 
In contrast to academic contexts, utilitarianism is in many public debates still a stumbling 
block – partially due to misunderstandings such as utilitarianism assessing consequences on 
their objective instead of their expected and so more or less probable consequences, but 
also due to a firm rejection of some of the characteristic norms of utilitarianism when they 
are strongly and undeniably opposed to popular convictions. Two examples are the value 
theory of utilitarianism, which has only a single value, that of a positive state of conscious-
ness – however this might be understood – and the normative theory that prioritizes those 
actions that under given conditions will in all probability maximize the gains as well as min-
imize the losses in subjective well-being for all those affected by the action. 
Utilitarianism, as a value theory, is often objected to because of the perception that it does 
not give any intrinsic but only a derived value to life (the life of human beings but also that 
of higher forms of animal life). Not life, but the quality of life has an intrinsic value according 
to the hedonistic value teachings of classic utilitarianism. Solely as a condition of the quality 
of life is life worth being preserved, protected, initiated, and made possible. The conse-
quence of this is that utilitarians take up liberal positions in many controversial issues in 
bioethics – such as abortion, reproductive medicine or euthanasia – which encounter re-
sistance in Germany, especially by the Catholic Church but also in political parties influenced 
by Christian morality. 
Utilitarianism, as a normative theory, is objected to for two of its characteristic tendencies. 
First is the tendency not to recognize any absolute moral boundaries to what is permitted 
(such as, in law the concept of human dignity) and instead to consider all value dimensions 
relevant for a particular decision as subject to calculation; second is the tendency to abolish 
the distinction in the moral evaluation of acting and not acting, of active doing and the pas-
sive allowing of an action. This distinction is firmly established in everyday morality as well 
as in the law, with the consequence that many people strongly reject active euthanasia just 
as they approve passive euthanasia.  
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This image of a division between academia and the public in its perception of utilitarianism 
is however one-sided. It neglects the fact there are undoubtedly contexts in academia and 
in the public where there are remarkable convergences between characteristically utilitar-
ian positions and those normative positions currently shared at least among the intelligent-
sia.  
One of which is the increasing recognition of the moral status of higher forms of animal life, 
another is the increasing recognition of a responsibility for the preservation of the basis for 
human life in future generations. Both are facets of what Wilhelm Kamlah called the “un-
bordering of responsibility” (1973, 105), which has been happening in our culture since the 
Enlightenment and has been most fully developed in the classics of utilitarianism.  
An ‘unbordering of responsibility’ beyond the human species was first broached in the pref-
ace to Rousseau’s (1973, 72-73) essay on inequality in 1755, in which he speaks of animals 
also partaking in natural law. In 1785, for the first time, the recognition of animal rights was 
expressly called for in Wilhelm Dietler’s treatise with the title Justice Towards Animals. It 
did not go so far as to prohibit the killing of animals for food or safety. But it should only be 
allowed for animals to be killed in ‘the fastest, most gentle and least painful way’. Nor were 
people allowed to hunt animals solely in the pursuit of pleasure or to abuse their pets 
(Dietler 1997, 26). In the revolutionary year of 1789, Bentham’s (1948, 311) major work was 
published, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, containing the argument that morality 
was not about whether a creature can reason or talk but solely about whether they can 
suffer.  
This inclusion of creatures capable of suffering, beyond the borders of species, can be found 
in modern laws governing animal protection, which without exception identify such animals 
as deserving of protection and aim to avoid, prevent and alleviate animal suffering. The 
reason that in Germany cephalopods such as octopuses are now protected is largely due to 
the supposition that their sensory capabilities justify their being included, alongside verte-
brate animals, among non-human creatures capable of suffering. It is entirely another mat-
ter whether this generous standard defining which animals are capable of suffering will be 
applied in practice. That there is a ‘lack of enforcement’ is obvious. 
II The Sentimental Future of Utilitarianism 
The second area in which everyday moral thinking and utilitarian principles are in contact is 
in the recognition of our responsibility for the long-term preservation of the biological and 
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civilizational basis of human life and for the successive humanization of living conditions on 
a global scale. Growing prosperity increasing social security has lead, in wealthy countries, 
to a willingness to recognize and take on ‘responsibility at a distance’, and in three different 
ways: beyond the borders of species to a responsibility for the well-being of sentient ani-
mals and the preservation of the natural world; beyond the borders of one’s own group to 
an extension of solidarity with a global community and so overcoming the evolutionary rel-
ict of tribalism and the limitation of solidarity to members of one’s own family, kinship, clan, 
or tribe; and finally beyond the borders of the present to an expansion of responsibility in 
the direction of an endless future. 
Advocates of a utilitarian ethics were crucially involved in the expanding circle of human 
responsibility. From Bentham to John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick to Peter Singer, there 
is an unbroken line of thinkers who, going beyond the human welfare, took up the cause of 
the welfare of animals and in the case of John Stuart Mill the preservation of natural diver-
sity. The young Peter Singer spoke so powerfully about the problem of world hunger in 1972 
in an article considered sensational at the time, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, that a 
number of other utilitarian authors hurriedly followed in its wake. And the perspective of 
‘in the long run’, a perspective that when taking decisions or making strategies primarily 
concerned with the present we should also, to the extent possible, consider their conse-
quences in the future is a hallmark of the writings of John Stuart Mill on economics, politics 
and social policy.  
In Mill we find – in almost all of his writings in which he took on the role of a public moralist 
– him expressing a sentimental belief in a better future. Mill’s style of writing about people 
and about what is good and right for them is not only confined to the people of his time but 
to humanity as a process, or as he would put it, man as a progressive being (CW XVIII, 224). 
Without doubt Mill understood utilitarianism from a long-term perspective and against a 
background of an ideal of civilization as increasingly intergenerational and global. Humanity 
is for Mill – I would like to use a category of Ernst Bloch here – a latency, a dynamis and not 
an energeia. It is a continuing, if also very gradual and always beset by reversals, transition 
to a successively higher level of perfection, a continuous emancipation from the limitations 
of an earlier state. It was not the social utility of the here and now that was decisive for him 
but the importance of human action for the future of humanity. The dominant medium of 
this progress for Mill – although in England he was a contemporary witness of the first in-
dustrial revolution – was not technology and economic productivity but education.  
Given this viewpoint it is hardly surprising that Mill was an avowed opponent of any anthro-
pology that sought to determine human nature or the essence of being human. For Mill 
there is neither a nature nor a God that determines the future of humankind. Humans are 
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instead literally an ‘animal that is not determined’, one that is free to set their own tasks for 
themselves.  
The moralist Mill goes so far as to not only encourage his fellow human beings to transcend 
the borders drawn for them by anthropologists but obligated them to do so. In his essay 
Nature he wrote:  
[T]he duty of man is the same in respect to his own nature as in respect to the nature of all 
other things, namely not to follow but to amend it. (CW X, 397)  
The most notorious example of a false determination of this type was for Mill the Aristote-
lian characterisation of women as an ‘inherently’ inferior being to men. Mill was convinced 
that women were, not only in his time but in the past as well, prevented from achieving 
their potential by mistaken norms and conventions. The seeming inferiority of women was, 
for Mill, nothing other than a projection of social coercion in an image of nature that legiti-
mized this relationship: the seeming inferiority of women as a product of the subjection of 
women.  
It was however characteristic for Mill that the inequality of the sexes, which is still prevalent 
around the world, was not only an example of a false philosophy but also a practical political 
challenge. Mill had the good fortune that when he was a member of parliament the elec-
toral franchise was debated. This gave him the opportunity to hold a number of speeches 
on women’s right to vote. Mill believed that – as he wrote in his autobiography – his advo-
cacy of female suffrage was “by far the most important, perhaps the only really important 
public service I performed in the capacity of a Member of Parliament” (CW I, 285) . He had 
a symbolic victory. His amendment to enfranchise women – it was to replace the word ‘man’ 
with the word ‘person’ in the Reform Bill – received an impressive 73 votes, a third of the 
members of parliament present. However, women did not receive the right to vote in the 
United Kingdom until 1928.  
Mill’s speech to his fellow parliamentarians still resonates today. To demonstrate the back-
wardness of the occupational regulations of the time, he gave the example of a young 
woman who wanted to become a physician and – thanks only to a legal loophole – was able 
to become a pharmacist. As soon as the Society of Apothecaries noticed that a woman had 
slipped into their ranks, they quickly passed a statute prohibiting women from becoming 
members. Mill’s sarcastic comment was, 
No sooner do women show themselves capable of competing with men in any career, than 
that career, if it be lucrative or honourable, is closed to them. (CW XXVIII, 160)  
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Mill’s advocacy for the emancipation of women has more to do with his sentimental view 
of the future than it may appear at first sight. Mill’s motive was not that English women 
were longing for emancipation. He knew and admitted that there was minimal interest in 
political equality among the great majority of English women and that gaining the right to 
vote was by no means a priority for them. Mill’s motive seems to have been another: not 
to forgo the promise that women’s participation in leading positions in politics, education, 
business and science had for the future of society. Self-realization, as we would say today, 
was for Mill, as a student of Humboldt, not only an individual but also – and especially – a 
collective goal. 
Many seeming inconsistencies and tensions in Mill’s writings are resolved if we place them 
next to the sentimentality of his view of the future and make this a key to interpreting him. 
His glorification of individualism and his encouragement of stubbornness – as expressed in 
On Liberty – are often seen as contradictions to his faith in utilitarianism. Indeed, Mill does 
seem to argue in long passages that the development of the productive potential of the 
individual is an end in itself and not solely a means to increasing social welfare. Even admit-
ting that Mill’s own biography may have been a cause of his showing a degree of sympathy 
with social outsiders – he lived for many years with a married woman, a relationship con-
demned in the Victorian era, and was areligious as few of his contemporaries were – there 
seems to be more to his argumentation, namely that it is outsiders who contribute through 
their intellectual, social, scientific and economic innovations to improving the lives of peo-
ple over the long run. Liberty is an essential condition for the unlocking of the creative po-
tential that will advance humanity. Not harmony, adaptation, or complacent satisfaction 
but instead restlessness, criticism and dissatisfaction are the yeast of progress. He was cer-
tain, as he once wrote, that  
[N]othing is more certain than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the 
uncontented characters. (CW XIX, 407) 
Liberty is not, in this utilitarian perspective, a luxury. On the one hand, with increasing af-
fluence and education the need for individual liberty also grows. On the other, only inde-
pendent thought is able to bring forth future-oriented ideas and work that lead to social 
progress. One of Mill’s fundamental convictions is that the active character type has ad-
vanced humankind to a much greater extent than the passive – even if he is not always 
popular and is sometimes seen as rival and a threat. This makes competition vital to pro-
gress, all the more so when it is a competition of plural opinions, perspectives and ways of 
living. 
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Mill’s ever-present references to the future may also help explain his seemingly arbitrary 
and eclectic use of the Platonic theory of the three parts of the soul to explain the sources 
of pleasure in Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism: different types of pleasure have different effects 
on an individual’s personality and motivation. Someone who enjoys science or technology 
– or music, art or theatre – generally also gives pleasure to others or makes their lives easier 
– in contrast to someone who only finds enjoyment in more ephemeral sensual pleasures.  
Also in his political economy, Mill’s arguments that certain institutional arrangements hin-
der ‘social justice’ are never solely about the present but invariably also about the future. 
They are about the functions an institution has for securing universal social welfare over the 
long term or, given social reform, could secure. What is important is that the reform of 
economic institutions is, as we would now say, ‘sustainable’ for those affected, for the 
‘stakeholders’.  
Mill’s arguments for a radical taxation of inheritances are a masterpiece of sophistry. In 
Mill’s day inheritance was a major condition for the accumulation of wealth and political 
influence in the hands of an unproductive landed gentry. In our time inheritance is a major 
factor in the maintenance and intensification of economic inequality. Large inheritances, 
like today, were bequeathed to individuals belonging to the same class as the person giving 
the inheritance. These people were rarely reliant on the inheritance for their prosperity. 
Mill made use of a daring conceptual construction to argue for the legal restriction of the 
inheritance of property or even its entire prohibition. Although he had to allow that the 
concept of property encompassed the right of the property owner to pass on property as 
he thought best, this did not mean that society had to recognize a corresponding right on 
the part of the heirs to receive the inheritance, or to receive it in full. While the liberty to 
bequaethe an inheritance is irrevocably tied to the institution of property, the freedom to 
receive an inheritance is subject to moral restrictions:  
The guarantee to them of the fruits of the labour and abstinence of others, transmitted to 
them without any merit or exertion of their own, is not of the essence of the institution, but 
a mere incidental consequence, which, when it reaches a certain height, does not promote, 
but conflicts with, the ends which render private property legitimate. (CW II, 208) 
This opens the way for the radical (in Mill’s day) proposal to increase the taxation of inher-
itances of property to a level that would bring about fundamental changes in its distribution. 
It is clear that Mill’s sentimentality about the future and his appeals to the responsibility to 
promote – and not to impede or hinder – progress for future generations is not specific to 
utilitarianism. It is a commonplace in Enlightenment philosophy. In the 18th and 19th cen-
turies this meant the rapid accumulation of theoretical and practical knowledge in the wake 
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of the liberation of thought from the dogmatic bonds of religion and despotism. What is 
important is that as the presence of the future has a growing importance in philosophical 
thought an ‘ethics at a distance’ takes shape, one that encourage the current generation to 
reflect on the long-term consequences of their actions and inactions and to exercise as 
much wisdom in providing for future generations as an individual does for his own personal 
future. 
A temporal ‘ethics at a distance’ was already proposed, in a certain sense, by Kant. In his 
philosophy of history he advanced the proposition that the so-called ‘pure’ time preference 
– that is the preference for a near rather than a distant future regardless of all other factors 
– is not only not an essential human characteristic (as Spinoza claimed) it is foreign to his 
nature: 
Moreover, human nature is so constituted that we cannot be indifferent to the most remote 
epoch our race may come to, if only we may expect it with certainty. (Kant 1902, 27) 
This statement is however at most acceptable as an ethical ideal. Empirical anthropology 
has shown that, without exception, the value of future events are ‘discounted’ whatever 
the certainty of their occurrence may be. The discount rate is not a linear one; it is a hyper-
bolic function. Whether a future good or harm occurs in one hundred or one thousand years 
does not have a large effect on how they are valued. There is however a great difference in 
whether it occurs in ten or one hundred years. 
III Three Affinities between Prospective 
Responsibility and a Utilitarian Ethics 
Utilitarianism is a paradigmatic example of a consequentialist ethics that measures the 
moral correctness or wrongness of something – actions and strategies as well as action 
guidelines, moral attitudes and moral emotions – solely according to the value of the ex-
pected consequences. This makes the justification of moral evaluations principally oriented 
toward the future and not the present or the past. This meant that the only justification for 
state punishment acceptable to utilitarians such as Bentham, Beccaria and Mill were ori-
ented towards the future, that is the expected consequences of this practice for society as 
a whole. State punishment at the time was, for a number of different reasons, almost com-
pletely unable to satisfy this condition. 
Utilitarianism and Responsibility for the Future  
10 
This orientation of justifying and criticizing moral institutions towards their consequences 
opens it to an empirical grounding. This aspect of consequential ethics is, however, both a 
blessing and a curse. Moral judgements, on the one hand, are unable to rely on intuitions, 
religious convictions and moral coercion. On the other, they are – to the extent that esti-
mates or evaluations of consequences are uncertain – also uncertain.  
In this context I would like to draw attention to another characteristic of utilitarian, and 
with it all other consequentialist ethics: the fact that the future consequences decisive for 
moral evaluation are expected positive or negative future events or states. The value of an 
action is not to be found in future actions but in evaluations of future events and states.  
This means that a consequentialist ethics touches on central elements of the concept of 
prospective responsibility – in contrast to retrospective responsibility for actions lying in the 
past. The first affinity can be expressed as follows: The primary meaning of assuming or 
accepting responsibility directed towards the future is (though not exclusively) ensuring 
that certain positive or negative events will or will not occur and that certain states will or 
will not come into existence. The meaning and purpose of attributing or assuming respon-
sibility is primarily the generation of certain goods and the avoidance of certain harms, not 
the execution or non-execution of certain actions. We speak of ‘responsibility’ not when we 
expect certain actions from someone bearing responsibility but when we oblige him to bring 
about certain events or states, without however specifying which actions will bring them 
about. In contrast to specific norms of behaviour a person who bears a responsibility is not 
obliged to act in a specific way but more generally to reach a specific goal with purposeful 
actions. To say that someone is responsible for one’s children, a device, world peace or the 
reduction of greenhouse gases does not oblige that person to specific actions directly im-
plied in the responsibility itself but to actions (including non-actions) that bring about or 
contribute to the bringing about of specified or implied objectives – whether the well-being 
of a child, the functionality or safety of the device, the non-occurrence of armed conflict or 
a reduction in emissions.  
This is the justification of the concept of an ‘ethics of responsibility’ as opposed to what Max 
Weber called an ‘ethics of conviction’. While a deontological ethics typically proscribes or 
prescribes certain actions regardless of the purposes or intentions for which they were car-
ried out and a virtue ethics the formation and exercise of certain moral behavioural dispo-
sitions, an ‘ethics of responsibility’ largely leaves open how the goals a person is responsible 
for achieving should be reached and which behavioural dispositions and attitudes are nec-
essary to that end. At the same time the person bearing responsibility is confronted with 
the difficult task of determining whether the means are morally justified given the moral 
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importance of the goals and placing the value and nonvalue of the means in an appropriate 
relation to the value and nonvalue of the ends.  
A second affinity between utilitarianism and the concept of responsibility lies in the equiv-
alence of intentional and unintentional but expected consequences. This equivalence is 
characteristic for a consequentialist ethics, in particular for utilitarianism. It is one of the 
central characteristics of a utilitarian ethics that intentional and indirect consequences are 
weighted equally and that foreseeable consequences that are accepted are not ‘discounted’ 
in relation to those that are intended. This leads to a conflict, on the one hand, with the so-
called ‘double effect principle’ in the tradition of Catholic moral theology, according to 
which intended consequences count significantly more than unintended ones, but also with 
elements of everyday morality and criminal law. On the other hand, there is a correspond-
ence between this characteristic and the prevailing meaning of the term responsibility. 
Whoever is responsible for achieving certain goals is not only responsible for not using 
means that are so negative that they outweigh the positive value of the goal but also for 
not accepting any harms that might be expected as a consequence of using this means and 
that are so negative that they outweigh the positive value of the goal to be achieved. 
Whoever is responsible for, say, keeping the peace is not only also responsible for not using 
means that would cause more harm than the harm being avoided but also for the indirect 
consequences of the harm caused not being worse than the harms being avoided. The 
bearer of responsibility cannot excuse himself that he accepted the indirect consequences 
of the means ‘for the sake of a good cause’ – at least not in a utilitarian perspective. The 
best intentions do not change anything on the moral wrongness of an action. Actions, action 
strategies or rules for which it is foreseeable that their bad indirect consequences – includ-
ing the bad indirect consequences of the means employed to reach a goal – outweigh their 
well-intentioned consequences are no less morally wrong than actions that are intended, 
from the start, to inflict harm.  
A third affinity between a utilitarian ethics and the concept of (prospective) responsibility 
may have far greater consequences for the practice of the attribution, assumption and ac-
ceptance of responsibility. This affinity is founded in a structural characteristic of responsi-
bility related to the specific moral character of this responsibility.  
It is an essential characteristic for every form of moral responsibility that it is not only at-
tributable to oneself but to others. To the extent that it is morally necessary to bring about 
or prevent certain future events or states, or advance their occurrence or non-occurrence, 
this responsibility is not only to be borne by each person equally, but those who respond to 
this moral imperative may and must attribute this responsibility to each other reciprocally.  
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Attributing responsibility to others must satisfy stricter conditions than to oneself. While 
for self-attributions attributing and assuming responsibility are more or less the same thing, 
when attributing responsibility to others they are not. It is not necessary to provide any 
special justification when placing oneself under a particular responsibility, but we can only 
expect another person to assume a responsibility we are placing on him if we provide rea-
sons that allow him to understand and, without direct or indirect coercion, accept them as 
reasonable. Whoever proposes to another person that he assume a responsibility will have 
to provide reasons why it should be accepted. 
This condition limits the possible content of reciprocally attributed moral responsibility in 
two ways. First, if A attributes a corresponding responsibility to B, A will not be allowed to 
appeal to values that he can only justify by appealing to authority. A cannot expect that B 
accepts the authority he is appealing to, regardless of whether it is a law, a cultural tradition 
or a religious authority. Moral responsibility can only have its source in an authority that is 
acceptable to everyone whatever their specific traditions or loyalties. Second, he will also 
not be able to appeal to values that are only understandable or acceptable given certain 
metaphysical presuppositions. A cannot assume that B will share his specific metaphysical 
convictions.  
Of course this last condition implies restrictions on the value theory foundations of attrib-
uting responsibility if values can only be justified by recourse to authorities or metaphysical 
assumptions. It is likely that most values justified by de facto appeals to authority or meta-
physical assumptions can also be justified without recourse of this kind. In most cases the 
appeal to authority or metaphysical assumptions serves only to strengthen their rhetorical 
and persuasive effect. For example, it is undoubtedly possible to imagine other justifications 
for the values postulated by Hans Jonas in his avowedly metaphysical theory of a ‘responsi-
bility to the future’ – such as the preservation of a higher human civilization. 
Alongside this critical argument there is a more positive and substantial plausible argument 
to be gained from examining the conditions of the reciprocal attribution of moral responsi-
bility. A can only expect B to accept the responsibility A is asking of him if its assumption 
and acceptance – however it might be requested – promotes the realization of a value that 
A can assume B would accept. Is there such a value? There is much to suggest that there is 
only one value, namely the value of subjective well-being, the experience of states of con-
sciousness subjectively assessed as positive. It is only this elementary value that can claim 
to be accepted by any individual B. That it is fundamentally better that someone feels better 
than worse – in his own estimation – is such an elementary value assumption that it can be 
attributed to all axiological systems both past and present and regardless of their other dif-
ferences. It seems to be the only value assumption that can be agreed upon by otherwise 
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so heterogeneous value theories in subjective and objective, ascetic and hedonistic, mini-
malistic and maximalistic ethical traditions. While there is much wide-ranging and problem-
atic dissension about the intrinsic value of virtue, dignity, justice, harmony and beauty, the 
assumption that what a subject feels for himself and regardless of the consequences as a 
positive state of consciousness – and so is also objectively something positive – can be con-
sidered a good candidate as a something held in common by every axiology ever proposed.  
The consequence is that it is easier to justify attributing responsibility to another person if 
the responsibility can be related to the intrinsic value of subjective well-being. The core of 
moral responsibility would be, in this regard, responsibility for the subjective well-being of 
conscious beings, including the creation and maintenance of its conditions and the preven-
tion or amelioration of impediments and threats to its continuation. All intrinsic responsi-
bility is at its core responsibility for the subjective well-being and happiness of conscious 
beings, all extrinsic responsibility is responsibility for its direct and indirect preconditions. 
Between utilitarianism and responsibility there is thus an extremely close relationship. The 
concept of responsibility seems to lend itself to a utilitarian interpretation. 
IV Responsibility in the Long Run: The Problem of 
Motivation 
‘Motivation problem’ is not a commonly used term in ethics. Nevertheless, it can serve as a 
convenient label for an inquiry into the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to make 
a norm, prescription, recommendation or any other action-guiding statement effective in 
the sense of making the addressee behave in conformity with it. 
This question arises because ought statements, like requests to assume and accept respon-
sibility, are in themselves unable to compel compliant behaviour but instead are dependent 
on a corresponding willingness on the part of the addressee. Even ought statements in the 
form of a categorical proposition – those including a ‘must’ – give the addressee the free-
dom to say no. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that more should be said about the motiva-
tion to follow moral demands, even when they are meant merely as guides to action and 
not as requirements. Whoever accepts a moral demand has a reason to orient his behaviour 
towards it and so is at least partially motivated to follow it. 
However, the recognition of an obligation is in general not a sufficient condition for the 
actual exercise of a responsibility. Even if in agreement with the more plausible and in moral 
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psychology more widely accepted concept of internalism we assume that recognition in it-
self contains an element of moral motivation, we cannot assume that this is sufficient to 
bring about a given behaviour. In order to make moral principles or resolutions effective 
there must as a rule be additional motivation. 
For many forms of attribution of ‘responsibility at a distance’, just as for the responsibility 
for avoiding future harmful consequences of climate change, the problem of motivation is 
especially acute because there seems to be a wider gap between the willingness to recog-
nize this obligation and the willingness to act according to this obligation than there is in 
other areas of morality. Even in Germany – a country pledged to renewable energy and 
often seen by other nations as a pioneer of forward-looking climate protection – climate 
policy is more about words than deeds. 
Psychologically, the discrepancy between words and deeds in climate policy is easily ex-
plained. In the climate problem a number of factors come together that are known to have 
an inhibiting effect on the motivation to behave in accordance with one’s own moral norms: 
the strong future dimension of responsibility for the climate, the social distance to those 
who are affected, and the menace of the changes needed to one’s habitual lifestyle.  
The first factor – the relation to a future that we will not see ourselves, one that is abstract 
and difficult to imagine – is something the responsibility for the climate has in common with 
the responsibility for the long-term preservation of the basis of human life and biodiversity. 
In both cases a responsibility over the long run has been acknowledged as urgent. That there 
is still a ‘motivation gap’ between acceptance and acting in accordance with this duty over 
the long term can be explained by the special features of these duties.  
The first special feature is that obligations related to a distant future are necessarily non-
reciprocal. From future generations we can expect nothing in return for present sacrifices 
but we also need not fear sanctions. Neither can they do something for present generations, 
nor can they be compensated by the present generation for irreversible harms they will 
suffer. They are unilateral beneficiaries but also unilateral victims. On the positive side, they 
have the present to thank for an enormous growth of knowledge and technology, which 
they can at most symbolically thank the present for; on the negative side, they will suffer 
an enormous loss of exhaustible resources and biodiversity, which they can at most sym-
bolically deplore. They are unable to be compensated for the harms we are inflicting upon 
them. They are unable to even demand from us reparation. When climate change has its 
most deleterious consequences those who bear responsibility will long since be among the 
deceased. While children and grandchildren today can claim their due and protest future 
burdens, great-grandchildren do not have a voice. If they have a voice then at most that 
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their interests and rights are anticipated and their claims put forward by those in the pre-
sent advocating on their behalf.  
A second aspect is that future developments are less certain than those of the present and 
that the causality of actions taken today on future life conditions are more difficult to esti-
mate than the causality of past or present actions on spatially far off regions in the world. 
Even if some estimates are more certain than others – and projections of demographic 
trends until mid-century show much less variation than estimates of the destruction of bio-
diversity resulting from climate change – uncertainty is a more than negligible variable.  
Uncertainty affects a number of dimensions. First, there is a residual uncertainty regarding 
the reliability of the scientific scenarios risk forecasts are based on. Even if there is little 
room for doubt about the physics of climate change, there is a much greater scope concern-
ing the question of how increasing temperatures will affect the economy, the living condi-
tions and – the most relevant dimension ethically – the quality of life. Since the motivation 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is dependent on the consequences for oneself and 
one’s immediate descendants, uncertainties about their local and regional effects are of 
great importance, especially with regard to the exodus of climate refugees that can be ex-
pected to besiege the wealthy fortress Europe, straining its assimilation capacities.  
The second dimension of uncertainty is the unpredictability of technical progress. It cannot 
be ruled out that less risky technological solutions for neutralizing carbon dioxide will be 
found than those being currently discussed under the heading geo-engineering.  
Third, it is uncertain whether today’s efforts to reduce emissions will have any appreciable 
effect on ethically relevant objectives. We are confronted with a systematic lack of feedback 
on the success and failure of long-term provisions for the future. ‘Control beliefs’ are miss-
ing, and these are crucial for the willingness of an individual to adapt his behaviour to his 
own principles. Without suitable convictions about our ability to control our environment 
our behavioural motivation is necessarily unstable.  
A further aspect is the uncertainty about the extent to which successive generations will 
continue strategies initiated today. We cannot be certain that our descendants will share 
our values and norms and continue a transition process we have begun. Much depends on 
how well the current generation succeeds in demonstrating to future generations that they 
are able to forego fossil fuels without having to accept losses in prosperity or disappoint 
expectations about future growth.  
The second factor, the social distance to those most affected, has similarities with the fu-
turity factor yet goes further. As a large part of those most affected live in the future they 
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are necessarily anonymous. They appear as ‘statistical’ instead of ‘identified’ victims. Moti-
vating feelings leading to solidarity action is however more likely to be triggered by people 
‘in front of our very own eyes’ suffering great harm or on the point of a catastrophe (in a 
mining accident, an earthquake or an epidemic), even in cases in which an unemotional 
utilitarian calculation would tell us to use the resources not for saving others but for pre-
vention efforts. 
Another specific aspect of responsibility for the climate is that those most affected are likely 
to belong to other cultures, and so they are outside the empathy horizon of the main actors. 
The third difficulty, the necessity to adapt our habits and lifestyle, may have an even greater 
effect on the possibilities of a rigorous adaptation strategy. Changing habitual lifestyles is a 
difficult undertaking, and in democracies politicians have understandable reservations 
about distancing themselves too far from the average voter. The surprisingly fast implemen-
tation of the social preference against smoking is not a suitable counter-example. Carbon 
dioxide emissions do not endanger an individual’s own health or the immediate environ-
ment. The risks remain abstract and so appeal to ‘cold reason’ rather than to the heart. A 
visceral response that could motivate appropriate behaviour is missing. And so in today’s 
industrialised nations the ambition to protect the climate exists side-by-side with the desire 
to preserve our habits and lifestyles, like fossil fuel mobility.  
All three factors – the future reference of climate responsibility, the social distance to those 
most affected and the conservatism of lifestyle – contribute to our more easily repressing 
awareness of even unambiguously recognised dangers than of dangers that are more im-
mediately threatening, that affect us personally or those close to us, or that can be handled 
without extensive changes to our behaviour. That warnings about potential catastrophes in 
the future are less likely to trigger solidarity than catastrophes occurring in the present can 
be better understood by examining three separate aspects: non-reciprocity, uncertainty 
and the anonymity of future generations. These are all reasons for doubting that motiva-
tions arising from the recognition of responsibility for the climate will be intensive and reli-
able enough – given the bombardment of competing moral and non-moral values and goals 
– to have an effective impact on behaviour.  
This does not mean however that the prognosis for a motivation to care for the climate is 
completely bleak. A more favourable outlook than direct motivation is to consider indirect 
motivation to assume responsibility for the climate. The object of indirect motivation is not 
caring for future generations themselves but achieving other more immediate goals that we 
assume will contribute to caring for future generations. The decisive advantage of indirect 
motivation is its more stable emotional foundation. Indirect motivation can, generally 
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speaking, rely on a number of emotional factors that are unavailable to direct motivation in 
the same way; it can make use of ‘quasi-moral motives’ – motives such as love, pity, caring 
and solidarity – which are to a large extent functionally equivalent to moral motives but are 
more closely bound to affectively coloured relationships and needs. 
The best-known model of indirect motivation for responsibility in the long run is the chain 
of love, the intergenerational linking of caring and precaution by each generation for the 
following generation. In this model each generation merely cares for the generation of their 
children. The ‘linking’ of generations, each caring for the next, has the same effect as a first 
generation assuming a hypothetical responsibility for all succeeding generations. Assuming 
the behaviour of the parents has a role model function and their children will care for their 
own children in the same way that their parents cared for them, then the same care will be 
given to the great-grandchildren as if each generation had oriented itself toward an abstract 
moral principle of caring for all future generations. The point of this model is that if the 
current generation does not care for the great-grandchildren’s generation and only for their 
children’s generation then the great-grandchildren may very well do better than if all had 
followed a more ambitious intergenerational moral principle.  
A second form of indirect responsibility in the long run – and one without moral motives in 
a strict sense – is the preservation and care of intrinsic cultural values. The appreciation of 
cultural values – such as, certain forms of art, music, literature, philosophy and science as 
well as social virtues and political institutions – is anthropologically closely linked to the 
motive to preserve these values and know that they will be preserved over the long term. 
Whoever loves Bach’s music also has, as a rule, an interest in preserving this music and 
ensuring that future generations, even if they have little appreciation for it, will also pre-
serve and hand down this music to successive generations. It is hard to imagine that some-
one can seriously prize values such as scientific truth, artistic perfection or the principles of 
democracy and not at the same time at least hope that they – in analogy to Nietzsche’s ‘all 
desire wants eternity’ – never pass away.  
The most important project of this kind for climate ethics is a permanent respect for human 
rights. Human rights do not have a timeline. As fragile an achievement as they may be and 
the result of an arduous historical process of humanisation, which is by no means at its end, 
they have a timeless validity. Whoever values them now will always value them.  
A further indirect motive that can serve as a stable basis, both today and tomorrow, for the 
assumption of responsibility for the climate is the human need for overarching goals that 
go beyond one’s self, one’s own community and one’s own lifetime. In a secularised and 
globally networked world this need can best be fulfilled with universal future-oriented 
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goals. Ernest Partridge has called such goals motives of self-transcendence. They could also 
be called motives of sense-making. Caring for a universal future is an especially appropriate 
example of these motives as it is through his engagement for the future that an individual 
confirms his own value and feels secure in being part of a greater overarching context 
providing meaning. He is a link in a generational chain that is held together by an inter-
generational sense of community, of which gratitude looking backwards is just as much a 
part as is recognition of obligations looking forward. This motive can be especially strong 
when it is supported by membership in a like-minded community. A not unimportant factor 
is also that moral engagement for a future that is beyond our experience – in this respect 
similar to a transcendental god – is undisappointable. 
Also self-binding commitment through future-proof institutions represents a way of trans-
ferring the moral burden of caring for the future to indirect motivation. Self-commitment 
can be understood as the long-term replacement of direct by indirect motivation, which is 
always advisable when direct motivation is not reliable enough for individuals to promptly 
assume particular responsibilities. Whoever enters a long-term contract – whether for life 
assurance or a regular charitable donation – finds it easier to remain true to an obligation 
and makes it more difficult to give in to the temptation to relinquish a commitment once 
made. He limits the scope of his future decisions and actions by committing himself to gen-
eral guidelines and replaces direct motivation for long-term provisions or charitable actions 
by indirect motivation to prevent the undesirable short-term consequences of a breach of 
contract or the cancellation of an agreement. Whoever knows that he that his motivation 
flags and he tends to give into impulsive moments but also knows that this will endanger 
his long-term goals will in general be better off by structuring his options so that impulsive 
motives are directed over the long term in the ‘right’ way and serve to promote rather than 
hinder his overarching goals. In the sense of a utilitarian ‘ethics at a distance’, he would do 
well, in other words, to live virtuously.  
This brings us at the end – by roundabout ways – to the utilitarian John Stuart Mill and his 
praise of virtue as an end in itself:  
It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for 
itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by 
which virtue is made virtue … they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which 
are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the 
possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it; 
and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the 
state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner – as 
a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual instance, it should not produce those 
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other desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to 
be virtue. (CW X, 235) 
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Was Abraham Lincoln a Utilitarian?1 
Thomas L. Carson, Loyola University Chicago, USA 
Abstract 
There is considerable prima facie evidence that Lincoln was a utilitarian. He said that we should judge actions by 
their “fruits” (consequences). He also said: 
I hold that while a man exists, it is his duty to improve not only his own condition, but to assist in amelio-
rating mankind; and, therefore ... I am for those means which will give the greatest good to the greatest 
number.   
The true rule, in determining to embrace, or reject any thing, is not whether it have any evil in it; but 
whether it have more of evil than of good. There are few things wholly evil, or wholly good. Almost eve-
rything, especially governmental policy, is an inescapable compound of the two; so that our best judgment 
of the preponderance between them is continually demanded.  
I would consent to any GREAT evil, to avoid a GREATER one. 
However, Lincoln endorsed other moral principles that can sometimes conflict with utilitarianism. He said that we 
should obey the law and follow God’s will. He also thought that he was morally obligated to abide by his oath of 
office to execute the law faithfully and defend the US Constitution. Lincoln didn’t have a fully consistent moral 
philosophy. But, while he was President of the United States, Lincoln was a utilitarian, in practice. In all of his 
important decisions and policies regarding slavery and the American Civil War, he tried to do what would have the 
best consequences. In these cases, he saw no conflict between utilitarianism and the other moral principles that 
he endorsed. Lincoln thought that it is very seldom possible to discern God’s will. He also believed that, in order 
for his policies to succeed, he needed to act in accordance with the law and his oath of office. 
Introduction 
Was Abraham Lincoln a utilitarian? The evidence is mixed, but, while he was President of 
the United States, Lincoln was an act-utilitarian, in practice. 
 
1 Tim Mulgan has asked me whether Lincoln might have been some kind of rule-utilitarian, or rule-consequentialist. 
I hope to address this question in a longer version of this paper. 
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I Some Evidence for Thinking That Lincoln Was  
an Act-Utilitarian 
Lincoln endorsed explicitly act-utilitarian moral principles at different times in his life. In a 
speech in February 1861, shortly before he became president, he said: 
I hold that while a man exists, it is his duty to improve not only his own condition, but to assist 
in ameliorating mankind; and, therefore ... I am for those means which will give the greatest 
good to the greatest number. (Lincoln 1989, II, 203) 
In a speech in the US House of Representatives in 1848, he said: 
The true rule, in determining to embrace, or reject any thing, is not whether it have any evil 
in it; but whether it have more of evil than of good. There are few things wholly evil, or wholly 
good. Almost everything, especially governmental policy, is an inescapable compound of the 
two; so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded. 
(Lincoln 1989, I, 192) 
In October 1854, he said: 
I would consent to any GREAT evil, to avoid a GREATER one. (Lincoln 1989, I, 333) 
In an early speech from 1842, he talked about the great good that the temperance move-
ment had done without causing much harm and said: 
If the relative grandeur of revolutions shall be estimated by the great amount of human misery 
they alleviate, and the small amount of harm they inflict, then, indeed, will this be the grandest 
the world shall ever have seen. (Lincoln 1989, I, 89) 
The context of this passage makes it clear that he is saying that we should estimate the 
goodness of social movements by how much human misery they cause and relieve. In 1852, 
Lincoln praised Henry Clay for not wanting to immediately eradicate slavery because it 
would produce “a greater evil, even to the cause of human liberty itself.” (Lincoln 1989, I, 
269) 
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II Some Apparent Evidence That Lincoln Was Not 
an Act-Utilitarian - That, on Examination, Is 
Actually Strong Evidence for Thinking That He 
Was One 
Sometimes following act-utilitarianism requires that one break promises. As a young man, 
Lincoln had a very strong commitment to keeping his promises come what may. In an early 
letter, concerning his promise to wed Mary Owens, a promise that he had come to regret, 
Lincoln wrote, “I made a point of honor and conscience in all things to stick to my word, 
especially if others had been induced to act on it ...”2 Later, he felt honor bound to keep the 
promise he had made to wed Mary Todd, even though he had grave doubts about doing so 
(Carson 2015, 318-26). In connection with this promise, he quoted and endorsed his father’s 
saying “If you make a bad bargain, hug it the tighter.” (Lincoln 1989, I, 91) 
But his views about the moral obligation to keep promises changed considerably by the end 
of his life. In his last public speech on April 11, 1865, just three days before his assassination, 
he discussed a plan he had proposed to Congress earlier. He said that this proposal had 
made a promise to states that had seceded from the Union and added: 
But as bad promises are better broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break 
it, whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest. (Lincoln, 
1989, II, 698) 
This is a sharp departure from his earlier view that bad bargains should be kept and held all 
the tighter. His criteria for bad promises are explicitly utilitarian. He says that his earlier 
promise should be regarded as a bad promise, provided that keeping it would be adverse 
to the public interest. He also says that he will (or should) break bad promises. This is exactly 
what an act-utilitarian would say. 
In a letter to Williamson Durley dated October 1845, Lincoln rebuked Durley and other New 
York members of the abolitionist Liberty Party for refusing to vote for Henry Clay for Presi-
dent because Clay was a slaveowner.3 In this letter, Lincoln endorsed a moral principle that 
many take to inconsistent with utilitarianism. Lincoln wrote: 
 
2 “Letter to Mrs. Orville Browning,” April 1, 1838, Lincoln 1989, I, 38. 
3 The Liberty Party drew enough votes from Clay to alter the outcome of the 1844 US presidential election. If the 
15,000 people who voted for the Liberty Party candidate in New York State had voted for Clay instead (almost all 
of them preferred the Whig, Clay, to the Democrat, Polk), Clay would have won the election. 
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“We are not to do evil that good may come.” This general proposition is doubtless correct. 
(Lincoln 1989, I, 111-2) 
Durley and other members of the Liberty Party said that “we should not do evil that good 
may come” and took voting for Clay to be an evil action. Lincoln asked whether voting for 
Clay was an evil action: 
If by your votes you could have prevented the extension [sic], &c., of slavery, would it not have 
been good and not evil so to have used your votes, even though it involved the casting of them 
for a slaveholder? By the fruit the tree is to be known. An evil tree can not bring forth good 
fruit. If the fruit of electing Mr. Clay would have been to prevent the extension of slavery, 
could the act of electing have been evil? (Lincoln 1989, I, 112) 
Lincoln says that whether or not an action is evil depends its “fruits” (consequences). So, 
appearances to the contrary, his endorsement of the principle that we shouldn’t do evil that 
good may come is perfectly consistent with utilitarianism. In fact, his discussion of this prin-
ciple strongly supports the view that he was an act-utilitarian. 
Act-Utilitarianism requires that one violate the law whenever doing so will produce better 
consequences than not. But this seems inconsistent with Lincoln’s reverence for the law. In 
a very early speech from 1838, Lincoln said “Let every American ... swear ... never to violate 
in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by oth-
ers.”4 
But later, while he was President, Lincoln was willing to defy the law for utilitarian reasons. 
He defied Chief Justice Taney’s order overruling Lincoln’s suspension of the right of habeas 
corpus in the Merryman case in 1861. In this case, he put utilitarian considerations ahead 
of obeying the law. Arguably, by the end of his life, Lincoln gave priority to doing what has 
the best consequences over obeying the law. In the Merryman case, he was concerned to 
minimize violations of the law as opposed to maximizing welfare. He asked “are all the laws, 
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be vio-
lated?”5 In effect, he said that he violated one law so that many other laws would not be 
unenforced. 
 
4 Lincoln 1989, I, 32. Still, his reverence for the law seems to have had a utilitarian rationale - his fear that general 
lawlessness and mob rule would result were people able to break the law with impunity (“Address to Young Men’s 
Lyceum of Springfield,” in Lincoln, 1989, I, 28-36.) Further, he clearly did not think that all people at all times and 
places have an unconditional duty to obey the law, because he held that people oppressed by unjust governments 
have the right to revolution and he approved of the American Revolution, Lincoln, 1989, I, 167 and 32. 
5 “Address to Congress July 4, 1861,” in Lincoln 1989, II, 253. 
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III Some Genuine Counter-evidence to the View That 
Lincoln Was an Act-Utilitarian  
As we have seen, Lincoln’s views about the morality of keeping promises changed consid-
erably and were clearly consistent with utilitarianism by the end of his life. But, he appar-
ently made a sharp distinction between ordinary promises and oaths, which we might de-
scribe as solemn promises. 
Lincoln took very seriously his oath of office to “faithfully execute the Office of President of 
the United States, and ... preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.” He called it “an oath registered in Heaven.”6 He made a distinction between his 
official duty as President, which required him to defend the US Constitution and execute 
the laws of the United States, and his personal moral beliefs. He thought that slavery was 
morally wrong but that his public duty required him to follow and execute laws that pro-
tected the institution of slavery.7 In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln read a portion of the 
US Constitution which includes an explicit provision for the return of fugitive slaves. That 
provision reads “No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged 
from such labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor or 
service may be due.”8 Lincoln promised to enforce this provision of the Constitution. 
Lincoln seems to have taken his duty to abide by his oath of office to be an absolute or 
unconditional moral obligation. 
Lincoln’s frequent statements to the effect that we should follow God’s will are another 
objection to the view that he was a utilitarian. He seems to have believed that the obligation 
to follow God’s will, when one can discern it, is an absolute unconditional obligation. 
In a speech in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1848, Lincoln gave priority to following God’s 
will over utilitarian considerations. He said that “when divine or human law9 does not clearly 
 
6 “First Inaugural Address,” in Lincoln 1989, II, 224. 
7 “Letter to Horace Greeley,” Lincoln 1989, II, 358. 
8 Article IV section 2 of the US Constitution. 
9 Whether or not Lincoln takes “human law” to mean the statutes of one’s society is unclear. 
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point out what is our duty” we must discern what our duty is “by using our most intelligent 
judgment of the consequences.”10 
In a public response to a group pressing him to end slavery in September 1862, just nine 
days before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln said: 
If it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, 
it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me ... it is my earnest desire to know the 
will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, 
the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. 
I must study the plain facts of the case, ascertain what is possible and learn what appears to 
be right. (Lincoln 1989, II, 361) 
In his private notes “On Pro-slavery Theology,” from 1858, Lincoln discusses the view that 
American slavery was in accordance with God’s will. He endorses the idea that we should 
follow God’s will, but says that there is difficulty in ascertaining it: 
Certainly there is no contending against the will of God; but still there is some difficulty in 
ascertaining, and applying it, to particular cases. (Lincoln 1989, I, 685) 
Lincoln thought that the institution of slavery, which deprived enslaved people of the fruits 
of their labor, was contrary to God’s will. In a 1859 speech he said: 
 
10 This speech criticized the anti-slavery Free Soil Party and its presidential candidate Martin Van Buren. Lincoln 
claimed that the Whigs and their candidate Zachary Taylor were just as much opposed to the extension of slavery 
as the Free Soil Party. He argued that supporting Van Buren would promote the election of the Democratic 
candidate, Cass, who supported the extension of slavery into new states and territories. Here is a larger portion of 
Lincoln’s speech that includes the passages quoted above: 
The “Free Soil” men in claiming that name indirectly attempted a deception, by implying the Whigs were not Free 
Soil men. In declaring that they would “do their duty and leave the consequences to God,’ merely gave an excuse 
for taking a course that they were not able to maintain by a fair and full argument. To make this declaration did 
not show what their duty was. If it did we should have no use for judgment, we might as well be made without 
intellect, and when divine or human law does not clearly point out what is our duty, we have no means of finding 
out what it is by our most intelligent judgment of the consequences. If there were divine law, or human law for 
voting for Martin Van Buren, or if a fair examination of the consequences [my emphasis] and the first reasoning 
would show that voting for him would have the best consequences [my emphasis] and first reasoning would show 
that voting for him would bring about the ends they pretended to wish - then he [Lincoln] would give up the 
argument. But since there was no fixed law on the subject, and since the whole probable result of their action 
would be an assistance in electing Gen. Cass, he [Lincoln] must say that they were behind the Whigs in their 
advocacy of the freedom of the soil.  
Basler 1953, Volume 2, 3-4. This passage is from a summary transcription of Lincoln’s speech in a Boston paper, 
the Daily Advertiser, September 14, 1848. That accounts for the fact that this is not written in the first person voice 
and it talks about what “he” [Lincoln] said. 
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I hold that if there is any one thing that can be proved to be the will of God by external nature 
around us, without reference to revelation, it is the proposition that whatever any one man 
earns with his hands and by the sweat of his brow, he shall enjoy in peace. I say that whereas 
God Almighty has given every man one mouth to be fed, and one pair of hands adapted to 
furnish food for that mouth, if anything be proved to be the will of Heaven, it is proved by this 
fact, that the mouth is to be fed with those hands, without being interfered with by any other 
man who has hands to labor with. I hold that if the Almighty had ever made a set of men that 
should do all the eating and none of the work, he would have made them with mouths only 
and not hands, and if he had ever made another class that he had intended should do all the 
work and none of the eating, he would have made them with all hands.11 
Lincoln often quoted the passage in Genesis 3:19 in which God tells Adam and Eve “By the 
sweat of your face you shall eat bread until you return to the ground.” Lincoln appealed to 
this passage to show that slavery (which allowed some people to eat bread from the toil of 
others) was contrary to God’s will. 
His “Meditation on the Divine Will” written in September 1862, shortly before he issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation, (Lincoln 1989, II, 359) also provides strong evidence that he 
sought to discern and follow God’s will. Lincoln wrote: 
In the present civil war it is quite possible that God’s purpose is something different from the 
purpose of either party - and yet human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the 
best adaptation to effect His purpose. I am almost ready to say this is probably true – that God 
wills this contest, and that it not end yet.... He could have either saved or destroyed the Union 
without a human contest.... Yet the contest proceeds. (Lincoln 1989, II, 359) 
At the time he wrote this, both Lincoln and the Confederate State of America were seeking 
a quick and relatively bloodless victory in the American Civil War. The Confederates wanted 
to gain their independence and preserve and expand the institution of slavery. Lincoln’s 
publically declared aim in fighting the war at this time was to preserve the union of the 
states and stop the spread of slavery. The upshot of this reflection is that Lincoln had come 
to believe that God willed that the war be long and terrible so that it would end American 
slavery. This is a central theme of his Second Inaugural Address. Lincoln’s “Meditation on 
the Divine Will” supports the view that he was sincere several weeks later when he told his 
cabinet that he sought to discern and do God’s will. During General Lee’s first invasion of 
the North in the late summer of 1862, Lincoln made a solemn vow to God to issue the Eman-
 
11 Lincoln 1989, II, 85. Also see Lincoln’s Speech at Hartford March 5, 1860, in Basler 1953., IV, 9. 
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cipation Proclamation if the Union defeated Lee’s invasion. He reported this vow to his Cab-
inet and told them that, because of the Union victory at the Battle of Antietam on Septem-
ber 17, 1862, “God had decided this question in favor of the slaves.”12 
IV Weighing the Evidence  
How should we interpret this seemingly conflicting evidence? Act-utilitarianism can conflict 
with these other moral principles that Lincoln endorsed. 
Since he apparently thought that, in practice, there were few, if any, serious conflicts be-
tween utilitarianism and these other moral principles, Lincoln might not have been inter-
ested in determining which principles were most fundamental or which took precedence in 
case of conflict. So, one possible interpretation of his moral views is this: 
1. Lincoln endorsed a number of different moral principles including act-utilitarian-
ism and had no opinion about which were most fundamental. 
But this interpretation is difficult square with evidence that Lincoln attached great im-
portance to following God’s will and to his oath of office. Other reasonable interpretations 
of Lincoln’s moral views are these: 
2. Lincoln believed that God’s will is the ultimate moral standard, but that it is seldom 
possible to discern God’s will and that we should follow a version of act-utilitarian-
ism, subject to the side constraint of keeping solemn oaths, when we cannot discern 
God’s will. 
3. Lincoln held that act-utilitarianism subject to the side constraint about keeping 
oaths is the true/correct moral principle and that God, when we can discern God’s 
will, is the ultimate epistemic authority about morality. 
4. Lincoln believed that: a. we should follow God’s will, b. God is benevolent and 
desires human welfare, c. God desires that we keep solemn oaths, therefore, Lincoln 
believed that d. we should always do what will have the best consequences or best 
promote human welfare (subject to the side-constraint of keeping solemn oaths). 
 
12 This was reported by Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells; see Fehrenbacher and Fehrenbacher 1996, 
474. 
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According to interpretation 4, Lincoln endorsed both act-utilitarianism (with the side-con-
straint about keeping oaths) and the view that we should follow God’s will and takes these 
principles of be fully consistent. According to this interpretation, Lincoln took the principle 
that we should follow God’s will to be more fundamental, i.e., he thought that this con-
strained version of act-utilitarianism is true because God wills that we so act. I have no direct 
evidence that Lincoln held either b. or c. 
1-4 are all possible interpretations of Lincoln’s moral views. I don’t have any decisive rea-
sons for preferring any one of these interpretations, though I think that 2 is more likely to 
be the correct interpretation than 1, 3, or 4. 4, however, is the interpretation which makes 
Lincoln’s moral views most coherent. 
For my purposes in this paper, it is not necessary for me to defend any particular interpre-
tation of Lincoln’s moral beliefs. Regardless of what we say about that issue, it is clear that 
Lincoln was an act-utilitarian in practice, if not in theory, while he was President of the 
United States. In his major decisions and policies as President (his policies on the expansion 
and abolition of slavery, Southern secession, the suspension of the right of habeas corpus, 
the conduct of the American Civil War, the colonization of freed slaves, and the post-war 
status of African Americans), Lincoln always chose the actions which he thought would have 
the best consequences. I defend this claim at great length in my book Lincoln’s Ethics and 
also argue that his actions and policies in the most important cases did have the best con-
sequences. Further, since he very seldom thought that he could discern God’s will, and since 
he rarely made choices about issues concerning which his oath of office applied, his actions 
were almost always consciously guided by utilitarian considerations. Lincoln knew that the 
powers of public opinion,13 the US Congress, and the US Supreme Court were such that he 
was unlikely to succeed in any action or policies that were clearly contrary to the US Consti-
tution and his oath of office. There is not a single important case during his presidency in 
which he took himself to be in a position in which by bringing about the best consequences 
he would be violating his oath of office or the will of God.14 So, in practice, there was no 
difference between his moral views and those of an act-utilitarian. In his official capacity as 
 
13 In his first debate with Stephen Douglas in August, 1858, Lincoln talked about the importance of public opinion. 
He said “In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; 
without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who molds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts 
statutes or pronounces decisions,” Lincoln 1989, II, 524-5. 
14 It is important to stress that in the Merryman case when he defied the order of Taney’s court and thus broke 
the law, he still took himself to be acting in accordance with his oath of office to “execute” the laws of the United 
States (see Carson 2015, 90-1). Recall that he asked “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” In effect, he said that he violated one law so that many 
other laws would not be unenforced. 
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President of the United States, Lincoln was almost always trying to do what would have the 
best consequences and he never took this to be at odds with the other moral principles he 
endorsed. 
Appendix 
What Lincoln Read 
Lincoln read J. S. Mill’s On Liberty and Principles of Political Economy (1848 edition). He also 
read Hume’s Essays and Francis Wayland’s Elements of Political Economy.15 
Mill on Lincoln and the American Civil War  
Mill’s 1862 essay on the American Civil War, “The Contest in America,” is of considerable 
interest. 
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Liberty as Resistance against Oppression and 
Epistemic Injustice in J. S. Mill 
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Abstract 
This chapter argues that J. S. Mill’s philosophy advances a conception of liberty that entails resisting oppression 
and epistemic injustice. Whereas oppression refers to any act that deliberately curtails citizens’ self-development, 
epistemic injustice denotes a specific type of oppression that harms people’s capacity to know themselves and 
their desires. In The Subjection of Women, Mill elaborates a conception of liberty as non-subjection, which indi-
cates that people lose their freedom when they suffer epistemic injustice. Since they were subjected to a system 
of education that shaped their psyche in such a way as to guarantee that their most ardent desire was to look 
attractive for members of the opposite sex, Victorian women were unable to discover and develop their potenti-
alities, and thus were unfree. In a move reminiscent of republicanism, Mill maintains that the absence of freedom 
cannot be identified with interference tout court. Ultimately, any time lived in the absence of guarantees against 
arbitrary interference constitutes a time of non-freedom. In order to achieve freedom, people need to be pro-
tected from arbitrary interference so they can critically examine the customs that prevail in their society and ex-
periment with different lifestyles. This intelligent following of custom, which can be identified as the ethical di-
mension of Millian liberty, allows each citizen to decide which experiment in living maximises the development of 
his or her character. The resistance against oppression and epistemic injustice that Mill deems indispensable for 
liberty also has a more political dimension, which can be observed in the proportional representation scheme 
proposed in Considerations on Representative Government. The public articulation of the plight of oppressed mi-
norities in the representative assembly increases their social standing as citizens and, moreover, can produce al-
ternative vocabularies and tactics that help them resist the oppressions perpetuated in civil society. 
 
I  
Resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us what we are to be  
 Mill, The Subjection of Women 
Though much has been written on Millian liberty, no scholar thus far has offered an explicit 
account of the entwinement of liberty with resistance in Mill’s political philosophy. It is likely 
that what Iain McDaniel (2018) said of Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville also 
explains the silence surrounding Mill’s concept of resistance. Perhaps the reason scholars 
working on ”resistance theory” nowadays tend to neglect Mill is because they do not expect 
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a nineteenth-century “liberal” philosopher to qualify as a “significant contributor” when it 
comes to understanding the importance of resistance for politics (McDaniel 2018, 433).1 By 
exploring the connection between freedom and resistance in Mill’s political thought, this 
chapter argues that Millian liberty entails resisting the oppression caused by epistemic in-
justice.  
Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Know-
ing, philosophers have devoted increasing attention to the topic of “epistemic injustice”, an 
expression used to denote any “wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a 
knower” (Fricker 2007, 1). Nevertheless, as Fricker herself acknowledges – and as Mill’s 
works testify – epistemic injustice had been scrutinised by scholars before the concept ‘ep-
istemic injustice’ was coined. In what follows, I contend that Mill’s conception of liberty 
seeks to resist and overcome the oppression caused by epistemic injustice. The resistance 
Mill associates with freedom comprises two dimensions: ethical and political. In its ethical 
dimension, resistance against oppression caused by epistemic injustice involves what Mill 
calls “an intelligent following of custom” (CW XVIII, 263).2 In its political dimension, it in-
volves a proportional representation scheme that sustains a conflictive and polyphonic de-
liberative setting in the representative assembly, one in which the different social perspec-
tives comprised in the demos are expressed and taken into account. 
II  
Published in 1869, The Subjection of Women is remarkable for advancing a conception of 
liberty as non-subjection (Urbinati 2002, ch. 5). According to Mill, women were unfree be-
cause they were subjected to male domination, which provoked epistemic injustice. “It is 
only a man here and there who has any tolerable knowledge of the character even of the 
women of his own family. I do not mean of their capabilities; these nobody knows, not even 
themselves, because most of them have never been called out” (CW XXI, 278). Nineteenth-
century women experienced epistemic injustice because the oppressive milieu where they 
lived precluded them from knowing their potentialities (Zakaras 2009, 139). “All women are 
brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is . . . not 
 
1 In Howard Caygill’s (2013) On Resistance and José Medina’s (2013) The Epistemology of Resistance, for instance, 
Mill is not cited. In the special issue ‘Resistance in Intellectual History and Political Thought’, published in 2018 by 
History of European Ideas, Mill’s thinking on resistance is also ignored. 
2 Following common practice among Mill scholars, references to The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill are written 
as follows: CW VII, 313 for Collected Works, volume VII, page 313. 
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self-will and government by self-control, but submission and yielding to the control of oth-
ers” (CW XXI, 271). Women not only lacked the opportunity to know and cultivate the ca-
pabilities that would develop their character to its utmost splendour, but also were taught 
never to explore and pursue such knowledge.3  
Though Mill does not offer a precise definition of oppression, an attentive reading of Sub-
jection reveals that oppression is present whenever citizens’ capacity for developing them-
selves is deliberately dwarfed. Put differently, an individual is oppressed when she is delib-
erately impeded to freely cultivate her capacity for self-development. That can happen 
through violence, of course, but also through more subtle mechanisms – such as deformed 
desires and epistemic injustice. A woman is oppressed not only when she is subjected to 
physical force, but also when society shapes her psyche in such a way as to guarantee that 
her strongest desire is to look attractive for members of the opposite sex. Rather than 
simply curtailing behaviour, oppressive power can be productive and encourage certain 
lines of conduct by dint of the internalisation of oppressive norms. Oppression is perpetu-
ated by external as well as internal forces. 
Because it is less visible and involves the active participation of the oppressed subject, psy-
chological oppression can be much harder to combat than physical oppression.4 This is 
something Mill highlights in the introduction to On Liberty: in a way, psychological oppres-
sion is more difficult to confront than physical oppression because, by “penetrating much 
more deeply into the details of life and enslaving the soul itself”, psychological oppression 
makes the formulation of resistant tactics more difficult (CW XVIII, 220). When oppression 
is transmitted solely on the basis of physical violence, there is only one way to resist, which 
is quite straightforward: just exert a contrary force. But when oppression is entrenched in 
one’s desires, how is one to resist?  
III  
Mill’s conception of liberty as non-subjection shows that being under the arbitrary will of 
somebody else, by itself, suffices to attest to the absence of freedom and the presence of 
 
3 The concept of character deployed by Mill is further clarified in the next section. On the centrality of the discourse 
on character in Victorian political thought, see Stefan Collini (1985).  
4 My understanding of the differences between psychological and physical oppression subscribes to Ann E. Cudd’s 
(2006). I take epistemic injustice to be an example of psychological oppression. 
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oppression. In a move reminiscent of republicanism, Mill maintains that despotism, arbi-
trary subjection and tyranny – in short, the absence of freedom – cannot be identified with 
interference tout court.5 Ultimately, any time lived in the absence of guarantees against 
arbitrary interference constitutes a time of non-freedom.  
From that perspective, a woman living under the dominion of a magnanimous husband or 
father who never interferes with her conduct remains unfree. Magnanimousness describes 
the kind behaviour of someone who has the power to interfere with another’s conduct in a 
whimsical manner, but who decides not to. The problem is that if the good will of the master 
subsides, magnanimousness disappears. When a woman living under the shadow of arbi-
trary subjection comes to terms with her predicament, she starts policing her words and 
deeds in such a way as to avoid arousing the master’s anger – which, her greatest efforts 
notwithstanding, remains a very imperfect way of dodging actual interference, for nothing 
guarantees the master will not suddenly become cranky and decide, without any reason, to 
oppress her. 
According to Mill, a society where arbitrary subjection is possible fosters sycophancy, ser-
vility and duplicity among its members (CW XXI, 279). Maintaining oppression over a long 
period of time is only possible with the active engagement of the oppressed. An arbitrary 
state of affairs can only reproduce itself systematically on the condition that people act in 
a way compatible with it. A regime that needs to resort to violence day in and day out in 
order to appease popular resistance is doomed to be short-lived. The capacity to shape cit-
izens’ desires and psyche in a way that co-opts them as active participants in their own 
oppression greatly facilitates the existence of an oppressive and arbitrary regime.  
Mill’s conception of liberty as non-subjection is linked to the power of formulating desires 
autonomously.6 In the conclusion of Subjection, Mill affirms that the polities he is most sup-
portive of  
are those which have most strongly asserted the freedom of action of the individual – the 
liberty of each to govern his conduct by his own feelings of duty, and by such laws and social 
restraints as his own conscience can subscribe to. (CW XXI, 336) 
 
5 On the republican features of Mill’s conception of liberty as non-subjection, see Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua 
(2018). Mill identifies himself as a ‘republican’ thinker in CW XXVI, 359.  
6 On the connection between liberty and autonomy in Mill, see Wendy Donner (2008), John Gray (2002) and Mauro 
Cardoso Simões (2008). 
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Freedom of action in this passage is identified with self-government, that is, with the capac-
ity to regulate one’s conduct by feelings and laws that somehow are one’s own. Freedom 
of action is thus linked to what Mill had described as ‘character’ in On Liberty: 
A person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own nature, as it 
has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have a character. One whose 
desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a 
character. (CW XVIII, 264) 
To guide one’s conduct by desires and impulses of one’s own – in other words, to have a 
character – does not entail immuring oneself from social intercourse. Pace Willaim Gairdner 
(2008, 11, 14), Millian liberty should not be conflated with atomism or individualism.7 As 
the passage above suggests, the constitution of character arises out of the interaction be-
tween one’s nature and one’s culture. The thesis that the formation of character cannot do 
without social intercourse is further clarified when Mill associates freedom of action with 
“an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from cus-
tom” (CW XVIII, 263). The critical lifestyle Mill relates to freedom and character is not 
against custom per se, though it is at odds with “a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to 
it [i.e., custom]” (CW XVIII, 263).  
The intelligent following of custom is a form of resistance against internalised oppressions 
that allows citizens to autonomously formulate their own desires. By being urged to criti-
cally examine social customs, a woman who was taught that her only desire should be to 
look charming to men can by and by realise there are other ‘experiments of living’ she can 
pursue besides that of an obedient and submissive wife (CW XVIII, 281). The intelligent fol-
lowing of custom and its concomitant engagement with different lifestyles incite the op-
pressed to resist epistemic injustice, because they bring to the fore the fact that the hege-
monic narrative of how to live, act and desire is only one among several others. By following 
social customs intelligently, citizens can know what kind of lifestyle they might want to pur-
sue.  
The intelligent following of custom and its attendant engagement with different experi-
ments in living constitute the ethical dimension of Millian resistance. Since both practices 
are connected with the formation of character, they qualify as ethical because, as Mill ob-
serves in A System of Logic, what he calls ‘character’ is nothing but a translation for the 
ancient term ethos (CW VIII, 869). As the next section highlights, the ethical and political 
 
7 As Catherine Audard (2009, 86-7) pointed out, it was precisely because Mill wanted to distance his philosophy 
from individualism that he started using the term ‘individuality’.  
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dimensions of Millian resistance can be distinguished from one another, inasmuch as the 
latter focuses more on traditional political institutions such as the representative assembly.8 
IV  
In Considerations on Representative Government, Mill seeks to understand how ‘collective 
resistance’ can be preserved in the context of mass societies (CW XIX, 419). As he explains 
in chapter seven of this book, the great 
difficulty of democratic government has hitherto seemed to be how to provide, in a 
democratic society, what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the societies which have 
maintained themselves ahead of others – a social support, a point d’appui, for individual 
resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power. (CW XIX, 459) 
In the Middle Ages, individuals were able to resist arbitrary power by organising themselves 
as members of a larger group that, as such, needed to have its voice taken into account by 
the government (CW XX, 292-93). This scenario changed with the advent of industrialisation 
and population growth. As Mill declared in On Liberty, “at present individuals are lost in the 
crowd” (CW XVIII, 268). With the spread of urbanisation and the weakening of membership 
in political groups, resistance became increasingly difficult. 
Mill thinks the solution to such a predicament lies in proportional representation. According 
to him, elected politicians should represent social groups, not isolated individuals (CW XIX, 
405). If representative government is to be truly democratic, it is imperative that the repre-
sentative assembly expresses the social perspective of every political group comprised in 
the demos.9 A proportional representation scheme respects that imperative because, unlike 
the first-past-the-post voting method, it does not allow only representatives who collect 
more than fifty percent of the votes to be elected. The winner-takes-all system leads to a 
falsified representative democracy in Mill’s view because it offers no guarantee against the 
tyranny of the majority. Endorsing Pericles’ view of democracy, Mill submitted that, rather 
than being identified with majoritarianism tout court, democracy should be described as 
 
8 This is not to deny that the ethical dimension of Millian resistance is of political relevance; the ethical and political 
dimensions are, indeed, mutually reinforcing. That does not mean, however, they cannot be differentiated. 
9 The association between representation and social perspective became prominent in contemporary studies on 
representation mainly due to Iris Marion Young (2000). The similarities between Young and Mill are interesting, 
yet to approach them here would lead us too far afield. For a good comparison between both writers, see Wendy 
Donner (2016). 
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the regime where the rule of the majority goes in tandem with the recognition and appre-
ciation of human diversity (see CW XI, 319 and Thucydides 1982, 109ff). More than a polit-
ical regime, representative democracy for Mill refers to a type of society where citizens’ 
differences are a reason for celebration, not condemnation. 
The reason proportional representation helps oppressed minorities resist epistemic injus-
tice is twofold. For one thing, the mere fact of having the perspective of an oppressed mi-
nority expressed in Parliament increases its social status. It means the perspective of this 
oppressed minority should be taken into account by the government when laws are being 
made. The representative of the oppressed minority can then reveal to the wider public 
that many assumptions about the group she represents are inaccurate and demeaning. This 
revelation, along with her power to propose bills that tackle the epistemic injustice perpet-
uated against the group she represents, allows resistance to take place.  
Moreover, minorities are more encouraged to resist the multifarious social sources of epis-
temic injustice that oppress them when they have someone expressing their perspective in 
the representative assembly. The public articulation of their plight by their representative 
in the face of political opponents – recall Mill’s depiction of the representative assembly as 
an “arena where opposing forces should meet and fight out their battle” (CW XXV, 1106) – 
arms minorities with vocabularies and tactics that help them resist oppression. By doing so, 
it allows minorities to develop themselves freely. 
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Protagoras, Political Economy, and the Art 
of Politics: J.S. Mill in the 1830s 
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Abstract 
This essay reads Mill’s early abstract of Plato’s Protagoras with his work on political economy, social science, and 
the art of politics. Protagoras is notable for the sophist’s defense of Athenian democracy in its division between 
expert advice and expert rule. And it is notable for Socrates’s insistence on the identity between knowledge and 
virtue in a proto-utilitarian doctrine linking pleasure and the good, and advocating the adequate measurement of 
future pains and pleasures in relation to present ones. How does Mill incorporate moments of democracy and 
economic rationality into a broader art and science of government? My contention is that Mill’s early work on 
political economy, where he develops the outlines of his logic of the moral sciences, amplifies resonances of the 
non-democratic elements in his thinking.  
My reading contests Nadia Urbinati’s powerful interpretation of Mill as agonistic democrat. Yes, Mill is an admirer 
of the “Sokratic” as opposed to the “Dogmatic” Plato. But this does not entail a defense of Protagoras’s democracy 
so much as a defense of open and vigorous scientific inquiry. Urbinati too readily dismisses the importance of Mill’s 
consistent analogizing of politics to medicine, which suggests less a contest over the direction of our common life 
than a contest over a cure for what ails us.  
What is the best medicine? On the one hand, political economy according to Mill concerns only one aspect of the 
conduct of individual and social life. But on the other hand, his early writing on the subject sketches a view of the 
social that, combined with an admirably dynamic, progressive, and capacious approach to political economy, cedes 
a substantial role to economic rationality and to economic science. In this way the great liberal theorist unwittingly 
contributed to what William Davies calls our “disenchantment of politics by economics”, and thus to a narrowing 
of the means and ends of individual and collective life. 
Introduction 
My work here is positioned between two projects. The first, a manuscript under revision, 
looks to John Stuart Mill and Charles Darwin as newly relevant for any consideration of the 
revival of naturalism in the contemporary social sciences and humanities. There I read Mill 
as a developmental naturalist thinker preoccupied with character—in particular with eco-
nomic rationality and expansive sympathy—as the alpha and omega of improvement, or 
progress; and I read Darwin the same way, and both in counterpoint to Bentham, who was 
notoriously uninterested in character. The second project, a short book on economic ration-
ality, looks to Mill among others as a classical thinker who demonstrates that economic 
reason is no mere instrumental reason, but instead a consequential ethics and quasi-poli-
tics. Both projects are aimed at showing how pervasive and how vexed what I along with 
others call the utilitarian art and science of government is in the nineteenth century and 
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today. As a political theorist, my interest is to read Mill neither as a promoter of nature or 
as a promoter of nurture, nor as a normative thinker or as the purveyor of a value-free social 
science (both of which are anachronistic oppositions), but as a supremely relevant biopolit-
ical thinker interested primarily in the conduct of conduct. I hope that this perspective can 
shed a bit of light on difficult questions of Mill interpretation. First, in connection with Prin-
ciples of Political Economy, is economic rationality for Mill a principle bearing only on that 
aspect of our conduct that concerns wealth, as he maintains, or is it a kind of civilizational 
marker and goal, at least when understood in broader terms as providence, or temperate 
foresight ([1848] 1965a and 1965b)? Which is also to say, what relation does political econ-
omy bear to Mill’s broader ambition for the “Social Science” of his System of Logic (Mill 
[1843] 1974, 875-8)? Is it one small piece having only to do with the production and distri-
bution of material wealth, as he insists, or does it, as long as it integrates the all-important 
principle of population, hold the key to human progress? Second, in connection with poli-
tics, do Mill’s ambitions for an art and science of government lead him away from politics 
understood as a conversation about common ends, or even as an exercise in persuasion or 
interest advancement among equals, and a step or two towards scientific administration as 
a substitute? Mill does suggest in the Logic that the corresponding art to social science is 
the “art … of politics” (Mill [1843] 1974, 877), and it is the art of politics that plays a small 
but pivotal role in Plato’s Protagoras. 
A way in to these questions is provided by Nadia Urbinati’s bracing revisionist interpretation 
of Mill as agonistic democrat (Urbinati 2002). Urbinati sets herself directly against a reading 
of Mill that I find quite compelling. On my reading, Mill skirts perilously close to embrace of 
a Platonic rule of experts in the slippage from analogy to identity that he promotes between 
politics and medicine. We see this analogy in a few places in the early work: Urbinati herself 
mentions the 1835 review of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Urbinati 2002, 48). In the 
same year, Mill writes in his “Rationale of Representation” that the “parallel holds exactly 
between the legislator and the physician.” The point here is that “the people themselves, 
whether of the high or the low classes, are, or might be, sufficiently qualified to judge, by 
the evidence which might be brought before them, of the merits of different physicians, 
whether for the body politic or natural.” Yet, “it is utterly impossible that they should be 
competent judges of different modes of treatment. They can tell that they are ill; and that 
is as much as can rationally be expected from them. Intellects specially educated for the 
task are necessary to discover and apply the remedy” (Mill [1835] 1977, 40). Note, as Urbi-
nati does, how this distinction anticipates Mill’s discussion of the capacities and limits of 
representative assemblies in ch. V of Considerations on Representative Government (Mill 
[1861] 1977, 433; Urbinati 2002, 46-7). I could add a reminder that Mill in every edition of 
the Logic suggests that medicine is the art to which politics is “most nearly allied,” and that 
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he criticizes past thinkers for being insufficient to the task of social inquiry because they 
attempted “to study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body, before they had laid 
the necessary foundation in its physiology; to cure disease without understanding the laws 
of health” (Mill [1843] 1974, 876-7). Regarding Plato, Urbinati acknowledges Mill’s longtime 
infatuation with Platonic texts, but argues that this is really an infatuation with the 
“Sokratic” as opposed to the “Dogmatic” Plato (Urbinati 2002, 7-8, 49-50). Plato’s Socrates 
provides us not with answers, but with the very model of how to conduct inquiry and to 
construct knowledge. And the encounters in Plato’s dialogues model the equality that Mill 
prized in Athenian life, and that he worked to help bring about through his political reform 
efforts. Urbinati argues that Mill’s political project, most bracingly communicated in his Sub-
jection of Women ([1869] 1984, 259-340), is consonant with a long-running republican tra-
dition that prizes the struggle against domination among an association of free equals (see 
also Skinner 1998, ix).  
Urbinati even goes so far as to suggest that Mill’s model is the Athenian politics portrayed 
in Plato’s Protagoras, and justified by the Protagorean myth: a model that limits expertise 
to technical questions and excludes it from the general questions of practical politics (Urbi-
nati 2002, 51-3). Although I think that Urbinati is correct, along with others, to identify Mill 
with the spirit of freedom as non-domination, I insist that Mill himself doesn’t see any in-
consistency between this spirit and a broadly therapeutic approach to politics that runs 
counter to Urbinati’s more democratic reading. 
I Protagoras 
Protagoras was the first of the Platonic dialogues that Mill published in the 1830s, in trans-
lations that he initially rendered sometime after his breakdown in the 1820s. Mill writes in 
his introduction that “there are, probably, in this kingdom, not so many as a hundred per-
sons who ever have read Plato, and not so many as twenty who ever do” (Mill [1834] 1978, 
40). Even if exaggerated, the low estimate speaks to the sea change conducted by contem-
porary radicals, including Mill himself, in canonizing Plato into Anglophone letters; many 
since have read Plato largely because of their efforts. 
Protagoras is an early dialogue between Socrates and Protagoras, a noted Sophist, or paid 
teacher of young men with political ambitions. When Socrates asks what expertise Protag-
oras has to offer these young men—what it is, exactly, that he teaches—Protagoras answers 
that he teaches politikê technê or civic and ethical know-how (Plato 2005, 16-7), what Mill 
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at one point translates quite literally as the “art of Polity” (Mill [1834] 1978, 49). The dia-
logue is ostensibly about what virtue is and whether it can be taught. Socrates suggests 
early on that the Athenians must think that the art Protagoras teaches cannot be taught, 
because in their deliberations they listen to experts and not to others when technical ques-
tions are before them with the ends already established (for example, how do we build a 
ship, or a plaza?). But when the questions before them consider the direction of the city (for 
example, should we even build a plaza?) anyone can rise and advise the city without dis-
tinction; everyone in the assembly is understood to have standing in these matters (Plato 
2005, 28; Mill [1834] 1978, 48). Protagoras explains, by way of a myth, that there is no con-
tradiction. According to the myth capacities for civic virtue allow people to live together in 
cities; these gifts were given, in addition to the illicit Promethean gift of fire, to humans out 
of pity for their natural weakness in relation to other animals. Protagoras suggests that the 
way politikê technê is both democratically distributed and learnable is akin to language. 
When children or adults say or do things wrongly instead of rightly they are corrected by 
parents or peers; we learn civic virtue in the same way that we learn speech, with some 
excelling in it or better able to teach others, but with a broadly democratic distribution of 
talents and skills (Plato 2005, 29-30; Mill [1834] 1978, 50-1). 
Protagoras is of special interest also to the economic rationality at the heart of political 
economy because, as Mill notes in the first paragraph of his article on Utilitarianism, there 
“the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato’s dialogue be 
grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality 
of the so-called sophist” (Mill [1861] 1969, 205). Near the end of the dialogue Socrates ar-
gues against Protagoras and for the identity of the virtues with a proto-Benthamic state-
ment of the “knowledge of measurement.” According to Socrates here pleasure is good, all 
activity is ultimately pleasure-seeking, all pleasures and pains are commensurable, and 
when we act rationally and virtuously we adequately weigh the values of present and future 
pleasures and pains against one another (Plato 2005, 72-3; Mill [1834] 1978, 58-9). Much 
has been written by philosophers on whether this is really a Socratic doctrine (that’s a mi-
nority position, of course), or is something deployed by him in order to introduce a firm 
distinction between appearance and reality in ethical matters, and to attack a popular mo-
rality invested in the idea of akrasia, or weakness of the will. On this latter point most com-
mentators, including Mill, agree that the dialogue is serious here about the equation be-
tween virtue and knowledge; the idea of measurement is one way to set up this equation 
and to defend the bracing doctrine that no one ever does wrong except out of ignorance 
(Mill [1834] 1978, 61). In any case, the ending is, as Socrates himself points out, notably 
inconclusive, for example because he and Protagoras have changed places about whether 
virtue can be taught (Plato 2005, 79-80; Mill [1834] 1978, 60). And of course we can add 
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that taking this proto-utilitarian doctrine seriously has implications both for the status and 
scope of economic rationality—for the place and prominence of Mill’s understanding of 
(im)providence—and for evaluating the Athenian position on democracy and expertise with 
which Protagoras begins. 
In an excellent work of classics scholarship, Alexandra Lianeri accuses Mill of “effacing So-
cratic irony” in his translation of Protagoras (Lianeri 2007). She focuses first on the end of 
the dialogue, which Mill softens with summary language, missing how Socrates sharply rid-
icules, for its production of absurdities, the kind of philosophizing that he and Protagoras 
have engaged in (Mill [1834] 1978, 60; Plato, Lianeri 2007, 173). And she notes how Mill 
introduces a sharper distinction between theory and practice and between truth, persua-
sion, and power than the original allows, and how Mill can reduce the political to the social, 
as we see in his references to “social virtues” in the dialogue, foreshadowing the “social 
body” of the Logic (Lianeri 2007, 175-80; Mill [1834] 1978, 49; Mill [1843] 1974, 876). Her 
conclusions have serious implications for Urbinati’s thesis. Lianeri’s Socrates is political, in 
a far more fundamental respect than Mill’s is.  
II Political Economy and Politics 
The reduction of the political to the social happens with some frequency in Mill’s work, 
especially in these early writings. And indeed, Mill’s 1836 “On the Definition of Political 
Economy” (Mill 1967, 309-39) performs one of the more dramatic of such reductions. There 
is a lot to be said about this remarkable essay; it is here, in my view, that Mill first formulates 
the distinctions and ambitions expressed for a comprehensive, causal social science in Book 
VI of his System of Logic, on the Logic of the Moral Sciences. On the one hand, “On the 
Definition of Political Economy” seems to make a lot of room for particular contingencies 
and for motives alternate to political-economic ones in the study of the social. On the other 
hand, its way of understanding scientific a priorism and its idea of the connection between 
the abstract and the concrete is such that that which falls outside of its political-economic 
models is understood as “disturbing cause” akin to “friction in mechanics” (Mill [1836] 1967, 
330), and, if not fully assimilable to the science, can perhaps be put together with it, at least 
in principle, to build a fully comprehensive understanding of social science or what the essay 
calls “social economy, speculative politics, or the natural history of society” (Mill [1836] 
1967, 320). Mill writes that “the science of social economy embraces every part of man’s 
nature, in so far as influencing the conduct or condition of man in society.” It may “be 
termed speculative politics, as being the scientific foundation of practical politics, or the art 
of government, of which the art of legislation is a part” (Mill [1836] 1967, 320-1). 
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In an admiring criticism of Jean-Baptiste Say Mill accuses Say of supposedly conflating the 
part that is political economy with the whole of social science. But “this large extension of 
the signification of [Political Economy] is countenanced by its etymology” (Mill [1836] 1967, 
321). In the first edition of the essay Mill goes on to commit the following bald anachronism: 
“[Oikonomia politike], the economy of the [polis], or commonwealth, must originally have 
meant the whole of the laws or principles which determine the working of the social ma-
chine” (Mill [1836] 1967, 321n). Thus Say’s mistake—to conflate political economy with all 
of social science—is a mistake, because political economy is actually “concerned with [man] 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth;” it “does not treat of the whole of man’s 
nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society” (Mill 
[1836] 1967, 321). But it is an understandable mistake, because the label “political econ-
omy” evokes an actually existing “social machine.” And politics and the political art are noth-
ing other than the art of superintending this social machine, as properly informed by a com-
prehensive science of it. 
I would argue that, even though the language of 1836 is dropped, some of the spirit of this 
position is maintained through Mill’s late Considerations on Representative Government. 
There Mill famously opens by rejecting the polar alternatives of two sorts of “political rea-
soners,” those who think of politics as able to do anything and simply transform the world, 
and those who think of it as able to do nothing but follow the way of the world (Mill [1861] 
1977, 374-5). Instead, just as medicine cannot cure just anything, it can cure some things, 
and it does this with proper knowledge of physiological causes and effects so that it can 
manipulate some causes to produce alternate effects. The question is how Mill’s insistence 
in Considerations on the ultimate sovereignty of the people relates to his insistence on there 
being a truth, open to discovery, of what would most improve the people at any one time. 
And this has implications for the meaning of what Urbinati rightly notes is Mill’s admiration 
for the Socratic as opposed to the dogmatic Plato. What Mill takes from Socrates, I am sug-
gesting, is—as he emphasizes in his introduction to the early Plato abstracts referencing 
Schleiermacher—philosophical method: the elenchus or Socratic dialectic as a way to pur-
sue truth (Mill [1834] 1978, 41). In this way the elenchus models not a game of common 
ends-seeking or persuasion or interest-advancement or other mode that we may think ap-
propriate to politics, but an intellectual search among equals to best figure out the science 
to which we need to subordinate our art of government. And indeed, in the Autobiography, 
Mill praises the elenchus and notes its profound influence on his own and his father’s work 
(Mill [1873] 1981, 25). On my reading then the problem with expert rule is, as it is in On 
Liberty, the fact that no one is infallible, and the fact that leaving one’s affairs to others as 
opposed to vigorously engaging them stunts individual and collective growth (Mill [1859] 
1977, 229-43 and passim); the problem is not in the underlying assumption that there is an 
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aggregate interest of the “social machine” and its advancement, and a science according to 
which that interest can be properly advanced. 
What does this understanding of politics mean for political economy? If it is true that in our 
time the truth of politics remains, as the Clinton presidential campaign famously said, “the 
economy, stupid!” then we might find the claim of the political scientist Timothy Mitchell 
arresting: Mitchell claims that there really was no such thing as “the economy” until the 
early twentieth century. Which is to say, economy remains for the most part until this time 
a way of doing things, and not itself a thing (Mitchell 2005). Mitchell’s contribution, in-
formed by Science and Technology Studies, is to insist that we not think of social science as 
describing a world that exists prior to or outside of it, but that we recognize social science 
as one among many sociotechnical forces that helps to build the world of things it studies 
(Mitchell 2007); following the work of Michel Callon and others (1998), he insists that eco-
nomics is performative, and that one of its surprisingly recent performances is “the econ-
omy” itself (he dates its reification from the 1930s) (Mitchell 2005, 126). A perfect illustra-
tion of what Mitchell is arguing is to be found in economist Paul Krugman’s post-financial 
crisis attack on the U.S. macroeconomics profession. There Krugman lambastes mathemat-
ical macroeconomics for its attraction to beauty over truth, noting how this contributed to 
it completely missing the crisis. Instead, economics needs to recognize the essential “mess-
iness” of the processes it tries to capture (2009). Mitchell would remind us that this focus 
on the problem of representation of a messy reality only serves, through familiar rhetorical 
conventions of literary realism, to reinforce and reinscribe “the economy” as a Millian social 
machine in need of expert superintendence. And this expert superintendence of a general 
interest works to elide the political commons. 
It might seem that Krugman’s Keynesian perspective is very different from the Austrian one; 
after all, Friedrich Hayek precisely denied that there was such a thing as an economy; this 
implies elements of organization and purpose that the great “catallaxy” of market society 
lacks, to its credit (1967, 173). But we should recall that Hayek’s early work was an attack 
on the mathematical economics of his time for its role in central planning, and so his work 
conjured Krugman’s messiness as a real and virtuous spontaneous order of dispersed 
knowledges activated and coordinated by the marvelous power of prices (Hayek 1945). And 
whenever Hayek got specific, his administrative orientation—and in particular an economic 
approach to law as utilitarian regulatory policy—could slip out. So we find in Law, Legisla-
tion, and Liberty the following: “The task of rules of just conduct can thus only be to tell 
people which expectations they can count on and which not. ... Which expectations ought 
to be protected must ... depend on how we can maximize the fulfillment of expectations as 
a whole” (Hayek 1973, 102-3). In Hayek as in Krugman, a social machine is conjured that is 
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always only imperfectly represented by its scientists, who can deliberate in Socratic fashion 
as to how best to administer it.  
We can see the germ of this contemporary approach in an example from Mill’s Considera-
tions on Representative Government, even as it is likewise an example of Mill displaying the 
remarkable empathy of which he was so capable. After praising the governing classes of his 
time for their comparative attention to the interests of the poor, he reminds us of the costs 
of excluding whole sections of the governed from representation. “Yet does Parliament, or 
almost any of the members composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the 
eyes of a working man? When a subject arises in which the labourers as such have an inter-
est, is it regarded from any point of view but that of the employers of labour?” Mill contin-
ues, “I do not say that the working men’s view of these questions is in general nearer to 
truth than the other: but it is sometimes quite as near; and in any case it ought to be re-
spectfully listened to, instead of being, as it is, not merely turned away from, but ig-
nored.” (Mill [1861] 1977, 405) It is the truth finally of the proper representation of the 
social that is our goal, and it is that truth, rising above all differences in perspective and 
interest, that should govern once we ascertain, through inclusion, what it is. Mill’s art of 
polity as the scientifically informed superintendence of the social in pursuit of an aggregate 
interest overshadows politics as a conversation or struggle over the meaning and direction 
of our common life. 
This should give us pause, as Mill himself understood better than most the danger of any 
narrowing of the ends of life: consider much of the tenor of On Liberty, and consider his 
contemptuous description of the US as carried through all the pre-Civil War editions of Po-
litical Economy. “They have the six points of Chartism, and they have no poverty: and all 
that these advantages do for them is that the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dol-
lar-hunting, and of the other to breeding dollar-hunters” (Mill [1848] 1965, 754n). But my 
point is that Mill’s earnestly and sincerely held outlook is undercut by his own participation 
in setting the preconditions for the “disenchantment of politics by economics” (Davies 2014, 
1-34), a disenchantment that has in turn played a significant role in the formation of our 
present predicaments. 
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J.S. Mill on Rebellion, Revolution and 
Reform1 
Don A. Habibi, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA 
Abstract 
The chapter examines John Stuart Mill’s nuanced opinions on rebellions, uprisings, and revolutions. Was he a ‘rev-
olutionary’? I claim that he was, but not in the Marxist sense of the term. The young Mill was raised to be a radical 
reformer for Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian movement, and he was politically active his entire life. He wrote on 
historic events such as the American and French Revolutions. He also lived through such events as the 1848 revo-
lutions, the Maori Wars, the Sepoy Mutiny, the U.S. Civil War, and the Morant Bay uprising. From his essays, letters, 
and his record in Parliament, we see that he supported these insurgencies, at least initially, or sided with oppressed 
people. However, he advocated gradual change based on deliberation, debate, and reason over force. Mill’s ap-
parent contradictions are explained by examining his perspectives on these events through the lens of utility and 
progress. Avoiding unnecessary violence is a means to minimizing pain, and it takes time for free and open discus-
sion to prepare and persuade people to accept change. For Mill, the aim of history is human improvement. This is 
what constitutes utility in the ‘large sense’ and the truest way to maximize happiness. 
 
In the opening sentence of “Mill’s Epiphanies,” Elijah Milgram asserts that at sixteen, J.S. 
Mill was an inspired activist bringing utilitarianism to the world. “John Stuart Mill was raised 
to be the Lenin of the revolutionary movement that we remember as utilitarianism, and 
whose members at the time were called the ‘Philosophic Radicals’ … he never became the 
Lenin of utilitarianism” (Milgram 2017). Like Lenin, Mill was on fire for his cause. An ener-
gized young man on a mission, Mill was groomed to be Jeremy Bentham’s worthy succes-
sor—the chosen leader of his utilitarian radical reform movement. Both Mill and Lenin re-
vised and adjusted their received doctrine with notable success. But, as I shall explain, the 
analogy breaks down. They were different kinds of revolutionary activists. In this chapter, I 
will argue that Mill steered a wiser course than Karl Marx’s Russian disciple, and show there 
is much to learn from the contrast. 
The Philosophic Radicals were products of the Enlightenment—secular, scientific, and ra-
tional, and their agenda was indeed radical for its time. Their leader, Jeremy Bentham, had 
extensive plans for changing the British legal, penal, educational, economic, electoral and 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloque “John Stuart Mill et la Révolution” Université Paris 
1 – Panthéon/Sorbonne, May 25, 2018. 
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governmental systems to make them fairer, meritocratic, rational, and efficient. He op-
posed the legal and taxation privileges of the aristocracy, packing juries, restrictions on 
usury, the established church, the monarchy, and colonialism, and supported universal suf-
frage, the secret ballot, humane prisons, a league of nations, and other progressive reforms. 
His revolutionary program aimed to redefine the ruling class and prepare the conditions for 
when the working class and rural poor have power. 
Bentham and the Radicals were optimistic because they believed in their utilitarian 
worldview, which was informed by up-to-date theories of human nature, psychology, edu-
cation, and governance. They knew that their agenda would take more than one generation 
to implement, and so Mill was dedicated and educated to fight for the cause. His father, 
James Mill, was a recognized expert in education and psychology, eager to test out his learn-
ing theory on his firstborn son. John Stuart received a most impressive education from his 
father, supported by Bentham his godfather, along with advanced tutoring from several 
Benthamites, among them David Ricardo, John Austin, Francis Place, and George Grote. The 
designated heir of the movement was home-schooled in isolation, and trained to be the 
exemplar of a rational utilitarian man. The experiment produced one of the most remarka-
ble intellectual polymaths in history.2 Although Mill rebelled against the confines of his ed-
ucation, he appreciated and made good use of his considerable intellectual talents through-
out his life. 
Bentham, Mill, Marx, and Lenin all foresaw that the rich will lose their power to the masses. 
They understood they lived during a transitional period in history, and that modern capital-
ism, industrialization, and urbanization, would eventually lead to majority rule. Bentham, 
Mill, and Marx lived in London where the Industrial Revolution was unfolding. However, the 
utilitarians foresaw that the oppressed masses were just as prone to abusing power as eve-
ryone else. There was an urgent need to educate and uplift the population destined for 
power. They championed the interests of the working class, but did not regard them as 
responsible and prudent. On the contrary, the masses were susceptible to serious deficien-
cies. Something must be done for the uneducated, functionally illiterate, creatures of habit 
who are easily manipulated and driven by narrow egoism, crass hedonism, and tribalism. 
Citizens needed to mature and understand their responsibility to promote the greatest hap-
piness. Mill worried about chaos and the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ The people had to ap-
preciate the function of free expression, tolerance, and collective decision making in a lib-
eral democracy. It is good the people will have power, only if they wield it with care. 
 
2 See Mill’s Autobiography, CW I, and Habibi 2001, Ch. 1. 
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Milgram is not wrong to call the teenage Mill a “revolutionary.” Inspired by the moderate 
Girondists of the French Revolution, he fantasized participating in a revolt against the Eng-
lish ruling class (CW I, 64-67).3 But such fervor was short lived. Mill’s views matured. At age 
20, he experienced his ‘mental crisis,’ which triggered his break with orthodox Benthamism 
and cooled his devotion to the movement somewhat. He declared his independence, but 
still held fast to the foundations of the Benthamite cause. Young Mill’s enthusiasm further 
waned as he increasingly understood that revolutions were rare and usually failed (Gold-
stone 2014). He learned that power corrupts (CW XXI, 288-9, 95-96, 320-25), and that even 
idealistic visionaries, saints, and the poor lose their scruples when they attain power. Thus, 
political structures must be set up to prevent or minimize the damage caused by abusive 
power. He endorsed the French Revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1870, but he was bitterly 
disappointed by their outcomes. Even well-justified good revolutions are corrupted by over-
zealous politicians, ideologues corrupted by power, ill-informed mobs, and foreign in-
vaders.4 
Mill saw the problem as a lack of foresight under conditions of uncertainty. With many ac-
tors, there are countless ways for things to go wrong. Making realistic assessments and 
plans requires clear thinking plus some good timing and luck. We do not know the future, 
and we often must react without the luxury of time. Revolutions are like war: in all likeli-
hood, things will spin out of control in a torrent of unforeseen consequences. Mill under-
stood that, as a general rule, organic, careful, incremental change was safer and surer than 
rapid or forceful revolutionary change. Of course there are exceptions and there are no 
guarantees. Nonetheless, to the extent it is possible, peace and order are better than chaos 
and war.  
Mill and Lenin were both activists, but they operated with different time frames. Mill took 
the patient, long term view. He was a first rate historian, well versed in ancient as well as 
 
3 He writes that the 1789 revolution “might easily happen again; and the most transcendant glory I was capable of 
conceiving, was that of figuring, successful or unsuccessful, as a Girondist in an English Convention.” The word 
‘convention’ is defined in this context, as: “A meeting of Parliament without a summons from the sovereign.” 
Oxford English Dictionary, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/convention 
4 For example, the 1789 revolution was welcomed by Bentham and the Radicals (and it inspired the juvenile Mill). 
Unfortunately, the moderate Girondins were eliminated by the ruthless Jacobins, resulting in the Terror, the 
French Revolutionary Wars, and hundreds of thousands of deaths. This led to Napoleon crowning himself emperor 
and wars resulting in millions of deaths. When Mill first visited France, the Bourbons were back on the throne. The 
1830 Revolution led to the Louis Phillippe monarchy. Late in Mill’s life, things fell apart again for France with 
invasion and shocking defeat by Prussia. 
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modern history. He was also a cutting edge historiographer. He was convinced that histori-
cal development occurs in stages, and taking major shortcuts will fail. The requirements and 
possibilities for change depend on the circumstances: “the proper functions of a govern-
ment are not a fixed thing, but different in different states of society; much more extensive 
in a backward than in an advanced state” (CW XIX, 383).5 Changes work out better when 
properly managed. Without oversight there is chaos. Marx and Lenin believed that they 
understood the iron laws of history. Class warfare is a reality, and the proletariat will emerge 
victorious. Patience was not a virtue; thus, educating, organizing, and agitating to hasten 
the process is for the good. Mill was unaware of Marx’s dialectical materialism and the his-
torical determinism inferred from it. Mill relied on his own knowledge of history. This in-
forms his trepidation with revolution. So much can go wrong that caution is advisable. Slow 
and steady wins the race if we can keep the peace, avoid blunders, and not lose control. 
Mill is pragmatic, not dramatic. 
So how are we to decide with so much beyond our control? Every consequentialist must 
wrestle with this question of predicting the future. Mill’s answer was that we still must do 
our best to anticipate and prepare for changes and problems. We are not absolved from 
making decisions and acting. There are some things that we can predict and some things 
over which we do have control. For instance, consider Mill’s prescription for the shift to 
majority rule. Mill predicts the existing class system will eventually give way to sharing 
power. If we control this process, we can minimize some likely damage. He identified two 
general paths this might take: 
The two strongest tendencies of the world in these times are towards Democracy and 
Revolution; meaning by Democracy—social equality, under whatever form of government; 
and by Revolution—a general demolition of old institutions and opinions, without reference 
to its being effected peaceably or violently. (CW XX, 297) 
Mill believed that increasing democracy peacefully (e.g., through universal suffrage and ex-
panding freedoms) would bring civilized people closer to social equality at far less cost than 
violent revolution. He also had extensive ideas on forms of liberal democracy most condu-
cive to social equality. Egalitarianism was vital to Mill’s agenda. He committed to equal op-
portunity and equality under the law. He was a pioneer for gender equality and universal 
suffrage. To guide us down this path to democracy, gradual change is more likely to succeed. 
Taking time to build consensus is important. Mill reminds us throughout his writings that 
 
5 See also, “Centralisation” 1862, CW XIX, 590. 
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the minds and opinions of people need to be prepared for change to take hold and last.6 
The wiser course is to avoid the destruction, pain, and uncertainties of violence. 
Another problem Mill anticipated stemmed from his understanding of human nature and 
history: he believed the natural state for human societies is to deteriorate. His answer was 
to control this negative dynamic by linking “Order and Progress.” Progress is served by care-
fully conserving our fragile gains.  
Order … is a part and means of Progress itself.  If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more 
than equivalent loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress.  Conduciveness to 
Progress, thus understood, includes the whole excellence of a government. (CW XIX, 377-88)  
Forward progress is an illusion if one is also regressing. Because the stakes and the possibil-
ities of backsliding are high, Mill’s utilitarian calculus is based on damage control, and it is 
decidedly risk averse. 
the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as 
much the prevention of falling back … The natural tendency of men and their works was to 
degenerate, which tendency, however, by good institutions virtuously administered, it might 
be possible for an indefinite length of time to counteract … we ought not to forget, that there 
is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse, consisting of all 
the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of mankind; which 
is only controlled and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons 
constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects. (CW XIX, 
388) 
Those persons who contributed their talents to human progress (including those ‘virtuous 
administrators’ who prevent setbacks) were Mill’s heroes (and I recognize Mill as an exem-
plar of such heroism). He emphasized the crucial importance of the dedicated, energetic, 
industrious, informed, expert, innovative, nonconforming, eccentric, genius personality 
types who were the stimuli of progress. Mill believed in an elite class—a ‘clerisy’—as those 
most likely to propel civilization forward. He recognized the centrality of individual actors 
directing and managing history—i.e., the ‘great man’ theory of history. He also understood 
that environmental conditions, economic forces, social dynamic tension, and the state of 
intellectual development are driving forces of history. The key to progress was reasoning 
and intellect: free and open discussion prepares people to benefit from positive change. 
Civil liberties promote diversity, variety, creativity, and improvement. The marketplace of 
ideas is the best forum for correcting errors and working out our differences. ‘Systematic 
 
6 See, e.g., “Armand Carrel” 1837, CW XX, 200; “Reorganization of the Reform Party” 1839, CW VI, 482; “Coleridge” 
1840, CW X,137f; A System of Logic 1843, CW VIII, 926. 
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antagonism’ sharpens the public’s understanding. It enables liberal societies to avoid the 
traps of authoritarianism, uniformity, and ossified customs. This is the dynamic progressive 
environment best suited for preparing responsible, rational, mature citizens for democratic 
governance. 
Mill’s optimism came partially from realizing that liberal Victorian England was at the cut-
ting edge of innovation, progress and civilization. This is a social achievement that took gen-
erations to devise. Mill’s pessimism stemmed from his knowledge that civilizations and cen-
ters of progress rise and fall. They are actually fragile. The historical trend was for an 
exceptional region or society to be open, energetic, dynamic, prosperous, and improving. 
This upward trajectory would begin to stagnate when complacency sets in, and then decline 
when beliefs become enshrined in custom or religion. Mill feared that Britain would fall 
from preeminence, if ever it lost its commitment to individual liberty and tolerance, limited 
government and the rule of law. To prevent this, he defended and reinforced an apprecia-
tion for the liberal value system, putting safeguards in place to keep the delicate experiment 
succeeding for future generations. 
On the strategic level of ideas, Bentham, Mill, and the Philosophic Radicals were revolution-
aries; however, in tactical terms they were reformers. It was generally more efficacious to 
work within the system to transform and improve it, rather than destroy and replace it. 
Thus, it was urgent to attend to the details of transitioning and finding optimal replace-
ments for inadequate policies and practices. Bentham and Mill were far more circumspect 
in their tactics than Marx and Lenin. They thought through the consequences of their cri-
tiques and proposals. Mill denounced French political thinkers, such as Rousseau, Robes-
pierre, and Proudhon for recklessly undermining social institutions without offering viable 
replacements. Mill criticized the continental tradition that relied on ‘natural’ rights claims 
for secular morals. 
This mode of thought reached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as pow-
erful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for directing the future. The 
complete victory which this philosophy gained, in speculation, over the old doctrines, was 
temporarily followed by an equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, 
having had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its tendencies, and showing 
what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously. (CW X, 299-300)7 
 
7 On Proudhon see: Mill’s letter to Harriet Taylor, 31 March, 1849, CW XIV, 21.  
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Marx and Lenin learned from the French philosophers and Jacobins, and advocated violence 
as necessary and justified to overthrow capitalism.8 Mass murder, forced labor, famine, and 
the gulag were the result. The commissars and centralized planning were far less efficient 
than the free market, as the communist parties in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, 
and Vietnam eventually figured out. For today’s crop of ‘new and improved’ neo-Marxists, 
democratic socialists, and postmodernists who carry on the tradition of ‘critical theory’, the 
same problem remains—strident critiques without viable, practical alternatives (Nozick 
2001, 55). Even if they eschew violent revolution as a means to achieving their visions, they 
still were dangerously destructive. Mill feared that when consequences are ignored, the 
cure would be worse than the disease. 
In sharp contrast to destructive criticism, Mill praises Bentham for tending to the important 
task of offering viable alternatives to outdated and unfair programs. 
The age then is one of destruction! Disguise it as we will, it must be so characterized; miserable 
would be our lot were it not also an age of preparation for reconstructing. What has been the 
influence of Bentham upon his age?—it has been twofold—he has helped to destroy and also 
to rebuild. No one has done so much to forward … the work of destruction, as Mr. Bentham 
… if he ever annihilated a received opinion, he was sure of having something either good or 
bad to offer as a substitute for it; and in this he was most favourably distinguished from those 
French philosophers who preceded and even surpassed him, as destroyers of established 
institutions on the continent of Europe. (CW X, 501) 
Bentham and Mill approached their activism with such consequentialist caution that they 
are best characterized as ‘conservative revolutionaries.’ They were committed to promot-
ing utility by managing change. The French debacle reminded Mill to think seriously about 
progressing with the minimal amount of suffering. As he explains, in the aftermath of the 
bloody French experience, thoughtful people pondered the question of governance and 
how best to proceed. 
Other nations, and England more than any, are in the middle of their Revolution. The most 
energetic minds are still occupied in thinking, less of benefits to be attained, than of nuisances 
 
8 On some apologetic interpretations, the elder Marx understood the potential of universal suffrage, encouraging 
his activist followers in advanced countries to take advantage of civil liberties to subvert the capitalist system using 
peaceful means.  See, Marx’s  Amsterdam speech to the International Working Men’s Association (September 8, 
1872), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/09/08.htm. See also, Marx’s pamphlet, The Civil War 
in France, “The Second Address” (September 9, 1870), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-
war-france/ch02.htm. This is the next to last sentence in the Preface, https://www.marxists.org/archive/ 
marx/works/1867-c1/p6.htm. See also, Richard W. Miller, Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History (Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 114-26. 
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to be abated, and every question of things to be done, is entangled with questions of things 
which have first to be undone; or of things which must not be undone, lest worse should 
follow. (CW X, 298) 
What Lenin and Mill thought about attaining power and governing were poles apart. Mill 
preferred to build consensus through reasoned debate rather than resort to force (Williams 
1989). He understood that revolutionary changes are usually messy, disruptive, divisive, 
chaotic, and sometimes violent and irreversible. These are yet further reasons for responsi-
ble leaders not to rush in, but to proceed with forbearance. 
None of this is to suggest that Lenin did not ‘think through’ Marx’s ideas or make careful 
plans to achieve and expand power. The Bolsheviks’ ready use of violence and their ruthless 
suppression of opponents, rivals, and even comrades came right out of their Marxist (and 
Russian) playbook. The enormous cost in terms of human lives and freedoms was simply 
the price for political victory. Lenin needed to move quickly to quit the war with Germany 
and fight the counter-revolutionary White Army plus eight foreign armies on multiple 
fronts. He had little time to make cautious decisions. Lenin was an expert synthesizer and 
communicator. His genius lay in his ability to adapt a mid-19th century German social phi-
losophy to fit Russian culture and inspire enough people to accept his vision, eliminate op-
position, and force the rest of society to comply. Lenin was able to make Marx’s complex 
theories appeal to the hearts and minds of Slavic peasants. This is how in one generation 
the Bolsheviks transformed the poor, backward, feudal Russian Empire into a modern, in-
dustrialized Soviet super power (Northrop 1946, chap. 6). We must give Lenin his due. He 
succeeded on his own terms. 
For all of Mill’s influence as the public intellectual, he achieved nothing comparable to Lenin. 
He was not a forceful ‘man of action.’ He was not aiming to eliminate private property or to 
liquidate the nobility and bourgeoisie. He inspired no movements that instituted a new po-
litical system through force. From a Marxist standpoint, Mill was a timid, reactionary apol-
ogist for capitalism, standing in the way of history. He was evolutionary and not revolution-
ary. However, this reflects a narrow ideological perspective. In fairness to Mill, we must 
understand him on his own terms. After all, he was a revolutionary, in that he advocated a 
radical transformation of Britain and the world. The leading economist in his generation, 
Mill was attentive to socialist experiments and he remained both open-minded and critical. 
No pacifist, he formulated a coherent position on when political violence is legitimate (Wil-
liams 1989). But he also showed concern for when it is unnecessary, unlikely to succeed, 
and a formula for massive pain. He argued that dialogue and appeal to reason are more 
likely to avoid pain than the use of force. 
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Mill believed that political revolutions originate in moral revolutions (CW XX, 118). They 
often arise from just and good motives, and are legitimate reactions to injustice. Happy or 
privileged people do not revolt; rather, history is made by those who struggle against op-
pression. He sympathized with the oppressed, and publicly supported most rebellions on 
his watch. In addition to his participation in the July 1830 and the February 1848 revolutions 
in Paris, Mill took strong principled stands supporting the Canadian rebellions of 1837-8, 
the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica (1865), and the Maori Wars in New Zealand (1845-72). 
He stood up for the Irish in their struggles with England. He strongly opposed the rebellious 
Confederate states in the U.S. Civil War. He opposed the Sepoy Rebellion in India (1857), 
albeit for less moral reasons. As I have argued, Mill consistently took principled positions 
based on his utilitarian passion for improvement and progress, which included minimizing 
pain (Habibi 2001, 2017). In his day, Mill was a vocal defender of many revolutionary causes. 
Today, his radical ideas are accepted and well within the mainstream of the liberal democ-
racies and international norms. If my arguments have merit, then Mill’s successes should 
serve to highlight, rather than obscure, his stature as a conservative revolutionary thinker. 
Mill’s prescience taught us to build open, liberal societies as the best path for achieving a 
progressive and happier world. 
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The Place of Good, Goodness and Goods 
within Consequentialist Frameworks 
Martin Hähnel, Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany 
Abstract 
Most of utilitarian theories are using the word “good” in the instrumental sense of “good for” and as an agent-
neutral basis for the aggregation of different goods. Furthermore, if utilitarian approaches are apparently conse-
quentialist and universal, they usually must expand their normative basis by adding the teleological component of 
absolute goodness. Thus, the universal and well-known principle of maximizing the goodness of consequences 
results from combining the instrumental and regional use of “good” with an almost cosmological outlook. Depend-
ing on the axiological structure this consequential goodness can also be defined as a goodness of outcome whereby 
goods are treated as certain states of affairs serving as commensurable measures of this goodness of outcome. 
From this it follows, that within consequentialist frameworks everything that has been, is or will be evaluated (i.e. 
the consequentialist goods) must be understood in terms of a state of affair (as a perfect bearer of instrumental 
and intrinsic value). In this paper I try to show that goods, in every respect, should not be identified with states of 
affairs. Against welfarism I claim that good life as an optimal combination of primary and secondary goods does 
not necessarily depend on thoughts about the aggregation or best distribution of these goods. Such goods, in my 
view, rather are species-relative qualities of an agent that characterize his moral flourishing. This kind of flourishing 
cannot be derived from an absolute or “best” goodness.  
Introduction 
What does it mean that a theory of goodness is or wants to be “consequentialist”? In order 
to give an appropriate answer to this question, we first have to look at what consequential-
ism properly means. As is well known the term was introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe (cf. 
Anscombe 1958) in order to characterize ethical approaches that typically emerge between 
Mill and Moore. To be "consequentialist” means nothing more than to evaluate actions as 
“right” or "good" solely with regard to the assessment of their consequences. For Anscombe 
it is the greatest temptation of consequentialism to establish a theory that allows intending 
certain consequences and effects of intentional acts. 
But what characterizes consequentialism as a genuine theory of the good that differs from 
a standardized theory of the right? In principle, neither intrinsic features of actions (as in 
Kantian approaches) nor typical character-qualities of the agent (as in virtue ethical concep-
tions) play a crucial role for a consequentialist theory of the good and its justification. For 
consequentialist moral reasoning it is more decisive to justify that the best agent-neutral 
state of affairs – in the sense of an impartial maximization of positive outcomes – can be 
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expected and should be brought about. Thus, the good is something extrapolated to a per-
son-indifferent state in the future whose entrance into the present has to be guaranteed in 
compliance with the premise that normative qualities can only depend on their conse-
quences. From that it follows that the emerging form of the good generally has a resultative 
form or character. 
Insofar as these consequentialist moral theories evaluate decisions, actions, and motives 
according to what is consequentially good or bad, they presuppose that there exist certain 
facts which are, in the end, intrinsically good. However, this goodness can only be intrinsic, 
as already mentioned, if it has a resultative (not a final!) form. A so-called "goodness of 
outcome" can be thematic in the context of a monistic conception as simple pleasure (as in 
classical utilitarianism), as an objective concept of well-being, as desert (Feldman 2012), or 
as regards the equality and inequality of individuals and their rights (Scanlon 1977; Sen 
1979). On the other hand, we can adopt a pluralist account of resultative goodness that is 
open to the integration of the aforementioned elements into its own explanatory paradigm. 
But if consequentialist approaches are so heterogeneous and can hardly be distinguished 
from approaches that vehemently insist on being non-consequentialist, what is their pecu-
liarity? According to a common thesis, it might be possible that all consequentialist accounts 
share the same axiology that is flexible enough to suggest that moral assessments, which 
are exclusively based on the evaluation und promotion of actions with positive outcomes, 
are consistent with common-sense judgements (Portmore 2011) and a universal (and the-
ological: Camosy 2012) understanding of the common good.  
If we take a closer look at this subject matter, we can state the following: In all consequen-
tialist approaches, it is not necessary to qualify an action for its own sake or to speak about 
agency in terms of ascribing to a person a certain moral property, e.g. responsibility. The 
intrinsic goodness of an agent does not really matter because what is good or bad is only a 
question of capturing and measuring something as a certain state of affairs. But can such 
states of affairs be "good" or “bad” at all? 
Weyma Lübbe has shown that consequentialists are inclined to talk about certain states of 
affairs because they cannot indicate "where an action ceases and where its consequences 
begin.” (Lübbe 2016, 326). Thus, the death of Fritz, who was shot by Franz (no matter how 
to describe the process of killing) can be qualified as a certain state of affairs. However, this 
evaluation contradicts our basic intuitions as we continue to believe that the death of Fritz 
a) belongs to one act, namely the voluntary activation of the pistol trigger by Franz, and that 




Of course, we do not usually assume that the death of a person is a state of affairs one 
normally has to strive for. However, there are several problems with regard to the determi-
nation of a best state of affairs: How can a certain state of affairs be good as such, especially 
when it has to be brought about first? A classical criticism particularly refers to the argument 
that there is no absolute good (cf. the criticisms of Kraut 2012; Thomson 1997), which is 
completely detached from any material conditions and subjective perspectives. Most con-
sequentialists elude this criticism by asserting that "goodness-for" can provide a moral jus-
tification, even though we accept the existence of an absolutely good thing from which we 
can derive the relative goodness and agent-dependent reasons. Although some of the con-
sequentialists insist on the existence of an absolute good we should not confuse this ac-
count with the medieval idea of a summum bonum that is mostly identified with God. The 
fact that there is a similarity between the good of the consequentialists and the summun 
bonum has something to do with the idea that the majority of consequentialists, from Sidg-
wick to Singer (cf. chapter I), identifies the objective good with the ‚good from the stand-
point of the universe’. The good at which we can or should look from a universal standpoint 
guarantees the impartiality and impersonality of our moral judgements. From a practical 
and partial point of view, however, this absolute ethical standpoint must remain blind to 
the difference between foreseeable and intended consequences (remember Anscombe’s 
caveat) because it constantly constrains agents to do the good always and everywhere (re-
gardless of whether or not an agent is able to do that). With regard to the scope of our 
duties this strategy legitimately evokes the objection of being morally over-demanding. 
With respect to the nature of our motivation to act, consequentialism tends to be sub-de-
manding. Hence, the consequentialist, unlike the deontologist or virtue ethicist, can assert 
that the good consequences of a bad action improve the general state of the world or that 
the bad action does not contribute to worsening this universal condition. Breaking into a 
pharmacy for stealing a drug that could save somebody’s life does not make the burglary 
good. Similarly, the legal purchase of a remedy, which the patient takes on medical advice 
but which leads to unexpected multi-organ failure, cannot be described as bad just because 
the purchase of the drug will cause the death of the patient. 
It therefore belongs to consequentialist approaches to deny their preliminaries as well as 
the consequences that their own theory – to the extent that the underlying axiology may 
not be aware for their users. In particular, it was Friedrich Nietzsche who first uncovered 
the particular intention of the Anglo-Saxon utilitarian and consequentialists, whose ideal of 
general welfare he emphatically rejected. By exposing their inability to question the prem-
ises of morality, consequentialism shows that immoralism is a serious option outside the 
morality while their defenders still believe that there is no possibility of doubting about the 
truth of moral judgments. 
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For a real defense of consequentialist theories of the good, there is no need for a separate 
appeal to a particular strategy of ‚consequentialisation’, especially if this strategy does not 
affect one’s own axiology at all. It suffices, as the next example will show, to do the follow-
ing: A classical consequentialist theory of the good states that it is senseless or restrictive 
to use "good" attributively, that is to say, in the sense of "good for someone" or "good in 
one way or another". Rather, consequentialists hold to the predicative use of "good" be-
cause the formation of an average amount of good actions is very important for the process 
of aggregation. Consequently, in order to solve the problem by limiting the good through 
its attributive use, consequentialists assume that the predicative use of "good" does not 
ultimately limit the attributive use. The attributive use rather complements the predicative 
one, which means that every attributive use, if it implies no restriction, is at the same time 
predicative. For example, according to consequentialist opinion, it can be said that "good 
for the consequences" or "good for the world" corresponds to the attributive model of 
"good in a certain respect” (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2003). In the end, consequentialists are 
convinced that the attributive use of "good" is not a real threat for their theory, respectively 
their axiology. 
I Main Representatives of a Consequentialist 
Theory of the Good 
Most representatives of a consequentialist theory of the good are also representatives of 
so-called noncognitivism. Noncognitivism is the collective term for a metaethical position 
according to which moral statements are not objective truths in the sense of moral qualities 
or facts to which concepts such as "the good" could refer at all, but merely considered and 
evaluated as personal statements. To put it bluntly, the normative judgment "The murder 
of Fritz is bad" means nothing more than ‘Yuck! Murder!’ As a serious result of this ‘boo-
hurray-theory of ethics’ goodness is the expression of a subjective consent or disapproval 
of a morally neutral state of affairs (such as murder). Most consequentialists of our times 
hardly have distanced themselves from this radically subjective foundation of morality, 
which is of course not free from indecency. In the sequel, the four most important protag-
onists of this moral theory are briefly introduced: Henry Sidgwick, Richard M. Hare, Peter 
Singer and Derek Parfit. 
Without a doubt, Henry Sidgwick is one of the great fathers of the other authors just men-
tioned, and thus one of the decisive champions of a consequentialist turn in 20th-century 
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moral philosophy. He was the first who tried to do ethics from an absolute valuation stand-
point, opposing both the Kantian and the ancient paradigms of ethics. At first, it was im-
portant for him to nullify the claims of the classical divine command theory which Elisabeth 
Anscombe deems to be unfounded in order to establish modern morality. Sidgwick thus 
asserted that a theist must not have a objective standard of goodness that is independent 
of God – something that Singer later revisits while making it explicit in his own way. Basi-
cally, Sidgwick sees himself as an intuitionist. For him, ethics are based solely on the self-
evident premise of rational benevolence. He claims, among other things, that given the 
"point of view of the universe”, one’s own good cannot be worth more than the good of the 
other. In doing so, he tries to counteract a (quite possible) egoistic disinterest in this objec-
tive perspective by focusing on a universal benevolence that is supposed to enable agents 
to combine their own interests with the interests of others: "[T]he good of anyone individual 
is of no more importance from the point of view … of the Universe, than the good of any 
other” (Sidgwick 1981, 382). However, Sidgwick fails to develop a universal approach from 
a subjective non-cognitive moral theory of self-interest, which actually brings self-interests 
together with foreign interests. 
For this reason, following Sidgwick, we should mention the moral theory of Richard Mervyn 
Hare, who assumes that self-interests and the moral judgments are logically intertwined 
because our self-interests are universalizable in the guise of internalisable rules. The so-
called prescriptivism states that moral judgments do not reflect how the world is (in a cer-
tain sense), but preserve their meaning through the properties of prescriptiveness and, as 
already mentioned, through its universalizability. According to the quality of prescriptive-
ness, moral judgments always imply imperatives. However, since you can only really accept 
imperative sentences according to Hare, even if you act accordingly, you can only accept a 
certain moral judgment if you act accordingly under the same circumstances. For example, 
if I sincerely make the moral judgment, I should do φ right now, then I am also determined 
to do φ. In this respect, moral judgments reflect volitive attitudes. According to the property 
of universalizability, moral judgments (similar to the deontological position of Kant) are gen-
eralizable: for example, if I pass judgment, Person P should now do φ, then I agree that any 
person who is in similar circumstances as P, should do φ. 
Finally, it is Peter Singer who wants to merge Sidgwick’s insights into the impartial ethical 
standpoint and Hare’s reflections on prescriptivism into a universal theory of consequen-
tialist altruism. Goodness-for and absolute goodness are thereby ‘extended’ to the good 
from the impersonal point of view of the universe (say the proponents of this approach) or 
‘reduced’ (the critics would say). Singer currently introduces his reflections on an expansive 
and absolute moral standpoint to a greater audience with the help of proclaiming an "ef-
fective altruism", which decidedly integrates economic considerations into its program. This 
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suggests a new synthesis of individual consequentialist and decidedly (world-) community-
oriented designs. While for former representatives of the idea of a free global market, such 
as Friedrich von Hayek, altruism is something that is fundamentally irrelevant for the mar-
ket, because it only plays an effective role at close range (among family members and rela-
tives, etc.), effective altruists assume a ‘responsibility for the world’, which obliges all peo-
ple, no matter if they are near or far from the needy, to give as much of their income as 
they can. This attitude is not anti-profit, because the more you earn, the more you can give 
to others. Although effective altruism has certainly lost any belief in the self-regulation or 
the natural evolution of the market, the fact that effective altruism is not anti-profit does 
not mean that it is already prosperity-oriented. Its central focus is no longer on the unlim-
ited proliferation of goods, but on the universal elimination of evils. Goods may be increased 
only if they remain bound to the purpose of the elimination of evils. Other purposes, e.g. 
aesthetic, may not contribute to the distribution of goods. Singer cleverly avoids the prob-
lem of equitable distribution of aggregated goods by preventing a leveling down insofar as 
people do not have to forego their individual needs, i.e. they do not have to make personal 
sacrifices when donating something in order to bring about a good state of affairs, e.g. a fair 
distribution of food. 
As the last representative of a highly elaborate and broadly understood consequentialism, 
which has partially obscured its traces to the theoretical origin, is the consequentalism of 
Derek Parfit. Parfit does not conceive of the best state of the world as the objective quantity 
to be achieved by using only the right means effectively but he defines the "best" as some-
thing that is contained in the meaning of impartial reasons. Thus, Parfit believes that he is 
able to ward off a utilitarian interpretation of the goodness of outcome or resultative good-
ness. Furthermore, he criticizes the view that goodness is only in the future, i.e. as a conse-
quence of actions that are intended to bring about an good state of affairs (Parfit 2006, 
233). Because Parfit asks in his work for the aggregation of the well-being of many people, 
he inevitably participates in the "debate about the best version of consequentialism” (Parfit 
2017, 31). Although it is repeatedly claimed that the importance of Parfit’s approach cannot 
be limited to consequentialist theories, the suspicion is vivid that Parfit only refers to non-
consequentialist models (e.g. Kant) in order to refine his comprehension of it. His refined 
consequentialism, for example, is expressed in his so-called Triple Theory, in which he trans-
forms Kantian, contractualist and consequentialist theory into a superordinate model. Sim-
ilar to Hare, Parfit attempts to reconcile Kantianism, which forms the basis of contractual-
ism, with consequentialism. Although Parfit, especially in his early work Reasons and 
Persons, contemplates act-consequentialism, he tends to accept in his later work On what 
matters rule-consequentialist principles. In so doing, he interprets Kant’s Categorical Imper-
ative insofar as generalizability is no longer the result of a rationality-driven test for the 
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consistency of subjective maxims, but the result of a balance between impartial and partial 
reasons, with the greater generalization potential being due to impartial reasons, which en-
sure a better course of things than partial reasons. However, it is questionable how Parfit 
deals with categorical prohibitions such as the killing of innocent people against the back-
ground of his theory. Another criticism of Parfit is that it is generally impossible for agents 
to find out which principles can bring about the best states of affairs ensuring that we can 
act morally right (cf. Scruton 2011). Parfit counters this criticism by withdrawing, as many 
British moral philosophers did before him, into a commonsense position, claiming that we 
have always been in unanimous decision-making (such as politics and society) and we are 
still in agreement – so what?. 
II Consequentialism and the Good Life 
We have already seen that in most cases consequentialist theories of the good also form 
the basis for a particular theory of the good life. So-called welfare theories are not to be 
confused with eudaemonistic theories, because – in short – it is not an issue for consequen-
tialists to ‘make happy people, but to make people happy’. Consequentialist goodness 
therefore is independent of how a human being is or should be; this special type of good-
ness is decisively a goodness of objectified or objectifiable states of affairs, which are solely 
determined by the subjective well-being of an individual or entire groups. This form of well-
being can consist in the preservation and promotion of pleasure or the absence and avoid-
ance of suffering, in the fulfillment of preferences or in the updating of objective values or 
normative ideals. Of course, the list is not complete yet. However, it can generally be said 
that most of current welfare theories are characterized by an entanglement of actuality 
(such as pleasure feeling) with ideal states (freedom from suffering, wishfulness) as well as 
between selfishness and altruism. 
In this context, the question of the sizing of the resultative good seems quite interesting. In 
recent years, new theoretical models that are based on consequentialist moral reasoning 
have emerged here: aggregationism and prioritarianism. In this regard, the welfare-eco-
nomic model of aggregationism claims that one can sum up the good without having to go 
into utility comparisons leading to particular distribution decisions. In contrast, prioritarian-
ism considers that benefit comparisons play an important role in determining the welfare 
of individuals and particular groups. Prioritarianism thus describes a constructivist theory 
of consequentialism in which two states are technically created (the state of the poorer and 
the state of the better off), which are judged and weighted by an impartial observer in order 
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to arrive at a just distribution of an absolute good (that could be wealth in this case). Prior-
itarianism seeks to correct, in particular, the ethical blindness of aggregationism in distribu-
tional contexts. 
This short description is primarily intended to clarify that both aggregative and prioritized 
approaches have central properties of consequentialist theories of good: the aggregate and, 
if possible, fair distribution of benefits remains the result of an assessment of the outcomes. 
In both cases, the consequences have been quantified first; while in the first case they are 
merely aggregated, in the second case they are both aggregated and distributed. It is also 
important to know that successful aggregations and effectively distributed benefits repre-
sent an impersonal value for the theories themselves, because the positive benefits (this 
time being understood as personal value) for the worse or equals and the negative for the 
better off are the same. 
III Conclusion 
But which use of "good" seems to come closest to our intuitions? It is not surprising that we 
frequently use the word “good” in each normative framework. However, there are funda-
mental differences with regard to the used operator and its role or value for constituting 
moral judgements:  
Operator Value/Role Corresponding Ethical Paradigm 
“good for X” instrumental, aggregative virtue ethics, consequentialism 
“good of X” constitutive, functional virtue ethics, deontology 
“good at X” performative virtue ethics, consequentialism 
“good as X” exemplary  (Neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics 
“the good X” attributive virtue ethics, deontology 
Within consequentialist frameworks everything that has been, is or will be evaluated as 
good must be understood in terms of a state of affairs, the perfect bearer of instrumental 
and intrinsic value. Hence, consequential goods are good states of affairs, which serve as 
commensurable units or measures of a so-called ‘goodness of outcome’. From that is fol-
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lows that modern consequentialist evaluations of good states of affairs lead to an aggrega-
tion of goods; and an aggregation of goods leads to the prioritization (ǂ fair distribution) of 
some (= better) goods. 
Finally, I would like to provide an outlook for another definition of what is good without 
bringing about any good states of affairs and without confusing our everyday intuitions: a 
Neo-Aristotelian understanding of goodness. What is it about? According to current Neo-
Aristotelianism, the species-relativity of “good” (Foot 2001; Thompson 2008) secures the 
agent-relativity of moral judgements in the following non-consequentialist way: 
1. “Good for me” can only be good for me if I belong to the species homo sapies (inhu-
man things are not good for me) that imposes certain norms on me. 
2. “Good for all” is only good if all members of the same species fulfill 1, everyone for 
herself/ himself. 
3. “Good for its own sake” is only good if 1 and 2 are not identical. 
Now consequentialists could say that doing an action which is ruled out by a constraint is 
bad-relative-to-the-agent. But by virtue of the species-dependence of goodness and bad-
ness constraints cannot be accommodated by consequentialism (there is no fitting attitude, 
because the fitting relation is defined by the species and its necessities). One should finally 
say: The species itself defines what fits the good or not! 
In this paper I have tried to show that ‚good’, ‚goodness’ or ‚goods’ should not be identified 
with calculable states of affairs. Against consequentialist welfarism I claim that the good life 
as an optimal combination of primary and secondary goods does not depend on thoughts 
about the aggregation or best distribution of goods. Goods, in my view, are species-relative 
qualities of an agent that characterize his moral flourishing while undermining every fitting 
attitude analysis. This kind of flourishing cannot be derived from an absolute or “best” good-
ness. 
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On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting 
Principle 
Jonas Harney, Saarland University Saarbrücken, Germany 
Abstract 
Parfit (2017) proposed a novel principle for outcome betterness in different people and different number choices. 
It is claimed to solve the Non-Identity Problem while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion, and it shall do so in 
person-affecting rather than in impersonal terms. According to this Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle, one of 
two outcomes would be (i) in one way better if this outcome would together benefit people more, and (ii) in 
another way better if this outcome would benefit each person more. I argue that a plausible construal of this 
principle has two features that make it vulnerable to objections. First, the most plausible interpretation of the 
second part of the principle turns out to incorporate an average function. Although this helps to avoid the Repug-
nant Conclusion, it implausibly implies that it can be better to add further people with less bad but still miserable 
lives to populations consisting only of lives full of suffering. Second, the principle is not based on a comparative 
but on an intrinsic notion of benefit. This allows to solve the Non-Identity Problem, yet it accounts only for a weak 
sense of person-affecting rather than for the more substantive person-affecting intuition that it is morally signifi-
cant that particular people are made better (or worse) off. Eventually, I highlight what we can, nevertheless, learn 
from Parfit’s idea of combining different ways in which outcomes might be better. 
Introduction 
Derek Parfit concluded the fourth part of his Reasons and Persons, one of the most influen-
tial works in population ethics, with a challenge to the philosophical community: We shall 
find Theory X – the best theory of beneficence that solves the Non-Identity Problem and 
avoids the Repugnant Conclusion, among other problems of population ethics. Parfit pre-
dicted that Theory X will take an impersonal form insofar as it “will not appeal to what is 
good or bad for those people whom our acts affect” (Parfit 1984, 378). While some popula-
tion ethicists follow Parfit’s direction, many others reject impersonal views as implausible. 
They claim that the part of morality that is concerned with people’s wellbeing needs to be 
spelled out in person-affecting rather than in impersonal terms. In his posthumously pub-
lished paper “Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principle”, 
Parfit gives in to this person-affecting intuition. He, now, claims it “to be a bad mistake” 
(Parfit 2017, 123) to have been advocating an impersonal view and abandons it in favour of 
the 
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Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle: One of two outcomes would be in one way better if this 
outcome would together benefit people more, and in another way better if this outcome 
would benefit each person more. (Parfit 2017, 154) 
In this paper, I examine the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle, or Dual Principle for short. 
Unfortunately, Parfit is not very clear in said paper since he could not finish it before he 
unexpectedly died. Given that Parfit’s formulation of the principle is therefore rather vague, 
I start by clarifying the Dual Principle and highlighting the principle’s aims and features in 
section I. I then argue that the principle is deficient in two ways. First, in its most plausible 
construal, the principle turns out to be a hybrid of total and average functions, which makes 
it vulnerable to objections against the latter (section II). Second, the Dual Principle accounts 
only for a weak person-affecting view since it fails to capture the more substantial intuition 
that making particular people better (or worse) off is morally significant (section III). I close 
by discussing how the Dual Principle might be improvable and what we still can learn from 
it.  
I The Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle 
The Dual Principle is supposed to provide a definition for the overall betterness of one of 
two outcomes. It holds that one of two outcomes is overall better in virtue of (1) together 
benefiting people more, and in virtue of (2) benefiting each person more. Unfortunately, 
the Dual Principle lacks analytical clarity for a proper understanding regarding both the two 
ways of betterness and the overall betterness they are supposed to constitute.  
Note that the two ways of betterness are supposed to conjointly make one of two outcomes 
overall better and, thus, need to be weighed against each other in case of conflict. Since 
Parfit did not provide specification for the weight of the two ways, the Dual Principle as such 
does not suffice for overall betterness yet. For simplicity, I assume that the two ways have 
equal weight, and I will point to alternative ratios only if it makes a difference for the overall 
betterness. Furthermore, it still remains unclear how to understand the two parts in them-
selves. I will provide a plausible interpretation in the next section. But let me mention the 
three aims the Dual Principle is supposed to achieve beforehand. 
First, the Dual Principle is claimed to be a person-affecting rather than an impersonal prin-
ciple. While person-affecting principles are based on what is good (or bad) for people, im-
personal principles do not refer to the relative property of being “good for someone”, but 
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to the absolute property of being “good simpliciter”. The Dual Principle bases the compari-
son of outcomes on the extent to which people benefit. And given that benefits always refer 
to what is good (or bad) for people, the Dual Principle is person-affecting rather than im-
personal. 
Second, although person-affecting, the Dual Principle solves the Non-Identity Problem be-
cause it does not use a comparative but an intrinsic notion of benefits. In the intrinsic sense, 
people are benefited not if (and if then because) they are better off than they would have 
been otherwise, but if (and if then because) they are caused into a state that is intrinsically 
good for them. Therefore, people are intrinsically benefited by being caused to exist leading 
a life worth living even if they are not better off than otherwise since they would never have 
exist at all. It follows that an outcome with a very happy person is better than an outcome 
with a numerically distinct and less happy person even though it is not better for any of the 
two persons. It is better, according to the Dual Principle, because it intrinsically benefits 
people together more. 
Third, the Dual Principle is claimed to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. This is due to the 
principle’s claim that one of two outcomes is overall better in virtue of two things: the out-
come maximizes benefits to people together, and it maximizes benefits to each person. Take 
a typical comparison between the two outcomes A and Z.  
A: One million people exist with very high wellbeing at level 100. 
Z: One billion people exist with very low but still positive wellbeing at level 1. 
The principle’s first part implies that outcome Z is better than outcome A. This is so because 
the Z-people together are benefited by one billion units of wellbeing, while the A-people 
together are benefited only by one hundred million units of wellbeing. Thus, Z benefits peo-
ple together more than A. This very implication is the Repugnant Conclusion. The Dual Prin-
ciple’s second part, by contrast, avoids the implication. For the people with very low well-
being would each be benefited considerably less by being caused to exist than the people 
with very high wellbeing would have been benefited. Given the assumption that the two 
parts have equal weight, the Dual Principle implies A to be better than Z because, although 
Z is ten times better than A according to the first part, A is a hundred times better according 
to the second part. Thus, the Dual Principle seems to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion.1  
 
1 It does so only for some cases as long as we assume equal weight for the two parts of the principle, because for 
any population Z’ that is larger than ten billion people it would be true that Z’ is better than A. However, other 
(potentially variable) ratios might avoid the Repugnant Conclusion in all cases. 
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We have seen that the Dual Principle is a person-affecting principle that solves the Non-
Identity Problem in virtue of the intrinsic notion of benefits and avoids the Repugnant Con-
clusion in virtue of its dual character. In the next section, however, I argue that the most 
plausible construal of the Dual Principle is vulnerable to an objection against average prin-
ciples. 
II The Principle’s Duality 
Parfit initially introduces the two parts of the Dual Principle separately. 
Collective Principle: One of two outcomes would be in one way better if it benefits people 
together more, by giving people a greater total sum of benefits. (Parfit 2017, 153) 
 
Individual Principle: One of two outcomes would be in one way better if it benefits each person 
more. (Ibid.) 
Consider the Collective Principle first. It claims that an outcome is better if it benefits people 
together more. This just means that the outcome would be better if the sum of intrinsic 
benefits were greater, as Parfit’s addition “by giving people a greater total sum of benefits” 
indicates. Thus, the Collective Principle incorporates a total function in the same way as 
Parfit’s  
Impersonal Total Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which 
there would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. (Parfit 1984, 287) 
The difference between these principles just is that the former one is formulated in person-
affecting terms, while the latter refers to impersonal goodness. But both use a total function 
in order to determine outcome betterness. 
Now, consider the Individual Principle. Since it, unfortunately, lacks analytical clarity, we 
need a plausible construal as a starting point. First, the antecedent in the Individual Principle 
can be interpreted differently. I suppose that what “benefits each person more” could mean 
that either 
(1) each person is benefited more than she would have been benefited otherwise, 
or  
(2) each person is benefited more than another person would have been benefited 
otherwise. 
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One might be inclined to think that (1) is the option Parfit had in mind. It seems intuitively 
more plausible than (2) since the principle is called “individual”. However, this must be 
wrong. If (1) were the correct construal, the antecedent would be true only if people were 
also benefited in the comparative sense because a person would be better off by being 
intrinsically benefited more than she herself would be intrinsically benefited otherwise. But 
if this were the case, the Dual Principle could not avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. For it 
would then imply that outcome Z (one billion people having a wellbeing level of only 1) is 
better than outcome A (one million numerically distinct people having a wellbeing level of 
100) if no one exists in both A and Z. This is so because, since A would not be better for 
anyone, the antecedent of the Individual Principle would not be true. Thus, the Individual 
Principle could not mitigate the Collective Principle’s assessment. Given that the Dual Prin-
ciple was meant to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, (1) cannot be the correct interpretation 
for Individual Principle. 
Second, (2) can be interpreted differently again since “another person” can refer to either 
(a) a particular other person, or  
(b) each other person, or   
(c) the average per person. 
These different interpretations do not make a difference if we hold on to Parfit’s restriction 
of the Dual Principle that there is perfect equality within each outcome (cf. Parfit 2017, 152). 
However, this restriction does not hold for most cases we are concerned with. And since 
this would severely limit the scope of the Dual Principle, we are well-advised to decide be-
tween (a), (b), and (c). Though one would not expect so on first sight, it will turn out that (c) 
is the most plausible construal as soon as we drop the equality restriction. 
Consider (a). If it were correct, the Individual Principle would hold that each person must 
be benefited more than another particular person. This construal immediately raises the 
question who that particular person is supposed to be. Since there might exist completely 
different people in two outcomes, this remains quite unclear. Furthermore, if we compared 
each particular person’s benefit only with one particular other person’s benefit, the Individ-
ual Principle would miss different number cases. For there would be some people in the 
higher populated outcome without a counterpart then. But if we compared some people 
with multiple other people, any actual comparison would be rendered arbitrary. Thus, (a) is 
unconvincing.  
Consider (b). The Individual Principle would then state that each person of one outcome 
must be benefited more than each other person in the compared outcome. Obviously, this 
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fairly strong condition would hold only for very few cases. Thus, while yielding the correct 
result concerning the Repugnant Conclusion, namely that A is better than Z, this construal 
would fail a tiny variation of that case: 
A: One million people exist with very high wellbeing at level 100. 
Z*: One billion people exist with very low but still positive wellbeing at level 1, and 
one person at wellbeing level 101. 
The people in A are not benefited more than each other person in Z* since one person in Z* 
has more wellbeing than each of the people in A. Therefore, A would not be better than Z* 
if (b) were correct. Rather, Z* would be better since only the Collective Principle would apply 
to this case. But the additional person in Z* should not turn around the overall assessment. 
Therefore, (b) must be wrong. It would make the Individual Principle irrelevant in many 
cases. 
If (a), (b), and (c) indeed exhaust the space of plausible interpretations of “another person”, 
then we are left with (c). For, as I have shown, if (a) or (b) were correct, the Individual Prin-
ciple would be either arbitrary or irrelevant in most cases. By contrast, if (c) is correct, there 
is no need for mapping counterpart relations between particular people, and we still get 
the correct result concerning A and Z*. For the proportion of average intrinsic benefits be-
tween A and Z* is nearly the same as between A and Z, which reflects that, although there 
is a difference between Z and Z*, it is not a huge one.  
Third, note that (c) might mean that each person needs to be benefited more in the better 
outcome than the average benefit per person in the other outcome. However, this would 
give rise to similar objections as it is the case for (b). Therefore, (c) plausibly means just that 
the average benefits in one outcome are higher than the average benefits in the other one.  
If my arguments are sound, the Individual Principle is best understood as the condition that 
the better outcome benefits people more on average, and the Collective Principle as the 
condition that the better outcome benefits people more in sum. Hence, the Dual Principle 
boils down to a hybrid of well-known total and average principles (which take intrinsic ben-
efits as value units here).  
The problem is that the average character of the Individual Principle makes the Dual Princi-
ple vulnerable to a common objection against average principles. Suppose that there are 
the two outcomes  
B: Ten people exist each having a miserable live at wellbeing level –100. 
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C: Ten people exist at wellbeing level –100, and one person exists at wellbeing level 
–10. 
The average benefits for the people in C are higher than in B, because C intrinsically burdens 
people on average less than B. Thus, according to the Individual Principle, C is better than B 
although there is one additional person with a less bad but still miserable life. This is highly 
implausible. Furthermore, the Collective Principle fails to mitigate this result. For, according 
to the Collective Principle, C is just around one hundredths times worse than B, because the 
sum of intrinsic burdens in C is just slightly higher than the sum of intrinsic burdens in B. 
But, according to the Individual Principle, C is around one tenth times better than B. Thus, 
assuming that the proportions of betterness and worseness have equal weight, C is even all 
things considered better than B.  
One might be inclined to reply that a different weighing ratio that gives more weight to the 
Collective Principle can avoid the objection. However, even though this is true for the pre-
sented case, there will be some hypothetical situations in which the Dual Principle still yields 
such an implausible implication even with a weightier Collective Principle. Furthermore, and 
even more problematic, if the Collective Principle had more weight, the Dual Principle 
would be more prone to the Repugnant Conclusion again. Thus, as long as we have not 
found more sophisticated weighing functions solving this problem2, the Dual Principle is 
prone to either the Repugnant Conclusion or the stated implausible implication due to the 
average function the second part incorporates. 
We have seen that Dual Principle has implausible implications given the average function of 
the Individual Principle. Thus, while the duality of the Dual Principle helps to avoid the Re-
pugnant Conclusion, it creates another, potentially even worse problem. In the next section, 
I argue that the Dual Principle captures the person-affecting intuition only in a weak sense 
and thus fails to achieve one of its main aims. 
III The Principle’s Person-Affecting Character 
The Dual Principle is claimed to be a person-affecting principle in virtue of it being spelled 
out in terms of benefits for people. Furthermore, it is based on an intrinsic notion of benefits 
securing that the principle is applicable to different people choices and able to solve the 
 
2 Matthew Clark argued for such a solution in his talk “The Continuous Weak Superiority View” at the 15th 
Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies 2018, Karlsruhe. 
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Non-Identity Problem. The question, however, is whether the Dual Principle captures the 
person-affecting intuition if benefits are used in the intrinsic sense. My claim is that, alt-
hough the Dual Principle is person-affecting in a weak sense, it fails to capture a more sub-
stantial person-affecting idea. 
Take a principle about outcome betterness to be person-affecting if and only if any assess-
ments made on behalf of the principle supervenes on personal goodness or personal bet-
terness, that is, facts about how particular people absolutely or comparatively fare. This is 
in line with the person-affecting claim that, as Nils Holtug puts it, “the part of morality that 
concerns individual welfare should be cashed out in terms of what is good and what is bad 
(or what is better and what is worse) for individuals” (Holtug 2004, 129). Given this under-
standing, we can distinguish a weak and a strong sense of person-affecting. According to 
the weak sense, assessments need to supervene on personal goodness only. According to 
the strong sense, by contrast, assessments need to supervene on personal betterness too.3  
The Dual Principle is spelled out in terms of intrinsic benefits for people, that is, how well 
off particular people are in a certain outcome. It thus complies with person-affecting-ness 
in the weak sense. The overall outcome betterness is derived from facts about how well (or 
badly) off people are. However, it fails to account for the stronger sense because it does not 
account for people’s being better (or worse) off. For illustration, consider a case in which 
there are the two outcomes 
D: Ali has wellbeing 10 Bel has wellbeing 5 Cam doesn’t exist 
E: Ali doesn’t exist Bel has wellbeing 10 Cam has wellbeing 5 
According to the Dual Principle, D and E are equally good. For both outcomes benefit people 
by 15 units of wellbeing in sum and by 7.5 units of wellbeing on average. However, there is 
a clear sense in which D is worse than E: D is worse than E for Bel. Note that this assessment 
is not attenuated by the fact that Cam has only 5 units of wellbeing in E while Ali has 10 
units of wellbeing in D. For Ali and Cam are different people. Hence, Cam could not have 
been better off in D. Rather, he would not have existed at all. Thus, while the Dual Principle 
considers what is good and what is bad for individuals, it fails to properly include what is 
better and what is worse for them. The principle is person-affecting only in the weak but 
not in the strong sense.  
I wonder why this should be so. Given that the Dual Principle is already composed of two 
ways in which outcomes can be better, there does not seem to be, on principle, a reason 
 
3 This implies what is commonly known as person-affecting restriction, according to which one of two outcomes 
can be better only if it is better for someone.  
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against adding (or combining it with) other views. And I think that we would do better by 
taking the strong sense of person-affecting-ness seriously. My claim in favour of this option 
is that it morally matters not only how much people are intrinsically benefited, but also how 
much they are comparatively benefited. We care not only about how well or badly off peo-
ple are, but also about how much particular people would gain or lose. If this is so, we should 
consider a third way in which outcomes are better that Parfit discusses but rejects. 
Weak Narrow Principle: One of two outcomes would be in one way better if this outcome 
would be better for people. (Cf. Parfit 2017, 129) 
This principle expresses the more substantial person-affecting idea to take into account 
what is better or worse for people. Even though narrow person-affecting principles fail to 
solve the Non-Identity Problem (which is why Parfit rejects it), the Weak Narrow Principle 
does not prevent a solution either since it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for outcome betterness. Hence, we can still combine it with another principle that provides 
a solution to the Non-Identity Problem such as the Collective Principle.  
IV Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that the most plausible construal of Parfit’s Dual Principle is vulnera-
ble to two objections. First, it implausibly implies that adding less bad but still miserable 
lives to a population consisting only of lives full of suffering makes things better. This impli-
cation could be mitigated but only at the cost of making the principle more prone to the 
Repugnant Conclusion again. Second, the Dual Principle fails to capture the strong sense of 
person-affecting according to which it is morally significant that particular people are com-
paratively benefited, that is, that they are made better off. We should rather consider a 
third way in which outcomes are better that captures the strong person-affecting sense. 
Where does that leave us? Although Parfit’s particular principle has serious shortcomings, 
we may still learn from the basic idea: a plausible principle of outcome betterness that 
solves the problems of population ethics might need to be composed of different parts cap-
turing different morally significant factors. With the Collective Principle, the Individual Prin-
ciple and the Weak Narrow Principle we have three possible components on the table. I 
think it is worthwhile to examine possible combinations in more detail. I have discussed the 
problems for combining just the former. Investigating on the other possible combinations 
may help to make further progress in solving the problems of population ethics. 
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Giving Hedonism a Second (and Proper) 
Chance1 
Moritz Hildt, University of Tübingen, Germany 
Abstract 
Classical Utilitarianism attributed hedonism a prominent place within its theoretical framework – as the “theory 
of life” on which utilitarianism is grounded (Mill) –, and thus gave hedonism its first chance (in modern times). 
Today, however, many regard hedonism as fundamentally flawed. As a result, hedonism has more or less dropped 
out of the picture in the current debates on well-being and the good life. My basic argument will be that the critics 
of hedonism fail to show the necessity of a wholesale rejection, and that hedonism, thus, deserves a second, and 
proper chance. After spelling out the argumentative structure of the main charge brought forward against hedon-
ism nowadays – the charge of its (alleged) systematic insufficiency –, I will discuss this charge in its two most 
prominent forms: Robert Nozick’s thought-experiment of the “experience machine”, and Thomas Carlyle’s polem-
ics that utilitarianism is a philosophy worthy only of swine. I will argue that there is good reason to doubt that 
Nozick’s argument even touches the question of the plausibility (or implausibility) of hedonism, and thus, under 
scrutiny, appears to be – despite its popularity – a rather easy case for hedonism. Mill’s answer to Carlyle, his 
qualitative hedonism and its well-known problems, however, does indeed present more trouble. My claim here 
will be that hedonism, as a theory of well-being, should stress its conceptual independence from any moral theory, 
and especially from utilitarianism, since some of the deepest problems Mill’s hedonism encounters are linked to 
specifically utilitarian concerns. I will conclude by summarizing the main implications my discussion has for con-
temporary hedonism, and, in doing so, sketch a version of hedonism as a theory of well-being that builds upon the 
very aspect that many today regard as its major deficit: I argue that hedonism’s systematic simplicity can be a 
major asset. 
Introduction 
Although hedonism is present in the philosophical debates about well-being and the good 
life ever since Antiquity, it has very few proponents today. Many seem to think that hedon-
ism – if it ever was plausible – has had its fair chance in modern times within Classical Utili-
tarianism, where both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill regarded hedonism as the 
“theory of life” (Mill 1998, II.2) on which they grounded their moral theory. Today, many 
 
1 The arguments of this paper are part of a larger research project concerned with re-establishing hedonism as a 
theory of well-being. This independent research project is generously funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, to 
whom I am deeply grateful for providing this scholarship. I have also profited from the comments of the audience 
at the ISUS 2018 conference in Karlsruhe, Germany, most notably from a conversation with David Lanius. Last but 
not least, I am very grateful to Jonathan Riley, for a thorough conversation and discussion about Mill and hedonism 
in New Orleans in April 2018. 
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regard hedonism as fundamentally flawed. Even most Utilitarians seem to have left it be-
hind for good, shifting their attention away from pleasure and pain, and more towards con-
cepts of preference or desire-satisfaction. 
I want to call into question the quick dismissal of hedonism, which has become common 
practice in much of today’s discussion about plausible accounts of well-being. My main 
claim in this paper is that the critics not only fail to show the necessity of a wholesale rejec-
tion of hedonism, but that the very feature they most frequently attack might in fact turn 
out to be one of hedonism’s major assets: its systematic simplicity. 
In what follows, I will first spell out the main charge brought forward against hedonism to-
day, which I will call the charge of its alleged systematic insufficiency (Section I). I will then 
discuss this charge in its two most prominent modern forms: Robert Nozick’s famous 
thought-experiment of the “experience machine” (Section II), and Thomas Carlyle’s polem-
ics against Classical Utilitarianism, which Mill famously discusses in Chapter 2 of Utilitarian-
ism, and against which he develops his qualitative hedonism (Section III). In both cases, I will 
try to show how the arguments put forward eventually fail to establish conclusive reasons 
for the rejection of hedonism. In the last section, I will summarize the implications my find-
ings have for contemporary hedonism, and, on that basis, I will, although quite tentatively, 
sketch a version of hedonism which takes its systematic simplicity not as a problem, but, 
rather, as one of its major assets (Section IV). 
I The Charge of Systematic Insufficiency 
It is no overstatement that hedonism can be called the most attacked school of ethics. Ever 
since Antiquity, when the ethics of hedonism was laid out most prominently by Epicurus 
and his followers, the theory has experienced a vast array of attacks and blows, ranging 
from rhetoric polemics and public ridicule to more serious systematic objections. Through-
out the most part of the history of ethical thought, hedonism was attacked either for its 
mere instrumental, and thus, it was argued, deficient account of reason, or for the morally 
dubious implications of a theory that so openly seems to embrace radical egotism. 
Today, however, a third line of criticism seems to be dominant in the debate – so dominant, 
in fact, that the other two get rarely even mentioned. This contemporary line of attack views 
hedonism as, at its base, too simple: It cannot account for all the various things that con-
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tribute to a person’s well-being, which go well beyond the experience of pleasure and ab-
sence of pain, or so it is argued. This is the charge of hedonism’s alleged systematic insuffi-
ciency.2 
In order to argue for that point, it has become common practice nowadays to merely refer, 
often only in an half-sentence, to the argument which has become the standard objection 
against hedonism, and which itself is a version of the charge of systematic insufficiency.3 
This standard objection is Robert Nozick’s so-called “experience machine.” 
II The “Experience Machine”-Objection: Aversion 
to Hedonism, or to Radical Alienation? 
As already noted, Robert Nozick’s thought-experiment of the “experience machine” is fre-
quently evoked in the current debate in order to dismiss hedonism as a plausible answer to 
the question of what makes a human life good.4 Under scrutiny, however, it is highly doubt-
able that Nozick’s argument has anything whatsoever to do with the plausibility (or implau-
sibility) of hedonism, or so I will argue. 
Let’s briefly review the argument. Nozick’s basic claim is that we “care about things in addi-
tion to how our lives feel to us from the inside” (Nozick 1989, 104). In order to argue for this 
claim, Nozick asks us to imagine a quite extraordinary machine – a machine, which, once 
we’ve plugged in, would supply us with all kinds of pleasurable feelings. The pleasures we 
feel, though, would not correspond to any real experiences in the world, but would be cre-
ated by chemically induced nerve-stimuli. After having set out the scenery, Nozick now asks 
us if we would plug into the machine. He adds that it is not a momentary decision, but one 
 
2 For a more detailed analysis of this charge, see Hildt 2018. 
3 For a paradigmatic, and pioneering, example of this practice, see Griffin 1986, 9. Concerning the overall situation 
of hedonism in the contemporary debates, Roger Crisp pointedly states that “these days hedonism receives little 
philosophical attention, and students are warned off it early on in their studies, often with a reference to Nozick” 
(Crisp 2006, 99). 
4 Cf. Matthew Silverstein’s assessment of the situation: “Many of the most prominent philosophers of value – 
including James Griffin, David Brink, Stephen Darwall, and L.W. Sumner – take this thought experiment to be the 
definite response to hedonism and, more broadly, to all mental state theories of well-being” (Silverstein 2000, 
282). We should add to this, though, that Sumner, despite his confidence in the experience-machine, rejects 
Nozick’s reality-condition as implausible (cf. Sumner 1999, 157).  
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you make for the rest of your life. Nozick assumes, and probably rightly so, that the vast 
majority of his readers will answer: No! The crucial question now becomes: Why?  
Nozick has a ready answer. According to him, the reason is that we sense that there is more 
to a good human life than mere pleasurable feelings. Therefore, Nozick concludes, hedon-
ism is refuted: “there is more to life than feeling happy” (1989, 106).5 In this concluding 
statement, it becomes clear that Nozick’s argument is a version of the charge of systematic 
implausibility (cf. Secion I above). 
For the present context, I want to leave aside the possibility that the majority may simply 
be wrong – the normative relevance of majority-arguments is a hugely problematic issue –
, and I also won’t go into the more general question of the relevance of empirical findings 
for normative questions. Instead, I want to draw attention to an alternative explanation of 
why we do not want to plug into Nozick’s machine. 
It is noteworthy that the existence Nozick pictures once we’ve successfully plugged in, ap-
pears to be radically different from our ordinary life as we know it: Instead of our everyday 
decision-making and acting, we will lie still, our body almost lifeless contained in some sort 
of nutrient solution. This surely is a case of radical alienation.  
Radical alienation is nothing we cope with easily. This point is made vivid from Plato’s alle-
gory of the cave up to the famous Matrix-movies of Lilly and Lana Wachowski (formerly the 
Wachowski Brothers). If we add to this the thoroughly negative, for many downright repul-
sive, connotations that the image of a body plugged into a machine evokes in our culture – 
one immediately thinks of hospitals, life-prolonging procedures, and the like –, it seems that 
a deep desire to avoid this kind of situation, this form of radical alienation, might alone 
suffice to refrain from being plugged into Nozick’s machine.  
This is a different story from the one Nozick tells us. Most notably for our present context, 
it is an explanation for our wish to keep our distance from the “experience machine” which 
does not even touch upon the plausibility, or implausibility, of hedonism, and the question 
wether hedonism can provide an adequate theory of human well-being. 
One could object that the explanation I am offering is more psychological than philosophi-
cal. This may be true. But, granted it is a possible and not altogether implausible explanation 
of the discomfort people feel when asked if they would plug in, there is a major conse-
quence: It calls into question the alleged unambiguity of Nozick’s explanation. Thus, it has 
 
5 Nozick’s additional aspects of a good human life include a desire for authenticity, a desire of a stable connection 
to reality, and the desire that our beliefs about the world be true and accurate (cf. ibid.). 
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the power to mitigate the whole thought-experiment: It might turn out that the “experience 
machine” does not even concern the question of the plausibility of hedonism. 
III The “Philosophy of Swine”-Objection, and the 
Independence of Hedonism 
If my argument above is sound, Nozick’s “experience machine” does not prove to be a fun-
damental problem for hedonism. At the very least, it should be clear that what Nozick offers 
is not tantamount to justify a wholesale rejection of hedonism.  
The underlying objection in Nozick’s argument, as we have seen, is the charge of systematic 
insufficiency: Hedonism is accused of being too simple to account for the complexity of hu-
man life. This objection goes back to an argument John Stuart Mill famously deals with in 
Utilitarianism (1998, II.3–II.10): Thomas Carlyle’s polemics that identifying human happi-
ness with the experience of pleasure is equivalent to degrading humans to swine. The up-
shot is that hedonistic happiness is claimed to be not only systematically insufficient, but 
also unworthy.  
To this charge, Mill presented his well-known solution: According to him, pleasures can dif-
fer not only in quantity and duration (like Bentham would have it), but also in quality. Thus, 
Mill argues, it is no problem for hedonism to assume that some kinds of pleasure are more 
desirable and valuable than others (1998, II.4). 
While Mill appears to be content with his answer, his so-called qualitative hedonism, the 
vast majority of his interpreters today think that he runs into a dilemma: Either Mill’s he-
donism reduces, upon closer inspection, to mere quantiative hedonism, or it introduces a 
value different from the feeling of pleasure, and thus leaves the basic premise of hedonism.6 
While this situation might seem to be first and foremost an interpretative issue – a matter 
of understanding the structure of Mill’s argument –, it has, however, direct consequences 
for the main question of this paper, namely, whether hedonism deserves a second chance: 
 
6 For the first horn of the dilemma, cf. in particular Mill’s discussion of the competent judges where it seems that 
the more elevated pleasures are the ones which, when enjoyed, produce a greater amount of pleasure (1998, II.5 
and 6). For the second horn, see Mill’s description of the higher pleasures as “more noble” (1998, II.4 and 6), which 
reads as if Mill conceived it as a separate and genuine, distinctly qualitative value for measuring and comparing 
pleasures – which would be in conflict to his earlier statement according to which pleasure and the absence of 
pain are the only things good in themselves (1998, II.2). Crisp 1997, 32 provides a concise and helpful analysis of 
this dilemma. 
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If the introduction of the notion of a “quality” of pleasures produces the complications just 
mentioned, it might seem that hedonism, in order to deal with Carlyle’s charge, needs to 
confine its notion of pleasure to mere quantitative matters.7 Given this situation, the “Phi-
losophy of Swine”-Objection, although much older than Nozick’s argument, appears to be 
far more troublesome for contemporary hedonism. 
If hedonism does not want to reduce its notion of pleasure to the dimension of quantity 
alone – and indeed I think it should not –, I suggest that contemporary hedonists should 
examine closely which of the problems Mill’s theory runs into relate to hedonism as such, 
and which relate to hedonism as a basis (“theory of life”) for utilitarianism, i.e. which follow 
from utilitarianism’s specific demands. As a consequence, hedonism, as a theory of well-
being, should claim its independence from any moral theory, and, given the current context, 
especially from utilitarianism. In this respect, I want to suggest one general, and two specific 
reflections. 
The general reflection concerns the claim often found in today’s discussions of hedonism 
that, if Mill’s attempt fails, hedonism has to “fall back” to its quantitative dimension. It is 
worth noting that this claim assumes an anachronistic default-position: From Epicurus on-
wards, almost all hedonists (except, of course, Bentham) put forward theories which en-
compassed both quantitative and qualitative aspects of pleasure – and saw no particular 
problem in their compatibility. 
The two more specific reflections both stem from the same observation of philosophical 
context: While the question of how to choose between different pleasures is, of course, a 
major question for all types of hedonism, the special urgency and thoroughness this ques-
tion receives in Bentham and Mill is arguably due to their specifically moral, i.e. utilitarian 
context: Measuring pleasures, and intra-personally comparing them, are aspects which are 
of major concern for utilitarian thinkers: they arise from the need to determine what’s the 
morally right action. They are not, in and by themselves, demands hedonism as a mere, and 
thus morally-neutral, theory of well-being needs to fulfill, at least not with the same urgency 
and thoroughness. 
Instead of trying to achieve precise calculability, I want – this is the first specific reflection – 
to suggest that hedonism should do the exact opposite, and stress the vast plurality of pleas-
ures: As a theory of well-being, hedonism should be concerned not so much with the exact 
calculability and comparability of its pleasures, but rather embrace, and stress, the many 
 
7 And this is, indeed, frequently assumed in the contemporary debate. Cf. vividly in White 2006, 41–2, 54. 
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ways in which we experience pleasure, and be open to the vast array of actions and things 
that induce and produce this sensation.8 
A second specific reflection directly concerns the notion of “quality”, which appears to be 
the source of so much trouble. Instead of understanding quality as a value-judgment – this 
is the way most interpreters seem to understand Mill, and he makes it easy enough for them 
to read him this way –, hedonism can make sense of quality in a different, and less prob-
lematic way: “Quality” can not only refer to a value-judgment, but also to a specific feature 
of the object in question. If I say “hiking has a distinct quality”, I might judge hiking to be 
more valuable than other comparable activities. This is the standard understanding of 
“quality”. I might, however, mean something quite different: namely, that hiking, as an ac-
tivity, has certain specific attributes, like, for example, the pleasantly tired feet in the even-
ing, the slowness of movement, etc. The central point in this respect is that quality in this 
second sense does not presuppose any judgment of value – and it were value-judgments 
which got Mill’s qualitative hedonism into trouble in the first place. 
IV Towards a Contemporary Hedonism – a Tentative 
Sketch 
So where does all this leave us? I set out to make a case for hedonism, and to argue that it 
deserves to be taken seriously in the current debates on well-being. With regard to the ar-
gument that is commonly used today in order to show hedonism’s alleged systematic insuf-
ficiency – Robert Nozick’s “experience machine” –, I tried to show why hedonists need not 
be overtly troubled with this thought-experiment: There are good reasons to assume that 
Nozick’s argument might not even touch upon the question of hedonism plausibility or im-
plausibility.  
The charge of systematic insufficiency, however, goes deeper, and does indeed pose prob-
lems which need to be answered. This has become clear in the discussion of the “Philosophy 
of Swine”-Objection and Mill’s problematic, maybe even failed, attempt to answer it. Here, 
I argued that hedonism, as a theory of well-being, should claim its independence from any 
moral theory, and, in particular, from utilitarianism: Although it was utilitarianism which 
supplied hedonism with its first chance in modern times, it is time for hedonism to detach 
 
8 The plurality of pleasures is actually a point stressed by Mill himself, when he talks about the various and distinct 
pleasures that arise from the use of our different faculties, additionally to the pleasures of sensation: “the 
pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” (1998, II.4). 
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itself from utilitarian concerns, if the theory aims to be a convincing account of well-being 
still worthy of discussion. 
In connection to this last point, I have already argued that hedonism should endorse the 
plurality of pleasures, and that it can, and should, make use of the notions of both quantity 
and quality, understanding the latter as a statement about specific features, and not as a 
judgment of value. 
Keeping with the programmatic tone of the paper, in what remains I will briefly present 
three key questions which I think every contemporary hedonism, as a theory of well-being, 
needs to address. I will also, albeit quite tentatively, suggest a possible direction an answer 
could take. What unites my suggestions here is the basic intuition that the very thing most 
people today find problematic with hedonism – its systematic simplicity – might turn out to 
be one of its major assets. 
IV.a What Do We Talk about When We Talk about Pleasure? 
Within the current debate, the few remaining hedonists have put forward two main candi-
dates to answer this question: Roger Crisp argues that we should understand pleasure as a 
sensation, and that while “enjoyable experiences do indeed differ in all sorts of ways”, they 
have one thing in common: “they all feel enjoyable” (2006, 110). Against this model, Fred 
Feldman has developed what he calls “attitudinal hedonism”, according to which the pleas-
ures relevant to human well-being are not sensations as such. Instead, he is concerned with 
those which are being directed in a certain way: with “attitudinal pleasures” we take in the 
existence of certain “state of affairs” (Feldman 2002, 611). 
While there are reasons for and against both of these candidates, I want to suggest that if 
hedonism wants to make good use of its systematic simplicity, it should endorse an under-
standing of pleasure along the lines of Crisp’s model, and thus conceptualize pleasure as a 
sensation. This model of pleasure not only keeps closer to our everyday-notion of pleasure, 
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but it also steers clear of the quite considerable systematic difficulties Feldman’s “attitudi-
nal hedonism” runs into.9 
IV.b What Is the Basis of Explanation? 
According to hedonism, pleasure, and the absence of pain, are the only determinants of 
human well-being. This basic premise is, of course (and has been throughout the history of 
ethical thought), as simple as it is provoking. One obvious, though far from easy, question 
that hedonists need to address is: What, then, is pleasure? And at the very bottom of this 
question lies the issue of the basis of explanation: How deep can we go in explaining what 
pleasure is, and does? 
Here, I think that one promising route for contemporary hedonism could run along the lines 
of T. M. Scanlon’s methodological approach in What We Owe to Each Other. Scanlon (1998, 
17) famously starts his book by announcing that he will take “the idea of a reason as primi-
tive. Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead 
back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it”. Hedonists could try to do 
something similar with regard to their notion of pleasure. Such a claim of the primitive na-
ture of pleasure would also be in line with understanding pleasure as a sensation, and it 
would also fit with the idea of systematic simplicity as an asset.10 
IV.c What about False, and Morally Corrupt Pleasures? 
Where people in the current debates get involved with hedonism, two problems appear to 
many to be especially troublesome for hedonistic theories of well-being: The case of “false” 
pleasures – where we experience pleasure because of an erroneous assessment of the 
world around us, like in Shelley Kagan’s famous example of the “deceived businessman” (cf. 
 
9 My main worries with Feldman’s account include: the question whether Feldman’s hedonism is indeed an 
alternative to a sensationalist account of pleasure, or rather an unsubstantiated selection among pleasures which 
are to count in matters of our well-being; the question of the methodological soundness of Feldman’s argument 
to counter possible objections by including his answer into the theory itself (and thus moving from Intrinsic 
Attitudinal Hedonism to Veridical Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism to Desert Adjusted, viz. Double Desert Adjusted 
Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism); and the more general question if Feldman’s account is more accurately described 
as a type of desire-fulfillment theory, which would be tantamount to leaving hedonism behind altogether. 
10 Interestingly enough, hedonism here gets seconded by a philosopher whom few recognize to be a hedonist: 
Immanuel Kant. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant sets out to explain his concept of pleasure, and then states 
that: “pleasure and displeasure cannot be explained more clearly in themselves; instead, one can only specify what 
results they have in certain circumstances, so as to make them recognizable in practice” (1997, 6:212).  
Giving Hedonism a Second (and Proper) Chance  
88 
Kagan 1997, ch. 2) – and the case of “morally corrupt” pleasures, where a person takes 
pleasure from morally base actions so that engaging in these actions, although they would 
be rejected by any moral standard, seems to add to this person’s well-being.11 
Although many nowadays seem to assume that these two kinds of “problematic” pleasures 
pose systematic difficulties for hedonism as a theory of well-being, I want to suggest that 
they might as well not. If hedonism stays true to its systematic simplicity, it can, and should, 
claim that a pleasure is a genuine pleasure, despite and independent of the question 
whether its circumstances include erroneous believes about the world or the motives of 
other people. Pleasures of the latter kind may have unfortunate consequences, but that 
does not diminish their felt intensity when they are experienced, and thus, neither adds, 
nor subtracts, their impact on our well-being.  
The case with morally corrupt pleasures is quite similar. As I have argued above, hedonism 
is not a theory of morality, but of well-being. As such, it accounts for the things that make 
a life feel good for the person who is experiencing it. How we deal with persons who behave 
morally wrong, and in ways which are not compatible with our values, is a different matter; 
it is a genuine moral question. 
As I have said in the outset of this last section, much more will need to be said about con-
temporary hedonism, and about how to address these three questions. What I have tried 
to do in scraping on the surface of each of them, so to speak, was first and foremost to make 
the case that hedonism is nowhere near of being out of the picture. It deserves a second, 
and proper chance. 
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Abstract 
For some philosophers rule consequentialism (RC) is the most plausible form of ethical theory: RC can rebut many 
of the well known objections raised against classical act utilitarianism. Yet, RC has its own weaknesses. One pow-
erful objection against RC is that even this form of consequentialism might get too demanding: If we think of the 
future of a “broken world”, RC might loose its moderate credentials (Mulgan 2015). This paper unfolds in three 
steps: First, I will distinguish five versions of the so-called demandingness objection against rule consequentialism 
(section I). Then the rule consequentialist conception of ethics proposed by Richard Brandt (Brandt 1979, 1992, 
1996) is presented (section II). Brandt has argued for an influential version of ideal acceptance rule utilitarianism. 
Some amendments are needed to adjust Brandt’s ethics to a global scheme, but this can be granted. Section III 
proposes options open to Brandt in order to respond to the demandingness objection regarding the future of a 
broken world. Brandt’s version of rule utilitarianism includes many resources that help to answer the objection 
(e.g. a concept of supererogatory acts, Brandt’s idea of “fully rational persons” etc.). Section IV will discuss and 
evaluate Brandt’s options. The paper argues that the most convincing responses open to Brandt implement deon-
tological propositions into his moral theory. The demandingness objection in view of a broken future effectively 
urges to review the commitment to the rule utilitarian account. 
Introduction 
For some moral philosophers rule consequentialism is the most plausible form of ethical 
theory. Rule consequentialism seems to embody many of the attractive elements of conse-
quentialism. Yet, it can rebut many of the well-known objections raised against classical act 
utilitarianism.  
One powerful objection against rule consequentialism is that even this form of consequen-
tialism might get too demanding. At the beginning of the 21st century, the prospects of the 
future are uncertain. Climate change, environmental pollution or nuclear disaster might 
lead to a “broken world”, where resources do not suffice to supply for the needs of all. In 
so far as rule consequentialism tries to maximize happiness over time, the prospect of a 
broken world would significantly alter the rules for the present. Thus, rule consequentialism 
loses its moderate credentials (Mulgan 2015).  
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This paper reconsiders the influential version of rule utilitarianism presented by Richard 
Brandt (1979, 1992, 1996) in order to look for possible replies to the above-mentioned ob-
jection. The argument unfolds in five steps: In section I, I distinguish five versions of the so-
called demandingness objection in order to focus on one specific version. Section II presents 
the rule utilitarian conception of ethics proposed by Richard Brandt. Section III proposes the 
options open to Brandt in order to reject the demandingness objection regarding the future 
of a broken world. In section IV, I will discuss and evaluate the different options open to 
Brandt. Finally, Section V summarizes the argument. The paper concludes that the most 
convincing responses open to Brandt implement deontological propositions into his moral 
theory. The demandingness objection in view of a broken future effectively urges to review 
the commitment to the rule utilitarian account.  
I The Demandingness Objection and the Prospects 
of the Future 
The objection that utilitarianism represents an implausible account of normative ethics 
since it entails obligations that are incredibly demanding for the agent is familiar. It was first 
raised against act utilitarianism, but since 1990 it has also been raised against rule conse-
quentialism (Hooker 1990, 1991, 2000; Mulgan 2001, 2015; Arneson 2005; Hills 2010; Tobia 
2013). In fact, there are at least five versions of this objection:  
1. the demandingness objection under “full compliance” in our present world: Rule 
consequentialism may be deemed too demanding, since the afflictions of the pre-
sent world might call for rules that demand too much even though all agents take 
their share in the necessary effort. 
2. the demandingness objection under “partial compliance” in our present world: 
Rule consequentialism might get too demanding, since “partial compliance” with its 
rules is what might be expected in actual societies. At least, if the utilitarian code 
contains a “prevent disaster rule”, partial compliance inevitable seems to have this 
effect (Hooker 1990; Carson 1991; Hooker 1991; Hooker 2000). 
3. the demandingness objection in view of possible worlds: Rule consequentialism 
could lead to overly demanding rules, if we consider possible worlds where circum-
stances are much worse than in our own world: If billions of people are starving be-
cause of apocalyptic disasters, rule consequentialist considerations might lead to 
very demanding rules for everyone (Mulgan 2001; Arneson 2005; Portmore 2009). 
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4. the demandingness objection in view of a broken future: It might be the prospect 
of a broken future that calls for excessively demanding rules (Mulgan 2015). 
5. the objection may be raised, if we claim that animals are to be included: Some 
authors argue that rule consequentialism would get too demanding, if we included 
animals among the beneficiaries for whom the rules are to be made (Hills 2010).  
In what follows, I will confine myself to the objection concerning the prospect of a broken 
future. For our discussion, consider the following scenario: In 2050 the prospects for the 
preservation of our natural environment have decreased significantly. After a nuclear war 
in the late 2030s, scarcity of water and many other important resources is to be expected 
within decades. Scientific research has made tremendous progress, but, unfortunately, no 
major break-through is to be expected. Clean water and other resources will run out in the 
2080s, if they are not proportioned rigorously. 
Let us see how the scenario influences the maximizing moral code of the year 2050. Since 
utilitarian consequentialism tries to maximize happiness over time, the prospects for the 
future will in any case make a huge difference for the determination of the moral rules for 
2050. If the scenario fittingly describes the prospects of 2050, the rules to be propagated 
then will be highly demanding: Water will be proportioned rigorously. In an extreme situa-
tion, even human rights may be abandoned. As Timothy Mulgan rightly says: “if it is not 
possible for everyone to survive, then there is nothing that can meaningfully be guaranteed 
to everyone.” (Mulgan 2001, 109). In order to secure the same chances for the presumed 
population of the 2090s, the utilitarian rules of 2050 would require strictest saving of clean 
water. They would even reduce the presumed right to life to mere chances to survive (cf. 
Mulgan 2015, 110). If prospects are really bad, a person of the 2050s, let us call him Frank, 
may be morally allowed to drink 0.3 liters of clean water the day. Beyond that quantity of 
clean water he might be required to resort to heavily contaminated water supplies that are 
still available.1 This conclusion, however, seems implausibly demanding. It does not seem 
plausible that the contingencies of the distant future of the 2090s can have that much 
weight as to suspend the right to life in 2050. To be sure, there is much reason to argue for 
rigid saving of water supplies in our scenario. But it seems highly counterintuitive to assume 
that the contingent developments of the distant future may override the basic human rights 
of actually living people like Frank. 
 
1 In 2018 the World Health Organization estimated that by 2025 half of the population on earth will live with water 
stress. Already in 2015 two billion people had to use contaminated drinking water (cf. WHO 2018).  
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II The Rule Utilitarian Moral Theory of Richard 
Brandt 
Richard Brandt faced the first version of the demandingness objection, the demandingness 
objection under “full compliance” in our present world, in the 1990s. He argued that a yearly 
donation of 600,- $ by all inhabitants of the wealthy nations on earth would suffice to pro-
vide for a life above the poverty line for all who are in need. Brandt’s argument for this 
conclusion draws on empirical informations supplied by the World Development Report by 
the World Bank (Brandt 1996, 229-36). However, since this argument does not treat the 
prospects of future developments, it may be set aside. What is needed for our purpose is a 
short overview of Brandt’s moral theory as a whole. This theory and his main argument for 
rule utilitarianism is presented in his main opus A Theory of the Good and the Right (1979). 
In what follows, I will shortly introduce Brandt’s main theses on the foundations of norma-
tive ethics as presented in his Theory.  
According to rule utilitarian ethics an action is morally wrong, if it is prohibited by a set of 
rules which prove to be happiness maximizing rules. As most classic utilitarians, Brandt 
claims that happiness is the only intrinsic value. The deontic status of an action is therefore 
to be considered as a function of its contribution to happiness. Rule utilitarianism differs 
from act utilitarianism, however, in the way it applies the consequentialist principle: Ac-
cording to the rule utilitarian it is not the individual action that ought to maximize happi-
ness. Rule utilitarians propose to go indirect. Brandt claims: Moral rules are to be judged by 
utilitarian criteria, individual actions are to be judged on the basis of these rules. 
Brandt proposes to speak of a “pluralistic welfare-maximizing moral system” (Brandt 1979, 
286), since the moral code proposed by his rule utilitarianism contains more than just one 
rule. The argument which inaugurates this kind of utilitarianism is quite complex. Since it 
draws heavily on empirical psychology, it has been suggested that Brandt’s argument should 
be classified as “foundationalism in science” (Mitchell 1996, 330; cf. Timmons, 1987). And 
there is, of course, much reason to this claim. Even Brandt himself agreed to this classifica-
tion (cf. Brandt 1995). However, his argument also contains contractualist considerations: 
Brandt proposes to think of a hypothetical choice of a moral system for one’s own society. 
After reflecting on how to define the concept of a fully rational person, i.e. a fully informed 
person, he suggests that the deontic status of an action should be determined by the code 
which fully rational persons would choose for their own society: “I suggest, however, that 
we assign ‘is morally wrong’ the descriptive meaning ‘would be prohibited by any moral 
code which all fully rational persons would tend to support, in preference to all others or to 
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none at all, for the society of the agent, if they expected to spend a life-time in that society’.” 
(Brandt 1979, 194; cf. Kavka 1993)  
Obviously, one crucial question for this argument is how to define the concept of fully ra-
tional persons. For these are the ones who choose the moral code. Brandt proceeds in two 
steps. He first defines the concept of a fully rational action. Then, the concept of a fully 
rational person is clarified by appeal to this concept of rational actions. Brandt considers an 
action to be fully “rational”, if the desires and aversions which lead to that action have been 
fully criticized by facts and logic and if the cognitive inputs present at the time of decision 
have been optimal as well (Brandt 1979, 11). The fully rational person, correspondingly, is 
a person “in whom the mechanisms underlying desire, pleasure, and action have been fully 
suffused by relevant available information” (Brandt 1979, 88). 
There are two further characteristics of Brandt’s Code that should be mentioned. First, the 
version of rule utilitarianism which Brandt tries to defend is defined as an ideal acceptance 
rule utilitarianism: It is an “ideal” rule utilitarianism due to the fact that it advocates ideal 
rules in contrast to the actual rules of a society. It is an example of “acceptance rule utilitar-
ianism”, since it is supposed to count not only the consequences of compliance with its rules 
but also the costs and benefits that are involved in the teaching and the internalization of 
that code in society (Brandt 1979, 198). Second, when speaking about the “society of the 
agent”, Brandt was mostly thinking of the societies of countries or nations. But in the 1990s 
he suggested that a world-wide code would be adequate for global issues (Brandt 1992, 
192; Brandt 1996, 227-36). We may at this point simply assume that Brandt’s theory of jus-
tification of moral codes might equally well be used to justify a global moral code.  
For our current interest in replies to the demandingness objection Brandt’s view about what 
fully rational persons would choose is fundamental. The way Brandt proceeds is important 
because it introduces two levels of argumentation for the justification of specific moral 
rules: Brandt argues for a meta-normative rationale for the choice of a welfare-maximizing 
moral code before starting the investigation in order to find out the content of the specific 
rules. He first argues at the level of a meta-normative choice scenario which may be abbre-
viated as Lcs (for Lchoice scenario). Only after that does he start to reflect about the specific con-
tent of the rules of his code. This second level of reasoning may be called the “level of rule 
determination”, abbreviated as Lrd. For it is at this level, that Brandt is concerned with em-
pirical investigations and the utilitarian calculus that determine the content of particular 
rules.  
With respect to questions of demandingness two features of Brandt’s social moral code 
seem to be highly relevant: Brandt’s positive evaluation of personal freedom to pursue 
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one’s own projects, and his concept of supererogatory acts. Each of these general features 
is established by some reasoning. For the discussion of possible replies to the demanding-
ness objection it is, however, important to see at which level of reasoning these features 
are introduced:  
1. Brandt argues in a consequentialist way that agents should be free to pursue their 
own projects: The opportunity to pursue one’s own projects generates a sense of 
freedom and pleasure (Brandt 1992, 86). The transmission of a code that restricts 
freedom, on the contrary, would cause a lot of frustration and a huge loss in happi-
ness. This argument is conducted at the level of consequentialist rule determination 
(Lrd). 
2. The concept of supererogation is part of Brandt’s definition of a moral code 
(Brandt 1979, 168, 172 and 201). But in addition, Brandt adduces consequentialist 
considerations for the acceptance of this concept. He claims that it is beneficial for a 
society to acknowledge the idea of supererogation so that some very beneficent but 
also costly actions are recommended even though they are not required by the rules 
of its moral code. Thus, people will be encouraged to perform demanding or even 
heroic deeds since these are praised although they are not required. The concept of 
supererogation allows to omit the costs of making those deeds obligatory for every-
one (cf. Brandt 1979, 289). 
III Brandtian Replies to the Demandingness 
Objection in View of a Broken Future 
Brandt’s moral theory obviously offers at least five ways to react to the demandingness 
objection in view of a broken future exemplified in the scenario of Section I:  
1. Brandt argues that agents should be free to pursue their own projects since this 
freedom probably maximizes happiness in society. Thus, the expected gain in overall 
happiness generated by freedom of action could justify Frank in drinking more than 
0.3 liters. This argument is brought forward on the level of consequentialist rule de-
termination Lrd. 
2. Brandt’s rule utilitarianism justifies the concept of supererogatory acts. It is one 
option for Brandt to claim that his moral code would highly recommend to spare 
water even though Frank is not morally required to do so. This point is again made 
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on Lrd. But maybe Brandt would also hold that the concept of supererogation is part 
of the definition of a moral code, thus making an additional point by defining the 
framework of his choice scenario. 
3. Brandt’s choice scenario suggests the choice of a social moral code for a society in 
which the agents – and possibly their children (cf. Brandt 1996, 240) – will live a life-
time. The significance of the distant future may therefore be disputed at the level of 
the apparently meta-normative choice scenario Lcs. This means that the framework 
of Brandt’s choice scenario allows to discount the future. 
4. It is open to Brandt to argue that “fully rational persons” would choose to make 
significant aggregate contributions to the happiness of future people, but not unrea-
sonably high contributions. A similar line of argument is put forward by Brad Hooker 
in his more coherentist argument for rule consequentialism (Hooker 2000, 150 and 
166). In the case of Richard Brandt, this reasoning would be established in terms of 
the meta-normative choice scenario Lcs. 
5. Brandt could of course also bite the bullet and claim that our common-sense intu-
itions are not reliable in the case at hand and contend that the conclusions of our 
scenario are correct: This means, Frank of the 2050s is morally not allowed to drink 
more than 0.3 liters of clean water the day. This reply is very much in touch with 
Brandt’s low esteem for reference to moral intuitions. Yet, we may put it aside. It 
would lead too far to discuss the epistemic value of strong moral intuitions. And, as 
it seems, despite his official disregard for intuitions Brandt’s moral philosophy tries 
to approximate utilitarianism to common-sense morality in many ways. 
IV The Evaluation of Brandt’s Options 
One remark seems to be in place before our discussion of the five options mentioned above. 
The argumentation of Brandt’s main opus (Brandt 1979) does not completely succeed in its 
project of justifying a thoroughgoing utilitarian morality. Brandt himself acknowledged that 
(Brandt 1993). The concept of a code for one’s own society might be understood in a way 
that restricts morality to a particular society, to the exclusion of certain demands from out-
side. The idea of a society in which oneself and one’s children are supposed to spend their 
life would therefore provide the option to discount the value of the distant future. Yet, 
Brandt himself did not pursue these tracks to restrict the demandingness of his theory. On 
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the contrary, as Brandt’s works clearly show, he considered it to be a weakness of his argu-
ment, that he was not able to establish a completely universalistic morality (Brandt 1993, 
246). His intention was explicitly to include the needs of future generations (Brandt 1996, 
133 and 142). The idea of discounting the future by reference to Brandt’s concept of the 
society of the agent (and his children) may, therefore, be put aside. This kind of argument 
would surely reject the demandingness objection. It abandons, however, one of the classical 
utilitarian tenets; and Brandt himself refused to take this line.2 
With that in mind let us turn to the discussion of the options introduced in section III. Op-
tions one and two may be treated together: Here, Brandt could adduce consequentialist 
arguments. For option two conceptual considerations might be added. The virtue of an ar-
gument via consequentialist considerations is obvious: This defense avoids any non-utilitar-
ian assumptions. However, the reasoning of these replies cannot reject the demandingness 
objection exemplified in our scenario. If the freedom to pursue one’s own projects is exclu-
sively justified by consequentialist considerations, the reasons for its introduction will surely 
be outweighed by the even more urging consequentialist reasons which flow from the dire 
need of others as described in our scenario. This applies to Brandt’s acceptance rule utili-
tarianism as well as to other versions of rule utilitarianism (cf. Carson 1997, 92). A similar 
reasoning may be put forward concerning the concept of supererogatory acts of option two: 
Frank’s health projects must surely be set aside, if their impact in the utilitarian calculation 
is measured against the lives of future people in the 2090s. The alternative open to Brandt 
would be an argument at the level of his choice scenario (Lcs). Yet, if this contractualist ar-
gument is supposed to establish normative conclusions which could not be established at 
the level of consequentialist rule determination (Lrd), Brandt’s code would appear to con-
tain genuine elements of deontological morality. Consequentialism purports to derive the 
deontic status of actions in terms of consequences alone. Deontological theories, on the 
contrary, deny what consequentialism affirms: They reject the idea that the right is solely 
to be determined as a function of what realizes the best balance of good over evil (cf. 
Frankena 1973, 14-15; Timmons 2013, 111). Thus, if Brandt uses his choice scenario in order 
to introduce normative considerations that cannot be established by consequentialist rea-
soning, he in fact falls back to deontology. What first seemed to be a meta-normative kind 
 
2 One could, of course, abandon the temporal impartiality of classical utilitarianism and argue for some kind of 
sophisticated rule consequentialism that incorporates a discount rate. However, discounting the future would drop 
a central point of utilitarian thinking. Cf. Cowen and Parfit 1992; Gesang 2011; Birnbacher 2013, 189-196 and 413-
417; Kaczmarek 2017, Mulgan 2017. I owe this point concerning Brandt’s code and the option to discount the 
future to a comment by Thomas L. Carson.  
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of contractualist choice scenario designed to establish a thoroughgoing consequentialist 
moral theory would turn out to be itself a decisive means for normative conclusions.  
The third and forth replies seem to provide a more solid ground to reject the demanding-
ness objection. Yet, both of them use the contractualist reasoning of Brandt’s meta-norma-
tive choice scenario Lcs. As mentioned above, this means to leave the grounds of pure con-
sequentialism. If there are valid reasons why some consequences do not count as much as 
others, the resulting normative theory will be a hybrid theory. Brandt’s choice scenario 
which at first seemed to be a purely hypothetical means to justify utilitarianism (and which 
was therefore described as a “meta-normative” foundation of his moral philosophy) would 
be transformed into a decisive part of his normative theory.  
One could of course point to the concept of “fully rational persons” in order to specify reply 
four: One could argue that “fully rational persons” would choose to make significant aggre-
gate contributions to the happiness of future people but not unreasonably high contribu-
tions. Yet, it seems that would presuppose a normative concept of practical rationality 
which again leads to “dangling” deontological propositions (Kagan 1989, 14). Brandt’s utili-
tarianism would then hold to an agent-centred prerogative and to corresponding rules 
which it cannot support on its own ground. If the rule utilitarian account is to be defended, 
no result of consequentialist reasoning may be classified as unreasonable. Brandt himself, 
of course, rejects the idea of a substantially normative concept of practical rationality 
(Brandt 1989). 
V Conclusion 
It has been shown that Brandt’s moral theory provides many resources that help to answer 
the demandingness objection concerning the prospects of a broken future world. Yet, 
Brandt’s most convincing replies lead to an acceptance of deontological propositions into 
the consequentialist account. If our present considered moral judgements are to be ac-
cepted, the prospect of a broken future constitutes a tough challenge for Brandt’s form of 
rule utilitarianism. Brandt’s contractualist argument seems to recommend restrictions 
against overly demanding rules. The acceptance of these restrictions, however, introduces 
“dangling” deontological propositions into his otherwise rule utilitarian account of norma-
tive ethics. This means, the demandingness objection successfully urges to accept deonto-
logical constraints.  
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Bentham’s Theories of the Rule of Law and 
the Universal Interest 
Michihiro Kaino, Doshisha University Kyoto, Japan 
Abstract 
It has been very rare in the Bentham studies that Bentham had an idea of the rule of law. But according to Professor 
Postema, Bentham was arguing for ‘the reflexive dimension of the rule of law’ meaning that those in power are 
also held accountable under the law and are subject to it. In his forthcoming book, Postema focuses on Bentham’s 
theory of constitutional constraints on the sovereign, which Bentham called ‘leges in principim’. Postema’s point 
that Bentham, who tried to maximize the accountability of officials, was analyzing the conditions of rule of law or 
law’s ruling in a community is convincing. However, it is difficult to assume that the majority, who are motivated 
by self-interests, would exercise the moral sanctions of Public Opinion Tribunal when the interests of minority, 
which have relatively little effect on those of majority, are violated by some legislators or officials. And Bentham 
himself seems to argue that it is difficult to rely on individuals as they are interested more in their own or particular 
interests than in the general interests of community or the universal interest. So, it would be argued that the 
system with judicial review is better as it protects the rights of minority better. However, I want to argue that 
Bentham was in a sense a precursor of those modern theorists who try to design some architecture for deliberative 
democracy. For example, in ‘A Table of the Springs of Action’, Bentham provides a description of ‘deontologists’ 
who are expected to lead ordinary citizens, supplying such motives to them that will promote the happiness of 
society, or the universal interest. 
Introduction 
I would like to focus on two chapters of Professor Postema’s forthcoming book, Utility, Pub-
licity, and Law, which are ‘The Soul of Justice: Bentham on Publicity, Law and the Rule of 
Law’ and ‘Interests: Universal and Particular’. Postema’s point that Bentham was analyzing 
‘the conditions of law’s ruling in a political community’ (Postema forthcoming, ch. 12) is 
new and convincing. And I think Postema’s point would help to put Bentham’s theory of law 
in the English tradition of the rule of law.  
However, it is difficult to assume that the majority, who are motivated by self-interests, 
would exercise the moral sanctions of public opinion tribunal when the interests of minor-
ity, which have relatively little effect on those of majority, are violated by some legislations. 
I would like to argue that Bentham was in a sense a precursor of those modern theorists 
who try to design some architecture for deliberative democracy and also that this aspect of 
Bentham and the paternalistic nature of Bentham’s theory would strengthen his theories of 
the rule of law and the universal interest.  
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I Bentham and the English Tradition of Rule of 
Law 
In ‘Utility and Command’, Postema notes that Bentham’s legal theory departs ‘significantly 
from other “command theories” of law’ in that ‘he held that whether a sanction is attached 
to a legal directive is a contingent matter’ (Ibid., ch. 8). And Postema focuses on Bentham’s 
theory of constitutional constraints on the sovereign, which Bentham called leges in prin-
cipim. According to Postema, Bentham departed from ‘the simpler Hobbes-Austin model of 
commands’ in that ‘whether a sanction is attached to a legal directive is a contingent mat-
ter’ (Ibid.). And when Postema analyzes Bentham’s leges in principim, he emphasizes that 
‘Bentham was even willing to say explicitly that the rules and standards issuing from firm 
expectations of public opinion themselves constitute a kind of law’ (Ibid., ch. 12).  
On the other hand, the following statement of Bentham in Of the Limits of the Penal Branch 
of Jurisprudence, which is quoted by Postema, seems to show that Bentham faithfully fol-
lowed the English tradition of the rule of law, which has been sustained by the distinction 
between legal and political sovereign. 
The mandate of the sovereign, be it what it will, can not be illegal: it may be impolitic; it may 
even be unconstitutional: but it can not be illegal. It may be unconstitutional, for instance by 
being repugnant to any privileges that may have been conceded to the people whom it affects: 
but it would be perverting language and confounding ideas to call it illegal (Bentham 2010, 
10-11). 
In A Comment on the Commentaries, Bentham looks to a 16th century English example 
when, in the reign of Henry the 8th, ‘(t)he Legislature made over its whole power to the 
King alone’ and ‘(t)he King’s Proclamations were enacted in general terms without reserve 
to have the force of Laws’. According to Bentham, This is an example when ‘(t)he constitu-
tion was actually destroyed’. And he also adds that ‘I will take up arms whosoever the Leg-
islature pass an Act, giving the force of Statutes in all cases and for this country that I write 
in, England, to the Sovereign’s Proclamations’, and that ‘Legislature would act consistently 
and legally in setting a price upon my head’ (Bentham 1977, 56-57). 
In Securities Against Misrule, Bentham treated the Petition of Right as one of the ‘legisla-
tive arrangements that have been established or have been endeavoured to be estab-
lished for the security of the governed against the governors’ (Bentham 1990, 23). As 
Postema notes, leges in principim – constitutional constraints on the sovereign – ‘impose 
legal duties, nevertheless, by virtue of their enforcement by the social or “moral” sanction 
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of public opinion’ (Postema forthcoming, ch. 8). And as Professor Lieberman shows, Ben-
tham thought that appeals to Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights ‘helped focus public opin-
ion on the abuses of the current political order, by taking advantage of well-established 
and well-publicized standards for the critical evaluation of public power’ (Lieberman forth-
coming).  
Postema shows an excellent theory of rule of law and attributed it to Bentham: 
The rule of law is not robust in a community – law does not effectively rule there – if some of 
those who wield political power and hold others accountable to the law are not themselves 
accountable under law. … (H)e [Bentham] analyzed the background conditions and 
engineered the supporting institutions needed for a comprehensive and effective architecture 
of accountability (Postema forthcoming, ch. 12). 
Postema call this ‘the reflexive dimension of the rule of law’ in that ‘(t)hose in power as well 
as those subject to that power must be subject to the law’ (Ibid.).  
And as we saw above, Bentham relied on leges in principim – constitutional constraints on 
the sovereign –, which is enforced by the social or moral sanction of public opinion to make 
the sovereign be subject to the law. And it is possible to say that Dicey in the 19th followed 
Bentham and emphasized the reflexive dimension of the rule of law. Dicey argues that there 
is an external limit to the power of sovereign which ‘consists in the possibility or certainty 
that his subjects, or a large number of them, will disobey or resist his laws’ and that ‘wide-
spread resistance would result from legislation which, though legally valid, is in fact beyond 
the stretch of Parliamentary power’ (Dicey 1982, 30, 32). 
II The Universal Interests and the Minorities 
It would be argued that the system with judicial review is better as it protects the rights of 
minority better. It is difficult to assume that the majority, who are motivated by self-inter-
ests, would exercise the moral sanctions of public opinion tribunal when the interests of 
minority, which have relatively little effect on those of majority, are violated by some legis-
lations. 
It is usually argued that Bentham’s theory of utility is not based on a simple aggregation of 
pleasures of the people of a society as suggested by Rawlsian interpretation of utilitarian-
ism. As Professor Schofield shows, Bentham’s argument is that legislation or policies will, 
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through necessity, seek universal interests, because it is difficult to pursue particular or sin-
ister interests within a representative democracy. Bentham may be too optimistic about 
democracy, but, as Schofield argues, the fact that Bentham was an individualist cannot be 
denied. Thus, Bentham’s universal interests incorporated each member’s security of person 
and of property (Schofield 2014).  
However, as Postema notes, ‘Bentham counsels us not to expect willing and spontaneous 
sacrifice of personal or particular interest to the universal interest’ (Postema forthcoming, 
ch. 6). So, even when it is in the universal interest to exercise the moral sanctions of public 
opinion when the interests of minority are violated by some legislations, the majority would 
not take that course as it may not be based on their personal or particular interest. As to 
the difference between the particular interest and the universal interest, Bentham writes: 
The individuals who compose the particular interest always are, or at least may be – and have 
to thank themselves and one another if they are not – a compact harmonizing body – a chain 
of iron: the individuals making the universal interest are on every such occasion an 
unorganized, uncombined body – a rope of sand. (Bentham 1962, 96) 
With regard to the universal interest, Postema writes, 
The argument for understanding the compositional principle in terms of the universal interest 
rests on the claim that the way to respect this fundamental value, understood as equal for 
every person, is to focus moral attention primarily on those interests broadly compatible with 
the interests of others in the community, and especially those interests all share or can come 
to share. (Postema forthcoming, ch. 6) 
Certainly, Bentham’s legislators are supposed to pursue the common interests of all rather 
than the interests of majority. And we should also note the importance of the public opinion 
tribunal and the publicity in Bentham’s thought. According to Postema, although ‘particular 
passions, narrowly focused interests can still influence public opinion’, Bentham thought 
that ‘(t)hrough participation in debates at the local level, members of the community 
[would] come to recognize the public dimensions of their concern to secure themselves 
against depredation or oppression and their individual part in that universal interest, and at 
the same time [would] come to understand the difficulty of enlisting the cooperation of 
others to advance their private, “sinister” interest’ (Postema forthcoming, ch. 13). However, 
Bentham was a realist and suspicious of the competence of the public and the public opin-
ion tribunal. For example, although Bentham often argued that consensual homosexual acts 
are harmless, he also proposed that consensual homosexual acts should be punished by 
banishment instead of by hanging, in the face of strong prejudice against homosexual acts 
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and the expected unpopularity of decriminalised homosexual behaviour in nineteenth-cen-
tury England. Concerning women’s franchise, although Bentham’s position was that the ex-
clusion of women was based on prejudice, he ‘was prepared to surrender to that prejudice, 
and wait the arrival of more enlightened attitudes’ (Quinn 2014, 79). 
So, we should, I suppose, look to Bentham’s paternalistic aspects, such as his theory on 
indirect legislation and his discussion about the ‘deontologists’. 
Some of Bentham’s indirect legislation try to make people find ‘the true interests’ by some 
indirect means. For example, as Quinn shows, Bentham suggested that ‘if you were able to 
demonstrate that, for instance, widely admired figures … had been in the habit of engaging 
in consensual homosexual acts, and successfully disseminated that demonstration, you 
might hope that hostility to homosexuality would gradually abate’ (Ibid.). 
Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism or nudging justifies the influence on peoples’ 
choice, if people are provided with free choice and that influence make them chose the 
better options. According to them, for example: 
When social influences have caused people to have false or biased beliefs, then some nudging 
may help. […] If many people do something or think something, their actions and their 
thoughts convey information about what might be best for you to do or think. (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2009, 58) 
So, their examples include the ‘public forum’ of parks and streets. It is interesting to see 
that Bentham’s also included ‘the freedom of press and public discussion’ in his strategy of 
indirect legislation. In ‘Place and Time’, Bentham writes that ‘as a means of obviating dis-
satisfaction, indirect legislation should be preferred to direct: gentle means, to violent: ex-
ample, instruction, and exhortation should precede or follow, or, if possible, stand in the 
place of law’ (Bentham 2011, 174).  
In addition, Bentham also argues that rulers not only follow public opinion but also ‘lead’ it 
(Bentham 1983, 36). And in ‘A Table of the Springs of Action’, Bentham provides a descrip-
tion of ‘deontologists’ who are expected to lead ordinary citizens, supplying such motives 
to them that will promote the happiness of society. To be more specific, Bentham expected 
deontologists, for example, to articulate their opinions and engage others on the same side. 
According to Bentham: 
What then is business of the Deontologist? In every instance to bring out of their obscurity, 
out of the neglect in which they have been hitherto in so large a portion been buried, the 
points of coincidence to the extent of which extra-regarding interest is connected and has by 
the hands of nature been identified with self-regarding interest (Bentham 1983, 193). 
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So, these deontologists would show the people the universal interest which corresponds 
their particular interests.  
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Utilitarianism and the English Poor Law 
Reform 
Emily Lanman, Notre Dame University Australia, Australia 
Abstract 
The Industrial Revolution transformed all aspects of society in England and Wales throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth-century, with one major aspect being mass migration to the new industrial centres. With this mass 
migration and increased industrialisation came unprecedented levels of poverty which the systems in place were 
not equipped to handle. This resulted in the system of poor relief, which had stood relatively unchanged since 
1601, needing to adapt to the needs of the changing society through the Poor Law Reform of 1832-1837, which 
was heavily influenced by Bentham’s Utilitarianism. The topic of this paper addresses an essential period in the 
history of welfare in England and Wales where a longstanding system of poor relief was radically transformed 
through the creation of a national system of poor relief for the first time. Despite an expansive body of literature 
surrounding poverty in the nineteenth-century, there is a specific gap surrounding the philosophical influences and 
the extent of their influence over the Poor Law Reform. This is also represented in the literature surrounding Util-
itarianism and the reform, as historians generally do not agree to what degree there was influence. This is largely 
due to the conflation between Bentham and his theory. This paper specifically looks at the influence of Utilitarian-
ism on the 1832 Royal Commission, the report it produced and its passage through parliament to the passing of 
the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, with discussion with the implementation following the enactment. The prem-
ise of the argument will be that Utilitarian ideas were central to the reform across all aspects. This study utilises 
reports, debates, legislation and relevant primary documentation to construct a narrative of the influence of Ben-
tham’s Utilitarianism on the English Poor Law Reform in England and Wales between 1832-1837. 
 
The nineteenth century was a period of rapid and unprecedented change for England and 
across all aspects of society, which were also intensifying poverty in an increasingly disrup-
tive manner leading to the Poor Law Reform in England and Wales beginning in 1832 (Gregg 
1965, 46; Checkland and Checkland 1974, 29). The Poor Law Reform was initiated to reform 
the 1601 Poor Law, later known as the Old Poor Law, and through this created a national 
system of poor relief for the first time in English history. This newly reformed system utilised 
the workhouse, an institution that provided a last resort for people who could no longer 
financially support themselves, as its main form of poor relief. This was not the first time 
the workhouse had been used as a method of relief, as they had been introduced in the 
seventeenth century, however, workhouses operated under the Old Poor Law had been 
smaller, more domestic institutions (Newman 2013b, 123). It should be noted that admit-
tance into the workhouse was done so on a voluntary basis and was meant to differentiate 
between the deserving and undeserving poor, as those who were not truly destitute and 
simply just work-shy would not sacrifice their freedom to the workhouse. This, it was 
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thought would ultimately lead to the restoration of social order (Stokes 2001, 711; Newman 
2013a, 360). Central to the discussion regarding the influence of Utilitarianism is the specific 
aspects of the theory, namely the pleasures and pains as outlined in An Introduction to Mor-
als and Legislation, as well as the principle of utility (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 155, 125). 
From this subsequent investigation it becomes apparent that there was a Utilitarian under-
pinning throughout the reform. To establish this, the historical context that results in the 
nineteenth century reform will be covered before looking at how Utilitarianism was able to 
influence the implementation of the reform.  
Poverty was not a new issue to the nineteenth-century, legislation combatting pauperism 
dates back to 1388 with the passing of the first act to deal with vagrancy, other legislation 
was passed with similar themes towards the end of the fifteenth century and into the six-
teenth (Blomfield et al. 1974, 7, 73; Gilliom 2001, 21). Methods for controlling vagrants 
were often extreme: while a 1547 vagrancy act proposing enslavement of vagrants was 
deemed impractical, a 1572 act instigated punishment of whipping and boring a hole 
through the right ear for the first two offences, with the death penalty for the third. How-
ever, the need to collect funds for the relief of the poor was recognised from the 1550s, 
though legislation to raise taxes was opposed, in favour of weekly parish collections under 
the supervision of the clergy. This would be further developed from 1572, with a further 
scheme of compulsory rates implemented by parishes to relieve the poor, the sick and the 
aged (Guy 1988, 326, 220-1). This would culminate with the highly significant 1601 act, this 
legislation aimed to relieve the old and infirmed, to train children in trades and provide 
work for the unemployed, for this each parish was made responsible for its own poor which 
helped reduce costs and prevent undesirable people moving freely (Beckett 1988, 389; 
Royle 1987, 172). This would be further solidified by the 1662 Act of Settlement which al-
lowed the landless poor to be expelled back to their parish of birth if it was thought that 
they could become a burden on the parish in which they were settled (Keynon 1969, 944). 
Settlement in a parish away from an individual’s birthplace became dependent on gaining 
employment for a year, undertaking an apprenticeship, becoming a ratepayer, and (for 
women) through marriage (Marshall 1956, 186).  
Whilst the Old Poor Law would stand until 1834, there were two key attempts at reforming 
the system. The first of these was the 1782 Gilbert’s Act, this shifted away from traditional 
notions of poor relief being solely a parish issue by encouraging parishes to unite and build 
workhouses to relieve vulnerable community members, such as the old, sick and insane 
(Fowler 2014, 28). However, it must be noted that this amalgamation of parishes was not 
mandatory, and primarily the pauper’s local parish was still the main administrative unit for 
poor relief (Driver 1993, 43). The act also provided a wage supplement to low-paid workers, 
this in affect facilitated employers to poorly pay workers, shifting the burden of support 
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onto the general tax base, ultimately leading to the downfall of the system (Fowler 2014, 
28). The second attempt came in 1795 in the form of the Speenhamland system. This aimed 
to provide relief to the unemployed and to supplement employed labourer’s wages when 
the price of bread exceeded a shilling (Watson 1960, 527; Arnstein 1971, 46-7). However, 
of the two attempts at reform discussed the Speenhamland System can be argued to be the 
least successful because, whilst at the surface level it seems beneficial, it removed any in-
centive from landlords and employers to increase wages as they knew that their workers 
would be entitled to a supplemented wage, and thus lead to the demoralisation of labourers 
(Arnstein 1971, 6, 47; Hobsbawm 2013, 202). 
To understand why by the 1830s there was an intense desire to reform the Old Poor Law, 
the society that existed at the beginning of the nineteenth-century needs to be explored. 
One of the most commonly cited reasons for the reform was the increase in costs, from two 
million pounds in 1784 to nearly six million pounds in 1815 (Beckett 1988, 390; Dyson 2013, 
422). This saw a massive shift in the social structure, which is highlighted by the statistics 
on agricultural employment which show in 1801, thirty-six percent of the population were 
employed in agriculture which would drop to twenty-two percent by 1851 (Rapport 2005, 
83). However, other factors that led to the demise of the Old Poor Law were the demorali-
sation that came as a result of lower wages, the burden placed on ratepayers, and the higher 
birth rates which are attributed to the law (Blaug 1974, 123). By 1800 there was a fear of 
poverty developing amongst the more affluent classes because of social conditions, which 
in turn led to depletion in charitable outputs (Beckett 1988, 389). This contributed to the 
years between 1813 and 1837 being described as the blackest years of English farming 
(Blaug 1974, 123).  
To understand how Utilitarianism influenced the Poor Law Reform as a whole between 
1832- 1837, it is important to understand the commission. The 1832 Royal Commission into 
the Poor Laws was the first of its kind, and its success would lead to the model’s future 
utilisation (Finer 1970, 39, 42; Derry 1992, 212). It has been argued that the format itself 
embodies a Benthamite philosophy of identifying a problem and directing an expert com-
mittee to advise on its resolution (Arnstein 1971, 44; Finer 1970, 39; Derry 1992, 212). The 
commission was appointed to examine the implementation of the Poor Laws whilst the gov-
ernment was preoccupied with the Reform Bill, which aimed to increase political represen-
tation (Checkland and Checkland 1974, 29; Dunkley 1981, 124; Royle and Walvin 1982, 158). 
Alongside this examination of the laws, the commissioners were also instructed to suggest 
their recommendations for their amendment of the law (Llewellyn 1972, 100). This came to 
the attention of parliament as the majority of people were dissatisfied with the implemen-
tation of the Poor Laws, particularly the landowners who thought their financial obligations 
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to the poor rates were too high (Finer 1970, 42; Derry 1992, 212). In turn, this led to in-
creased pressure for reform, but ideologically Utilitarianism drove the reform (Royle 1987, 
191). In terms of the problem with the Poor Law, the commission and parliament had op-
posing views: the commission saw the moral and social degradation as being significant 
alongside the administrative and financial issues, whereas the government only saw the 
political advantages of its reform (Bowley 2003, 284). The commission was made up of nine 
individuals, including three clerical representatives presided over by the Bishop of London, 
Charles Bloomfield, and arguably the most notable members of the commission were Nas-
sau Senior and Edwin Chadwick (Checkland and Checkland 1974, 29). Both Senior and Chad-
wick can be shown to have been influenced by Utilitarianism, with Chadwick studying under 
Bentham for an extended amount of time – thus the involvement of these two individuals 
ensured the prominence of the theory in the commission and the report (Finer 1970, 35; 
Brundage 1988, 20; Finlayson 1969, 72). Bentham also helped shape the ideology of Nassau 
Senior who also ideologically shaped the commission (Royle 1987, 191).  
The report produced from this commission embodies the Utilitarian ideology they em-
braced. Utilitarian manifests itself in this document primarily through the promotion of the 
greatest good for the greatest number. This penetrates the core of the report with the belief 
that anyone should have access to relief stating, “To refuse relief … is repugnant to the 
common sentiments of mankind” (Blomfield et al 1974, 334). Through this the principle of 
utility is promoted through the maximisation of happiness for both the individual and the 
wider community (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 127). This would continue through the out-
line for the depauperizing of the able-bodied in the wider community as it would elevate 
the general condition of the mass of the society. However, limiting conditions would be 
placed on relief given it was “the country at large, at whose expense he is to be relieved” 
(Blomfield et al 1974, 335, 337, 375). This would protect the financial interests of the rate-
payers in the wider community, promoting the Bentham’s pleasure of wealth. Through 
these principles, the promotion of the overall happiness of the community would occur, 
thus demonstrating the principles of Utilitarianism (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 127).  
Before examining the individual cases of Hansard for evidence of Utilitarian ideas, a general 
understanding of the Hansard must be gained. The debates necessary for discussion range 
from the 21st February to the 13th August 1834 to reflect the reform’s passage through par-
liament to the passing of the bill. The influence of Utilitarianism is predominantly found in 
the discussion of the implementation, rather than the machinery of the Act itself. The Han-
sard has been examined for evidence of direct and indirect references to Utilitarian thought 
as Bentham said, “A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the 
approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action … is determined by and propor-
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tioned to the tendency … to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the commu-
nity.“ (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 127) This means that whilst an action may not be cre-
ated specifically with Utilitarian beliefs in consideration, it is possible for the theory to be 
represented in the values by which they are guided. Utilitarianism was also able to perme-
ate through parliament through Joseph Hume and John Arthur Roebuck who were known 
subscribers to the philosophy (Angas Weaver 1987, 1). 
A common issue routinely raised in the Hansard of 1834 was the separation of the family 
unit, as it was proposed that inmates would be segregated by gender, and in some cases by 
age1. This was regularly called into question by those opposed to the bill as being unneces-
sarily cruel however, this was refuted through statements by the likes of Lord Althorp who 
stated that separation was necessary “to ensure the proper regulation of workhouses”.2 
This is an idea that is steeped in Utilitarian influence as it draws on the pleasure versus pain 
principle by using the separation of the family unit as a deterrence to paupers claiming relief 
from the parish (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 155).  
In the discussions surrounding the mechanics of the bill, food and luxury products namely 
beer and tobacco were discussed in terms of their denial.3 It was generally agreed that 
workhouse inmates “… should not be so well fed.”4 This relates to the “pleasure of taste or 
palate; including whatever experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst”, 
which would be denied in the workhouse as bland food was to be provided in the work-
house as a disincentive to staying (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 156; Miller 2013, 945-6). 
The denial of a paupers “… accustomed enjoyments – no beer, no tobacco …” was raised, 
which further demonstrates the Utilitarian influence in its denial of the pauper the “pleas-
ure of intoxication”, which is one of Bentham’s pleasures of sense.5 This demonstrates how 
the Utilitarian pleasures infiltrate the debates in parliament.  
The topic of bastardy was discussed with reference to whom should have to predominately 
support the child.6 Whilst it was agreed that the mother should retain partial responsibility 
of the child, it was also maintained that the father should also be held, “responsible to the 
parish for the maintenance of his illegitimate child for otherwise the changes on the par-
ishes in large manufacturing towns and districts would be much increased”7. This promotes 
 
1 HC Parliamentary Debates, 17 April 1834, vol.22, c. 896. 
2 HC Parliamentary Debates, 9 June 1834, c.24, c.338.  
3 HC Parliamentary Debates, 1 July 1834, vol.24, c.1035.  
4 HC Parliamentary Debates, 23 May 1834, vol.23, c.1304.  
5 HC Parliamentary Debates, 1 July 1834, vol.24, c.1035; Bentham and Harrison 1960, 156. 
6 HC Parliamentary Debates, 18 June 1834, c.525, 527, 535.  
7 HC Parliamentary Debates, 18 June 1834, c.525, 527, 535. 
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the principle of utility through the “pleasure of wealth”, as by making the parents of the 
child responsible for its upkeep, instead of the of the parish, the financial interests of the 
wider community, and specifically the rate-payers would be protected (Bentham and Har-
rison 1960, 127, 156).  
Given the prominence of religion in society, it is not surprising that it was a major topic of 
debate throughout the Hansard. It was proposed that the commissioners should not be 
permitted to, “… oblige the inmates of a workhouse to attend any religious service that they 
did not conscientiously believe in, or to oblige the children in a workhouse to be educated 
in any faith that their parents did not approve of …”.8 This principle was further discussed 
in the sitting at the end of June, where it was proposed that children whose parents perish 
within the workhouse would not be educated in a faith that their parents did not agree 
with9. This positively represents the “pleasure of piety” as presented by Bentham’s Utilitar-
ianism which stated, “… the belief of a man’s being in the acquisition or in the possession 
of the good-will or favour of the Supreme Being …” is a pleasure which people will seek to 
maximise (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 157). Concerning the religious education, Lord Alt-
horp once again reiterates the “… greatest importance that persons of every religious de-
nomination should have religious instruction from their own pastors …”, even if they were 
not ministers of the established church.10 This ensures that paupers are still entitled to the 
“pleasure of piety” as they have the opportunity to acquire …” the good-will of favour of 
the Supreme Being …” (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 157). 
The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act was produced through the contributions of the Royal 
Commission and parliamentary debate over its report and drafting of legislation, thus the 
final form of the Act is also evidence of Utilitarianism’s influence on the Poor Law Reform. 
Historians regard the Act as radical piece of legislation that highlights the triumph of the 
newly emerging liberalism in parliament; this is also considered to be significant as it coin-
cides with the rise of middle class as an influential entity (Dentith 2009, 79; Salvadori 1972, 
2; Edsall 1971, 1). Despite its radical nature, the Act is vague in content: it does not make 
an explicit plan for reform through its one hundred and ten sections, but rather provides 
guidelines predominately focusing on the operations of the commissioners and guardians 
(Midwinter 1969, 7; Public General Act 1834, s.1-18). Once again, similar traits appear in 
the Act as seen in the Hansard, including the role of religion the upkeep of illegitimate chil-
dren, outdoor relief and the prohibition of alcohol within the institution (Public General Act 
1834, s.57, 27, 91). These guidelines structured the daily operations of the workhouses and 
 
8 HC Parliamentary Debates, 21 June 1834, c.719.  
9 HC Parliamentary Debates, 27 June 1834, c.926.  
10 HC Parliamentary Debates, 11 August 1834, c.1225. 
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relief of the poor being left in the hands of local guardians (Public General Act 1834, s.38). 
In a circular sent to parishes in November of 1834 by Edwin Chadwick, the aim of the new 
law was laid down clearly for the overseers, stating that it was not passed, “… for the pur-
pose of abolishing the necessary relief to the indigent, but for preventing various illegal and 
injurious practises, which had by degrees grown up in the administration of such relief” 
(Chadwick 1834b, n.p). The first eighteen sections of the Act relate specifically the commis-
sioners and aspects of their operations, including their appointment, who is eligible to sit 
and so forth (Public General Act 1834, s.1-18).  
Following the enactment, Utilitarian influence can be found in the implementation in the 
workhouse. Food, it has been argued, was seen by the central authority as an integral part 
of workhouse discipline (Crowther 1983, 213-4). Food was doled out in the workhouse from 
six predetermined diets that local commissions could pick from; these were graded accord-
ing to the age, sex and status of the inmate, the able-bodied receiving only the plainest fair 
(Roberts 1963, 103; Chadwick 1835, n.p.; Crowther 1983, 214). Bentham supported deter-
mined diets stating: “The dietary should not be fixed to a single mess: but a list of messes 
…”, further stating that the diets should “not be left to the local authority” (Bentham and 
Quinn 2010, 140). These diets all consisted of bread and gruel for breakfast, and bread and 
cheese for supper, the main meal of the day differs between the six, but being made up of 
meat, bread, cheese, soup or meat pudding (Chadwick 1835, n.p). This demonstrates Utili-
tarian principles as it removes, “The pleasures of taste or palate; outlining whatever pleas-
ures are experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst” through the monoto-
nous fair they would be given (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 160). For the majority of 
paupers, the distaste concerning the food came from the lack of luxuries such as beer, ra-
ther than a lack of nourishment; in some cases, access to salt was denied, further stripping 
their diet of everything that was familiar or acceptable. Once again removing the “pleasure 
of taste” from the inmates (Crowther 1983, 218; Bentham and Harrison 1960, 156). 
The evidence of Utilitarian influence also manifests within the principles surrounding out-
door relief, which the Royal Commission report had sought to prevent, but which neverthe-
less was allowed by the Act11. This provision of outdoor relief promoted the greatest good 
as it allows the Board of Guardians to still provide outdoor relief at their discretion, thus 
promoting the principle of utility as it allows for the Guardians to act in a way that promotes 
the greater interest of the community (Public General Act 1834, s.23; Bentham and Harrison 
1960, 126-7). It also highlights how the pauper was able to retain some dignity through the 
“pleasure of a good name” as they would not have to submit themselves to the workhouse 
 
11 HC Parliamentary Debates, April 17 1834, 883, 889; Public General Act 1834, s.23. 
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and thus enter a lower social ranking (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 157; Newman 2013a, 
366). This notion relates to the idea permeating through wider society of the deserving and 
undeserving poor, as only the deserving poor were said to be willing to give up their free-
dom to the workhouse (Stokes 2001, 711; Newman 2013a, 366). The idea of the deserving 
and undeserving poor is particularly relevant, as by submitting themselves to the work-
house, a pauper would reduce himself to a lower social standing (Newman 2013a, 365). The 
evidence of Utilitarianism also presents itself in the circular sent to the overseers of the 
poor in November of 1834, to advise how to make the transition to the new system as 
smooth as possible. For example, point 4 discusses the financial allowances allotted to la-
bourers with a number of children, stating, “… you should not suddenly or altogether dis-
continue these allowances, but you should make them in kind, rather than in money” (Chad-
wick 1834b, n.p). This endorses the principle of utility as it promotes the pleasure of the 
individuals in the community; specifically, this was done through the “pleasure of wealth”, 
as it does not strip the paupers of their allowances immediately but rather weans them off 
the parish fund (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 127, 156). This then results in the preservation 
of the “pleasure of a good name”, as it means they are not forced to enter the workhouse 
immediately to obtain their relief (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 157). So, it is evident 
through the principles of outdoor relief under the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act that Util-
itarianism manifested itself within the operation of the New Poor Law, as well as through 
the workhouse system. 
Religion was a significant aspect of life within the workhouse, such as regular prayers, in-
cluding before meals (Poor Law Commissioners 1836b, n.p). However, in the Utilitarian 
spirit no inmate would be forced to conform to, or practise a religion they did not believe 
in, as highlighted in the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act and circulars sent out to parishes 
after enactment (Public General Act 1834, 19; Poor Law Commissioners 1836b; 1836a, n.p). 
Bentham discusses how “being in the acquisition or in the possession of the good-will or 
favour of the Supreme Being” under the pleasures of piety (Bentham and Harrison 1960, 
157). This notion is further expanded to the religious instruction of pauper children in the 
event of the death of the parents, because pauper children would continue to be educated 
and allowed to practise the faith of their parents, even in the event of their demise (Public 
General Act 1834, s.19). Once again this relates back to the “pleasure of piety” as it allows 
for the inmate, and their children, to gain a knowledge and good will of their Supreme Being 
(Bentham and Harrison 1960, 157). 
So, it can be determined that Utilitarianism was a driving force behind the English Poor Law 
Reform of 1832-1837. This can be observed through the prominence of Utilitarian thinkers 
in the Royal Commission and the subsequent report that was produced. These ideas then 
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continue through the parliamentary debates, culminating with the 1834 Poor Law Amend-
ment Act. Through this Act, the Utilitarian principles can be seen through the workhouse 
system it reformed. This is shown through the system that Utilitarianism facilitated the cre-
ation of the materially dealt with the structural poverty created by the industrial revolution, 
while providing an ideological narrative that justified blaming paupers for their own pov-
erty, and the regulating of their behaviour to minimise social disruption (Finlayson 1969, 
72; Derry 1992, 212; Newman 2013b, 123). The influence of Utilitarianism can be estab-
lished through the analysis of the primary documents relating to the reform, namely reports 
produced for the British government, Hansard, legislation and archival material pertaining 
to the operations of the workhouse and the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act.  
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Samuel Romilly and Jeremy Bentham’s 
Decisions of Publication 
Cheng Li, University of York, UK 
Abstract 
From 1788 to 1818, Samuel Romilly had been Jeremy Bentham’s closest friend in his intellectual life. Due to his 
admiration of Romilly’s reformism and rising reputation in the courts and parliament, every time Bentham wrote 
a new manuscript he would send it to Romilly for advice. Romilly’s advice directly influenced Bentham’s decision 
on whether or not to distribute or publish his increasingly radical writings. In Romilly’s revisions, he would mark 
the dangerous passages of Bentham’s manuscripts and replace them with safer expressions. For the most time, 
Bentham appreciated much of Romilly’s revisions and accepted his suggestions. The following works of Bentham 
will be discussed: Truth versus Ashhurst; or, law as it is, contrasted with what it is said to be, the ‘On the dispensing 
power exercised by the Duke of Portland and his confederates’, the Elements of the Art of Packing and the Church-
of-Englandism. The analysis reveals that Romilly’s persuasion had two consequences for Bentham. Firstly, it stim-
ulated Bentham’s thinking about the freedom of speech and the nature of the existing libel laws. Secondly, it im-
proved Bentham’s judgement of publication. 
I   
The intellectual life at the salons of the Marquess of Lansdowne largely promoted the for-
mation of Bentham’s friendship with Romilly. By 1788 when Bentham had failed to attract 
the interest of the Russian empress and returned to England, Lansdowne’s Parisian salons 
had attracted many British, French and American intellectuals and became a centre of in-
novative ideas (Andrew 2006, 170). On the eve of the French Revolution, both Romilly and 
Bentham were excited by an optimistic view that the Revolution would improve both French 
and British societies. Lord Lansdowne encouraged them to aid his French connections with 
their knowledge of British law. Through Lansdowne’s arrangement, Romilly travelled to 
France and was asked by a French military officer for "some book which stated the rules 
and orders of proceeding in the English House of Commons" for the Estates-General (Ro-
milly 1840 I, 101). This inquiry stimulated Romilly’s interest in writing a manual by himself 
after a failed search for a suitable one. When Romilly returned to England, and shared the 
news with Bentham on Lansdowne’s salons, Bentham began to write on a similar topic. Also, 
Romilly assisted Bentham in his French writing and passed Bentham’s manuscripts on to 
Etienne Dumont, whose translation later built an international reputation for Bentham. Ro-
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milly and Bentham enjoyed the intellectual life at Lansdowne’s circle, particularly in his li-
brary which provided a plentiful source for them (de Champs 2015, 104). This association 
with Lansdowne is important also for the reason that through Lansdowne’s transnational 
network, Romilly and Bentham for the first time were presented to a large Enlightened au-
dience with the hope that their ideas could be heard and appreciated. When they worked 
closely together on writing on French issues and other reformist projects, they found more 
mutual appreciation. 
Secondly, Romilly’s rising reputation in the courts and parliament made Bentham seek as-
sistance for marketing his projects. Though the nineteenth century saw that social entre-
preneurs or "projectors" became more influential in some policy-making, the process of 
marketing or persuading the government still relied on personal friendships, and political 
patronage in many ways dominated the career of a social projector. In order to advertise 
the advantages of his projects, Bentham would seek friends within the system. In two of 
Bentham’s projects, the Panopticon prison building and the Scottish court reform, Romilly 
provided continuous support and became one of Bentham’s comrades. Romilly was named 
a king’s counsel in 1800 and in 1802 he was considered as "the head of the profession both 
in point of legal accomplishments, general information, and respectability" (Horner 1843, 
182). Due to Romilly’s high reputation and his practice in the chancery court, when Bentham 
met difficulty in persuading the Lord Chancellor he often asked Romilly for support. Through 
Romilly’s nudging, the Lord Chancellor responded to Bentham, saying why he disapproved 
of the Panopticon Bill. In 1806, Romilly was appointed as the Solicitor-General and this pro-
motion encouraged Bentham’s hope that his voice would be more appreciated. One ambi-
tion of the Whig ministry in 1806-7 was the reform of the Scottish civil courts. Some young 
Scottish lawyers came to London and visited Romilly’s house, where they were supposed to 
learn Bentham’s new writing on the same topic through Romilly’s introduction (Dinwiddy 
1988, 416). Through Romilly’s connection, Bentham received a public invitation from the 
influential Edinburgh Review to give advice on the Scottish legal reform (Jeffrey 1807, 483). 
In 1808, at Romilly’s encouragement, Bentham published the Scotch Reform; Considered 
with reference to the plan, proposed in the late Parliament, for the regulation of the courts, 
and the administration of justice in Scotland which guided the later reforms.  
II  
Due to Romilly’s position and legal knowledge, it would be safer for Bentham to know Ro-
milly’s opinion before the distribution or publication of his ideas. Many of Bentham’s radical 
expressions could cause the risk of prosecution. During the period of French Revolution and 
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the wars against France, many innovative and democratic ideas were interpreted as a threat 
to the national security. Without a precise code, judges were encouraged to use their dis-
cretionary power, but the opinion of a judge was uncertain. The political situations in that 
period also increased the difficulty in predicting a judge’s decision. Though judges tended 
to use the law more as a threatening tool and were not keen on the actual enforcement 
(Harling 2001, 107-34), the harshness of punishments and costly court fees still produced 
much anxiety. In practice, corruption was rife before the trial. The jury trial had long been 
boasted of as the safeguard of English justice but in 1817, a national scandal happened 
when corrupt practice in the special jury selection in Crown prosecutions was exposed and 
led to unprecedented publicity. Newspapers revealed how the master of the Crown Office 
selected jurymen in favour of the government (Epstein 1994, 56-57). 
Bentham’s critiques of the practice and theory of the existing laws developed from the 
1790s. December 1792 was a sensitive moment when the memory of the French September 
Massacres was so fresh, and the government had just conducted a trial of Thomas Paine for 
seditious libel. Bentham wrote a sweeping pamphlet, Truth versus Ashurst; or, law as it is, 
contrasted with what it is said to be. His words were most intense where the judge Ashurst 
boasted of the superiorities of the English law: Bentham refuted these as the abuses. Ben-
tham also interpreted Ashurst’s theory as the "dog-law" thinking in which judges designed 
the law as a tool to rule the people of inferior social status. The relationship between law 
makers and receivers was like the dog master and his dog. Judges deliberately made the 
laws vague in order to trap people for court fees: "when your dog does anything you want 
to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make 
laws for your dog" (Bowring 1843 V, 235). 
Soon after finishing the Truth versus Ashurst, Bentham sent a copy to Romilly. Romilly ac-
cepted its arguments and planned to make extracts. However, his opinion was not to pub-
lish as "the praise given to the French would, I have no doubt, throw discredit on all the 
truth it contains" (Milne 2017, 415). Bentham then gave up its publication until 1823. Inter-
estingly, this decision might have reflected their change of attitude towards the French Rev-
olution. After the September Massacres, Romilly said, "how could we ever be so deceived 
in the character of the French nation as to think them capable of liberty" (Romilly 1840 II, 
4). He also burned the copies of his new pamphlet as it contained his optimistic hopes. As 
their common friend Dumont said, "let us burn all our books, let us cease to think and dream 
of the best system of legislation, since men make so diabolical a use of every truth and every 
principle" (Romilly 1840 II, 6). Many French friends whom Romilly and Bentham knew 
through Lansdowne died in the Massacre. The death of the duc de La Rochefoucauld on 4 
September was devastating to Bentham, who was to have dinner with Dumont and the 
duke’s first cousin when the news arrived (de Champs 2015, 100). Since this event until the 
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mid-1795, Bentham hardly supported any political reformist projects and even associated 
any democratic polity with a series of negative features such as ignorance, violence, extrav-
agance, discontent, frequent wars, and danger of violent revolution to any democratic pol-
ity (Schofield 2004, 392, 396).  
While after the Massacres, Bentham found much to say about the merits of the British con-
stitution he still highly criticised its legal system (Schofield 2004, 398; 2006, 114). At the end 
of March 1802, Bentham wrote a polemic against the Duke of Portland, the then Lord Pres-
ident of the Council and the former Home Secretary. The polemic was in the form of a letter 
which Bentham planned to send to Lord Pelham, the Home Secretary. Bentham declared 
the former Secretary and his assistants of exercising "a dispensing power, for the purpose 
of illegally obstructing, and if possible preventing the execution of an imperative Act of Par-
liament" (University College London Library, Bentham Papers [hereafter UC], box 120, fol. 
470). The Act refers to the 1794 Penitentiary Act which gave approval to build a profit-mak-
ing prison and to allow Bentham to make a contract with the government (34 Geo. 3 c. 84). 
For many disadvantageous conditions such as the aristocratic dislike of Bentham’s chosen 
site and the Home Office’s preference of the penal transportation policy, by 1802 Bentham 
had spent 8 years of money and energy to get the land but failed to secure the contract 
(Semple 1993, 224-5). In an angry mood, Bentham had written a few weeks earlier that 
"unfortunately as to the destruction of eight years … they have murdered my best days!" 
(UC, box 120, fol. 466). When Romilly read the polemic, he agreed with Bentham’s argu-
ment but discouraged the publication for the reason that Bentham’s violent expressions 
might be conceived as libel (Dinwiddy 1988, 154). Bentham used words such as "conspiracy" 
and "state crimes" (UC, box 120, fol. 470, 473). Also, Romilly reminded Bentham that since 
the 1794 Act concerned his personal interest, the publication might cause a public scandal 
which would injure his own reputation. Thirdly, as a legal expert, Romilly suggested that 
such a scandal would force the government to accuse Bentham the guilty of libel. Romilly 
further inquired Bentham "what has passed between you and the present ministers" and 
reminded Bentham that there was very little chance of persuading the new Home Secretary 
(Dinwiddy 1988, 155).  
Bentham was alarmed by Romilly. Though still angry with Portland, he calmed down and 
began to revise the violent passages. He trusted Romilly’s libel law knowledge and asked 
him to detect "any objectionable passages" and claimed that if Romilly would not do, he 
would risk publishing the polemic and took the chance "for seeing the inside of the King’s 
Bench" (Dinwiddy 1988, 155). While the tone was tough, Bentham avoided danger.  
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The radicalization of Bentham’s legal thought continued, although it remained unpublished 
until 1817. On 20 February 1809, The Times commented on the government’s actions relat-
ing to the Duke of York Scandal. It claimed that 26 printers and publishers were under pros-
ecution for libelling the Duke, and the public mind was under "no ordinary uneasiness". 
Some of these printers and publishers were close to Bentham’s circle. For example, in April 
Bentham’s friends James Mill, Francis Horner and Francis Burdett concerned and petitioned 
for the Independent Whig newspaper, whose publisher and printer were convicted of libel 
and imprisoned (Conway 1988, 26-7). Their parliamentary petition complained that the 
king’s bench conducted an unfair trial and the special jury was selected in an irregular way 
which damaged the constitutional right of the accused (Hansard 24 Apr. 1809, 175-7). In 
the same month, Bentham was consulting sources for the Elements of the Art of Packing, as 
applied to Special Juries, particularly in Cases of Libel Law (UC, box 26, fol. 68; Conway 1988, 
22). By October, the sheriff of London, who was responsible for the selection of the special 
jury, seemed supportive of Bentham’s inquiry (Conway 1988, 47-9). At the end of 1809, 
Bentham completed a draft and judged that a suitable time for its publication was in the 
near future when he wrote "the current of public opinion has been turned against the Min-
istry, or rather against all Ministries, and in favour of Parliamentary Reform as the only rem-
edy" (Conway 1988, 60).  
In this context, Bentham sent a copy to Romilly. On 31 January 1810, Romilly replied that "I 
do most sincerely and anxiously entreat you not to publish it, --and I have not the least 
doubt that Gibbs [the then Attorney-General] would prosecute both the author and the 
printer" (Conway 1988, 60). Romilly stressed the point that the current Attorney-General 
was a very tough adversary and would prosecute and put Bentham in prison straightway. 
On 9 June 1809, Romilly had a conversation with Gibbs in the House of Commons. On that 
day, Gibbs had planned to move a Bill to strengthen the government’s power to suppress 
seditious activities, but as other business occupied the House till past 12 o’clock at night, 
Romilly prevented him for the reason that he would oppose the Bill and it was too late to 
have another debate. Romilly was concerned that Gibbs’ Bill was "a most insidious attack 
upon the liberties of the people" (Romilly 1840 II, 289-90). On 28 March 1811, Gibbs was 
criticised in the House of Lords for his harshness and partiality for his enthusiasm with which 
he filed ex officio information against the publishers. More relevant to Bentham’s case, 
Gibbs was a strong loyalist supporter of the Duke of York and his overreaction in protecting 
the Duke’s fame made these 26 publishers suffer (Melikan 2009, 3). Due to these consider-
ations, especially Romilly’s personal observation of Gibb’s character, Bentham was per-
suaded as he repeated Romilly’s warning to another friend later (Conway 1988, 94).  
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III  
These experiences pushed Bentham into developing a cautious strategy of publication to 
avoid prosecution. In September 1817, Bentham had printed a book which criticised how 
the Church of England conducted a series of abuses by its system of education. Before the 
decision of publication, Bentham lent Romilly a proof copy for the possibility of prosecution. 
Romilly cautioned that Bentham’s words might be viewed as disrespectful to Jesus (Conway 
1989, 66). Bentham then asked Romilly "to mark the dangerous passages" and "set down in 
the margin what he regarded as safe substitutes" (Conway 1989, 66). However, by 7 January 
1818, as Romilly still did not finish the revisions, Bentham lost patience and asked the return 
so that he could make use of whatever comments in it (Conway 1989, 143).  
In fact, earlier in December 1817, in order to test the possibility of prosecution by the cur-
rent Attorney-General Samuel Shepherd, Bentham had planned to publish a sample of the 
work which included extracts on the subject of blasphemy in a well-known newspaper. 
Shepheard was not like Gibbs and had defended Bentham’s radical MP friend Burdett in 
1810. The newspaper in Bentham’s mind was either the Morning Chronicle or the Examiner 
(Conway 1989, 138). Bentham particularly admired the editor of the Morning Chronicle, 
John Black who worked closely with James Mill and Francis Place. Meanwhile, William 
Hone’s blasphemy case encouraged enormous publicity and mobilized the public opinion 
against the government (Marsh 1998, 28). Bentham had hoped to publish the sample before 
the trial so that his arguments could produce its best effect. Eventually, he managed to 
publish the sample on 18 January 1818 in the Examiner with the promise that it could be 
revised freely with the editor’s discretion (Conway 1989, 139).  
Bentham also developed another method to secure safe publication. On 24 January Ben-
tham contacted William Smith, a unitarian MP and friend of the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
to enquire about the Archbishop’s attitude towards the blasphemy laws as Smith worked 
together with the Archbishop in 1813 in a reform campaign. One of Bentham’s questions 
was "whether it be not true, that a Bill, either drawn or approved by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, gave to the liberty of printing and publishing" (Conway 1989, 151-3). In this 
way, Bentham aimed to get the endorsement of the Archbishop for by adding the MP’s 
account into the preface of his new work. On 16 February, the MP provided the account. 
Later, Bentham published the Church-of-Englandism safely. 
In short, Romilly deserves the credit for improving Bentham’s judgement about publication. 
The bitter Panopticon experience not only pushed Bentham into a novel form of radical 
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politics but also made his rhetoric inappropriately violent sometimes. Bentham was too po-
litically optimistic and misjudged the tide of popular opinion and the stability of the Tory 
government many times. In this sense, it was fortunate for Bentham to have a critic lawyer 
friend who could tell him other sides of the real world.  
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Killing Animals: The Badness of Death, 
Value and Replaceability 
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Abstract 
Whilst animal suffering is usually considered morally relevant in utilitarian ethics, it is commonly argued that killing 
an animal can be a morally neutral act, so long as some conditions are met. In particular, Singer has argued that 
non-persons (both human and non-human) are replaceable, that is, we can painlessly kill them as long as we bring 
a similar being into existence to compensate for the net loss of utility that the killing would have resulted in the 
universe. This, known as the replaceability argument, is arguably Singer’s most controversial argument.  
In my paper, I will argue that death can be a misfortune for the victim due to the deprivation it causes. Death 
leaves the victim comparatively worse off (if the balance of well-being lost is positive), and therefore, death can 
be a misfortune for the victim. Furthermore, as (sentient) animals can experience different levels of well-being, 
they are too affected by their deaths. Thus, in cases where the animal is harmed by their death, utilitarians have a 
direct pro tanto reason to oppose their killing. However, replaceability means that this loss can be compensated 
by bringing a being with similar level of well-being into existence, leaving utilitarians with no direct reasons to 
condemn the killing.   
Importantly, I argue that the scope of the replaceability argument is wider than commonly recognised, and that 
once replaceability has been introduced, it also applies to persons, that is, to self-aware beings. Thus, those ac-
cepting replaceability may also need to accept that adult human beings are replaceable. This is a highly controver-
sial position and, I contend, should make us pause and consider the plausibility of those versions of utilitarianism 
that endorse replaceability. 
Introduction 
While utilitarian thinkers commonly regard animals as moral patients, and as such take a 
strong stance against animal suffering, the same cannot be said about the killing of animals. 
For some utilitarians, killing an animal can be considered a morally neutral act, as long as 
the killing is done without causing any suffering, and the animal is not self-aware. This eval-
uation of killing animals depends on the idea that death does not harm (merely sentient) 
animals, or if it does, this negative utility can be compensated, a position known as the 
replaceability argument. In particular, the replaceability argument holds that the killing of 
an innocent being can be a morally neutral act, as long as the victim is replaced with a similar 
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creature, which will restore the previous level of overall utility in the universe. This argu-
ment was first presented in its most prominent form by Peter Singer in Practical Ethics 
(2011, 106-7), and has been intensely debated since.1  
I will argue that utilitarians can account for the wrongness of killing, in both hedonistic and 
desire-based approaches, however, some versions of this ethical theory need to endorse 
replaceability. And those accepting replaceability may be unable to deem the killing of (at 
least some) innocent beings as wrong, leading them to highly controversial implications. To 
show this, I will analyse the utilitarian reasons against killing in both hedonistic and desire-
based accounts, and how these reasons can be applied to the case of non-human animals. 
Then, I will elaborate on how the replaceability argument, as devised by Singer, undermines 
these reasons. Finally, I will discuss the main issues with the replaceability argument, in 
particular its supposed scope, to highlight the unsettling implications of this argument when 
taken seriously. 
I The Wrongness of Killing 
Before we examine the utilitarian assessment of the wrongness of killing, a couple of clari-
fications are needed. First, for simplicity’s sake, I will assume that the killings are done pain-
lessly and without creating any distress for the creature. Secondly, in my discussion, I will 
assume (unrealistically) that the killing will not affect other sentient beings. That is, I will 
ignore indirect reasons against the killing, such as the grief or fear that the killing will pro-
duce in others, in order to elucidate whether killing sentient creatures harms them. 
First, let us examine the utilitarian reasons against killing. In the case of killing, and leaving 
aside indirect reasons, a utilitarian could argue that painlessly killing someone negatively 
impacts on their well-being. As their well-being has diminished, they have been harmed, 
and therefore, and other things being equal, we have committed a morally wrong act. How-
ever, to accept this as a direct reason against the killing of innocent beings, first it is neces-
sary to determine whether it is true that death has a negative effect on the victim’s well-
being.  
 
1 It has been argued (Dombrowsky 1997, 43-44; Uniacke 1997, Kemmerer 2007) that replaceability implies that 
utilitarian theory cannot account for the wrongness of killing merely-conscious life. Consequently, accepting 
replaceability may imply that utilitarianism fails to account for the value of (at least some) life. And even more, 
some have argued that this includes, in some instances, the wrongness of killing self-conscious beings (Lockwood 
1979). This is frequently regarded as a fatal criticism of utilitarian theory (Regan 2004, 206-11). 
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Traditionally, philosophers have considered that death harms the victim due to the depri-
vation it causes. Death takes our future from us, and with it, all future well-being. This po-
sition is known as the deprivation account of the badness of death. However, there is a 
serious problem for the deprivation account: even if death may curtail their possibility of 
future positive well-being, the victim is not around any more to experience that deprivation. 
So, although it is true that they are deprived of all future positive goods, they do not expe-
rience it. This, sometimes known as the experience condition, is the argument Epicurus 
(1994, 78) used to defeat the idea of the badness of death. 
The Epicurean challenge can be responded in several ways. A popular response is to claim 
that we can elucidate the effect death has for an individual in a comparative way. We could 
compare, for instance, two possible worlds, one where the victim dies at time X and another 
one where the victim continues to live until it dies at a later time Z. If all other variables are 
held constant, the difference in value between these two worlds is the value of the victim’s 
death. Whilst it is true that the victim cannot experience this frustration, they have been 
affected by their death: their overall well-being level is lower than it could have been. Thus, 
it is possible to claim that the victim has been harmed. 
When discussing the morality of killing, Singer appeals to the loss of future pleasure that 
the victim will suffer. However, he adds that the victim will not be present to suffer this 
deprivation and thus, is not affected by it. Singer says  
This means that we cannot move automatically from valuing a pleasant life rather than an 
unpleasant one, to valuing a pleasant life rather than no life at all. For, it may be objected, 
being killed does not make us worse off; it makes us to cease to exist. Once we have ceased 
to exist, we shall not miss the pleasure we would have experienced. (2011, 87) 
Hence, it would appear that Singer accepts some version of Epicurus’ existence condition: 
he acknowledges that pleasure may be lost with the killing, but this loss is not suffered by 
the victim herself.  
Let us clarify Singer’s position and his acceptance of the existence condition. Imagine I need 
to decide whether to kill Sally, whose future life is destined to be a happy one, with a posi-
tive balance of overall well-being. If we are measuring utility in a hedonistic way, we need 
to account for the loss of value that her death will cause: pleasure will be eliminated. How-
ever, note that whilst value has been destroyed, no disvalue has been created: assuming 
that her death was painless and caused no fear, the killing has not created a surplus of suf-
fering. Furthermore, this loss is merely accounted in impersonal terms, as the victim does 
not experience her loss. Thus, according to Singer, although pleasurable lives are valuable, 
the killing may not harm the victim herself. 
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However, I disagree with Singer. First, even in Singer’s own terms, we can still deem her 
killing as wrong, given that the amount of pleasure in the universe has been reduced, mak-
ing the universe worse (although not worse for anyone in particular). Hence, as reducing 
the amount of utility in the universe (in both personal and impersonal terms) is wrong, we 
can conclude that killing the creature is wrong (other things being equal). Secondly, I claim 
that Singer is mistaken when he declares that the victim has not been harmed. Even if the 
death has created no additional disvalue, the well-being level of the victim has been nega-
tively affected by her death, thus making her worse off. Moreover, as she has lost all possi-
bilities for positive value in her life, I contend that this harm is a great one, giving us a strong 
personal reason to condemn her killing. 
Let us now turn to preference utilitarianism. The response of preference utilitarians is sim-
ilar in the case of merely-conscious beings, that is, their killing will prevent the satisfaction 
of future preferences. Note that, similarly, the victim will not experience this frustration, so 
the loss of utility may also be impersonal. However, their response goes further in the case 
of self-conscious beings: a creature that is self-aware has an idea of itself through time, and 
can project themselves into the future, creating plans and holding preferences for their lives 
as a whole. Killing a self-conscious being will mean that their present preferences about the 
future will be frustrated. This frustration means that killing a self-conscious creature is 
worse, as along with the impersonal loss of value, there will be a personal one. Hence, killing 
them is a seriously wrong act. 
Thus, utilitarians can, in principle, deem the killing of innocent beings as morally wrong. This 
may not be enough to award these creatures the right to live, as utilitarians may agree to 
harm a creature if it maximizes overall utility; but it gives them a pro tanto reason to oppose 
the killing of innocent beings. How is it possible that some sentient beings are considered 
replaceable then? Here, it is necessary to explore the question of the creation of disvalue. 
Although the mere loss of value is enough to resolve the initial question of the wrongness 
of killing, the fact that disvalue is not being created is relevant to the discussion of replace-
ability.  
II Killing and Replaceability 
First, let us consider hedonism. When discussing replaceability, note that, although the loss 
of pleasure created by the victim’s death could be used to condemn her killing, this loss can 
be compensated. Namely, it is possible to restore the previous level of pleasure in the uni-
verse by bringing a similar being into existence, as long as its life will be as pleasurable as 
Killing and Replaceability 
135 
the victim’s. Importantly, as according to Singer the loss is only measurable in impersonal 
terms, it makes no difference who experiences the pleasure. This implies that sentient be-
ings are replaceable: it is morally acceptable to kill them, provided that they are replaced 
by a future being with a similar level of well-being. 
At this point, Singer needs to determine whether all sentient beings are replaceable, and if 
not, which of them are. In accord with a lengthy philosophical tradition (Locke 2008; Rachels 
1975; Tooley 1983), Singer alludes to the division between persons (self-conscious beings) 
and non-persons (merely conscious beings). This, together with a desire-based approach to 
utilitarianism, will allow him to claim that, while merely conscious beings are replaceable, 
self-conscious beings are not. As we have seen, persons not only have pleasurable states, 
but also preferences for the distant future and for their life as a whole. Importantly, these 
future-oriented preferences will be frustrated if they are killed, creating additional disvalue. 
Thus, these beings have a personal interest in continued existence, and for this reason, 
Singer considers them not to be replaceable. 
At this point we could ask why cannot this wrongness be compensated by bringing a similar 
being into existence, as done with merely-conscious beings. To reply to this question, we 
need to elucidate the values attached to the killing.2 Imagine two creatures. The first one is 
Sally the cow, a merely-conscious being (for the sake of the argument let us assume that 
cows are not self-conscious beings) The other being is Kelly, a self-conscious human being. 
Both their lives have a positive balance of well-being, faring at a five of positive utility. In 
the case of Kelly, though, of those five points, three are related to present concerns, but the 
remaining two are linked to plans that are projected into the future, such as the desire to 
see her children grow, or the preference for a continued existence. So, how will each version 
of utilitarianism address the loss suffered by their death and their possible replacements? 
In a hedonistic approach, when Sally the cow dies she loses five utility points. Similarly, 
when Kelly the human dies, she also loses her five utility points. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that both these losses are only accounted in impersonal terms, as they do not expe-
rience their loss. Moreover, and importantly, as their deaths have been void of suffering, 
the amount of negative utility in the universe has not increased. This means that all we need 
to do to compensate for their deaths is to bring into existence an equally happy being, that 
will restore the previous level of utility in the universe. Thus, in a hedonistic approach, both 
Sally and Kelly are replaceable in a similar manner. Some will try to counter this evaluation 
arguing that a human being will score higher in happiness than a non-human animal. How-
 
2 My example is based on Jamieson’s (1983) take on replaceability. 
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ever, note that even if we accept this, it does not mean that human beings are not replace-
able, it only means that they are not replaceable by a cow, as their score would be lower. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to replace a human with another human (or, perhaps, with 
multiple cows). 
Here is where preference utilitarianism helps Singer avoid the undesired implication that 
persons are replaceable. When Sally the cow dies, she loses five utility points. However, 
when Kelly the human dies, she loses all her five points of utility, but given that her long-
term preferences have been frustrated, she now scores a negative two. The key difference 
here is that, in a desire-based approach, the death of a self-conscious being creates disvalue, 
as the long-term preferences have been frustrated. This negative score implies that Kelly 
cannot be replaced by the creation of a similar creature. 
One could question, however, whether the frustration of future-oriented preferences is 
enough to deem self-conscious beings irreplaceable. On the contrary, I argue, that this dis-
value could still be compensated by the creation of other beings. It is possible, for instance, 
to create a being that will exceed the happiness level of the previous one. For instance, if 
we bring Mark into existence, he will enjoy an optimistic personality that will allow him to 
fare a positive well-being of seven. This is enough to compensate for the negative two of 
Kelly, and still restore those five impersonal points lost. Alternatively, it would also be pos-
sible to bring into existence, two cows or four rabbits, and their aggregated positive welfare 
will in fact exceed that of Kelly. Therefore, it would seem that, even in a desire-based ap-
proach, persons are still replaceable. 
I have argued that both versions of utilitarian theory can account for the wrongness of kill-
ing, as long as the victim was destined to enjoy a positive balance of overall well-being. 
Killing the victim eliminates what utilitarianism considers to be the unique value, positive 
welfare, thus robbing the victim of all the good things in their life. This loss negatively affects 
the overall well-being of the victim, therefore harming her. Consequently, and other things 
being equal, killing the victim is morally wrong. In this way, utilitarians have a pro tanto 
reason reason to condemn the killing. The problems arise, however, when replaceability is 
introduced. As the harm inflicted on the victim can be compensated by the creation of an-
other being, this harm becomes irrelevant, leaving utilitarians with no means to justify the 
wrongness of killing. Furthermore, we have seen that efforts to restrict replaceability to 
merely-conscious beings by appealing to long-term preferences may be unsuccessful too, 
leaving persons equally unprotected.  
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Importantly, although utilitarians are commonly criticised as having too weak a stance 
against killing, the problem created by replaceability is far more problematic. Critics fre-
quently contend that the utilitarian pro tanto reasons against killing fail to adequately pro-
tect potential victims, as such reasons can be trumped if the act maximises utility. This is a 
serious criticism, as rules against the killing of innocents are frequently considered among 
our most basic moral intuitions. However, as we have seen, utilitarians who accept replace-
ability lack any direct reasons to condemn killing, including the killing of self-aware beings, 
such as adult human beings. This leads us to the perplexing conclusion that, as long as we 
bring new beings into existence, the harm done to the victim is irrelevant to the evaluation 
of the killing, even in the case of persons. 
Does this mean that utilitarianism is a failed moral theory? Here it is relevant to note that 
not all versions of utilitarianism accept replaceability, as this position mainly depends on 
the assumption that value is to be accounted in an impersonal way. This is the type of ap-
proach Singer takes, a position known as the Total View. Nevertheless, this is a controversial 
view in utilitarian ethics, as are, in fact, all the other potential positions on how to account 
for utility in the universe. However, I believe that the implications that the replaceability 
argument has for the ethics of killing are serious enough to count against the plausibility of 
those views supporting it. 
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From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism 
An Empathy-Based Internalist Foundation of Welfare 
Ethics 
Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, Italy 
Abstract  
The article develops an internalist justification of welfare ethics based on empathy. It takes up Hume’s and Scho-
penhauer’s internalistic (but not consistently developed) justification approach via empathy, but tries to solve 
three of their problems: 1. the varying strength of empathy depending on the proximity to the object of empathy, 
2. the unclear metaethical foundation, 3. the absence of a quantitative model of empathy strength.  
1. As a solution to the first problem, the article proposes to limit the foundation of welfare ethics to certain types 
of empathy. 2. In response to the second problem, an internalistic metaethical conception of the justification of 
moral principles is outlined, the result of which is: The moral value of the well-being of persons is identical to the 
expected extent of (positive and negative) empathy arising from this well-being. 3. The contribution to the solution 
of the third problem and focus of the article is an empirical model of the (subject’s) expected extent of empathy 
depending on (an object’s) well-being. According to this model, the extent of empathy is not proportional to the 
expected empathy, but follows a concave function and is therefore prioritarian. Accordingly, the article provides a 
sketch of an internalist justification of prioritarianism. 
I The Search for a Justification of Utilitarianism and 
a New Proposal - With a Prioritarian Outcome 
The justification of utilitarianism is not exactly a success story. Mill’s justifications (1998, ch. 
4, par. 3-9), for example, are paradigmatic fallacies. Several justifications, in an intuitionistic, 
question-begging way, already presuppose certain moral principles – Hare (disguised by se-
manticism) (1981, sects. 1.3; 1.6) and Singer (1993, 11-12; 2011, 91-93; 100-102; 113-14) 
presuppose a certain form of universalization, Harsanyi (1953) presupposes ignorance of 
one’s own identity (thereby operationalizing impartiality like Rawls) or the Pareto Principle 
plus the application of Bayesian Rationality to moral decisions (Harsanyi 1955). Still others 
build on – questionable – rationality-theoretical premises – in particular the equalization of 
one’s own future time slices and the time slices of other persons (Sidgwick 1982, 381-82; 
418-19; Parfit 1992, 281-82; 342; 346; Broome 1991, 231-37; 239-40). Most utilitarians do 
not even give a reason and only rely on their intuitive acceptance of utilitarianism (e.g. 
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Smart 1973, 3-8). But the research on the rational foundations of utilitarianism also contains 
unexploited potential, e.g. Hume’s reflections. 
This article develops a justification of a welfarist moral value function based on empathy, 
or, in Hume’s (1978, 317-19) terminology, on sympathy. Here I will use the terms "empa-
thy", "sympathy" and "compassion" interchangeably and with them mean: an emotion 
evoked by considering some person’s or sentient being’s well-being, that leads to the com-
passionate emotion, which may be negative or positive, according to the object’s assumed 
negative or positive well-being. My justification takes up Hume’s (1978, sects. III.2.2; 3.1-3) 
and Schopenhauer’s (1977, §§15-6) internalistic (but not consistently developed and em-
pirically flawed) approaches, but tries to solve three of their problems. The first problem, 
seen by Hume himself (but not satisfactorily solved), is: Morality formally requires univer-
sality and impartiality, while empathy varies with the temporal, spatial, social and personal 
distance from the object of empathy (1978, 580-82; 603). The second problem is the unclear 
metaethical basis of Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s approaches. The third problem, seen by 
neither of them, is that empathy is not proportional to the well-being of the empathy ob-
ject:1 An empirical study I conducted shows that compassion with negative well-being is 
more intensive than happiness about others’ positive well-being. 
My proposal for solving the first problem is that, in order to achieve universality and impar-
tiality, which are necessary for the purpose of morality, the moral justification should be 
based only on certain universalistic forms of empathy: empathy that arises when consider-
ing the effects of one’s own actions on the well-being of others (and not, for example, the 
empathy that arises from direct contact with others) (Lumer 1999). Unfortunately, this is 
only a very weak component of our total empathy but the only one which is subject-univer-
salistic, i.e. leads to interpersonally identical valuations of the same objects (though there 
will rarely be valuations of the same object by different persons). The problem of the emo-
tion’s and therefore also the appertaining motivation’s weaknesses may be resolved by tak-
ing the empathic emotion only as the signal which informs us about its object’s moral value. 
This signal then has to be amplified by other motives which follow its lead. The most im-
portant such amplifiers are socially valid norms (Schopenhauer also suggested this (1977, 
257-58)) and our feeling of moral self-worth. In the following I will not deal any further with 
this problem but will focus on the first and third problems. 
 
1 Hume, instead, seems to presuppose some proportionality between the pleasure of the persons affected and the 
spectators’ sentiments: sympathy for the affected, love and hate for those changing their fate (1978, 591). 
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The proposal for the solution of the third problem is to study empirically how the degree of 
other persons’ well-being influences our empathy.2 More precisely: In the following an em-
pirical model is developed, that calculates which extent of empathy (i.e. the integral of pos-
itive and negative empathy over time) occurs depending on the average well-being of an 
object of empathy. The expected extent of empathy is then the hedonistic and internalist 
moral reason for empathy-optimizing actions; and this empathy is also the basis and source 
of the internalist morality: The proposal equates the expected extent of empathy – which 
is identical to its expected hedonic desirability for the empathetic subject – with the moral 
value of the object’s underlying well-being. The most important outcome of the model be-
low is: Because of the greater intensity of negative empathy, the resulting moral value func-
tion is not utilitarian (linear function from well-being to moral desirability) – as a Humean 
may have guessed –, but prioritarian (concave function from well-being to moral desirabil-
ity). This means the model provides a justification3 and quantitative specification of priori-
tarianism. 
In the following I will first (II) briefly explain the metaethical basis of the justification devel-
oped here and thereby outline my solution of the second, metaethical problem; this is only 
for understanding the approach, a further justification of this basis is not possible here. (III) 
Subsequently, I will present the empirical model of expected empathy in order to (IV) draw 
normative-ethical consequences. 
 
2  I have developed the model set out below in my professorial dissertation from 1992, which, however, was 
published only in 2000, 2nd edition 2009 (Lumer 2009). This paper is the first English presentation of the model. 
3  If prioritarianism is justified at all, exceptions aside, it is justified only intuitionistically, in particular as a middle 
way between utilitarianism, which is economic but does not intrinsically care about distributive justice, and 
maximin or leximin, which cares about distributive justice by giving priority to those who are worst off but in an 
extremist way. An exception is Hurley’s (1989, 360-82) idea to introduce a risk-averse, concave weighting of 
prospects into a Rawlsian/Harsanyian framework of rational decision under uncertainty about one’s identity. The 
result would be a concave, today we would say: prioritarian, moral value function. But Hurley did not elaborate 
this idea nor bring it together with the critique of utilitarianism and Rawls’ difference principle; she envisioned her 
idea as something egalitarian – prioritarianism at that time was not yet a theoretical movement. 
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism  
142 
II Metaethical Foundations of the Justification of 
Morals 4 
What is a valid justification of morals at all? Justifications of morals, firstly, contain an epis-
temically rational component: By justifying these morals, one gains insights which distin-
guish them as something special. Secondly, valid justifications of morality contain a practical 
component: they are to have the consequence that the addressee of the justification adopts 
the justified morality as his own and, if possible, also acts on this basis. 
The simplest and clearest way to bring the epistemic and the practical requirements to-
gether is to design moral justifications as arguments for a thesis about the object of justifi-
cation, i.e. about the moral principle, etc. However, this cannot be any thesis; but the justi-
fication for this thesis must meet certain conditions. A thesis which fulfils these conditions 
is the justification thesis for moral principles. In this way, the epistemic requirement can be 
met by the fact that the justification still consists in an argumentatively valid and adequate 
argument which leads to a justified belief; and the practical and moral requirements can be 
met by selecting a particular thesis about the object to be justified, i.e. the justification the-
sis that this object has a certain justificatory quality F. I have developed several adequacy 
conditions for selecting this property F: 
Adequacy Condition 1 (AC1): Motivation or practical requirement: Moral justification theses 
about moral principles are motivating in the sense that if a prudent addressee (i.e.: an ep-
istemically and practically rational addressee with certain relevant information) is justifiedly 
convinced of the justification thesis (i.e. that the moral principle in question is F), he is mo-
tivated, at least to some extent, to adopt and observe the moral principle. 
The motivation requirement is the specifically practical component of the conception for 
justifying moral principles. It makes the justification internalistic.  
Adequacy Condition 2 (AC2): The motivating effect’s stability with respect to new infor-
mation: The motivating effect of a justified conviction of a justification thesis is stable with 
respect to new information, i.e. it is not lost as a consequence of acquiring additional true 
information. 
Stability with respect to new information is the rational component of the concept of justi-
fying moral principles. The only thing we can rationalize (in the sense of making it rational) 
 
4 Unfortunately, for reasons of space, this section is rather apodictic. A detailed explanation and justification of the 
presented metaethical approach can be found in: Lumer 2009, 30-127; 577-632; 2015. 
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directly are beliefs, indirectly also actions and other things. And the two main directions of 
that rationalization are: first, to make our beliefs true, i.e. to acquire possibly only true be-
liefs (or to correct false beliefs) by observing epistemological rules and, second, to increase 
the number of true beliefs. The requirement of the motivation’s stability with respect to 
new information introduces the practically relevant maximum of epistemic rationality into 
the conception of practical justification. 
Adequacy condition 3 (AC3): Moral instrumentality: Principles for which the justification the-
sis is true fulfill the function of moral principles, they meet the instrumental requirements 
for such principles and for morals in general. 
Moral instrumentality is the specifically moral component of the conception of justification. 
If the “justified” moral principles do not fulfill the function of morality we are no longer 
dealing with a justification of a morality. 
What is the function of morality? One can facilitate answering this question by distinguish-
ing the structural components of morality. Normative morality consists mainly of a moral 
desirability function and moral norms, institutions and virtues. Once the moral desirability 
function has been established, it can be used to justify the other components of morality as 
more or less good means for realizing moral values. So, proceeding in this way, only the 
practical function of the moral value order has to be determined. 
One can distinguish an individual and a socially binding morality, where the latter is de-
signed to regulate social relations in an intersubjectively binding way. Here I will mainly deal 
with the second type. The sense of a socially binding moral desirability function could be 
prudential-consensualistic:  
1. Consensualistic requirement: Socially binding moral evaluation criteria constitute a com-
mon moral value system that provides the intersubjectively shared standard (i) for assessing 
socially relevant measures, (ii) for planning social projects and (iii) for consensual arbitration 
of interpersonal conflicts of interest. In addition, for individuals the purpose or sense of 
such an intersubjectively shared value system could be to procure a benchmark for self-
transcendent ego ideals and actions. I call this quality of the desired moral value functions 
“subject universalism”, i.e. the value of all value objects (or more precisely the value relation 
of every two value objects p and q (= U(p)/U(q)) of this value function is roughly identical 
for all (or nearly all – except e.g. for psychopaths) moral subjects of the moral community. 
2. Prudential requirement: The prudential requirement is that the subjective value functions 
to be compared according to subject universalism be parts or components of the subjects’ 
prudential desirability functions. Prudential desirability functions express what is good for 
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the respective subject and hence, rationally or from a prudential point of view, should be 
the guideline of the subject’s decision. Prudential desirability functions are constructed sim-
ilarly to the utility functions of rational decision theory but with much stricter, philosophi-
cally developed standards, which also permit the criticism and correction of the subject’s 
present instrumental or even intrinsic preferences (cf. e.g. Brandt 1979, part I; Lumer 2009, 
241-428; 521-48). Prudential desirability functions are intersubjectively different – that I 
have a headache is mainly bad for me and neutral for you, and the reverse holds for your 
headache –; otherwise they could not express the personal good. Therefore, the subject-
universalistic requirement is not intended to refer to complete prudential desirability func-
tions but only to components thereof, i.e. parts of the total value which derives from par-
ticular types of consequences of the value object. 
This concludes the metaethical considerations regarding the justification of morals; now the 
exposed conception has to be applied. The next step is empirical, viz. to enquire empirically, 
with the help of empirical decision theory and moral psychology, which component V of the 
prudential desirability function U is subject-universal and hence can be adopted as the 
moral desirability function. The result of a respective scrutiny is that interpersonally (nearly) 
identical components of our prudential desirability functions arise from our expected com-
passion and our expected feelings of respect. Of these two subject-universal feelings and 
motives, however, compassion is much better suited as the basis of the moral desirability 
function. For unlike compassion, one can hardly specifically optimize one’s feelings of re-
spect; respect is rather passive, it evokes motives for defending the respected object, but 
not motives for creating or improving respected objects. Therefore, in the following I will 
develop a model of a prudential desirability function based on empathy, or more precisely: 
a model of expected empathy depending on the well-being of other people. This expected 
empathy, in turn, corresponds to its hedonic desirability for the empathic subject. Ulti-
mately, desirability procured through empathy is the sought-after subject-universal compo-
nent of the prudential desirability function, which defines moral desirability. In short: The 
extent of expected empathy (according to the empirical model) is equated with moral de-
sirability. 
III An Empirical Model of the Expected Extent of 
Empathy 
So the present task is to develop a – simplified – quantitative model of how the well-being 
of other persons whom we neither particularly like nor dislike is reflected in our expected 
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sympathy, i.e. the expected amount of our feelings of positive and negative sympathy. In 
short the model informs about the (expected) extent of our sympathy depending on other 
persons’ well-being. The model’s most important simplifying assumptions are these: 1. The 
object of our sympathy is the assumed well-being of the person(s) for whom we feel sym-
pathy. 2. Errors in our assumptions about other persons’ well-being statistically offset each 
other. 3. The model deals with universal sympathy only, i.e. a kind of sympathy we feel for 
strangers whom we neither like nor dislike in a particular way and whose behavior we do 
not judge in a moral way. 4. In a very flexible society like ours, the chances to be confronted 
with the lot of other people are equal for all objects of sympathy. And the salience of the 
fate of other people is equally distributed statistically. 5. The intensity of our compassion 
depends on the intensity and duration of considering it. But again, the expected values of 
these two quantities are intersubjectively equal for all objects of sympathy. 6. Prudent sub-
jects have feelings of sympathy and do not try to avoid them. 
The first step in developing this model is to determine the intensity of our sympathy de-
pending on the assumed condition of the object. Consider figure 1.  
The x-axis represents the object’s well-being; positive values represent pleasant feelings, 
negative values represent unpleasant feelings. The y-axis represents the appertaining sym-
pathy, negative values representing pity and positive values representing pleasant feelings 
of sharing joy or the other person’s flourishing. The other person’s well-being as well as the 
sympathy are normalized into the interval [-1;1] with 0 being the point of indifference. Plau-
sible assumptions about the function from well-being to sympathy are: The sympathy func-
tion ascends monotonously. To neutral well-being we are sympathetically indifferent; i.e. 
the function includes the point (0;0). Negative sympathy, i.e. pity, is much more intense 
Fig. 1: Sympathy S(x) depending on assumed well-
being x 
Fig. 2: Distribution PD(x) of well-being x  
for xµ=0 
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism  
146 
than positive sympathy. At the time when I developed this model I conducted interviews 
for testing the willingness to exchange packages of such feelings with different durations. 
This kind of willingness was then hedonistically reinterpreted as the subject’s comparative 
judgement of the respective extents of sympathy. According to these calculations, pity for 
the most extreme sort of suffering was 4 to 10 times more intensive than positive sympathy 
with the most extreme form of joy. Conservatively I have taken 4 to be the right relation. 
The most extreme points of the function of figure 1 then are (-1; -1) and (1;0.25). Empirically 
our normal well-being ranges between 0 and 0.4; our sympathetic reaction to this kind of 
normal well-being is minimal. Outside of this region of normalcy sympathy’s intensity in-
creases rapidly, though much more rapidly versus negative than versus positive. When ap-
proaching extreme states of well-being sympathy will be satiated. – From these assump-
tions one gets the sympathy function designed in figure 1. 
The most important feature of this function is that it is not linear: Pity is much more intense 
than positive sympathy; and normal states of well-being (between 0 and 0.4) are nearly 
neglected by our sympathy. 
The second step of the model is to find out the intrasubjective distribution of well-being for 
different objects of sympathy over their life-time. For establishing the extent of sympathy, 
we need not know the exact course of the object’s well-being but only the proportional 
duration of the single levels of well-being during the whole life. Again simplifying, I assume 
that these well-being levels are distributed normally. The open parameters of such a normal 
distribution are, first, the mean µ and, second, the spread σ. Empirical research on well-
being has revealed that the intersubjectively most extreme long-term means of well-being 
of the unhappiest and the happiest people, positively-linearly transformed in our scale (-
1;1), lie between 0 and 0.4 (0≤µ≤0.4), so that the happiest people in the long run arrive at 
a mean of 0.4. Continuing the simplification, I assume that the mean levels of well-being of 
happy and unhappy people are intersubjectively different, but that the spread remains the 
same. Relying on some plausible assumptions about the absolute duration of very extreme 
feelings, the spread can be calculated as being equal to σ=0.16. The resulting curve for µ=0 
is shown in figure 2. In this way one gets a bundle of curves of normal distributions each 
representing the distribution of different well-being levels for typical more or less happy 
individuals; all these curves are equally shaped but their means range from 0 to 0.4 – ac-
cording to the individual happiness –; i.e. the curves are shifted to the left or to the right 
with the top of the curves ranging between 0 and 0.4. 
The third step is to multiply the probabilities given by the normal distribution of well-being 
with the sympathy function and to calculate the integral from -1 to 1 over this product func-
tion. The result of this operation is the expected extent of sympathy, i.e. the sum of all 
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feelings of sympathy which one expects to feel for a given person depending on the mean 
well-being µ of this person. This operation can be repeated for all the long-term means µ of 
well-being from the empirically expected range of such means, i.e. the interval from 0 to 
0.4. The result is the function of the extent of sympathy depending on the long-term mean 
level µ of well-being. Normalizing the mean levels of well-being as well as the resulting ex-
tents of sympathy by a positive-linear transformation into the interval [0;1] one gets the 
normalized function of the extent of sympathy: ESN(m). This function is represented in fig-
ure 3. 
In this function the x-axis represents the normalized lifetime mean-levels of well-being; and 
the y-axis represents the normalized expected extent of sympathy resulting from facing per-
sons having the respective mean-level of well-being. 
If somebody wants to value some social order from a purely sympathetic perspective he can 
assess the various mean levels of well-being of the people living in this society, find out the 
appertaining extent of sympathy and, finally, sum up these extents of sympathy. This, of 
course, is the same procedure which a hedonist prioritarian has to use to assess the priori-
tarian value of this social order. The only difference is that the prioritarian uses the priori-
tarian welfare function instead of the function of the extent of sympathy. 
For formal mathematical reasons, but above all for metaethical reasons, one would like to 
have functions with certain properties as prioritarian weighting functions: They should be 
concave throughout, i.e. have a constantly decreasing gradient, rise monotonously, etc. For 
Fig. 3: Normalized extent of sympathy ESN(u) 
depending on the long-term mean level u of well-
being 
 
Fig. 4: Comparison of the normalized extent of 
sympathy ESN(u) with utilex VPe19∙0.95 (exponential 
value function) 
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this purpose I have discussed several mathematical curve families (Lumer 2005, sect. 3.1). 
The most suitable of these curve families are exponential curves: 
for e > 1: VPee(u) = e/(e-1)) ‧ (1-e-u); and 
for e = 1: VPe1(u)=u; this is identical to the right-hand limes of VPee(u) for e→1 (see figure 5). 
VPee(u) is the family of exponential Prioritarian Value functions with the parameter e, where 
"e" within the function is a parameter equal to or larger than 1 (and does not mean Euler’s 
number), which expresses the degree of priorioritarianism: the higher the number e, the 
stronger the prioritarian inclination. With e=1 the prioritarian inclination does not exist; the 
curve coincides with utilitarianism. With extremely high values for e the function creates 
leximin preferences. e-values between these extremes represent more or less radical forms 
of prioritarianism. 
One can now compare the empirically established function of the extent of empathy with 
these ideal prioritarian curves. The one that fits best is the curve for e=19. The two curves 
are compared in Figure 4. (The prioritarian function has been compressed by the factor 0.95 
in order to facilitate the comparison.) One can easily see that, for a big stretch the two 
functions are more or less identical. That is why I have proposed the exponential prioritarian 
curve with e=19 (VPe19(u)) as the internalistically justified prioritarian weighting function. 
The function of the extent of sympathy just presented is based on some rather provisional 
measurements. But its general prioritarian shape is rather stable with respect to changes of 
Fig. 5a: Exponential functions: VPe1, VPe7, VPe19, VPe500 
 




these assumptions and measurement results. So the exact function may be changed by re-
measuring but the prioritarian shape will remain, because it depends only on the stronger 
intensity of pity as compared to positive sympathy. 
IV Conclusion 
On the basis of all these considerations we can now draw the conclusion: The internalist 
justification strategy for value ethics based on the adequacy conditions presented in section 
2 and the prudential-consequentialistic determination of the function of socially binding 
morals, via an empirical scrutiny of possible subject-universal components of the prudential 
desirability functions has led to identifying empathy with others whom we neither like nor 
dislike in a particular manner as the sought source of the moral desirability function. On the 
basis of prudential hedonism, the empirical model of the expected extent of sympathy de-
pending on other persons' (mean life-time) well-being provides the quantitative specifica-
tion of this prudential desirability function. This function is mathematically simplified as 
VPe19(u), so that this function is therefore proposed here as the internalistically justified 
moral value function. This value function is universalistic, welfaristic and prioritarian. In the 
next parts of the theory, on the basis of this value function, certain moral norms, institu-
tions, virtues, etc. can be justified as good means of realizing moral values. 
What has been achieved with the study presented here? 1) If one tries to justify welfare 
ethics internalistically in the manner outlined above through compassion, the result is a 
version of prioritarianism, not utilitarianism (i.e. a concave not a linear moral value func-
tion). 2) In this way, prioritarianism has been justified internalistically, i.e. with recourse to 
(pre-moral) motives. This goes far beyond a merely intuitive acceptance of prioritarianism. 
3) Prioritarianism has been quantitatively specified, beyond a vague comparative intuition, 
in a way that is needed for complex moral assessments with the comparison of many dif-
ferent consequences for different persons. From an infinite spectrum of more or less radical 
forms of prioritarianism, a specific one is distinguished as internalistically justified. 
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How to Define ‘Prioritarianism’ and 
Distinguish It from (Moderate) 
Egalitarianism 
Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, Italy 
Abstract 
In this paper, first the term ‘prioritarianism’ is defined, with some mathematical precision, on the basis of intuitive 
conceptions of prioritarianism, especially the idea that "benefiting people matters more the worse off these people 
are". (The prioritarian weighting function is monotonously ascending and concave, while its first derivation is 
smoothly descending and convex but positive throughout.) Furthermore, (moderate welfare) egalitarianism is 
characterized. In particular a new symmetry condition is defended, i.e. that egalitarianism evaluates upper and 
lower deviations from the social middle symmetrically and equally negatively (as do e.g. variance and Gini). Finally, 
it is shown that this feature distinguishes egalitarianism also extensionally from prioritarianism. 
Introduction: Open Problems of Prioritarianism and the 
Aims of This Paper 
Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are important ways of correcting utilitarianism for con-
siderations of justice (others are sufficientarianism and leximin). (Telic) egalitarianism aims 
at diminishing (or eliminating) intersubjective differences in personal goods, in particular 
individual utilities (Parfit 1997, 204). Prioritarianism on the other hand, wants each person 
to fare as well as possible, but is especially concerned with those who are worse off. From 
this idea we get Parfit’s prioritarian slogan: "Benefiting people matters more the worse off 
these people are" (Parfit 1997, 213). While egalitarians are concerned with relativities, i.e. 
how each person’s level compares with the level of other people, prioritarians are con-
cerned with absolute levels, giving the higher priority to improving the situation the lower 
the beneficiaries fare in absolute terms (Parfit 1997, 214). 
Prioritarianism has many advantages with respect to other criteria of distributive justice, 
which, however, I can not discuss here. Despite these advantages, up to the present priori-
tarianism has not been elaborated that much and – among others – the following problems 
still have to be resolved: 1. (Moderate welfare) egalitarianism as well as prioritarianism, 
both fulfil the Pigou-Dalton condition and can be represented by concave welfare-functions. 
Does there then remain any difference between these two approaches and, if yes, what 
does it consist in? 2. More generally, how can ‘prioritarianism’ and ‘(moderate welfare) 
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egalitarianism’ be precisely defined? 3. If prioritarianism is to be applied in practice the de-
gree of priority has to be established. What exactly is the prioritarian welfare function? 4. 
Prioritarians have described their intuitions about priority. Is there any deeper, in particular 
internalist, justification of prioritarianism? – In this article I sketch an answer to the first two 
questions. In a parallel paper (Lumer 2020) I propose an answer to the fourth question; and 
in Lumer 2005 (22-32) I have provided an answer to the third question.1 
I Defining ‘Prioritarianism’ 
Parfit has summarized and systematized the ideas of a number of other philosophers, given 
this system the name "priority view" and coined the prioritarian slogan: "Benefiting people 
matters more the worse off these people are" (Parfit 1997, 213). A somewhat different way 
of explicating prioritarian intuitions is to take prioritarianism as a synthesis of utilitarianism 
and leximin somewhere between these two systems, which preserves the advantages of 
both, utilitarianism’s efficiency and leximin’s concern for those badly off, and removes their 
respective one-sidedness’s, utilitarianism’s neglect of distributive justice and leximin’s inef-
ficient and hard-hearted intrinsic disregard of improvements for those better off (even the 
second worst off) (Lumer 1997, 102; 2009, 628-32; Temkin 2003). 
‘Prioritarianism’ may informally be defined like this: 
Prioritarianism is a way of intrinsically morally valuing individual situations, according to 
which (small) changes in personal well-being, or more generally: personal desirability of the 
situation, are morally valued in strict positive correlation to these changes but giving more 
– though not infinitely more – weight to changes for people being badly off; this weight 
declines continuously and smoothly with increasing personal desirability, however without 
ever reducing to zero – not even for the highest levels of personal desirability. 
The different weights express the degree of our moral concern, i.e. how close improving the 
lot of the person in question is to the moral subject’s heart. Because this desirability func-
tion is applied to life situations of individuals, the moral value of a group’s state can be 
established additively. 
 
1 The present article to a great extent is an abridged version of a part of an unpublished working paper of mine 
(Lumer 2005, sect. 2). The parallel article (Lumer 2021) mainly relies on material – so far published only in German 
– of my habilitation thesis from 1992: Lumer 2009, 589-632. 
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The straightforward way of formally modeling prioritarian valuing is to define a one-adic 
moral value function over normalized personal desirabilities – which may range from 0 to 
1. This is represented in figure 1a (source: Lumer 2005, sect. 2.1). 
The moral value function increases monotonously because of the strict positive correlation 
between personal desirability changes and their moral assessment. Therefore, and because 
of the normalization it has to cross the points (0;0) and (1;1). But the moral value function 
is concave; it increases less and less steeply, without ever arriving at a slope of zero. The 
first derivation of this moral value function is represented by the middle curve of figure 1b 
(VPe19’). It expresses more intuitively the idea of prioritarianism as it is coined in the slogan 
than the value function itself, namely the degree of our concern for, the weight we attribute 
to changes of other people’s well-being. This weight is positive allover but it decreases mo-
notonously and smoothly; and because it never reaches zero, not even for the highest well-
being, the curve of the first derivation has to be strictly convex (otherwise it would intersect 
the x-axis at some point). Mathematically this means that the second derivation has to be 
negative allover and must be monotonously increasing (see fig. 1b, VPe19’’). The welfare of 
a group or a society, finally, is defined as the sum of the moral desirability of the situations 
of its members. 
Fig. 1a: Prioritarian value function VP (VPe19) Fig. 1b: Derivations of prioritarian value function 
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As suggested by figure 2a, there are infinitely many functions having the features just de-
scribed. The two limiting cases are, first, the diagonal itself, i.e. the identity function, ac-
cording to which the moral value is identical to the personal desirability; this is the utilitarian 
way of valuing with a zero-degree of priority so to speak. And, second, there is the right 
angle connecting the points (0;0), (0;1) and (1;1), or more precisely a function which ap-
proaches this angle and cannot be visually distinguished from it; this function represents 
leximin. Prioritarian desirability functions have to be between these two limiting cases, 
which expresses that prioritarianism is a synthesis of utilitarianism and leximin. 
The features explained so far are sufficient for formally defining ‘prioritarianism’: 
Abbreviations:  
VPT(a) = prioritarian value function (under certainty) over objects a (e.g. actions). 
[VPP(a) = prioritarian value function (under risk) over objects (prospects) a (e.g. actions).] 
VP(x) = prioritarian weighting function over personal desirabilities x. 
Ui(a) = personal utility / desirability of object a for person i. 
Fig. 2a: Prioritarian functions: VPe1, VPe7, VPe19, VPe500 
 





Prioritarianism is a way of moral valuation that can be represented by an  
(P1) additively separable moral value function VPT(a) of the form: 
 VPT(a) := ∑i VP(Ui(a)) = ∑i VP(ui) for certain prospects a 
(readers not interested in the valuation of risky prospects can skip conditions P2 and P3) 
[(P2) and VPP(a) := R[VPT(a1), P(a1) , ... VPT(am), P(am)] for risky and uncertain pro-
spects a = (a1, P(a1), ..., am, P(am)) – ai is a possible outcome of a, and P(ai) is its 
probability –, where] 
[(P3) R(x1, ..., xm) is a suitable monotonously increasing weighting function for not certain 
prospects with R(0) = 0 and R(VPT(a), 1) = VPT(a),]  
(P4) and where VP(u) is a three times differentiable value function with 
(P4.1) VP’(u) > 0 for all u, 
(P4.2) VP’’(u) < 0 for all u, 
(P4.3) VP’’’(u) > 0 for all u, and 
(P5) for which a set of real (at some point in history) options {a, b} exists with VPT(a) > 
VPT(b) which is in contrast to the leximin valuation (because a entails some greater 
utility for people better off than b for some people worse off). 
For the subsequent comparison of prioritarianism to egalitarianism it is helpful to consider 
the following feature. Prioritarian value functions remain above the diagonal (see figure 2a) 
so that one can examine the mathematical qualities of the piece over the diagonal, too, i.e. 
the curve which results from subtracting the diagonal from the desirability function. This 
difference function may be called the "surplus function"; it is shown in figure 3 (SPe19, i.e. 
the more horizontal graph; the other graph in figure 3 represents the first derivation of the 
surplus function, SPe19’). 
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In prioritarianism this surplus function intuitively makes no sense; it is just the result of a 
mathematical transformation; but it can be compared to egalitarian surplus functions. The 
prioritarian surplus function goes from (0;0) to (1;0), is concave and constitutes a hill be-
tween these points. However, the characteristic property, which distinguishes prioritarian 
surplus functions from some egalitarian surplus functions, is that the prioritarian surplus 
functions are right-skewed: they ascend steeper on the left side than they descend on the 
right side. (Its first derivation is identical to the first derivation of the prioritarian value func-
tion shifted downwards by one unit. The second and third derivations of the surplus func-
tion are identical to those of the prioritarian value function itself.) I will come back to this 
feature below. 
II Trying to Define ‘Egalitarianism’ in Opposition to 
Prioritarianism 
What is egalitarianism? Parfit has distinguished telic egalitarianism from deontic egalitari-
anism, where the former is interested in the final distribution, intrinsic from instrumental 
egalitarianism, and moderate from radical (or pure) egalitarianism, where the former satis-
fies the Pareto-principle. In addition, egalitarianisms have to be distinguished according to 
the good they hold to be distributed equally (Parfit 1997, 203-9). In the following I will speak 
only of moderate, telic and intrinsic egalitarianism of utilities because this version is the 
most difficult to distinguish from prioritarianism. Moderate egalitarianism is not only inter-
ested in equality but also in a high sum of personal utilities. 
Fig. 3: Prioritarian surplus function: SP(u) := VP(u)-u 
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Some theorists have a rather loose way of using the label "egalitarianism" so that egalitari-
anism includes prioritarianism or leximin. Here I will use the expression "egalitarianism" in 
a narrower, more specific sense, namely – provisionally –: egalitarianism cares about equal-
ity in the sense that it tries to diminish inequalities; it values lower and upper deviations 
from the middle (mean, median …) negatively, the greater they are the more negative. 
How can egalitarianism and prioritarianism be distinguished? In the literature several dif-
ferences are recognized: 1. different "justifications", or better: different aims (equality vs. 
priority); 2. interest in relativities vs. absolute levels; 3. lacking vs. present additive separa-
bility; 4. lacking vs. present strong separability; 5. interest in distribution patterns vs. inter-
est only in absolute levels. However, so far there is still no proof of a compelling and exten-
sionally relevant difference between egalitarianism and prioritarianism (for decisions under 
certainty). In the following I try to prove that there is such difference, which goes beyond 
the just mentioned: 6. symmetrical and increasing depreciation of deviations from the mean 
vs. smoothly decreasing care for those better off, which implies: 6.1. symmetrical vs. right-
skewed surplus functions and 6.2. lack vs. presence of strong separability. In the following 
only feature 6.1 can be dealt with. 
III The Essence of Egalitarianism: Symmetrical and 
Increasing Devaluation of Deviations from the 
Middle 
So what is the essential core of moderate egalitarianism that leads to the demarcating for-
mal, mathematical differences and then also extensional differences to prioritarianism? De-
spite egalitarianism’s lack of additive separability (in contrast to prioritarianism, see P1), 
one may isolate individualized components of the egalitarian welfare function, i.e. vary the 
personal desirability for one person only (and keeping the desirability levels of all other per-
sons constant, so that the social mean remains virtually unchanged) and see how these 
changes affect the egalitarian total welfare. If we consider such individualized functions, the 
purely egalitarian component of egalitarian value functions can be formulated in a negative 
way: Egalitarianism as such values deviations from a (hypothetical) state of equality as neg-
ative, the bigger these deviations are, the more negatively (more than proportionally) they 
are valued. This holds for downward deviations as well as, ceteris paribus, for upward devi-
ations, which in this respect are valued symmetrically, i.e. equally negative, depending on 
the absolute value of the deviation alone. This symmetry is essential for egalitarianism be-
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cause if somebody is exclusively interested in equality, the direction of deviation from equal-
ity should not matter; and if he is interested in equality only among other aspects – like, 
additionally, high sum or mean of individual desirabilities – the direction of deviation should 
not matter for the egalitarian aspects of his valuations. To summarize, pure egalitarianism 
and the egalitarian component in moderate egalitarianism here are characterized by two 
conditions, the symmetry condition, which says that upward and downward deviations from 
some middle must be valued equally negatively, and the increasing weight condition, which 
says that greater deviations should be valued increasingly, over-proportionally stronger. 
Moderate egalitarianism then may add the sum of utilities to this pure egalitarianism.  
In contrast to this interpretation of ‘egalitarianism’, however, various contemporary theo-
rists characterize (moderate desirability) egalitarianism by very broad conditions that do 
not imply the symmetry condition – e.g.: intrinsic badness of inequality, intrinsic badness of 
some being worse off than others, optimality of equality, Pigou-Dalton condition (Parfit 
1995, 4; 1997, 204; Temkin 2003, 62-63; Tungodden 2003, 2; Fleurbaey 2015, 207; 
Voorhoeve 2015, 201). According to the argument just put forward, this would be too broad 
(so also: Broome 2015, 219). And this missing confinement of the concept ‘egalitarianism’ 
is confusing for the ethical systematics. For not only egalitarianism, but also prioritarianism 
fulfils these conditions at least extensionally. Thus, these conditions are not suitable for the 
demarcation of egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Prioritarianism, on the other hand, does 
not fulfil the symmetry condition (details below). Therefore, symmetry and increasing 
weight are not only characteristic of egalitarianism, but also suitable for the differentiation 
from prioritarianism.2 
 
2  Because Fleurbaey defines ‘egalitarianism’ very broadly – namely via the principles: ‘equality is the best 
distribution’ and ‘inequality is intrinsically bad’, to which he often adds the Pigou-Dalton condition and, in the case 
of moderate egalitarianism, also the Pareto Principle (Fleurbaey 2015, 207-8) – he considers prioritarianism 
extensionally only to be a special form of egalitarianism (ibid. 203; 207): prioritarianism "can be represented as a 
combined function of the average (or total) amount of benefit and of an inequality index" (ibid. 208). According to 
the argument just presented, Fleurbaey overlooks an essential characteristic of egalitarianism, viz. the symmetry 
condition, which leads to a narrower meaning of "egalitarianism". And he has a much too broad concept of 
‘inequality index’, which also includes the prioritarian surplus function as the core of an inequality index, though 
it is right-skewed and completely detached from the social mean. 
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IV Specification of the Essential Conditions of 
Egalitarianism and Formal Demarcation from 
Prioritarianism 
The symmetry and the increasing weight conditions, which have just been characterized 
informally, are now to be more precisely defined mathematically in order to specify the 
difference between prioritarianism and the forms of egalitarianism which are closest to pri-
oritarianism in mathematical terms as well. There is a wide variety of egalitarian welfare 
functions with very different constructive features. Therefore, egalitarian welfare functions 
altogether are hard to compare to prioritarian ones. But at least some of them are con-
structed in a way that they subtract some measure of inequality from the sum of individual 
desirabilities. And again, some of these inequality measures are symmetrical in the sense 
that they count lower and upper deviations from some mean in the same way, furthermore 
they fulfil the increasing weight condition: e.g. variance, Gini-coefficient, Rescher’s (1966, 
33; 35-36) effective-average principle, Trapp’s Utilitarianism incorporating justice (cf. Trapp 
1988, 356; 1990, 365). The appertaining welfare functions are ideal types of egalitarian wel-
fare functions. One can construct such ideal egalitarian welfare function as follows. First, 
one models the pure egalitarian part, as it is exemplified in figure 4a. (Figure 4a shows egal-
itarian surplus functions which lead to variations of the variance as inequality measure: 
ICVARSp(u) = -0.5 ∙ |0.5-u|p + 0.5∙0.5p, with p>1; figure 4a represents the graphs for p=1.5, 
p=2, p=3.) 
Fig. 4a: Inequality contribution (= equality surplus) of 
individual utility (uµ fixed (uµ=0.5)): ICVARS1.5(u), 
ICVARS2(u), ICVARS3(u) 
 
Fig. 4b: Derivations of inequality contributions (= 
equality surplus) of individual utilities ICVARS1.5’(u), 
ICVARS2’(u), ICVARS3’(u) 
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The two conditions of symmetry and increasing weight are implemented by a surplus func-
tion, which gives some surplus value to the fact that a person’s well-being is close to the 
social mean – which for simplicity we assume to be 0.5. The farther away a person’s well-
being is from this mean, the more the surplus value decreases. In addition, this deviation 
from the mean is valued over-proportionally so that we have a concave and not a linear 
decrease of the surplus function at both sides of the mean. In the usual models of moderate 
egalitarian value, a measure of inequality is subtracted from the utility sum (or average util-
ity). The surplus function corresponds to the function of this inequality measure except that 
the surplus function is shifted upwards, so that the surplus values are positive for the nor-
mal utility interval [0;1]. This allows the comparison with prioritarianism without changing 
the order of preference.) In function ICVARS2, shown in figure 4.a, for example, the inequality 
measure is shifted upwards by 0.125. The deductions for the deviation from the center thus 
become a surplus for the proximity to the center. This surplus function can now nicely be 
compared to the prioritarian surplus function – shown in figure 3: 1. Egalitarian surplus 
functions (fig. 4a) are axially symmetrical with respect to the social mean, whereas the pri-
oritarian surplus functions (fig. 3) are right-skewed. For reasons of space I will not go into 
the mathematical details, but the axial symmetry of the egalitarian surplus functions, of 
course, has many further mathematical consequences for the derivations: point symmetry 
of the first derivation (fig. 4b), axial symmetry of the second derivation, point symmetry of 
the third derivation with respect to the point (uµ;0). Right-skewness of the prioritarian sur-
plus function, instead, means that upper deviations from the peak are valued less negatively 
than lower deviations. This feature of prioritarianism makes sense in the context of as-
sessing welfare, i.e. desirability distributions: We can neither redistribute desirabilities from 
above to below, as is presupposed in resource egalitarianism; nor does above-average well-
being directly cause harm to those badly off, as is presupposed in egalitarianism of power, 
rights and status for these distribuenda. Rather, right-skewness is only the mathematical 
consequence of a heavier weighting of changes for people who are badly off – completely 
independent of social distributions of individual desirabilities. 2. By definition, the peak of 
the egalitarian surplus function is attributed to the social mean (i.e. IC(uµ)). The position of 
the peak of the prioritarian surplus function, on the other hand, has no defined meaning, it 
can only be calculated; and it changes with the degree of prioritarianism: the stronger the 
degree of prioritarianism, the further to the left is the peak (i.e. the smaller is the ux above 
which the peak is collocated). 
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As a second step in modelling welfare egalitarianism one might want to include moderate 
egalitarianism, which apart from caring about equal distributions is also interested in in-
creasing overall social well-being. This concern can be modelled by simply adding a utilitar-
ian component to the surplus function, i.e. the diagonal – mathematically speaking. As a 
result, as can be seen in figure 5a, we get the concave value functions, which at first sight 
are similar to prioritarian value functions. But now we know that there are clear mathemat-
ical differences – at least between ideal egalitarian and prioritarian welfare functions –, 
which can easily be read from the surplus functions. The egalitarian surplus function is ax-
isymmetric (with respect to x=uµ) (fig. 4a), whereas the prioritarian surplus function is right-
skewed (fig. 3). Therefore, the first derivation of the examined egalitarian surplus function 
is point-symmetric with respect to the point uµ, 0 (fig. 4b) – as opposed to the convex first 
derivation of the prioritarian surplus function (function of fig. 2b shifted downwards by 1; 
the slant graph in fig. 3). 
Do the mathematical differences between prioritarianism and moderate welfare-egalitari-
anism have any practical significance – in terms of different preference orders? Consider 
the following desirability distributions: 
Symmetry litmus: 
𝑎 =  ⟨0.75, 0.75, 0⟩, 
𝑏 =  ⟨1, 0.25, 0.25⟩  (cf. Lumer <2000> 2009, 631). 
Fig. 5a: Egalitarian value function VEVARS2 based on 
variation, individual contribution uµ fixed (uµ=0.5) 
 
Fig. 5b: Derivations of egalitarian value function 
based on variation, individual contribution uµ 
fixed (uµ=0.5) 
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a and b have the same sum of utilities and the same mean, namely uµ=0.5. They are con-
structed in such a way that in a there are two upper deviations of 0.25 and one lower devi-
ation of 0.5 from this middle, whereas in b these deviations are exactly reversed: two lower 
deviations of 0.25 and one upper deviation of 0.5 from the middle. So the structure of the 
example is: a = ⟨m+d, m+d, m-2d⟩, b = ⟨m+2d, m-d, m-d⟩, where m is the mean. Hence the 
utilitarian aspects of a and b are identical, and their egalitarian aspects are symmetrical. 
Therefore, all (real) egalitarian value functions, which fulfil, the symmetry condition, have 
to value a and b as equivalent. Prioritarian valuations, on the other hand, prefer b to a, and 
they have to do so because of the definitional properties of prioritarian evaluation func-
tions, namely the continuously decreasing moral weight of desirability changes with increas-
ing desirability level (represented by the first derivation of the prioritarian value function 
and which leads to the right-skewness of the respective surplus function). The example can 
therefore be used as a litmus test for fulfilling the symmetry condition and thus for distin-
guishing between truly egalitarian and other, especially prioritarian evaluations. This pref-
erence for b is generated even with minimal degrees of priority. 
The prioritarian value difference between a and b is also reflected in many people’s intui-
tions. In studies conducted in 2002-2004 with 79 participants who had to choose according 
to their moral intuitions between alternatives constructed in the fashion of a and b 81.0% 
(n=64) of the subjects preferred the analogue of b, i.e. decided in a prioritarian way; 13.9% 
(n=11) preferred the analogue of a; and only 1.3% (n=1) found the analogues of a and b 
equivalent, i.e. decided in a welfare egalitarian way (3.8% (n=3) gave no clear answer). This 
means, first, that the difference between a and b is not only technical gimcrackery but is 
intuitively seen as making a practical difference and, second, there are more prioritarians 
around than is usually assumed. 
In summary, we have thus found an important, also extensionally relevant difference be-
tween prioritarianism and egalitarianism – if egalitarianism is understood only in a suffi-
ciently specific way –: namely symmetrical and increasing depreciation of deviations from 
the mean (egalitarianism) vs. smoothly decreasing concern for the better-off with growing 
well-being (prioritarianism). This difference then implies the symmetry vs. right-skewness 
of the surplus function. 
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The Reasons of Objective Consequentialism 
and Collective Action Problems 
Susanne Mantel, Saarland University, Germany 
Abstract 
Objective consequentialism faces a challenge from action guidance. Consequentialists typically respond by drawing 
the distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision criterion. Many objective consequentialists think 
that this challenge is thereby solved. However, if the challenge is reformulated as a challenge concerning the nor-
mative reasons which are implied by objective consequentialism, it might initially seem to be more troubling.   
Normative reasons are typically thought to do both, determine rightness and serve as a decision criterion. A crite-
rion of rightness could not amount to a normative reason, it is sometimes said, unless it can guide the agent in 
deliberation towards doing the right thing. However, there is a response available to this version of the challenge 
which is similar to the one given to the original version of the challenge from action guidance: We may use a 
distinction between right-making reasons and good deliberative reasons. Plausibly, deliberative constraints may 
hold for good deliberative reasons but need not hold for right-making reasons. Right-making reasons may thus 
consist in even those consequences of actions which cannot guide the agent in deliberation.  
There remain various other problems for objective consequentialism, for instance the challenge from uncoordi-
nated collective action. I discussed such a case which helpfully illuminates how right-making reasons might come 
apart from good deliberative reasons. There are different ways in which both right-making reasons and good de-
liberative reasons could be understood in this case. Thinking about similar problem cases with the distinction be-
tween different notions of normative reasons in mind might shed new light on the debate about objective conse-
quentialism. 
Introduction 
It is a well-known objection to objective consequentialism that it does not provide sufficient 
help in guiding the agent in deliberation about what to do.  
A version of this challenge might be expressed in terms of reasons: objective consequen-
tialism is unable to come up with a satisfactory account of consequentialist practical rea-
sons, since practical reasons must be capable of guiding us in reasoning about what to do. 
It might seem that this reasons-focused version of the challenge is more worrisome. Maybe 
the consequentialist can accept that ethical theories are merely standards of correctness 
and do not guide deliberation, but can anyone accept that the reasons which these theories 
are committed to do not figure in reasoning and deliberation?  
However, just as consequentialists are often unimpressed by the challenge from action 
guidance, they need not be worried by the related challenge concerning reasons.  
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After arguing for this point, I will further examine my resulting view by applying it to an 
especially interesting problem case which will reveal different ways in which it could be 
developed. The case is a collective action problem which calls for mixed responses. The case 
highlights the distinction between right-making reasons and good deliberative reasons in 
an especially complex and interesting way. 
I Consequentialism and Action Guidance 
According to commonsense, right actions are right because they make the world a better 
place. This idea is captured by objective act consequentialism as follows: “Objective conse-
quentialism is the view that the criterion of the rightness of an act or course of action is 
whether it in fact would most promote the good of those acts available to the agent.” 
(Driver 2012, 98). 
The “criterion of rightness” consists in the consequences which different courses of action 
would have. The problem is that at least some consequences are hard to predict, especially 
those in the far future. Agents are often unsure which of the actions available to them would 
most promote the good. Even if these consequences might make the action right or wrong 
they cannot serve as the considerations which guide our deliberation about what to do be-
cause we have limited epistemic access to them. Therefore, objective consequences pro-
vide the standard of rightness but often cannot be relied on as decision criteria in delibera-
tion. This has been discussed as the problem of action guidance. 
Objective consequentialists tend not to be troubled by this problem. They hold that there 
is an epistemic difficulty for agents, but that the consequentialist theory nevertheless gives 
true evaluations of which actions are right and wrong. Furthermore, the theory could in 
principle be supplemented with an account of considerations which are generally most 
helpful for guiding deliberation – even if these guiding considerations are distinct from the 
standard of rightness.  
II The Challenge Concerning Reasons and 
Reasoning 
If we apply the terminology of reasons to this problem, it might seem that the problem gets 
worse. It might be said that the standards of rightness constitute the normative reasons 
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that objective consequentialism posits, but that normative reasons, by definition, are guid-
ing considerations for reasoning agents. So, objective consequentialism cannot introduce a 
distinction between standards of rightness and guiding considerations, it might seem. 
Why think that objective consequences should be understood as normative reasons? What 
the agent ought to do is determined, according to objective consequentialism, by the total-
ity of consequences, even if these are impossible to grasp. Since it is a truism that what the 
agent ought to do is determined by the totality of normative reasons, these consequences 
seem to play the role of normative reasons for objective consequentialism. It seems as if 
the normative reasons are constituted by objective consequences – or, at least, by some-
thing in the close neighborhood, maybe by present facts which determine which actions 
have which consequences. For instance, one might say that the fact that the fish contains 
salmonella is a normative reason not to eat it because if there are salmonella in the fish 
then the agent will suffer as a consequence of eating the fish. The normative reasons would 
then be facts which determine indirectly what an agent ought to do - by determining the 
consequences which more directly, in their role of standards of rightness, determine what 
the agent ought to do. But even if normative reasons might on this interpretation not be 
the consequences themselves but the present facts that determine the consequences, one 
would need to know how these present facts determine the consequences if one wanted 
these normative reasons to guide one’s deliberation to the right action, and when one is 
unsure about the consequences of an action one does not possess this knowledge either. 
So the normative reasons which determine which action ought to be performed, according 
to objective consequentialism, are either the consequences themselves or present facts in 
virtue of the role they play in determining the consequences. However, neither of these two 
candidates are helpful guides for deliberating agents when the consequences of an action 
are hard to predict. This is problematic, one might think, since reasons are for reasoning 
with.  
Being a consideration which could be used to guide the agent in reasoning is often said to 
be the central mark of normative reasons (e.g., Kearns and Star 2008, 39). Depending on 
how this ‘can’ should be understood, it might be concluded from this that consequences 
which cannot be known – like non-obvious distant consequences – do not seem to bear the 
central mark of normative reasons. Nevertheless, according to objective consequentialism 
they are the normative reasons which determine what agents ought to do. 
Similarly, many philosophers argue that there is a deliberative constraint on normative rea-
sons, such that something cannot be a reason for an action unless the agent could perform 
that action for that reason (e.g., Kiesewetter 2017). But an agent cannot perform an action 
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for the reason that it has certain distant consequences if the agent cannot come to know 
these distant consequences at the time of action. So many consequences fail the constraint 
on normative reasons. 
III A Distinction between Two Notions of Normative 
Reasons 
Despite all this, I believe that introducing the notion of a normative reason does not make 
things worse for objective consequentialism. The distinction between a standard of right-
ness and a decision criterion which we find in objective consequentialism resembles a dis-
tinction which has recently been made between two notions of normative reasons, i.e., rea-
sons that determine what is right or what ought to be done (e.g., Broome 2008) and reasons 
that, roughly, are premises in good reasoning (Setiya 2014, similarly Kearns and Star 2008).  
In my terms, according to objective consequentialism consequences (or some facts in their 
neighborhood) are the reasons which determine rightness (short: right-making reasons), but 
they need not be premises of good reasoning (or good deliberative reasons). Although we 
use one and the same term, i.e., “normative reasons”, for the entities which are determi-
nants of rightness and for the entities which guide deliberation, we may discover that there 
is an important difference between the entities which fulfill the first role and the entities 
which fulfill the second role. It is sometimes assumed that normative reasons play both 
these roles (e.g., Kearns and Star 2008, 39 and 49-51), but it may be doubted that this as-
sumption can be defended, since these roles can come apart in various ways (Wedgwood 
2015). When this distinction between two notions of normative reasons is made, it is not 
obvious that the deliberative constraint should be applied to right-making reasons, alt-
hough it may be applied to good deliberative reasons. Objective consequentialists may 
simply say that all objective consequences (or all determinants of objective consequences) 
determine rightness and thus constitute right-making reasons, but that they need not meet 
constraints on reasoning like the one described by Kiesewetter, for these hold only for good 
deliberative reasons. If some right-making reasons like distant and non-obvious conse-
quences do not constitute good deliberative reasons, the reasoning constraint does not 
seem to apply to them. 
It might be objected that the claim that right-making reasons are consequences of actions 
implies that agents can never act for the right-making reasons when these right making rea-
sons do not obtain prior to the action. How could they act for a reason which does not yet 
exist? But I think that agents can at least sometimes act for right-making reasons even if all 
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right making reasons are consequences of actions. Acting for a right-making reason does 
not presuppose that these reasons obtain prior to the action, but that the agent has some 
epistemic access to them prior to the action, even though they may obtain at a later time. 
Although some consequences are such that the agent has no epistemic access to them at 
the time of action, at least some consequences of actions are epistemically accessible. 
Sometimes agents are able to figure out many of the consequences of their actions (maybe 
by the use of indicators, as I argue in Mantel 2018). Under these circumstances, agents may 
act on their knowledge of the right-makers, even if these lie in the future. They may thus at 
least in some cases act for right-making reasons even if these are consequences. 
IV Collective Action Problems 
There are several problem cases for the view defended here. All I can do here is to sketch 
one interesting case involving collective actions and to discuss some of the questions and 
possibilities which it brings to mind, although a much more thorough treatment of this case 
and similar ones would be desirable which cannot be provided in this short paper. 
In many collective action situations actual consequences are determined by many uncoor-
dinated individual actions together. One class of interesting examples are cases which call 
for agents to act in different ways, as the following:1 
Going to Work 
Suppose that when people are going to work in a given city, they ought to use climate friendly 
means of transportation. Accordingly, it would be best if 60% used public transport and 40% 
used their bicycles – otherwise, either public transport or biking lanes would get crowded and 
would be slowed down or would eventually collapse. However, mobile communication just 
broke down and the agents are unable to coordinate who is to use which means of transport. 
If consequences determine rightness, then we might think that the right-making or wrong-
making reasons of each individual action are the consequences which each individual action 
has and compare them to the consequences which would obtain if the agent had not acted, 
presuming that everything else is held fixed.  
 
1 Compare, for example, Pinkert’s (2014) ‘The Concert Audience’. By contrast, most attention has so far been paid 
to scenarios where all agents intuitively ought to do the same thing, e.g., eat less meat. This is a challenge for 
consequentialism because it may nevertheless be thought that their individual actions made no difference to the 
harm that has been caused collectively (e.g. Kagan 2011). 
The Reasons of Objective Consequentialism and Collective Action Problems  
172 
Suppose everyone had used public transport and it broke down. According to the criterion 
just given, this would mean that everyone did the wrong thing, since for each agent it is true 
that it would have been better if they had used the bike while everyone else had still used 
public transport. But it might seem more plausible to say that 60% did the right thing, since 
60% ought to use public transport, and only 40% ought to use bicycles (although, of course, 
there is no truth of the matter of who of those who used public transport belonged to the 
60% who were right in doing so). After all, if everyone had used bikes, the biking lanes would 
have collapsed. It is counterintuitive that each individual should have used bikes if the con-
sequences of everyone doing what they should would have been just as bad.2  
When mixed behavior is called for but coordination is ruled out, the same decision situation 
applies to all agents, but best consequences are achieved only if a certain percentage of 
individuals acts differently than the others. The consequences of individual actions then 
depend on the combinations in which these individual actions stand. Therefore, one might 
suggest that objective consequentialism should be formulated not for individual actions (as 
it was in section I) but for combinations of actions. The primary bearers of rightness and 
wrongness might be combinations, where any combination which consists of 40% individual 
acts of taking the bike and 60% individual acts of using public transport is right.3 This, how-
ever, means that there is no true answer to the question what a given individual should 
have done when all used public transport. According to this approach, there seem to be no 
right-making reasons for individual actions in a case such as this one. Instead, there would 
seem to be only right-making reasons for combinations of actions, such as a combination’s 
efficiency in transportation. 
What about good deliberative reasons, by contrast? Good deliberative reasons seem to ap-
ply primarily to individual actions, not to combinations of actions. Nevertheless, good de-
liberative reasons may guide agents towards those actions which are more likely to be parts 
of right combinations of actions. In the example, good deliberative reasons (under uncer-
tainty of what the others will do) may thus favor using public transportation over using the 
bike, because there are more right combinations of actions in which the individual action is 
among the 60% which consist in taking public transport than right combinations of actions 
in which the individual action is among the 40% which consist of going by bike. The most 
 
2 This intuition is described by Portmore (2018) in the principle “moral harmony” and by Regan (1980) in his 
“adaptability”.  
3 This view obviously raises the questions whether the rightness of a combination of actions requires joint agency 
or, at least, joint responsibility, which does not seem to be given without the possibility to coordinate (see e.g. 
Pinkert 2014, who draws on work by Virginia Held). However, maybe rightness and responsibility must be 
separated by a view along these lines. Good deliberative reasons might be closely related to responsibility even if 
right-making reasons were not. 
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troubling implication of this example seems to be that in cases like this one, although a 
mixed pattern of action would have the best consequences, the decision situation of all 
agents is stipulated to be identical, such that their good deliberative reasons all point to-
wards the same action (taking public transport).  
However, in principle it is possible to prevent this consequence. This is especially obvious if 
we keep in mind that good deliberative reasons are mere tools for decision making which 
need not be of any deep moral importance (by contrast to right-making reasons). Agents 
may simply invent new deliberative reasons when they create a lottery with a 60% chance 
of a blue ticket. They may then use the consideration that they drew a blue ticket as a good 
deliberative reason to use public transport, and the consideration that they did not draw a 
blue ticket as a good deliberative reason to use the bike.4 Agents may know full well that 
the outcome of the lottery does not help them to predict the consequences of their action 
– especially not if other agents did not use a lottery as well. They may even hold that it is 
not morally prescribed to do what the lottery says. They need not believe that what they 
treat as a good deliberative reason is also a right-making reason with respect to their action, 
and may thus use the lottery ticket as a tool to guide them even if they don’t ascribe any 
moral importance to the lottery. 
V Conclusion 
Objective consequentialism faces a challenge from action guidance. Consequentialists typi-
cally respond by drawing the distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision 
criterion. Many objective consequentialists think that this challenge is thereby solved. How-
ever, if the challenge is reformulated as a challenge concerning the normative reasons 
which are implied by objective consequentialism, it might initially seem to be more trou-
bling.  
Normative reasons are typically thought to do both, determine rightness and serve as a 
decision criterion. A criterion of rightness could not amount to a normative reason, it is 
sometimes said, unless it can guide the agent in deliberation towards doing the right thing. 
However, there is a response available to this version of the challenge: We may distinguish 
between right-making reasons and good deliberative reasons. Plausibly, deliberative con-
straints hold for good deliberative reasons but need not hold for right-making reasons. 
 
4 This idea goes back to a manuscript by Kevin Baum and Eva Schmidt, the discussion of which has influenced many 
thoughts in this section. I owe Kevin and Eva my thanks. 
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Right-making reasons may thus consist in even those consequences of actions which cannot 
guide the agent in deliberation. 
However, there remain various problems for objective consequentialism, for instance the 
challenge from uncoordinated collective action which helpfully illuminates how right-mak-
ing reasons may come apart from good deliberative reasons. Thinking about similar prob-
lem cases with the distinction between different notions of normative reasons in mind 
therefore sheds new light on the debate about objective consequentialism. 
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A Shell Game Theory – Reconnect Mankind 
with Nature to Create Wealth 
Vincent-Emmanuel Mathon, University of Rouen, France 
Abstract 
How to rethink financial transactions in order to create wealth by protecting nature? Wealth is the result of a 
transfer of utility (or of energy), conveyed through a currency. A currency requires an unalterable underlying asset, 
which is traditionally matter, like gold for instance. But with our modern economy becoming increasingly immate-
rial, the boundaries between matter and energy have been blurred. Utility must be re-assessed under that scope. 
Utility now depends simultaneously on two parameters – matter and energy – and should then be represented by 
a complex number, with both its real and imaginary components. Utility is a point on a complex plane, namely the 
energy/matter plane. Moreover, from now on, in our transaction, there is not just you and me around the table. 
There will be you, me, plus fictitious economic agents representing respectively nature, the effects of regulation, 
and people not necessarily known to us, but potentially influenced by our deal. During a transaction, all these 
agents will move on the energy / matter plane, transferring utility to each other, drawing their own convex space 
on that plane; all the convex planes from various transactions shall combine together to form a symbolic shell. This 
virtual energy / matter plane is then connected to reality through a blockchain, powered by a new type of hashing 
function, a one that would convert all the actions of the agents in the real world into energy and matter. That 
blockchain can be used as the unalterable underlying asset of a new crypto-currency a shell-type crypto-currency 
(for a blockchain is unalterable by definition). As this crypto-currency would involve agents that are not necessary 
human but that could stand for the interests of nature as well, it would make the very fact of protecting nature 
profitable. 
I  
This title is a play on words. I did not mean the “Theory of Shell Games” but the theory of 
games as applied to shell. The original purpose of this paper was to rethink financial trans-
actions in order to create wealth without damaging nature and by protecting nature. It 
starts with a new enquiry on wealth – where does it come from? – leading to a new way of 
conceiving currency (and hence money), which, in turns, shapes a new type of economy 
where the very protection of nature can be profitable indeed. The initial step of this paper 
is to determine where wealth comes from. Wealth is the result of a transfer of utility. Shells 
(seashells) might have been the first means of exchanges, and the first way to transfer util-
ity1. Symbolically speaking, a shell can indeed represent the safe repository in which I would 
 
1 See Wikipedia 2018, chapter "Currency": “Seashells have been used as a medium of exchange in various places, 
including many Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean islands, also in North America, Africa and the Caribbean.” 
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store the memories of all that I have been doing to / for the others and that I expect them 
to do for me in due time. All my actions are symbolically recorded in the shell. All the utility 
I have received from others and the utility I have been giving to others, is therefore symbol-
ized by the shell. However, “symbolically recorded” is not sufficient in a complex society 
where corn can be traded for animals or artifacts. My actions, and more broadly, all my 
energy – for whenever human activity may be involved, it ends up with human energy – 
must be stored more effectively. My “safe repository” now becomes a stock of matter, for 
instance, gold. Gold has an ideal property: it is unalterable. Therefore, it can be a good asset 
to store the footprint of human energy. When I trade with you, I give you my energy and 
you give yours to me. This is the way I transfer my utility to you. This exchange of energy is 
printed onto matter, which is used as an intermediate; this is where the very concept of 
currency comes from. A currency uses unalterable matter – like gold – as an underlying 
asset. 
Transfer of utility – which ultimately leads to wealth – has been conveyed through a cur-
rency fitted with an unalterable underlying asset. This can work if economy is essentially 
material, if all economic transactions end up in transforming matter. In other words, it 
works in a Newtonian world, where there is conservation of energy on one hand and, sep-
arately, conservation of matter on the other hand. It is then possible to create a direct and 
unique link between a given variation of energy and its corresponding variation of quantity 
of matter. In that case, utility is a one dimension entity – be it matter or energy – and can 
be represented by a real number. But with our modern economy becoming increasingly 
immaterial – where wealth can be created through pure information not backed up by mat-
ter –, the boundaries between matter and energy have been blurred. We then switch from 
a Newtonian world to an Einsteinian (from Einstein’s physics) world where matter and en-
ergy are not separated anymore. Matter is potential energy and potential energy is matter; 
hence the famous formula E=Mc2. It becomes therefore impossible to use matter as a fixed 
pattern to record the footprint of (human) energy because matter is potential energy and 
vice versa. This is why today currencies are “floating” and are deprived of any unalterable 
asset. This explains the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in the early 1970s and the 
gap between the paces of financial and material exchanges, as conjectured by Tobin back 
in 1978 in his famous Essay A Proposal for International Monetary Reform.2 The challenge 
would then be: how to create a new type of currency that would win back an unalterable 
 
2 See Tobin 1978: “The basic problems are these. Goods and labor move, in response to international price signals, 
much more sluggishly than fluid funds. Prices in goods and labor markets move much more sluggishly, in response 
to excess supply and demand, than the prices of financial assets, including exchange rates.” 
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underlying asset in our Einsteinian world where energy and matter are not separated any-
more? As a currency is basically what shall convey a transfer of utility, the very concept of 
utility must be re-assessed. 
Utility now depends simultaneously on two parameters – matter and energy – and not on 
any of them separately, with potential energy being potential matter and vice versa. Phil-
osophically speaking, this does make sense as the duet energy / potential matter and po-
tential energy / matter may apply to the concept of pleasure as well. Pleasure can be actual 
or potential. I can feel it actually – as a matter of fact – or I can anticipate it. This concept 
of anticipation was developed by Epicurus3, and more recently, it became the cornerstone 
of John Nash’s bargaining theory (1950). This can also be compared to Aristotle’s duet: “po-
tential” (Dynamis) versus actual (Energeia).4 Actual matter is potential energy and vice 
versa; actual pleasure versus anticipated – or potential – pleasure. An appropriate way to 
translate this potential / actual duet – be it through the energy / nature duet or through the 
concept of pleasure – is a complex number, with both its real and imaginary components. 
Utility is not to be modelized by a real number like in most micro economics literature – but 
by a complex one. Therefore utility is not a mere quantity but a point on a complex plane, 
defined by both the axes of real and imaginary components. 
Another aspect of Einstein’s theories is, that, contrary to Newton’s physics, there are no 
frames of reference. In a Newtonian world, space is a three-dimension Euclidean vacuum 
in which motions of bodies come from their respective forces and can be traced from a 
frame of reference, with time considered as an independent value. As symbolically trans-
ferred in the economy, when I trade with you, or, in other words, when we transfer utility 
to each other, there is only you and me, and the frame of reference. Practically, this frame 
of reference can simultaneously be regulation, commodities, nature, environment, and 
some other people potentially influenced by the deal but not directly involved in it. 
On the contrary, in an Einsteinian world, time is not an independent value. Space and time 
form a continuum. Material bodies do alter the shape of this continuum, thus creating mo-
tion. This is the law of gravity according to Einstein’s theory. The very concept of frame of 
reference has no meaning anymore as even the metrics of our world can change. Instead of 
a frame of reference, there are only material bodies in motions. Which means that, for our 
financial transaction, our own frame of reference (regulation, commodities, nature, envi-
ronment, other people potentially influenced by the deal) should now be replaced by an 
 
3 In Epicurean philosophy, pleasure is not only actual pleasure but also pleasure that is going to come or, even, to 
avert; hence the concept of anticipation. 
4 See Aristotle’s physics in Aristote 1999. 
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array of material bodies, or, as translated in economics, of economic agents. Nature – com-
modities, natural resources – would be represented by economic agents. Regulation as well, 
or rather, the influx of regulation on our deal, should be modelized by an agent. Most of 
these agents would be fictitious as they would not correspond to an actual individual. But 
they would anyway, to some extent, refer to, or be linked to, some material body. Com-
modities, nature, and legal constraints are then represented by fictitious economic agents 
acting in their name. From now on, in our transaction, there is not just you and me around 
the table. There will be you, me, plus an agent acting in the name of some natural resources, 
of some animal species involved in our deal, plus an agent representing people potentially 
influenced by our deal, plus an agent standing for the effects of regulation on our deal, 
namely, regulation implemented. 
All of this can be implemented through artificial intelligence which would modelize the be-
haviour of all those agents – fictitious or not –, in real time. Some of these agents are real 
and well known to us even though they need to be represented through mental images as 
they are fictitious agents (for instance, those representing nature). Some of them are un-
known to us, yet they are influenced by our transaction and can potentially influence it. 
How can we discriminate agents known to us from agents unknown to us? My supplier is 
known to me, the supplier of my supplier may indirectly be known to me … the supplier of 
my supplier of my supplier … maybe not. 
But does it matter to me if I know her? Maybe not. If knowing an agent better – i.e. having 
more information about her – enhances her utility in my transaction, I do consider this agent 
as known to me. Unknown agents do typically stand for those that are not physically around 
the table but that may though be influenced, or that may influence themselves our trans-
action. They do represent the “rest of the world”. They should be represented by a fictitious 
agent acting in their name. 
Our transaction is thus a transfer of utility involving simultaneously on one hand “n” actors 
(including you and I), either fictitious or real, that are known to us, i.e. that are trading di-
rectly with us, and, on the other hand, an indefinite number of actors unknown to us. A 
good method to model the way “n” actors do simultaneously transfer utility between each 
other is Pagerank, the algorithm powering Google’s search engine, as described in Brin and 
Page’s paper5. 
Pagerank assigns a rank to each web page. A rank is the equivalent of utility. When one 
page points to another one, the former transfers its rank – or part of it – to the latter. The 
 
5 Google’s algorithm is being studied exclusively through the following paper: Brin and Page 1998. 
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very principle of Pagerank algorithm consists in modeling the transfer of utility between n 
given web pages whilst taking into account the “rest of the web”. 
The algorithm results in such an equation: 
R = AR + E6 
Where R is a n x n dimension matrix representing the pagerank – or utility – of our n given 
web pages, A is a n x n dimension matrix modelizing the losses in the transfer of utility, and 
E, a vector – with randomly chosen values – standing for the “rest of the web”. A simulta-
neous transfer of utility between n given actors is thus – according to Pagerank – expressed 
through matrixes, i.e. linear applications.  
As transcribed into our financial transaction, the R matrix would apply to the utilities of our 
n economic actors – including you and I – known to us, be they real or fictitious. The A matrix 
would feature the losses when those actors transfer utility to each other, just like for Pag-
erank. And, finally, the E vector would stand for the “rest of the world”, i.e. all actors that 
are unknown to us and that yet either influence, or are influenced by, our transaction. 
Being expressed through matrixes, thus through linear applications, utilities – by “utilities” 
I mean the utility of each and every agent involved in the transaction – are added up and 
multiplied each other simultaneously. Utility is here modelized by a complex number, not a 
real one. Hence, multiplying or adding up utilities means shifting them on the complex 
plane. Our transfer of utility is thus a simultaneous shift on a complex plane of our n actors 
known to us (processed through R matrix) and unknown actors (represented by vector E). 
They all tend to move towards the ideal location. The closer you get from that ideal location, 
the better, and the richer you are. 
II The Ideal location 
The ideal location can be determined using Nash bargaining solutions. All actors agree to 
have their respective utility functions displayed and they know that, after a finite number 
of iterations (namely, shifts on the plane), they shall reach an optimum point – the ideal 
location – where utility is maximized for all of them. Some of them may not have their own 
utility apparently maximized but if they divert from that point, the overall utility will dimin-
ish and, at the end of the day, they all shall lose. 
 
6 The actual equation from Page and Brin’s paper is R = c(AR + E) with c<1. 
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By applying Nash bargaining scheme, all actors will then define – through their various shifts 
– a convex space containing the optimum point inside. This convex space shall be labelled 
the deal area of our transaction. Each transaction will have its own deal area space. Such 
spaces are not totally isolated from each other as their respective E vectors, or source vec-
tors, are fed by the transactions of others. There are combined, forming a shell–shape like 
this:7 
 
Hence, the “shell returns” but not as a game conceived to deceive (a shell game) nor as a 
safe repository but as a shape symbol of all transactions combined with each other. Wealth 
is not expressed in terms of possession (of matter) but in terms of location. The better lo-
cated you are (on that complex plane), the richer you become. 
Still, that complex plane – which is basically a matter/ energy plane – on which all agents 
move remains fictitious at this stage. It must be connected to reality. The challenge is to 
throw all actual moves of economic agents in the real world – all their actions – onto this 
two-dimension energy/ matter plane. This could be done by assuming that all actions in the 
real world – be they abstract or concrete, intellectual or practical – result in changes in mat-
ter and energy. These changes could be processed through a function, let us call it “function 
H “. That function would admit a multi-dimension (or possibly infinite dimension) space – 
to describe any action in the real world – as input and the complex plane as output. 
H ℝ∞ → ₵ 
Practically, the transfer of utility would then consist in converting all real actions into a com-
plex number through the H function. Transfer of utility, as implied by an Einsteinian world 
governed by the energy / matter duet, can then be implemented using this H function. The 
 
7 https://www.hugolescargot.com/coloriages/3207-coquille-st-jacques/ 
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goal is now to find a new type of currency, fitted with an unalterable underlying asset, able 
to convey such a transfer of utility. 
A solution could consist in a crypto-currency based upon a blockchain. In a blockchain, in-
formation is dispatched and not alterable. Dispatched meaning information is stored on 
several occasions. Unalterable meaning, no matter where I find myself, the piece of infor-
mation I see before me will never be altered. And that is because, any new piece of infor-
mation has been specifically shaped into a new block (thanks to a complex algorithm); a 
block that is then ready to be inserted consistently into the already existing chain of blocks 
(namely, the blockchain). That complex algorithm is the hashing function. 
The purpose of a hashing function is to make it very difficult to create a block and very easy 
to read it. The aim of a hashing function is thus to trigger complexity. In crypto-currencies 
like Bitcoin, complexity is artificial as it comes from an algorithm which is processed by com-
puters, and which is hence time and energy consuming. A substantial amount of energy is 
thus removed from the real world – quite environmentally unfriendly – to create a virtual 
world of blockchains. A new type of hashing function should be imagined, a one that would, 
instead, dig its complexity not in any fixed pattern of algorithmic calculus but in nature itself. 
It would embrace the very complexity of nature, the way it evolves, including the behaviour 
of our economic agents (fictitious or real), human beings, animals and use that natural com-
plexity to create blocks. 
That hashing function would not be based on artificial complexity but on natural complex-
ity. Instead of a fixed algorithm – like for current crypto-currencies – it would be a liquid 
algorithm embracing nature in all its components. It would admit the “real world” as input. 
Our above-mentioned H function, with its infinite dimension space – i.e. the real world – 
as an input would be adequate. 
H would then become our liquid hashing function. H would have a dual role: it would 
transform all the actions of agents into transfers of utility (on the complex energy/ matter 
plane) and, in so doing, it would also create blocks for the blockchain. And, this blockchain 
could be used as the underlying asset of a new currency, specifically shaped for our new 
type of economy where transfers of utility are moves on a complex plane; for, namely a 
“shell-type economy”. Two challenges must though be overcome to implement this con-
cept. 
First, “everything” involved into our transaction – nature, regulation – must be turned into 
economic agents. It is practically possible by observing nature and using artificial intelli-
gence but appropriate axiomatics are required. Second, our H hashing function is still to be 
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found, and practically, all human and natural actions must be assessed in terms in changes 
of energy and matter. This can be easily done for natural phenomena by using sensors, it 
may be more difficult for intellectual operations. Still, with appropriate axiomatics this issue 
could be solved as well. Once those challenges overcome, once a shell-type economy and 
its associated crypto-currency implemented, two major pending issues could be solved: the 
Tobin issue and the profitability of the protection of nature. 
First, the Tobin issue about de-correlation between financial and real exchanges would be 
solved as any actions in the real world would be automatically and mechanically transferred 
into the financial world, through our crypto-currency and its H hashing function. 
Second, as nature would de facto become a real economic agent, it would be inserted into 
the financial system, thus transferring wealth of its own through our energy / matter com-
plex plane. 
It would then become possible to earn money by protecting nature. That would create a 
genuine green economy, a one that would not be based on disguised subsidies but on actual 
financial gains from nature protection. Our new definition of utility – a complex one based 
on the interactions between energy of matter – thus implies a wide array of agents – either 
fictitious or real, some of them representing nature –, agents that will have all their actions 
symbolically traced as moves on a transaction plane. The very process – based on our H 
hashing function – through which their moves are traced on that plane also creates an un-
derlying asset for a new type currency, powering a genuinely green economy, a “shell-type 
economy”. 
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Against Animal Replaceability: A Restriction 
on Consequences 
Ricardo Miguel, University of Lisbon, Portugal 
Abstract 
Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, 
an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by 
the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily 
attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in 
such theories is somewhat compromised. As is, consequently, their position as an alternative to rights-based the-
ories in animal ethics. Recognising this, some utilitarians tried to disassociate utilitarianism and replaceability. I will 
here add my voice to this project. However, instead of seeing the culprit in the usual suspects (hedonism, maximi-
sation or the total view), I advance a new proposal. After identifying that the compensating value for a disvaluable 
action has to be its consequence, I present a restriction on consequences: consequences of sequences of actions 
cannot be consequences of the isolated actions in the sequences. Given this, the main argument is simple: killing 
an animal is permissible only if the the value of the new animal’s life is a consequence of the killing; but this value 
is a consequence of a sequence of actions which involves the killing plus some additional actions; therefore, since, 
via the restriction, such value is not a consequence of the killing, it is irrelevant to its normative status. I then 
present two further motivations for the restriction: firstly, it prevents the value of conditional actions from trivially 
influencing the value of the actions on which they are conditional; secondly, it is useful – even if not a complete 
solution – to reply other objections to consequentialism: the accordion effect of action and the cluelessness prob-
lem. I finally consider a couple of objections. 
I The Replaceability Argument 
This is what I take to be the best available version of the replaceability argument (RA):1 
(1) If killing animals2 whose future life would have a positive value will lead to the 
creation of other animals which would not exist otherwise and whose lives will 
have at least the same value as the one lost with the killed animals, then such 
killing is permissible. 
(2) Killing this animal exemplifies the antecedent of (1). 
 
1 See Miguel 2016 for a contrast between this and two other versions of the argument. 
2 I use ‘animals’ to abbreviate ‘non-human animals’. Although the RA may apply to humans too, I choose to focus 
on animal replaceability mainly because of its greater practical importance. 
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(3) It is permissible to kill this animal. 
A theory that implies this argument is not just incapable of a strong moral protection of 
animals’ lives – like a right to life – but, in addition, allows killing them given conditions 
which seem rather easy to satisfy. Even if most animals presently raised for some purpose 
that implies killing them do not enjoy good lives and, as such, are not individuals which 
make (2) true, some present or improved forms of raising and killing animals may find sup-
port in the RA. For example, according to the RA, the conscientious small farmer who raises 
animals for food is killing them permissibly. 
In general, moral theories that require promoting overall value above individual harms and 
benefits seem to imply the RA. As a standard example of such theories, Utilitarianism has 
been criticised for recognising an inadequate moral status of animals and, relatedly, for not 
grounding ethical vegetarianism. If this is sound, Utilitarianism falls behind competing views 
in animal ethics that tick those marks, like rights-based theories. 
Nevertheless, I must note that some authors have defended non-standard utilitarian views 
that do not imply the RA, but I cannot assess their merits here. Instead, I will propose a 
novel way to cut the link between Utilitarianism and replaceability – one that restricts the 
notion of consequence and maintains the core properties of the standard theory. 
II Necessary Conditions for the Compensating Value 
Suppose that some value, v, is not a consequence of some action, φ. Then v does not deter-
mine, or contributes to determine, the normative status of φ. Therefore, when a value com-
pensates a disvalue which is a consequence of φ, the former must be a consequence of φ 
too. This means that the success of the RA implies that the value of the new animal’s life – 
the candidate to compensating value – must be a consequence of killing another animal – 
the action with a disvaluable consequence.3 However, as I will argue, there are good reasons 
not to regard such value as a consequence of the killing. But before moving on to this, let 
me illustrate why the consequentialist is committed with this tight relation between the 
compensating value and the value it is to compensate. 
 
3 This action may have, and normally has, valuable consequences too. Throughout I use ‘disvaluable action’ just to 
mean the action with the relevant disvaluable consequence, which is compatible with it being, sometimes, 
permissible. 
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In November 2017 a lynx that had escaped from an animal park in Wales was shot dead. 
Imagine that right after this a new lynx was born at the park and that his life was at least as 
valuable as the killed lynx’s future life would be if he had not been killed. Thus, the balance 
between the value of the new lynx’s life and that lost with the killing would not be negative. 
Yet, the value of the new lynx’s life does not compensate the killing in the required sense 
aimed at by the RA – it does not make it permissible. Why? Since the new lynx’s existence 
is independent of the other lynx’s death, whatever value his life has, it is not a consequence 
of the killing. Therefore, such value cannot determine the normative status of the killing. In 
addition, this example brings to light that, when the disvaluable action is independent of 
the alleged compensating value, its omission would have made things better. 
Thus, besides the requisite of non-negative net value, we have two other necessary condi-
tions for the compensating value: on the one hand, it has to be a consequence of the dis-
valuable action (consequentialism); on the other hand, the omission of the disvaluable ac-
tion and the performance of that which leads to the compensating value has to be 
inaccessible to the agent (maximisation). In sum, utilitarian value compensation requires: 
(i) that an action ψ brings about a value at least as good as the one lost with a disvaluable 
action φ; (ii) that the value of ψ is a consequence of φ; and (iii) that performing φ and ψ 
maximises the good. 
To my knowledge, everyone discussing this matter has been accepting that the RA satisfies 
(ii).4 I think that this is wrong and will argue for a restriction according to which (ii) fails. 
III A Restriction on Consequences 
III.a Blocking the Replaceability Argument 
Consider the following restriction on consequences: 
(R) Consequences of sequences of actions cannot be consequences of the isolated actions 
in the sequences.5 
 
4 To name a few, see Singer (2011), Regan (2004), Višak (2013, 2016), Chappell (2015) and Delon (2016). 
5 I am shamelessly applying to my needs Diogo Santos’ “Non-disaggregation Principle” (ms.), which he uses to deal 
with the cluelessness problem (see the end of III.b). After reading Bratman (2006) on the connections between the 
accordion effect and Hart and Honoré’s (1959) Voluntary Intervention Principle, I realised that (R) also has some 
connections with that principle, but I cannot explore them here. 
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I will now show that (R) blocks the RA. Recall premiss (1): If killing animals whose future life 
would have a positive value will lead to the creation of other animals which would not exist 
otherwise and whose lives will have at least the same value as the one lost with the killed 
animals, then such killing is permissible. For this to be true and, as I have argued, faithful to 
Utilitarianism, ‘lead to’ must relate the killing with its consequences. However, killing ani-
mals, by itself, does not “lead to the creation of other animals which …” Some additional 
actions are required, like making animals reproduce, taking good care of the newborn, and 
so on. Thus, the plausible sense in which killing animals leads to such and such is by being 
one action among a sequence of actions which has that consequence. Yet, in this sense, (R) 
tells us that the value of the new animal’s life is not a consequence of the killing (nor of the 
other isolated actions). According to consequentialism, then, the new animal’s life is irrele-
vant to the normative status of the killing. Therefore, (1) is false, for although the killing 
leads (in the specified sense) to the valuable state of affairs, this has no bearing on its per-
missibility.6 
An obvious question now arises: why should a consequentialist accept (R)? Well, if one cares 
about stopping the RA, then this already counts in its favour. But of course that this alone 
will seem rather ad hoc. Moreover, without any further support, (R) is also too strong a 
claim just to deal with a problem for utilitarians concerned with the ethics of killing animals. 
Nevertheless, I believe that we can say more in favour of (R). 
III.b Two Further Motivations 
Firstly, without a restriction like (R) the consequentialist allows the value of conditional ac-
tions to trivially influence the value of actions on which they are conditional. And I think 
that this is untenable. Consider an example of value sabotage. You did an intuitively per-
missible action like saving a person’s life. Now suppose that someone killed another person 
on the condition that your saving was successful. Then your saving may not be permissible 
after all, for its normative status depends on the overall value of those two actions. It is odd 
that the value of an action depends not just on the things that it brings about, but also on 
the things chosen to be brought about by it (mutatis mutandis for value improvement, 
where the conditional action allegedly improves the condition action). To be clear, in these 
 
6 Were the argument stated with the consequence relation, (R) implies that the antecedent of (1) is false, making 
premiss (2) false. Interestingly, Persson (2017, 78-9) agrees that raising good lives cannot compensate killing good 
lives, “for while the latter could be done by means of a single act, the former cannot.” But Persson leaves unclear 
why performing various acts cannot compensate a single one. My proposal is a step to explain this. 
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cases, conditionalising is itself a result of agency. Therefore, contrarily to non-agential con-
ditional events, the conditional action can occur without the condition action. 
This way of influencing the normative status of actions is too trivial to be acceptable. Even 
if every non-agential consequences of one’s action would be good/bad, conditional actions 
could always overturn the balance. So, unless one is prepared to abandon a view of agency 
as being tightly connected to individual responsibility, consequences of other actions should 
not be treated like an action’s non-agential consequences. 
Consequentialists, then, can make a relevant distinction between consequences of se-
quences of actions and consequence-related events tracing back to a single action.7 (R) does 
just this by preventing that consequences of sequences of actions bear on the normative 
status of the isolated actions. Still, (R) does not depart from the basic idea that, to evaluate 
an action, consequences are all that matter. In this way, although (R) restricts the received 
view about what counts as consequences of an action, we remain on consequentialist 
ground.8 
Secondly, (R) has other useful applications for consequentialists. I will point out two.9 The 
first regards the so called “accordion effect” of action. In brief, the worry is that the same 
set of events can be appropriately described in various ways that are such that the action 
in one description contains some of its consequences in another description. Adapting an 
example from Miller (1987), consider these two descriptions of what Jones did: 
(a) Jones tells a lie. 
(b) Jones saves a life. 
If (a) and (b) are correct descriptions of Jones’ action, then, assuming that the relevant value 
is in (b), consequentialists can only account for the normative status of the action via de-
scription (a); in contrast, non-consequentialists will care if (b) follows (or not) some rule. If 
 
7 E.g. pushing a person on the street is not permissible because someone decides to benefit that person if you push 
her; however, it would be if, say, by pushing her, a bullet happens to miss her. In the latter case, but not in the 
former, the valuable consequence is a result of your action alone. Note also that all I said is compatible with both 
single or multiple agent sequences of actions. 
8 Smart (1956) distinguished “extreme” and “restricted” Utilitarianism by, respectively, having a focus on single 
actions or on classes of actions. My suggestion is similar, but I am distinguishing single actions from sequences 
thereof and disregarding their being subsumed under a rule. Thus, in Smart’s sense, Utilitarianism with (R) is still 
extreme. 
9 The aim here is just to motivate (R)’s acceptance beyond the RA and not to exhaust its usefulness. But I also 
envisage other applications, e.g. to a more commonsensical consequentialist account of blameworthiness. 
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this is sound, then, as Oldenquist (1966, 183) puts the problem, “whether we appeal to rules 
or to consequences to determine the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is of no 
moral significance.” That is, the notion of consequence is left without distinctive normative 
relevance. 
Given (R), however, the accordion can only be stretched so much: although we can agree 
that, say, 
(*) Jones deceives the intending murderer 
is also a correct description of what he did, we cannot say the same of description (b). The 
reason is that (b), but not (*), forces us to recognise multiple actions – whether or not a life 
is saved also depends on the intending murderer’s action. Thus, (R) prevents the accordion 
from stretching beyond descriptions involving single actions. 
Finally, another useful application of (R) pertains the cluelessness objection (Lenman 2000). 
In brief, the objection is the following: since the consequences of our actions are normally 
spread in time and space in a way that surpasses our knowledge, then we have no clue 
about what we ought to do. What seems to be a perfectly permissible action, like sparing 
the life of a pregnant woman, might actually be impermissible because such action happens 
to have the consequence of not preventing the birth of a future terrible dictator and all his 
atrocities. 
Again, with (R) at disposal, the consequentialist has a line of response: consequences of the 
dictator’s actions are not consequences of sparing his ancestor. We remain clueless about 
the consequences of sequences of actions that contain our actions as parts. Yet, given that 
such consequences are not consequences of our actions alone, we are not required to know 
them (we could not). And since they have no bearing on the normative status of our actions, 
ignoring them does not imply that we are in the dark about what we alone ought to do.10 
 
10 There is a reply if we can be clueless even if there are no sequences of actions involved. But the burden of proof 
is with those who think that single actions can have massive causal ramifications and that most of our actions are 
like that. But note that the claim here is modest: if (R) can mitigate this problem (as well as the accordion effect), 




One tempting objection to my way of blocking the RA is that, somehow, we can automate 
the sequence of actions that together lead to the new animal’s valuable life. In this way, it 
seems that there would be a single action, e.g. the press of a button, that leads to the killing 
of one animal and to the raising of another satisfying the relevant conditions. Thus, the 
value of what would otherwise be a sequence of actions is, in the automation case, the 
value of a single action. Since this, apparently, would not involve a sequence of actions, (R) 
would not apply and, therefore, it seems that the killing would be permissible (given that 
the press of the button would).11 
This objection fails because it overlooks one crucial action (or sequence), namely, setting 
up the automation, making it seem that (R) would not apply when in fact it does. Hence, 
the valuable state of affairs would still be a consequence of a sequence of actions. 
Perhaps one serious objection is that the RA can be restated in a way that bypasses (R). One 
might say that it does not matter whether or not the valuable state of affairs is a conse-
quence of the killing, for as long as the whole sequence brings about such state of affairs, 
then, replacing an animal, that is, the whole sequence, is permissible. In other words, we 
shift the evaluation focus from actions to sequences of actions. And since I do not deny that 
the valuable state of affairs is a consequence of the sequence, then it seems that I have to 
agree that it determines (or contributes to) the normative status of the sequence. 
But is this an objection to my proposal? The goal was to argue that, contrarily to widespread 
agreement, standard act-Utilitarianism does not imply the RA. After all, this was the target 
of those who used the RA against Utilitarianism (e.g. Pluhar 1982; Regan 2004). To achieve 
that goal I proposed a novel way, via (R), to stop the RA. But I did not claim that every utili-
tarian view with (R) stops the RA. It may well be the case that a global utilitarian view, that 
is, one which allows every sort of thing as evaluative focus, implies the RA. At the very least, 
the objector has to argue that a utilitarian should accept sequences of actions as evaluative 
focus. This comes with difficulties. 
The said shift of evaluative focus requires completing and making sense of the new, refor-
mulated principle: 
 
11 I had thought of this objection before, but I thank Melinda Roberts for mentioning it to me and thereby 
confirming my intuition that it was something I had to address. 
Against Animal Replaceability: A Restriction on Consequences  
190 
(C*) A sequence of actions is permissible iff it brings about more value than any other 
alternative ________ available to the agent. 
The natural move is to fill the blank with ‘sequence’, but do agents have alternative se-
quences of actions to choose from? Maybe just in single agent sequences, for an agent can-
not choose a sequence that involves other people’s actions (otherwise he would know how 
others would act).12 And while single agent sequences are enough to formulate the RA (but 
seriously limiting its application), we would still need a systematic account of the normative 
relation between sequences and the actions composing them. Without such account, that 
the consequences of a sequence are good overall is not enough for its permissibility, since 
it may be the case that a single impermissible act stains the sequence of which it is part. 
V Conclusion 
The value of the new animal’s life should be a consequence of killing another animal if the 
RA is to be successful. Yet, I argued that such value, given the restriction on consequences I 
presented, is not a consequence of the killing. Therefore, the first premiss of the RA is false. 
Since that restriction is quite strong and, apparently, ad hoc, I offered two distinct motiva-
tions for it: one axiological and one of usefulness. I then considered and replied two plausi-
ble objections, the last of which hints at further work on coordinated actions and on the 
normative relation between sequences and the actions composing them. 
I should conclude by stressing that even though I could not assess here the relative merits 
of others ways to disassociate Utilitarianism and replaceability, my proposal does not give 
up of any of the usual suspects like those other ways do – hedonism, maximisation or the 
total view. And while I am sure that other objections might be raised, I think that this utili-
tarian proposal against the RA is worthy of being discussed in more detail.13 
 
 
12 What about coordinated actions? Here seems possible to choose a sequence involving other people’s actions 
because everyone agreed to act in such and such manner and so the agent seems reasonably informed in a way 
that does not preclude the sequence from being an alternative action. I have no answer to this. 
13 Meanwhile, following comments from Theron Pummer, Bruno Jacinto, José Mestre and Pedro Galvão, to all of 
whom I am thankful, I became aware of other difficulties, and also possible developments, of the view presented 
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What Exactly Is Wrong with Human 
Extinction? 
Tim Mulgan, University of Auckland, New Zealand 
Abstract 
In this paper, I explore the impact of risks of human extinction on the debate between consequentialism and con-
tractualism. To get clear intuitions, I consider an imaginary case where scientists discover that deadly cosmic rays 
will hit the Earth in two hundred years, instantly and painlessly killing all living things and rendering the Earth 
uninhabitable. We can only avoid total human extinction by constructing interstellar ‘generation starships’ where 
a small population and their descendants will continue the human story in space in the hope that their distant 
descendants will re-establish human civilization on some distant exoplanet.   
This is a fruitful thought experiment for moral philosophers, because competing moral theories that often go to-
gether in real-life come apart very radically, thus forcing us to choose between them. I contrast two moral theories: 
Scanlonian Contractualism and Rule Utilitarianism. These represent two broad approaches to moral theory: Con-
sequentialism and non-Consequentialism. I argue that even the most plausible forms of Scanlonian Contractualism 
and Rule Utilitarianism find it difficult to make sense of our choice in Cosmic Rays. I also conclude that thinking 
about extinction puts pressure on Derek Parfit’s recent argument that Contractualism and Consequentialism can 
be reconciled, because even the the most moderate Rule Utilitarianism gives much greater importance to extinc-
tion risks than even the most future-oriented Contractualism. 
Introduction 
Most people agree that human extinction would be bad. But moral theories disagree about 
why it would be bad and how bad it would be. These differences don’t emerge in implausi-
ble tales where one option leads to certain extinction. But they come to the fore in more 
mundane cases involving small risks of extinction. 
I The Generation Starship Tale 
To get clear intuitions, I consider one imaginary case: 
Cosmic Rays: Scientists discover that deadly cosmic rays will hit the Earth in two hundred 
years, instantly and painlessly killing all living things and rendering the Earth uninhabitable. 
We cannot prevent this. But we can avoid total human extinction by constructing interstel-
lar ‘generation starships’ where a small population and their descendants will continue the 
What Exactly Is Wrong with Human Extinction?  
194 
human story in space in the hope that their distant descendants will re-establish human 
civilization on some distant exoplanet.  
We have only two options. 
1. Remain: Accept imminent extinction, and try to make the lives of the last people 
as pleasant and worthwhile as possible. When the cosmic rays hit, humanity be-
comes extinct. 
2. Starship: Invest heavily in starships. The cosmic rays still eliminate life on Earth, 
but no longer bring human extinction. Unfortunately, to have any realistic chance 
of success, this option must be very expensive – greatly depleting non-renewable 
resources, causing enormous environmental damage, and making life much less 
pleasant for those remaining on Earth. 
My Cosmic Rays tale has the following ethically salient features: 
1. The Starship option adds future people. Remain is clearly better for all actual or 
necessary present or future people (i.e., everyone who will exist whatever we 
do), but Starship maximises expected future well-being.1 
2. The Starship option involves deliberately creating a very limited quality of life for 
some future people – namely, those living on starships – in the hope that much 
later future people – namely, those living in a flourishing human society on our 
target exoplanet – will enjoy much better lives. The starship people are thus ef-
fectively used as a means to an end. The deficiencies of starship life include: 
a. Lower quality of life. 
b. Restricted liberty, freedom, or leisure time. 
c. Potential moral tragedy. (Apart from tragic choices onboard a starship, when 
resources are insufficient to meet everyone’s basic needs, our target ex-
oplanet may already contain indigenous life that cannot coexist with humans. 
 
1 I assume here that, while it is very harsh, life in the post-starship future is still (on average, on balance) worth 
living. This optimistic assumption is controversial, but it is very common in the consequentialist literature on 
human extinction (e.g., Beckstead 2013; Kaczmarek 2017). A full treatment of starship cases would need to 
accommodate more pessimistic alternatives – especially the staple fictional situation where some future 
catastrophe leads to a fallen starship community whose members live in Stone Age poverty without any awareness 
that they are living on a spaceship (e.g., Aldiss 1958; Heinlein 1963). 
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The last starship generation must then choose between voluntary human ex-
tinction and the destruction of an entire extra-terrestrial ecosystem.) 
3. The original choice is iterated. Each Starship generation faces the same two op-
tions: Remain and Continuation. 
4. Procreative ethics is especially salient, for several reasons.  
a. Starship volunteers impose starship life on their own descendants. Is this a 
permissible exercise of their procreative freedom? 
b. Long-term starship survival demands very tight population control. Procrea-
tive freedom will be virtually unknown.  
c. Bearing and raising children in outer space are hazardous activities. (As is 
growing up in outer space.) Does anyone have a right to impose such hazards 
on others?  
d. Because the burdens of bearing children in space are borne by women, Star-
ship life thus reintroduces gendered hazards, risks, and obligations which 
modern affluent liberal societies had hoped to consign to the past. 
Why we should talk about such far-fetched examples? Here are some reasons. 
1. Similar thought experiments are explored in detail in speculative fiction.2 So we 
have many existing imaginative resources to draw on. 
2. This case is not necessarily entirely fictional. Generation starships are one future 
possibility. (At least, some influential and wealthy people think this is a future 
possibility.) 
3. Even if it isn’t possible, this imaginary case shares salient features with mundane 
futures that are definitely possible. Other extinction avoidance strategies – colo-
nising the solar system, enduring a temporarily broken terrestrial future, escap-
ing to virtual worlds, uploading ourselves into computers, colonising the galaxy 
 
2 A good overview of the Generation Starship sub-genre is Caroti 2011. Influential and/or philosophically 
interesting contributions include Aldiss 1958, Heinlein 1941/1963, Ballard 1962, Delaney 1965, Wolfe 1993-1996, 
LeGuin 2002, MacLeod 2005, Bear 2007-2010, Robinson 2015. 
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with inanimate machines, or even making very significant sacrifices now to pre-
vent truly catastrophic future climate change – are less dramatic than generation 
starships. But they raise very similar ethical issues. 
4. This is a good case for moral philosophers, because competing moral theories 
that often go together in real-life come apart very radically, thus forcing us to 
choose between them. This is my focus today. 
I contrast two moral theories: Scanlonian Contractualism and Rule Utilitarianism, which rep-
resent broader approaches: Consequentialism and non-Consequentialism. 
I assume that Contractualism can accommodate non-identity, obligations to future people, 
and the imposition of risk (Kumar 2003, 2015; Weinberg 2015; Frick 2015). Instead of fixat-
ing on what actually happens to the worst-off actual person, our Contractualist asks 
whether some representative future person could object to our present behaviour. For in-
stance, by storing nuclear waste negligently where it might leak radiation in a thousand 
year’s time, I display an objectionable lack of respect for any future person who might suffer 
as a result. 
I also assume that Rule Utilitarianism avoids collapse into Act Utilitarianism, and provides a 
plausible, moderate, liberal alternative within the utilitarian tradition. 
These are, I believe, the most plausible forms of Contractualism and Consequentialism. They 
are also the points where the two traditions are closest together, and therefore provide the 
most interesting contrast. My question is whether either theory can make sense of our 
choice in Cosmic Rays. 
II Contractualism 
For the Scanlonian Contractualist, an act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by a set of 
principles that no one can reasonably reject as a basis for our common life together (Scanlon 
1999). Contractualism balances the complaints of representative individuals. In Cosmic 
Rays, there are several possible salient groups: 
- Present Deciders: These people make the initial choice between Starship and Re-
main. They want to keep both options open. So they want to reject any principle that 
prohibits either Starship or Remain. 
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- People who remain on Earth between now and when the cosmic rays hit: These peo-
ple much prefer Remain, because the Starship option makes their lives go much 
worse in clearly non-trivial ways. So they want to reject any principle that permits 
Starship. 
- Future people living on Starships: These people only exist at all if we choose the Star-
ship option. So they could not possibly object to Remain. (If you never exist, you have 
no complaint!) However, if their lives are sufficiently bad, or if they otherwise object 
to our using them as a means to ensure human survival, they might well reject any 
principle that permits Starship. 
- Future people flourishing in some distant future exoplanet civilization: These people 
would obviously prefer Starship. But, as they only ever exist if that option is chosen, 
they cannot reasonably reject any principle that permits or requires Remain. 
- Sentient non-human animals who live on Earth between now and when the cosmic 
rays hit: If their voices are heard, these animals will favour a version of Remain where 
(at least some of) the resources that would otherwise be consumed by the Starship 
programme are devoted to their welfare. 
- Sentient non-human extra-terrestrial beings (who may be persons): As the Starship 
option may impact very negatively on any extra-terrestrial life we encounter, extra-
terrestrial sentient or rational beings will want to reject any principle that permits 
that option.  
Even setting aside the possible complaints of future starship people – let alone those of 
non-humans on Earth or elsewhere – the complaints of the people left behind on Earth 
alone seem to clearly outweigh those of the present deciders. Surely our desire to preserve 
our own freedom of choice cannot outweigh their desire not to endure a very impoverished 
life? 
It seems that Contractualism could not require the Starship option. At most, it might permit 
it. Unless it is extremely demanding, Contractualism presumably permits some sub-optimal 
projects. But would that be enough? Is human-extinction-avoidance just another morally 
optional sub-optimal personal project that is permitted but cannot ever be recommended, 
let alone required? 
Here are some strategies Contractualists might use to support the Starship option: 
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1. Only present people: We only consider the complaints and perspectives of pre-
sent people who already exist. (We must then argue that the starship programme 
can be delivered in a way that no present person could reasonably reject – per-
haps by giving all present people some stake in the project.) 
2. Only necessary people: We only consider the complaints and perspectives of pre-
sent people and those future people who will exist whatever we do (i.e., necessary 
future people). We then argue that any future people who suffer on Earth be-
cause of Starship would not have existed otherwise and therefore have no right 
to complain. (Perhaps, like Parfit’s Risky Policy (Parfit 1984), Starship involves 
widespread social upheaval that is identity-determining for all future people.) 
3. Compensation and meaning: We argue that the very fact that their existence is 
necessary to avoid human extinction adds meaning to the lives of both those who 
suffer on Earth and those who endure restricted lives on starships. And this extra 
meaning outweighs the undesirability of their lives. (We might find this move 
more plausible for starship people, who are essential to the Starship plan, rather 
than for people left on Earth who are merely collateral damage.) 
4. Contingent people: We allow contingent future people to reject principles that 
prevent them from coming into existence. (We might appeal to Nils Holtug’s 
(2010) suggestion that bringing someone into existence benefits that person.) 
5. Impersonal values: We strengthen present people’s reasons for rejection by al-
lowing appeals to impersonal values – either because impersonal values are gen-
erally admissible, or because there is something special about the value of avoid-
ing human extinction. The basis of such appeals could be either impersonal value 
simpliciter (as Parfit does in On What Matters) or the importance for the agent 
herself of responding to impersonal values (as Scanlon does himself). 
6. Pluralism: Contractualism only captures one part of morality. Other moral rea-
sons may compete with ‘what we owe to each other’. Extinction-avoidance might 
enter our overall theory alongside other non-Contractualist obligations to the en-
vironment or to non-human animals.  
7. Precondition: The continued existence of human society is a precondition for the 
applicability of Contractualist morality. Perhaps we should therefore introduce a 
hitherto neglected background obligation to do whatever we can to avoid immi-




Consequentialists object that Contractualism misses the worst thing about human extinc-
tion: the loss of all that future human happiness, the absence of all those happy future peo-
ple. The challenge for Consequentialism is to avoid the dominance argument, which con-
cludes that the Starship option is always obligatory (e.g., Beckstead 2013). Any negative 
impact over the next two centuries is dwarfed by the potential loss of billions of extra happy 
lives. The far distant future must dominate our present ethical thinking. Any reduction in 
extinction risk justifies any present cost. 
The basic Dominance Argument is simple:  
1. If we avoid imminent human extinction, then humanity could continue for billions 
of years. 
2. The expected value of possible futures where humanity continues for billions of 
years is astronomically large. 
3. Therefore, the expected value of any reduction in the probability of imminent 
human extinction is also astronomically large. 
4. Therefore, any reduction in the probability of imminent human extinction out-
weighs any present or near future cost. 
Rule Utilitarians argue that the right thing to do in any situation is the act that follows from 
the ideal moral code – the code whose widespread acceptance would have the best conse-
quences relative to other possible moral codes (Hooker 2000; Mulgan 2006, 2015, 2017). 
Prima facie, the dominance argument applies to rule utilitarianism as much as to act conse-
quentialism (Kaczmarek 2017). 
Rule Utilitarians have several strategies to weaken the dominance argument. 
1. Uncertainty about long-term survival. Avoiding imminent human extinction only 
dominates if it raises the probability that humanity will survive for billions of 
years. But how much faith should we put in any future prediction whose conclu-
sion so far outstrips any possible evidence base? What if the probability that hu-
manity will survive for billions of years (even if we avoid imminent extinction) is 
itself astronomically small? 
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2. Uncertainty about far distant future well-being. Avoiding imminent human ex-
tinction is only good if (most) far distant future lives are worth living. But why 
think that? Are most present lives worth living? Have most past human lives been 
worth living? If not, why assume the future will be better? Can we reasonably 
project current levels of happiness or current (upward) trends indefinitely into 
the future? 
3. Rejecting Total Utilitarianism. The standard dominance argument assumes total 
utilitarianism. Most people reject total utilitarianism. Some alternatives (such as 
Larry Temkin’s 2015 suggestion that what matters is the number of times that 
are inhabited by happy humans) seem to give extinction avoidance an even 
higher priority. But others – notably average utilitarianism, limited quantity 
views, or diminishing marginal value views – may counsel against extreme extinc-
tion avoidance measures such as Starship. 
4. Rejecting anthropocentrism. The Starship option poses an unknown threat to un-
discovered extra-terrestrial life. If (some of) that life is sentient, then the poten-
tial loss of extra-terrestrial wellbeing may outweigh any value added by ensuring 
that there are some happy humans – especially if we attach diminishing marginal 
value to each species or kind of life.  
5. Priority to the Worst-off. If we give priority to the fate of the worst-off future 
people, then the costs imposed on those who suffer on Earth or on starships may 
outweigh the (possible) benefits enjoyed by distant future people who might 
flourish on a colonised exoplanet. 
6. Rejecting expected value maximisation. If we give priority to avoiding cata-
strophic outcomes, then the Starship option may be ruled out by the many ways 
it could go very badly wrong – which have long been the central theme in gener-
ation starship fiction. 
7. Limits on demandingness. Rule Utilitarians argue that their theory is less demand-
ing than Act Utilitarianism, because (a) human beings cannot internalise an overly 
demanding moral code, and (b) once we factor-in the costs of compliance borne 
by every successive generation, such a code won’t maximise long-term well-be-
ing anyway. If these argument carry over to the special case of human extinction 
(where one possible future has no inhabitants in the far distant future), then they 
suggest that Rule Utilitarianism will not make extreme demands regarding ex-
tinction avoidance. 
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8. Consequences in other possible futures: Even if the Starship option would pro-
duce the best consequences in this particular case, it doesn’t automatically follow 
that someone who had internalised the optimific moral outlook would feel free 
to choose this option. When rule utilitarians select an ideal code of rules, they 
must assess it against a wide range of possible futures. Would a willingness to 
abandon a ruined Earth and unleash our not-entirely-admirable-consumer-soci-
ety on an undeserving galaxy have negative effects in other (more plausible) sce-
narios? (In the real world: Does the fantasy of escaping the consequences of their 
own environmental destruction insulate the super-rich from recognising the 
need to mend their ways?) 
9. Pluralism: We might acknowledge that Consequentialism only captures one part 
of morality, and that other moral reasons may compete with our reasons to pro-
mote the good (whether individually or collectively). Consequentialist reasons to 
avoid human extinction might compete with – or are constrained by – a Contrac-
tualist story about what we owe to each other. 
IV Beyond (or between) Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism 
Intuitively, Contractualism seems to give too little weight to human extinction and Utilitar-
ianism too much. It is hard to accept that avoiding human extinction is merely (at best!) one 
optional but sup-optimal project among many. But it is equally hard to accept that threats 
of extinction should always and completely dominate our ethical thinking. I have presented 
several ways for Contractualists to take extinction more seriously, and for Utilitarians to 
take extinction less seriously. Perhaps one or other of these succeeds. Perhaps the two the-
ories can – as Parfit hoped – meet again in the middle. If not, we must look elsewhere.  
One option is to introduce a new normative source – attaching direct importance to the 
continuation of humanity itself and/or the avoidance of extinction (e.g., Frick 2017). I think 
this is a mistake. Consider two puzzle cases: 
Leave or Remain: Humanity faces an existential threat. We have only two options. We can 
either (a) maximise the quality of life on Earth for a short time, or (b) pour all our resources 
into a very Spartan short-lived generation starship programme. If we Remain, then a hun-
dred million people will enjoy good lives for one century, and then humanity becomes ex-
tinct. If we Leave, then during each of a thousand centuries, one hundred people will enjoy 
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less good lives, and then humanity becomes extinct. This is a Partial Same People Choice. 
Everyone who exists under Leave would also have existed under Remain. (Perhaps Leave 
involves cryogenic storage in outer space, with a hundred people thawed each century.) If 
we Leave, then every individual is worse-off than she would otherwise have been, and there 
are many fewer happy people, but Humanity will endure for an extra nine-hundred-and-
ninety-nine centuries. Could Leave possibly be preferable?  
Multiple Escape: At t1, the human community embarks on an ambitious multi-pronged plan 
to avoid human extinction: generation starships are dispatched across the galaxy, human 
minds are uploaded into virtual worlds stored safely in the asteroid belt, the rest of the solar 
system is colonised, and so on. Once established, these human colonies cannot interact with 
one another or with the people left on Earth. At t2, we are those people left on Earth. An 
approaching meteor poses a (very) small risk to all human life on Earth. How seriously 
should we take this threat? What sacrifices should we endure to avoid it? And, in particular: 
Would the failure of the various extra-terrestrial human communities established at t1 
make the risk of meteor strike more important? 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism both answer ‘No’ in both cases. Remain is (much) better 
than Leave, and the fate of other communities should not affect our reasoning about the 
meteor threat. These verdicts seem very plausible to me. 
A final option is dualism. If Contractualism errs in one direction, and Utilitarianism in the 
other, then why not simply combine them? Perhaps our ethical theory should balance Con-
tractualist obligations to particular people with Consequentialist obligations to promote fu-
ture well-being. I suggest that this dualist option is worth pursuing.3 
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Hegels Begriff der Nützlichkeit: Zum 
Zusammenhang von Religionskritik 
und Terror 
Ryu Okazaki, Humboldt University Berlin, Germany 
Abstract 
Some of the literature on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s reception of the utilitarian philosophy of the French 
enlightenment, especially Claude Adrien Helvétius and Paul-Henri Thiry d’Holbach contends that Hegel misunder-
stands their concept of utility (Nützlichkeit), because he oversees the potential of that concept and reduces it to 
the isolation of human subjects, claiming it resulted in the terrorism of the French revolution. Against such criti-
cism, this paper analyses the arguments within the Phenomenology of Spirit, in order to clarify the conceptual and 
logical connection between the criticism of religion by the French enlightenment and the terror of the French 
revolution. The first part deals with Hegel’s analysis on the enlightenment’s criticism of religion according to the 
three moments of superstitious consciousness, namely what it believes, why it believes and how it believes, in 
order to highlight not only the weak point of superstitious consciousness but also the fault of enlightenment. The 
second part analyses the emergence of the French Revolution and its relationship to the terrorism within it, from 
the perspective of the concept of utility, which the consciousness of enlightenment offers as the alternative to the 
religious relationship between human subjects, which was destroyed by the enlightenment. Through the reading 
of these passages it should become clear that the terror was caused by the French Revolution which try to eradi-
cate all kinds of institutions. Our task now is to establish anew these institutions on the basis of the concept of 
utility as the reciprocity of need and its satisfaction between human beings. 
Einleitung 
Im Abschnitt über “den sich entfremdeten Geist: die Bildung” in der Phänomenologie des 
Geistes hat Hegel bekanntlich den Begriff der “Nützlichkeit” entfaltet. Wenn auch Hegels 
Einfluss im Werke der klassischen Vertreter des Utilitarismus, wie Jeremy Bentham oder 
John Stuart Mill kaum spürbar ist, weisen einige Literaturen darauf hin, dass Hegel dabei 
den Nützlichkeitsgedenken von den Denkern des französischen Materialismus, etwa von 
Claude Adrien Helvétius und Paul-Henri Thiry d’Holbach mitberücksichtigt, die als Vorläufer 
des utilitaristischen Denkens gelten. Blickt man auf den systematischen Stellenwert dieses 
Begriffs in der Phänomenologie des Geistes, dann ergibt sich, dass dieser Abschnitt, in dem 
der Begriff thematisiert wird, Ausgang vom Rechtszustand des römischen Reichs nimmt und 
dann die Geistesgeschichte bis hin zur Französischen Revolution darstellt. Dabei bedeutet 
die Entfremdung nicht nur den Verlust, sondern auch die Bildung, weil der Entfremdung 
eine Funktion “der Aufhebung des natürlichen Seins” (Hegel 1980, 267) zugeschrieben wird. 
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In diesem Bildungsprozess versucht das Bewusstsein, sich selbst zu verallgemeinern, weil 
die Allgemeinheit des Rechts zuerst etwas nur unmittelbar von außen her Gegebenes ist. 
Die Gestalt des Bewusstseins der Aufklärung tritt im zweiten Abschnitt auf, wobei sich die 
Aufklärung mit dem (Aber-)Glauben auseinandersetzt. Die Aufklärung versucht dort ihre 
Allgemeinheit dadurch zu beweisen, dass sie im Kampf mit dem Glauben “das Absolute” des 
Glaubens als kein Absolutes, sondern etwas vom Selbstbewusstsein Hervorgebrachtes 
aufzeigt. Hierbei analysiert Hegel, wie bereits gesagt, die aufklärerische Religionskritik des 
französischen Materialismus, der anhand der menschlichen Sinnlichkeit die Scheinhaftigkeit 
des Absoluten bzw. Gottes zu entlarven versucht und dabei zugleich den Begriff der 
Nützlichkeit darstellt. 
Im Folgenden soll die Bedeutung des Nützlichkeitsbegriffs besonders hinsichtlich der zwei 
Begriffe, der Religionskritik und des Terrors etwas genauer analysiert werden. Wie wir 
sehen werden, weist Hegel einerseits auf die Mangelhaftigkeit der aufklärerischen Religion-
skritik hin, wobei es sich um eine Zerstörung der Bindung der Menschen untereinander han-
delt, die erst der Glauben ermöglicht hatte. Hegel sieht nämlich einerseits das unerwün-
schte Resultat der Aufklärung in der Atomisierung des Menschen. Andererseits sieht er im 
Begriff der Nützlichkeit die Möglichkeit, eine neue Konzeption der Vergesellschaftung bzw. 
der Wiederherstellung des verlorenen menschlichen Zusammenlebens darzustellen, die ja 
nach dem Untergang der religiösen Bindungskraft eine moderne Weise der Vergesellschaf-
tung gewährleisten soll. Gerade hierin besteht jedoch der kritische Ansatzpunkt der Litera-
turen z. B. die von Günther Mensching, der etwa betont, Hegel habe die Tragweite der Sozi-
alphilosophie der französischen Aufklärung übersehen, indem Hegel die Relevanz ihrer 
utilitaristisch- materialistischen Religionskritik auf die Atomisierung reduziere, die ja letz-
tendlich zum Terror führt (Mensching 1971). Um diese Kritik kritisch zu hinterfragen, soll 
angesichts der Nützlichkeit der logische, begriffliche Zusammenhang zwischen der Religion-
skritik und dem Terror geklärt werden. Dazu werde ich im ersten Schritt Hegels Analyse der 
aufklärerischen Religionskritik skizzieren, um das Argument für die Atomisierung durch die 
Aufklärung zu rekonstruieren. Sodann werde ich den Begriff der Nützlichkeit in Bezug auf 
die darauffolgende Erfahrung des Terrors betrachten, um die Bedeutung und Grenze der 
Nützlichkeitskonzeption als eines modernen Vergesellschaftungsprinzips zu ermessen.  
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I Hegels Analyse der aufklärerischen 
Religionskritik 
Im zweiten Abschnitt über “den sich entfremdeten Geist” behandelt Hegel die Gestalten 
des Bewusstseins als Aufklärung. Dabei zielt die Aufklärung darauf ab, gegenüber der Bezi-
ehung des Glaubens zu seinem Gegenstand des Glaubens, nämlich zum absoluten Wesen, 
zu zeigen, dass das angeblich absolute Wesen kein absolutes ist. In diesem Zusammenhang 
ist jedoch zuerst auf die Bestimmung des glaubenden und aufklärerischen Bewusstseins zu 
achten. Beide Gestalten des Bewusstseins haben nämlich gemeinsam, dass jedes sich auf 
das absolute Wesen bezieht. Der Unterschied beider besteht hingegen darin, dass sich das 
glaubende Bewusstsein nicht als Selbstbewusstsein auf jenes Wesen bezieht, während das 
aufklärerische Bewusstsein das absolute Wesen als etwas von ihm Hervorgebrachtes sieht, 
sich nämlich als Selbstbewusstsein verhält. 
Hegel erwähnt bei der Analyse die drei Momente des Glaubens, mit denen sich die Aufklä-
rung auseinandersetzt: das absolute Wesen, der Grund des Glaubens, und das Tun bzw. der 
Dienst desselben. Diese Momente lassen sich auch so formulieren: was man glaubt, warum 
man glaubt, und wie man glaubt.  
Das erste Moment ist das Absolute, oder der Gegenstand des Glaubens, also das, was man 
glaubt. Hierbei führt Hegel ein Beispiel vom Aberglauben an, dessen Objekt des Glaubens 
beispielsweise ein natürliches Ding ist: “Die Aufklärung sagt hiernach über den Glauben, 
dass sein absolutes Wesen ein Steinstück, ein Holzblock sei, der Augen habe und nicht sehe, 
oder etwas Brotteig, der auf dem Acker gewachsen, von Menschen verwandelt darauf 
zurückgeschickt werde” (Hegel 1980, 300). Dabei scheint folgerichtig gesagt zu werden, dass 
das Objekt des Aberglaubens nichts anderes als ein sinnliches Ding ist, und das ist ganz an-
ders als das, was ein Absolutes sein soll. Dieser scheinbar rationalen Argumentation der 
Aufklärung widerspricht Hegel. Wenn die Aufklärung den Gegenstand des Glaubens als 
einen bloß sinnlichen nennt, versteht die Aufklärung den Glauben falsch. Denn ein solcher 
Gegenstand des Glaubens kann für den Glauben nur insofern ein Gegenstand des Glaubens 
sein, als dieser Gegenstand auf das Absolute bezogen wird. Trotzdem löst die Aufklärung 
die Gebundenheit des sinnlichen Dinges mit dem Absoluten auf und isoliert das sinnliche 
Moment als solches. Für den Glauben ist es ohne weiteres verständlich, dass der Gegen-
stand ein sinnliches Ding ist. Aber der Glauben weiß zugleich, dass diese sinnlichen Dinge 
ohne die Beziehung auf das Absolute nichts sind, zumal er nicht aufgrund der Sinnlichkeit 
jenes Dinges daran glaubt. Hegels Kritik am aufklärerischen Angriff auf das erste Moment 
lautet deshalb, dass die Aufklärung die Beziehung auf das Absolute einseitig übersieht, in-
dem sie die Sinnlichkeit des Gegenstandes des Glaubens zu entlarven meint. 
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Nun komme ich zum zweiten Moment, dem Grund des Glaubens, d.h. warum man glaubt. 
Dazu betrachtet Hegel die Überlieferung einer beliebigen Religion als ein Beispiel des Grun-
des des Glaubens, wobei die Aufklärung dem Glauben zeigt, dass es immer zufällig ist, ob 
diese Überlieferung wahrhaft oder gefälscht ist. Wenn der Aufklärer den gläubigen 
Menschen nach der Wahrhaftigkeit fragt und dementsprechend der Glauben dem Aufklärer 
einen rationalen Grund zu geben versucht, dann ergibt sich unabsichtlich, dass der Glauben 
nicht aufgrund der Absolutheit seiner Religion, sondern aufgrund der Rationalität der Be-
gründung daran glaubt, was aber dem unmittelbaren Glauben widerspricht. Er zeigt nämlich 
entgegen seiner Absicht seinen Glauben nicht an das Absolute, sondern an die Rationalität. 
Dazu merkt Hegel trotz der unbewussten Bekenntnis des Glaubens als Glauben an die Ra-
tionalität wiedermal an, dass diese kritische Verführung der Aufklärung so einseitig ist, dass 
sie den Glauben selbst außer Acht lässt. Die Aufklärung abstrahiert nämlich wieder die Be-
zogenheit irgendeiner religiösen Überlieferung auf das Absolute und isoliert das diesseitige 
zufällige Moment. 
Und zuletzt komme ich zum dritten Moment des Glaubens, nämlich das Tun bzw. der Dienst 
des Glaubens, d.h. wie man glaubt. Dieses Moment veranschaulicht Hegel an der diesseiti-
gen Aufopferung des Individuellen: “Dies Tun ist das Aufheben der Besonderheit des Indi-
viduums oder der natürlichen Weise seines Fürsichseins, woraus ihm die Gewißheit 
hervorgeht, reines Selbstbewußtsein nach seinem Tun, d.h. als fürsichseiendes einzelnes 
Bewußtsein eins mit dem Wesen zu sein” (Hegel 1980, 301). Hier ist wohl ein religiöser 
Dienst wie beispielsweise das Fasten gemeint, wodurch das Individuum auf seinen Genuss, 
nämlich das diesseitige Bedürfnis Verzicht tut, um den jenseitigen Genuss zu garantieren. 
Die Aufklärung merkt demgegenüber an, dass dieses Tun bzw. der religiöse Dienst unsinnig 
ist, weil es auf den Genuss Verzicht tut, um denselben zu bekommen. Hegel zufolge ist diese 
Kritik am Dienst jedoch ebenfalls einseitig. Sobald nämlich die Aufklärung den jenseitigen 
Genuss, den Zweck des Dienstes, mit dem diesseitigen Genuss identifiziert, übersieht sie, 
dass die diesseitige Aufopferung nur zwecks der jenseitigen Wohltat durchgeführt wird und 
nicht zwecks des Genusses im Allgemeinen.  
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Kritik Hegels an der aufklärerischen Religion-
skritik darin liegt, dass ihre Religionskritik die Bezogenheit des einzelnen, diesseitigen, zufäl-
ligen Moments auf das Absolute abstrahiert und das diesseitige sinnliche Moment als 
solches isoliert. Da sich jedoch der Glauben zugleich auf die Unmittelbarkeit des Absoluten 
stützt, kann der Glauben trotz der Einseitigkeit der aufklärerischen Religionskritik nicht 
mehr bestehen und wird nunmehr von der Aufklärung besiegt. Durch die drei Angriffe geht 
nämlich der Glauben an das Jenseits bzw. das Absolute verloren. Dies ist deshalb wichtig, 
weil die Beziehung der Menschen, die der Glauben, wenn auch auf prekärer Weise, gar-
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antiert, verloren geht. Die Aufklärung befreit zwar den Menschen von seinen aber-
gläubischen Ketten, aber aus dieser Befreiung resultiert zugleich in die Atomisierung der 
Menschen, weil die verbindende Kraft der Religion dadurch verloren gegangen ist. 
II Hegels Begriff der Nützlichkeit und dessen Bezug 
zum Terror 
Wenn auch das Resultat der aufklärerischen Religionskritik so zu sein scheint, dass durch 
die Atomisierung die Beziehung der Menschen irreversibel zerstört ist, so entsteht doch die 
Möglichkeit neuer Strukturen des Zusammenseins der Menschen: das Prinzip der Nützlich-
keit. Im Folgenden werde ich nun versuchen zu klären, ob und wenn ja, inwiefern das Prinzip 
der Nützlichkeit mit dem Terror zu tun hat.  
Hegel thematisiert den Begriff der Nützlichkeit zweimal: zuerst in Bezug auf den Angriff der 
Aufklärung auf das dritte Moment des Glaubens, nämlich das Tun und den Dienst des Glau-
bens und dann im darauffolgenden Abschnitt mit dem Titel “Die Wahrheit der Aufklärung”, 
wo nach dem Untergang der religiösen Vergesellschaftung eine neue Konzeption der Bezi-
ehung der Menschen zuinander dargestellt wird. Im letzten Teil des Entfremdungsab-
schnitts geht es dann darum, wie die Nützlichkeit zum Terror übergeht.  
Wie wir gesehen haben, basiert die aufklärerische Religionskritik gegenüber dem ersten 
sowie dritten Moment darauf, dass das Absolute des Glaubens tatsächlich mit der Sinnlich-
keit des einzelnen individuellen Menschen verbunden ist. Hierbei findet die Aufklärung ein 
neues Prinzip der Vergesellschaftung der Nützlichkeit, die das religiöse Prinzip ersetzen soll. 
Die Wechselseitigkeit der Nützlichkeit beschreibt Hegel folgendermaßen:  
Wie dem Menschen alles nützlich ist, so ist er es ebenfalls, und seine Bestimmung ebensosehr, 
sich zum gemeinnützlichen und allgemein brauchbaren Mitgliede des Trupps zu machen. So 
viel er für sich sorgt, gerade so viel muss er sich hergibt, so viel sorgt er für sich selbst, eine 
Hand wäscht die andere. Wo er aber sich befindet, ist er recht daran und wird genützt. (Hegel 
1980, 305) 
In diesem Zitat geht es Hegel darum, dass, indem man etwas gebraucht und es genießt, 
immer eine Wechselseitigkeit des Menschen vorausgesetzt und aktiviert wird, gerade worin 
die Nützlichkeit besteht. Wenn auch das religiöse Band der Menschen zerstört wurde, so 
bleibt oder entsteht noch die Möglichkeit, basierend auf dem essentiellen Moment des 
Menschen, dem Genuss, ein Vergesellschaftungsprinzip zu konzipieren, was Hegel mit der 
im Begriff der Nützlichkeit angelegten Wechselseitigkeit darzustellen versucht. Etwas 
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Nützliches ist nur insofern nützlich, als dessen Genuss zugleich einen Genuss für den an-
deren Menschen schafft. Hegels Definition der Nützlichkeit lautet deshalb: “der nicht in sich 
zurückkehrende Wechsel der Momente des ansich und des für ein anderes und des fürsich 
Seins” (Hegel 1980, 314). In dieser Definition des Begriffs ist es besonders wichtig, dass die 
Nützlichkeit “nicht in sich zurückkehrt”, weil diese Rückkehrlosigkeit keineswegs eine 
Feststellung des isolierten Individuums bzw. dessen Genuss bedeutet. Die Nützlichkeit kehrt 
nicht in irgendein Subjekt zurück. Die wesentliche Bestimmung der Nützlichkeit ist somit die 
Wechselseitigkeit.  
Aus dieser Bestimmung der Nützlichkeit als der Wechselseitigkeit ergibt sich nun, dass He-
gel die Nützlichkeit nicht bloß auf das isolierte Individuum reduziert, wie bereits erwähnte 
Literatur von Mensching, die den Terror auf Hegels angeblich falsches Verständnis 
zurückführen, meinen. Trotzdem macht das Bewusstsein im darauffolgenden Abschnitt die 
Terror-Erfahrung in der französischen Revolution. Die Kritik an Hegel, dass nach Hegel we-
gen des egoistischen Nützlichkeitsdenkens jedes Individuum die anderen nur zum eigenen 
Zweck als ein Mittel benutze und dadurch den Terror entstehen ließe, ist somit als falsch 
anzusehen, weil wie bereits gesagt, die Nützlichkeit keineswegs das Benutzen des anderen 
für eigene Zwecke bedeutet, sondern die Wechselseitigkeit voraussetzt. Wenn dem aber so 
ist, stellt sich doch die Frage, wie der Terror entsteht.  
Hierbei ist es zuerst darauf zu achten, dass die Konzeption der Nützlichkeit noch nicht als 
solche realisiert ist. Die Nützlichkeit soll als Prinzip fungieren, mit welchem man eine neue 
moderne Vergesellschaftung konzipiert und auf dem basierend man die Gesellschaft insti-
tutionell umbauen kann. Trotzdem bleibt der Begriff der Nützlichkeit bloß ein Prinzip, d.h. 
es ist noch nicht verwirklicht. Dies verdeutlicht Hegel folgendermaßen:  
Die Nützlichkeit ist noch Prädikat des Gegenstandes, nicht Subjekt, oder seine unmittelbare 
und einzige Wirklichkeit. Es ist dasselbe, was vorhin so erchien; dass das Fürsichsein noch nicht 
sich als Substanz der übrigen Momente erwiesen, wodurch das Nützliche unmittelbar nichts 
anderes als das Selbst des Bewusstseins und hiedurch in seinem Besitz wäre. – Diese 
Rücknahme der Form der Gegenständlichkeit des Nützlichen ist aber an sich schon geschehen, 
und aus dieser innern Umwälzung tritt die wirkliche Umwälzung der Wirklichkeit, die neue 
Gestalt des Bewusstseins, die absolute Freiheit hervor. (Hegel 1980, 316) 
Dieses Zitat befindet sich am Anfang vom letzten Abschnitt, “Die absolute Freiheit und der 
Schrecken”. Hierbei ist auffällig, dass die Nützlichkeit noch nicht ein Subjekt, sondern ein 
Prädikat ist. Dies besagt, dass die Nützlichkeit noch nicht durch die Subjektivität verwirklicht 
ist, weil sich das Individuum der Vergesellschaftung noch nicht bewusst ist. In diesem 
Zusammenhang kann man sich daran erinnern, dass die Nützlichkeit wesentlich nicht in ein 
Subjekt zurückkehrt. Die Totalisierung der Individualität durch die Nützlichkeit erfolgt 
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dagegen erst durch “das Bewusstsein der absoluten Freiheit”, womit Hegel das Bewusstsein 
der Französischen Revolution beschreibt.  
Was diese neue Gestalt versucht, ist Hegel zufolge somit, dass sich das Individuum ausge-
hend von seinem sinnlichen individuellen Sein das Ganze der Gesellschaft aneignet. Weil 
durch die aufklärerische Religionskritik alle andere Macht als das sinnliche Sein des 
Menschen liquidiert ist, muss das Individuum darauf abzielen, dass “jedes Individuum im-
mer ungeteilt Alles tut” (Hegel 1980, 317). Diese “ungeteilte” Tun charakterisiert passend 
das Verwirklichungsprinzip der absoluten Freiheit. Es müssen nämlich alle Institutionen aus-
gelöscht werden, insofern sie nicht von dem fürsichseienden einzelnen Bewusstsein selbst 
ausgerichtet sind. In diesem Versuch der Verwirklichung der absoluten Freiheit ausschlie-
ßlich durch sich selbst muss allerdings, laut Hegel, die Nützlichkeit verloren gehen und nur 
noch der Terror bleibt übrig.  
Da die Französische Revolution alle vorherige Institution vertilgt und sodann nur noch die 
vereinzelten Menschen übrig sind, kann keine Institution mehr aufgebaut werden, die die 
Nützlichkeit konkretisieren soll. Die Nützlichkeit an sich soll zwar dem Menschen eine neue 
Vergesellschaftung nach dem Untergang der religiösen Gesellschaft ermöglichen. Insofern 
es aber an Institutionen fehlt, muss dieses Prinzip der Nützlichkeit notwendig versagen. 
III Fazit 
Hegels Deutung nach verwendet die Aufklärung das Moment der Sinnlichkeit bzw. des Ge-
nusses dazu, die Scheinhaftigkeit des Absoluten des Glaubens zu entlarven. Die Aufklärung 
hat zum Begriff gebracht, dass der Mensch nicht wegen der Absolutheit des Absoluten an 
das Absolute glaubt, sondern der Mensch glaubt an das Absolute, um den Genuss zu 
vergewissern oder zu rechtfertigen. Wenn auch durch die aufklärerische Verkehrung des 
Absoluten trotz der Einseitigkeit derselben die Beziehung der Menschen verloren geht und 
alle Menschen nur noch isoliert leben können, so tritt doch ein neues Prinzip des Zusam-
menlebens, das Nützlichkeitsprinzip, auf, weil in der unbewussten Handlung des Menschen 
eine Wechselseitigkeit der Nützlichkeit ausgedrückt ist. Hegel sieht, mit der Französischen 
Aufklärung bzw. dem Materialismus die Möglichkeit, dass sich durch die Nützlichkeit an-
stelle eines vormodernen religiösen Vergesellschaftungsprinzips ein modernes Konzept des 
menschlichen Zusammenlebens darstellen lässt. Ferner sieht Hegel den Terror nicht als eine 
notwendige Konsequenz des Nützlichkeitsdenkens. Hegel betrachtet den Zusammenhang 
von der Nützlichkeit mit dem Terror nicht als notwendig, sondern es geht ihm vor allem 
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darum, dass die Konkretisierung oder Vergewisserung der Nützlichkeit ohne eine institu-
tionelle Vermittlung unmöglich ist. Die Nützlichkeit fungiert immer noch als ein wichtiges 
Prinzip, mit dem sich die Sittlichkeit nach der Zerstörung durch den Terror institutionell 
wiederherstellen lässt.  
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Abstract 
I critically discuss James Mill’s rather neglected essay “Liberty of the Press” (1823). Mill embarks upon a normative 
inquiry to define justifiable exceptions to the liberty of the press in view of the British government’s onslaught on 
dissenting political speech through a harsher libel law. He maintains that newspapers should not publish false 
accusations concerning private individuals or public officials, true statements we would classify as “hate speech” 
as well as incitements to obstruct lawful state procedures. On the contrary, the publication of criticism against the 
government and its officials, even if it is expressed in “a passionate language”, is absolutely necessary for the 
proper functioning of representative democracy. I argue that, despite their shortcomings, Mill’s arguments and 
recommendations bear heavily upon contemporary free speech debates. 
Introduction 
There is no doubt that James Mill’s mature essay “Liberty of the Press” (Mill 1992, 95-135), 
first published as a supplement to the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1821 and then included in 
a volume of Mill’s essays that appeared in 1823 has not drawn much attention, in stark 
contrast to his son’s “Liberty of Thought and Discussion”, the famous second chapter of On 
Liberty.1 Whether this neglect is justified or not remains to be seen. 
Mill is interested in determining anew which content-based legal restrictions on newspaper 
publications could be justified in a parliamentary democracy, given his conviction that the 
existing legislation is vague, unfair and utterly hostile to a robust conception of the liberty 
 
1 See Hamburger (1977, chapter 2), O’ Rourke (2001, 9-15), Niesen (2015, 295-6) and Grint (2017). The last article 
focuses on Mill’s unpublished commonplace books, and it is a valuable source for understanding the development 
of his thought on libel, censorship and the value of a free press.  
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of the press.2 Thus, he does not aim at constructing a general theory of free speech or ex-
pression, but he, unavoidably, relies on moral considerations as well as on his overall un-
derstanding of the political function of a free press to justify his de lege ferenda conclusions. 
The first conceptual distinction he makes is between “offences capable of being committed 
by the press” and “offences in the commission of which the press had an instrumental role” 
(Mill 1992, 99-101). An example will clarify the second term of the distinction. Suppose that 
a man publishes an ad in the personals section of a newspaper seeking the company of 
women who like gardening and the opera. In fact, this person is a psychotic serial killer who 
uses the services offered by newspapers to lure potential victims. It would be absurd to hold 
the press accountable for such a publication, since there was no indication of foul play. 
However, there are cases in which the offence, if any, is a publication in the press. Mill 
chooses to focus on two types of relevant cases, defamation of private individuals and po-
litically-minded speech, and embarks upon an inquiry about the scope of the freedom of 
the press as far as these two types of speech acts are involved. 
I Defamation of Private Individuals 
For Mill, everyone has a right to be publicly portrayed as she really is. By defaming a partic-
ular individual through the press, we tarnish her reputation causing her considerable harm. 
Can this harm be morally unjustified to such an extent as to attract the legislator’s atten-
tion? Mill’s answer is that the law should take defamation seriously, and he distinguishes 
three separate instances of it that can be reconstructed as follows:  
Case A. The press is subject to penalties if: 
i. It has been proven in court that a certain publication had falsely imputed to A an 
action or a disposition to action. 
ii. The imputed act or disposition “brings the evil of dislike or disrepute” upon A.  
 
2 In the aftermath of the Peterloo Massacre (1819), the British government passed six acts, two of which aimed at 
more effectively suppressing the dissemination of radical and dissenting political writings, a task that in practice 
proved to be difficult, given the number of radical authors that were being acquitted by juries. In fact, the acquittal 
rate in prosecutions for libel between 1817 and 1822 was sixty-two percent. See Harling (2001, 110). Cf. O’ Rourke 
(2001, 12-3) and Grint (2017, 363-8). For the rather limited impact of “Liberty of the Press”, see Hamburger (1977, 
32-3). 
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He makes clear that it is profoundly wrong to publicly accuse someone for something she 
has not done or to attribute to her a character flaw she does not possess. In particular, the 
ensuing harm “affects a man in two ways”: the victim suffers either a monetary loss or is 
made worse off from the “lessening [of] the marks of respect and affection which he would 
otherwise have received” (Mill 1992, 101). The exact nature of the afflicted harm is some-
thing that can in principle be decided in court, albeit lack of evidence or the complexity of 
the issues involved might aggravate the establishment of the relevant facts.3 As far as the 
remedies for defamation are concerned, those who have lost money should receive ade-
quate compensation, and those who have seen their reputation tarnished are entitled to a 
retraction, which will include the publication of the sentence of the court and whatever else 
is deemed necessary for the restoration of their good name. These penalties will also deter 
publishers from attacking the reputation of ordinary individuals. Moreover, Mill examines 
the likelihood that all these measures will prove insufficient in the sense that the general 
public will not be convinced that the defamed person has been wrongly accused. This might 
happen if the public is aware of the existence of evidence that was withheld from court, or 
it is incapable of seeing the truth of the matter. In the second case, the government is held 
accountable for not cultivating the epistemic virtues of its citizens. 
Case B. The press is not subject to penalties if: 
i. It has been proven in court that a certain publication had imputed to A an action or 
a disposition to action that are unquestionably true. 
ii. The imputed act or disposition “brings the evil of dislike or disrepute” upon A. 
iii. The ensuing loss of A’s good reputation is morally justified, since it makes A recognize 
her fault and it deters members of society from behaving in a similar manner. 
Here Mill argues that the press should not be held answerable to the law for exposing some-
one’s true character or for revealing the morally repugnant actions someone has per-
formed, even if the publicity she will receive will make her fall into disrepute. On the con-
trary, there are good utilitarian reasons for doing so: “The advantage which would be 
derived from the true exposure of any man’s actions of any sort, would exceed beyond cal-
culation the attendant evil” (Mill 1992, 106). Mill is closely following Bentham (2005, 106) 
 
3 It is noteworthy that, contrary to Bentham, in this essay Mill does not consider the possibility of a miscarriage of 
justice due to juries that have been selected to reach the verdict magistrates want. Moreover, he does not 
distinguish between telling a lie and simply making an erroneous statement. Perhaps, this could be explained by 
the emphasis he places on the harm suffered by the defamed person, which is not affected by the defamer’s false 
belief that she was right in her accusations. For his earlier views see Grint (2017, 372, 374-5). 
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in attributing to people a strong motive to seek the pleasures and avoid the pains resulting 
from the moral opinion other people have about them. This makes them fear dishonor, 
disgrace, infamy and shame. If all agents (or most of them) realize that morally reprehensi-
ble conduct, no matter what legal penalties it might bring forth, will be made public 
knowledge through the press, they will have an additional incentive to abide by the estab-
lished moral rules and this will work to everyone’s benefit.  
Case C. The press is subject to penalties if: 
i. It has been proven in court that a certain publication had imputed a true fact or ac-
tion to A.  
ii. The imputed fact or action “brings the evil of dislike or disrepute” upon A. 
iii. The ensuing loss of A’s good reputation is morally unjustifiable, since it is unde-
served, and it is generated by a crooked system of social or religious prejudice.  
Mill admits that his recommendations concerning the press’s liability in case B are not ab-
solutely valid. It is likely for someone to be met with disapproval, contempt or even derision 
for her actions, her character traits or her manners for the wrong reasons. In these rather 
rare cases, where the moral sentiments of the many are “perverted” and “corrupted,” indi-
viduals should be protected from “the declaration of truth by the press” (Mill 1992, 108). 
When it is written that someone is of humble origins and this statement is beyond dispute, 
this person will feel the “antipathy” of society not because of her own fault but because of 
the domination of an aristocratic class-system, which puts an unjustifiably high premium on 
what it defines as noble ancestry and has managed to command widespread acceptance. In 
this case, this particular truth (which of course makes sense only within a system of aristo-
cratic values) should not be reported by the press to keep this person out of harm’s way. 
There is an important point undergirding Mill’s discussion. Defamation is not only about the 
truth or falsity of what is said, but also about endorsing a normative framework that be-
stows – in a justifiable or unjustifiable manner – disvalue on what is said. There is nothing 
wrong with having “slit eyes” or a “red neck”. These descriptions become derogatory be-
cause those who use them express through them a long-established bias against people of 
Asian origin or southern American farmers. This is not the case when you call someone who 
has been convicted for appropriating money she did not own an “embezzler”. When it 
comes to the legal evaluation of defamatory speech, moral judgments are unavoidable.  
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II Politically-Minded Speech 
Up to this point, the discussion of free-press issues has been associated with their positive 
or negative consequences for private individuals as well as for society’s moral health. The 
next topic Mill discuses – politically-minded speech expressed through the press – provides 
him with the opportunity to highlight the general significance of the liberty of the press in 
a democratic society. The establishment of this liberty allows ordinary individuals (at least 
most of them) to undertake and successfully perform the role of responsible and competent 
citizens, thus securing the proper functioning of representative democracy. His basic argu-
ment (Mill 1992, 115-30) can be summarized as follows: 
a. The people need adequate information to choose the right representatives and to 
assess their performance, when they come into power.  
b. Given the tendency of those in power to care more about their own interests, the 
people must be able to express their discontent with them, which is the only means 
for removing the evils of bad government. 
c. There is no epistemic authority that can tell the body politic what is right and wrong 
in matters of government. 
d. Therefore, all views and reports (positive or negative) concerning matters of govern-
ment and the performance of politicians and other state officials should be freely 
published to enable the majority of citizens to weigh the available evidence, to make 
up their own minds and to act accordingly.  
This highly idealized argument, if it is valid,4 undoubtedly justifies a general presumption in 
favor of the liberty of the press, but, in my opinion, Mill’s originality lies in his treatment of 
three particular cases involving the expression of politically-minded speech. General en-
dorsements of the free press as the oxygen of democracy are common from the eighteenth 
century onwards, but the devil is hiding in the (legal) details.  
 
4 It is difficult to understand why “there is moral certainty … that the greater number of [the people] will judge 
aright” (Mill 1992, 121), if no one is epistemically qualified to distinguish the right political opinions from the 
mistaken. In my view, Mill has either to produce a skeptical argument – if we can never tell with certainty that an 
opinion is false, no restrictions in their publication are allowed – or to invoke something like Bentham’s public 
opinion tribunal.  
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II.a Subversive Advocacy  
According to a contemporary definition (Tassopoulos 1993, 13), “subversive advocacy is the 
inciting of other citizens to undertake the violent overthrow of governmental institutions as 
a means of political change”. Although Mill does not use this term, he discusses print exhor-
tations to the “people in general to take arms against the government, for the purpose of 
altering it against the consent of its rulers” (Mill 1992, 112). Surprisingly, he argues that 
subversive advocacy should not be made an offence. On the one hand, if the people are 
determined to revolt and only a spark is needed for the fire to start, it is pointless to punish 
the inciter. In such cases, no one is to be deterred from the existence of penalties. On the 
other hand, if the inciter is not to be taken seriously by her readers, no harm is done, and 
therefore it would be wrong to criminalize harmless speech.  
II.b Incitement to Obstruct Lawful State Procedures  
Mill has more to say on what he calls “exhortations to obstruct the operations of govern-
ment in detail.” Here one does not wish the overthrow of the government but instead ob-
jects to a particular established procedure related to the general functioning of the state 
and/or to the outcome that is expected to come out of it. Thus, she encourages the public 
to intervene and forcefully stop the above lawful procedure (cf. Mill’s example in 1992, 
113).  
Not all exhortations fall within the same category. There are “direct” and “explicit” exhor-
tations, which leave no doubt about the author’s intentions. In addition, there are “implied” 
and “constructive” exhortations from which the author’s position cannot be inferred with 
certainty. For Mill, there is a great difference between writing, “let’s storm the parliament 
to stop the government from passing this onerous new income tax bill” and “I wonder how 
the government will react, when the people storm the parliament to demand the with-
drawal of this onerous new income tax bill” (the examples are mine). Statements of the 
second type are to be interpreted as expressions of harsh political criticism and not as en-
couragement to commit crime and therefore they enjoy the protection of the law.  
On the contrary, statements of the first type should be subject to legal sanctions, when they 
lead to the use of force against the state apparatus. Mill realizes that explicit exhortations 
addressed to small groups under the right circumstances are likely to be effective, thus con-
tributing to a blunt and forceful obstruction of lawful proceedings. The legal system cannot 
allow individuals to have any role whatsoever in the violation of particular laws. Citizens 
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should be deterred from showing disrespect for the normal operations of government, es-
pecially when they are about to disagree with decisions resulting from these operations. 
Nevertheless, Mill insists that the sanctions imposed should be of “moderate severity” and 
not be motivated by “vengeance”. Given the tendency of the bearers of power to “multiply 
the list of offences against governments,” we should take steps to prevent penalties that 
prescribe some sort of retribution for insults given to state officials. That is why it is a mis-
take to retain offences like contempt of court. The unjustifiable harm done here is strictly 
restricted to the obstruction of lawful state procedures.  
II.c Criticism of Public Officials 
Finally, when it comes to the criticism of public officials in general, anything is allowed with 
one exception.  
If, in supporting his opinion of the inaptitude of any public functionary, [an individual] imputes 
to him actions which there is not even an appearance of his having performed, that limited 
prohibition … will strictly apply. With this exception, freedom should be unimpaired. (Mill 
1992, 126) 
Mill would be inconsistent in allowing public officials to be accused of things they have not 
done. This is ruled out by his endorsement of the value of factual truth (with the exception 
noted above). When someone has only suspicions of foul play on the part of a public func-
tionary, she should state so. Otherwise, she should provide adequate evidence. What about 
the language used in attacking public officials? Should we demand certain standards of de-
cency and good manners to apply? In the last section of his essay (Mill 1992, 130-35), Mill 
reflects upon the prohibition of “indecent discussion”. He maintains that criticism of public 
officials is unavoidably associated with certain strong sentiments like contempt, anger, sym-
pathy, admiration and hatred caused to third parties by their acts and omissions. Politics is 
not like mathematics. The public performance of an office-holder is expected to trigger pos-
itive and negative feelings in any citizen, feelings she is entitled to convey to her fellow 
citizens to convince them of the rightness of her views. The obligation of critics to provide 
evidence does not include an obligation to express it in a “calm and gentle language”. More-
over, any official attempt to set standards of decency regarding the language of political 
criticism runs the following risks: (a) to impose the relevant subjective views of the legisla-
tors on the public and (b) to give judicial authorities a pretext to prosecute views they dislike 
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as libelous. Hence, Mill concludes, the evils of punishing language “to which the name pas-
sionate could be applied” far outweigh the goods arising from not punishing it.5  
Conclusion 
I have tried to show that James Mill has remarkable practical insights to offer, which could 
be charitably interpreted to become relevant to contemporary free speech discourse, even 
if one disagrees with certain of his arguments and recommendations.6 The issues that con-
cerned him continue and will continue to occupy scholars, legislatures and courts alike. 
Thus, we have at least one good reason for a more thorough study of his work, one that is 
more detached from his son’s legacy. 
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Parfit’s Reorientation between Reasons and 
Persons and On What Matters 
Ingmar Persson, University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
Abstract 
This paper aims to show that between Reasons and Persons and On What Matters the orientation of Derek Parfit’s 
philosophy underwent a significant change. The approach of Reasons and Persons is largely revisionist, which is 
exemplified by his reductionist account of personal identity. This account is suppressed in On What Matters ap-
parently because it does not fit in with the conciliationalist project of this work. The aim of the first two volumes 
of this work is to show that, on the basis of a non-naturalist theory of normative reasons, rule-consequentialism, 
Kantian and Scanlonian contractualism could converge into a Triple Theory. In the third volume, the conciliation-
alist approach is carried further by Parfit’s attempt to show both that his metaethical position is in essential agree-
ment with rivals, like Allan Gibbard’s expressivism, and to reconcile parts of common-sense morality and conse-
quentialism in order to bring them together in the Triple Theory. However, there isn’t space here to pursue the 
problems with aspects of Parfit’s conciliatory project other than those of personal identity. 
Introduction: Parfit’s Reorientation from Revisionism to 
Conciliationalism 
A few years after the publication of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit said to me as we 
walked along High Street in Oxford: ‘I don’t want to become like Hare’. He went on to ex-
plain that what he had done in his book was to present various arguments rather than trying 
to defend any particular ethical position. By contrast, what Richard Hare was known for was 
precisely to defend vigorously certain ethical positions, both in meta-ethics and normative 
ethics: a form of rule-utilitarianism based on his universal prescriptivism.  
The normative framework of Reasons and Persons is overall consequentialist, and already 
at the time of writing it Parfit’s favoured meta-ethical view was a non-naturalist theory of 
reasons, according to which normative reasons are irreducible to natural facts. But he was 
anxious to stress that many of his arguments didn’t presuppose this objectivist theory as 
opposed to subjectivist theories of reasons. And in this book he didn’t defend consequen-
tialism, though he’s obviously most at home in this tradition, a tradition that he inherited 
from Henry Sidgwick, just as he inherited non-naturalism about normative reasons from 
him. Thus, at the time of writing Reasons and Persons, Parfit differed from Hare in that he 
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didn’t try to argue for any particular normative position on the basis of a particular meta-
ethical position. He didn’t take what he calls the ‘High Road’ (1987, 447).  
At that time, Hare hadn’t yet argued in print that Kant could have been a utilitarian, but he 
was to do so in ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Hare 1997). There’s an obvious simi-
larity between Hare’s idea of the universalizability of moral judgments and Kant’s first for-
mulation of the categorical imperative to the effect that we should act only on maxims that 
we could simultaneously will to be universal laws (Hare 1997, 153-54, 161). So, Kant even-
tually came to occupy a place of some prominence in Hare’s moral philosophy – just as he 
did in Parfit’s moral philosophy.  
Whilst Kant is barely mentioned in Reasons and Persons, he undeniably looms large in On 
What Matters. But the only positive claim Parfit succeeds in extracting from Kant seems to 
come from his first formulation of the categorical imperative, precisely what Hare also 
zoomed in on. It’s the centrepiece of what Parfit calls Kantian contractualism. A main ob-
jective of the first two volumes of On What Matters is to show that Kantian contractualism 
could be aligned not only with rule-consequentialism, as in Hare’s case, but with Scanlonian 
contractualism as well, making up what he calls the ‘Triple Theory’.  
This normative unification project is carried further in the third volume of On What Matters, 
where Parfit also argues (2017, ch. 58) that his Triple Theory supports the acceptance of an 
improved version of common-sense morality. This, too, is in line with Hare’s ‘two-level’ 
moral theory in which common-sense morality corresponds to an ‘intuitive’ level which is 
underpinned by a consequentialist ‘critical’ level (1981). Moreover, Parfit’s normative uni-
fication project, like Hare’s, is based on a certain meta-ethical position, albeit of a non-nat-
uralist kind, which is diametrically opposed to Hare’s prescriptivism. Nevertheless, central 
for both of them was that there are moral judgments that are objective to the extent that 
all rational subjects in possession of all relevant empirical facts would agree about them.  
Consequently, Parfit ended up doing moral philosophy much more like Hare than you could 
have anticipated 30 years ago. They were both hoping to show that there’s a ‘single true 
morality’ (2011, II, 155), which could take the shape of rule-consequentialism. This is of 
course compatible with there being huge differences with respect to both their ways of 
proceeding and their conclusions.  
In the Introduction to Reasons and Persons, Parfit refers to Peter Strawson’s distinction be-
tween ‘two kinds of philosophy, descriptive and revisionary’ (x). Parfit describes himself as 
a revisionist ‘by temperament’, and the tenor of RP is indeed revisionist. In these terms, On 
What Matters is by contrast ‘descriptive’ or conservative as regards matters of normative 
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substance. Its aim isn’t as much to challenge commonsensical moral claims as to defend 
them by showing that, with a bit of revision, they can be supported by leading ethical theo-
ries once we get the meta-ethics right. His fear is that ‘if we cannot resolve our disagree-
ments … morality might be an illusion’ (2011, II, 155).  
Parfit is celebrated for developing revisionist views about personal identity in Reasons and 
Persons, and there’s evidence that he never repudiated this revisionism. But it receded into 
the background in On What Matters, as I’ll try demonstrate in section I. The reason for this 
recession is probably that it’s in tension with the ‘conciliationalist’ project of this book. Of 
course, revisionism and conciliationalism aren’t inconsistent; it’s just that a combination of 
them is unlikely to succeed, since revisionist views are likely to stir up disagreement. In sec-
tion II I’ll briefly comment on some other aspects of his conciliationalist project. 
I The Suppression of Reductionism about Personal 
Identity 
In On What Matters (I, section 19) Parfit develops a version of Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of prac-
tical reason’ which consists in there being two kinds of reasons to care about the well-being 
of individuals: self-interested or personal reasons to care about our own well-being, and 
impartial reasons to care about everyone else’s well-being. He concedes to Sidgwick that 
he ‘rightly claims that we have reasons to be specially concerned about our own future well-
being’ but, he goes on, many of these reasons ‘are provided, not by the fact that this future 
will be ours, but by various psychological relations between ourselves as we are now and 
our future selves’ (I, 136). Notice that this implies that some of our reasons to care about 
our future are provided by the fact that it’s ours. This contradicts his famous claim in part 
III of Reasons and Persons that ‘personal identity is not what matters’.  
It isn’t that he has abandoned this claim about personal identity, for in his paper ‘We are 
not Human Beings’, published the year after On What Matters (2011), he re-affirms his al-
legiance to it. After having argued that the animalist or biological view of our identity – 
according to which are identical to our human organisms – isn’t true, he confesses that he 
has ‘a reason to wish that Animalism were true’ (2012, 27), since this would make it easier 
for him to vindicate his claim that our identity doesn’t matter. Contradicting what’s implied 
in On What Matters, he writes that when ‘we have reasons for special concern about our 
future, these reasons are not given … by the fact that this will be our future’ (2012, 27). So, 
some sort of double-thinking or ambivalence about the importance of personal identity is 
present.  
Parfit’s Reorientation between Reasons and Persons and On What Matters  
226 
As regards the psychological relations that provide us with reasons to care about ourselves, 
we have ‘partly similar relations to some other people, such as our close relatives, and those 
we love’ (2011, I, 136). Thus, these relations provide us with ‘personal and partial reasons 
to care about the well-being of ourselves and those to whom we have close ties’ (2011, I, 
136). These reasons are ‘only very imprecisely comparable’ (2011, I, 137) to impartial rea-
sons. They’re only very imprecisely comparable in the sense that, though we can tell, for 
instance, that we’re permitted to save our own lives rather than the lives of at least two 
strangers, we can’t give anything like a precise answer to how many strangers we’re allowed 
to sacrifice to save ourselves. According to Parfit, this imprecision is due to the fact that, 
whereas impartial reasons are person-neutral, self-interested and partial reasons are per-
son-relative in the sense that they ‘are provided by facts whose description must refer to 
us’ (2011, I, 138), either because these facts concern our own well-being, or the well-being 
of people to whom we have close ties. 
Now although self-interested reasons permit us to give somewhat greater weight to our 
own well-being in comparison to the well-being of strangers, Parfit thinks – surely rightly – 
that it would be ‘too egoistic’ (2011, I, 139) to maintain that they require us to give greater 
weight to our own well-being: we’re permitted to ‘give equal or even greater weight to 
some stranger’s well-being’ (2011, I, 139) than our own. He notes, however, a difference in 
this respect between reasons to care about our own well-being and the well-being of others 
to whom we have close ties. For in a case in which I could save either my own child or the 
child of some stranger ‘I ought morally to give priority to my child’ (2011, I, 141).  
This difference seems sufficient for holding our self-interested reasons to care about our 
own well-being to be a different kind of reason than partial reasons to care about the well-
being of others to whom we have close ties. Thus, whereas Parfit lumps together self-inter-
ested and partial reasons and talks about two kinds of reasons (e.g. 2011, I, 138), a case can 
be made for distinguishing three different categories of reasons: self-interested, partial and 
impartial reasons.  
I’ll now try to show that both this alleged difference between self-interested and partial 
reasons and the claim that both of them are only very imprecisely comparable to impartial 
reasons conflict with his reductionism about personal identity in Reasons and Persons. Ac-
cording to this reductionism, our identity consists in the holding of psychological and phys-
ical relations that can hold to a greater or lesser degree, and there are cases in which it’s 
indeterminate whether or not they hold to such a degree that it can truly be said that we 
persist. This is a claim about the analysis of our identity. But his reductionism also features 
a claim about its importance, expressed by the slogan that personal identity is not what 
The Suppression of Reductionism about Personal Identity 
227 
matters. What matters in identity is rather ‘psychological connectedness and/or psycholog-
ical continuity, with the right kind of cause’ (Parfit 1987, 214). The right kind of cause is 
normally the persistence of one and the same brain. 
Psychological connectedness consists in the holding of psychological connections, like mem-
ories and interests, and psychological continuity in chains of such connectedness. Strong 
enough psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity, but not sufficient. Sup-
pose that each hemispheres of the brain of a person is capable of underpinning the psychol-
ogy of the person and that they’re separated and transplanted to two different bodies (Par-
fit 1987, ch. 12). In such a case of branching psychological continuity, personal identity is 
disrupted, since the original person can’t be identical to both of the resulting persons, who 
are clearly distinct from each other, and it would arbitrary to identify the original person 
with any one of them. Personal identity, then, consists in non-branching psychological con-
tinuity, with the right kind of cause. But Parfit claims that the occurrence of such a division 
isn’t worse for us than survival as the same person with the same degree of psychological 
connectedness and continuity. Thus, it’s the latter relations that matter for us, not personal 
identity. 
If this is correct, it raises the question how we could be morally permitted to sacrifice our-
selves for a smaller benefit to some stranger, but not sacrifice someone else who is closely 
related to us. For surely we must be morally permitted to sacrifice the people who come 
into being when our psychological continuity branches no less than ourselves. The relations 
that matter are in both instances the same. This conclusion undermines the alleged differ-
ence between self-interested and partial reasons. 
Furthermore, Parfit’s reductionist campaign in Reasons and Persons encompasses a pro-
posal to extend morality into the intrapersonal sphere which implies that we’re not morally 
permitted to treat ourselves differently than others. He considers ‘a boy who starts to 
smoke, knowing and hardly caring that this may cause him to suffer greatly fifty years later’ 
(1987, 319-20). In such cases in which there’s a considerable loss of psychological connect-
edness, but enough psychological continuity to preserve identity, he proposes that we may 
outlaw great imprudence by importing moral reasons into the intrapersonal sphere, with 
the result that ‘we ought not to do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to 
others’ (1987, 320). But this is incompatible with the claim that we’re morally permitted to 
give ‘even greater weight to some stranger’s well-being’ than our own. This would permit 
us, for instance, to die a more painful death to save some stranger from a less painful death, 
though we’re hardly permitted to save one stranger from a less painful death at the expense 
of another stranger dying a more painful death. Still less are we permitted to let someone 
close to us die a more painful death.  
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Consider now the proposed very imprecise comparability between person-relative reasons 
and impartial reasons. Imagine a spectrum of cases in which the reduction of psychological 
continuity successively increases, by successively greater parts of the underlying brain being 
replaced by parts supporting different memories and so on. It would seem that the differ-
ence in strength between a case in which there’s definitely enough (non-branching) psycho-
logical continuity for identity and a case in which there’s too little for identity, and barely 
enough for someone being close to us, could be as great as between the latter and a case 
in which psychological continuity is just about so weak that there would somebody else who 
isn’t even close to us. If so, and reasons for concern are based on psychological connected-
ness and/or continuity, it might be wondered why their comparability must be less precise 
in the latter case when person-relative reasons are compared to impartial reasons than in 
the former case when only person-relative reasons are involved. 
Suppose, however, that we instead adopt the non-reductionist view that Parfit in Reasons 
and Persons attributes to common sense and Sidgwick, to the effect that the difference 
between ourselves and others involves ‘a further fact’ beyond psycho-physical continuities, 
a fact that is either–or rather than a matter of degrees (1987, 138-39, 329). Then it appears 
more comprehensible how self-interested and partial reasons, on the one hand, and impar-
tial reasons, on the other hand, could be only very imprecisely comparable given that the 
former are person-relative in the sense that they’re provided at least partly by facts that 
refer to what’s irreducibly ourselves (though it’s harder to see why self-interested and par-
tial reasons should differ in the way he thinks). This is to insinuate that Parfit suppresses his 
reductionist view of personal identity when he propounds a dualism of practical reason in 
On What Matters.  
The reasons for this suppression probably have to do with the fact, as he confesses, he is 
‘deeply worried by disagreements with people who seem as likely as I am to be getting 
things right’ (2017, xiii). Samuel Scheffler concurs with this diagnosis in his Introduction to 
On What Matters: “The drive to eliminate disagreement … is a defining feature of Parfit’s 
work” (2011, I, xxxi). If Parfit was a revisionist by temperament, he was also a conciliation-
alist. The more embedded he became in the academic establishment, the stronger he may 
have felt the pressure to include more people in the agreement. Radical revisionary ideas 
inevitably kick up dust, as he had experienced not least in the case of his views about per-
sonal identity. Feeling that he couldn’t convince adversaries of the truth of these ideas, he 
might have felt that they better be covered up in a unification project.  
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II Concluding Remarks about Other Aspects of 
Parfit’s Conciliatory Project 
It’s also important to Parfit’s pivotal belief to the effect that we have an intuitive ability to 
recognize irreducibly normative – rational and moral – truths that it doesn’t become appar-
ent that we have ‘deeply conflicting normative beliefs’ (2011, II, 546). By contrast to the two 
first volumes of On What Matters in which Parfit tries to refute rival meta-ethical theories, 
in volume III he rather extends the conciliationalist strategy from normative ethics into 
meta-ethics. He argues, for instance, that his and Allan Gibbard’s “main claims don’t con-
flict” (2017, 225). But Gibbard seems in fact to stick to his expressivism. He’s prepared to 
say that normative claims can be true, but this is truth only of “a minimalist sort” (2017, 
221), according to which “‘It’s true that suffering is bad’ just means that suffering is bad” 
(2017, 205). Gibbard adds: “As for truth of a more robust sort, I suspend judgment pending 
some satisfactory explanation of what this more-than-minimal truth consists in” (2017, 221-
22). So, contrary to Parfit’s wishful belief (2017, 226), Gibbard explicitly refrains from com-
mitting himself to truth in Parfit’s more robust “descriptive sense” (2017, 226) which un-
derlies his non-naturalism. The fact that there’s no agreement about there being reasons in 
Parfit’s sense obviously reduces the significance of building an agreement in normative eth-
ics by appeal to these putative reasons.  
A leitmotif of part IV of Reasons and Persons is the failure to come up with “a new theory 
of beneficence” that can cope with problems in population ethics such as the non-identity 
problem and the repugnant conclusion (1987, 443). In Parfit’s view, in order to show that 
any moral “theory could be objectively the best theory”, “we must find a theory which re-
solves our disagreements’ about these matters” (1987, 452). But in On What Matters 
there’s no attempt to show how a morality underpinned by the Triple Theory could resolve 
these disagreements. The task of finding “a new theory of beneficence”, “Theory X”, has 
disappeared from the horizon. The non-identity problem and the repugnant conclusion are 
together with reductionism about personal identity the topics in Reasons and Persons that 
have generated most controversy, but they have symptomatically almost vanished in On 
What Matters. 
To conclude, between these books there’s a shift in the orientation of Parfit’s moral philos-
ophy, from revisionism to conciliationalism. As my remarks indicate, I’m skeptical of the 
success of his conciliatory project, but I don’t think this is due to any shortcoming on Parfit’s 
part. I regard him as the greatest philosopher I’ve met, and I’m glad I got around to telling 
him so before he died. It’s reasonable for moral philosophers to aim to establish a rational 
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consensus about what’s morally right and wrong, and what the ground for this is. I’m how-
ever strongly inclined to think that this goal is unattainable because we have fundamentally 
conflicting intuitions both in normative ethics and in meta-ethics. 
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Prioritarianism and the Moral Negativity Bias 
Ingmar Persson, University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
Abstract 
The moral negativity bias is an intuition to the effect that there’s more of a moral reason to reduce what’s bad for 
individuals than to increase what’s equally good for them. This intuition, if sound, supports a negatively weighted 
utilitarianism to the effect that what’s bad for individuals has greater negative moral weight than what’s equally 
good for them has positive moral weight. But it’s here argued that the moral negativity bias can be given a debunk-
ing explanation that undermines its soundness. This explanation refers to the psychological fact that negative feel-
ings are usually stronger than positive feelings because the badness of the deteriorations with which they are 
associated is generally greater than the goodness of the improvements associated with positive feelings. Appeals 
to intuitions which could be accounted for by the moral negativity bias seem also to have been made in support 
of prioritarianism in opposition to egalitarianism. If this bias is given a debunking explanation, this support is un-
dercut.  
I Negatively Weighted Utilitarianism, 
Prioritarianism and the Negativity Bias 
Intuitively, it seems there’s more of a moral reason to reduce – that is, to remove, prevent 
or avoid producing – what’s intrinsically bad for individuals than to increase what’s equally 
good for them – more precisely, to increase goodness directly, as opposed to doing it by 
reducing what’s bad. This is the moral negativity bias.  
Negative utilitarianism – championed e.g. by Karl Popper (1966, ch. 9, note 2) – is commonly 
understood as the doctrine that there’s only moral reason to reduce what’s bad for individ-
uals, and no moral reason to increase what’s good for them; in other words, only what’s 
bad for individuals has moral weight or value. A less extreme view – negatively weighted 
utilitarianism, nw-utilitarianism – is that there’s stronger moral reason to reduce what’s bad 
for individuals than to increase what’s good for them to a corresponding degree; that what’s 
good for individuals has some, but smaller, moral weight or value than what’s equally bad 
for them. Nw-utilitarians claim e.g. that there’s stronger moral reason – or that it has 
greater moral weight – to reduce the intrinsic badness that suffering due to physical pain 
has for us than to increase the intrinsic goodness that happiness due to physical pleasure 
to a corresponding degree has for us. 
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The practical implications of nw-utilitarianism converge to some extent with those of tele-
ological prioritarianism. According to this version of prioritarianism, the positive (negative) 
moral weight of benefits (burdens) to the worse-off is proportionally greater than the moral 
weight of the same benefits (burdens) to those who are better off. Accordingly, it’s morally 
irrelevant whether a benefit – i.e. something that makes recipients better off – consists in 
an increase of what’s intrinsically good or a decrease of what’s intrinsically bad. What mor-
ally matters is the positions of recipients on a scale from being better off to being worse off: 
the worse off they are, the greater the moral weight of benefiting them is. But it’s reasona-
ble to surmise that benefits to those lower down the welfare scale are likely to consist more 
in the reduction of intrinsic badness than benefits to those higher up, which will consist 
more in increases of intrinsic goodness. Benefiting those who are worse off will then be 
morally more important not only on prioritarianism, but also on nw-utilitarianism.  
All the same, nw-utilitarianism and prioritarianism clearly differ. Compare a choice between 
either preventing a pain of somebody who’s better off or causing somebody who’s worse 
off to feel a pleasure of the same magnitude, which would do more to put the two individ-
uals on the same welfare level. In contrast to prioritarianism – and egalitarianism – nw-
utilitarianism would recommend preventing the pain, which might seem intuitively plausi-
ble. 
Due to the fact that their practical implications sometimes converge, not only nw-utilitari-
anism but also prioritarianism can be nurtured by the moral negativity bias, as will transpire 
in section III. I believe this bias to be an element of common-sense morality, but shall in 
section II present a debunking explanation of it which is compatible with equal amounts of 
goodness and badness in fact having equal moral weight, in accordance with traditional 
utilitarianism.  
II A Debunking Explanation of the Moral Negativity 
Bias 
Let’s begin by surveying some psychological facts. It seems clear that the signal of some-
thing’s being harmful for our bodies, physical pain, can be more intense and bring more 
suffering than the signal of something’s being beneficial for our bodies, pleasure, can bring 
enjoyment. For instance, there’s surely no pleasure so intense that having it is worth under-
going the most painful torture of equal duration.  
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Some philosophers, like Arthur Schopenhauer, have claimed that, in contrast to pain, pleas-
ure is nothing positive; it’s merely the cessation of pain (1995, 146). This is certainly false, 
but it’s symptomatic that nobody has been crazy enough to uphold the corresponding view 
about pain, that it’s just the absence of pleasure, a neutral state. Pain can simply be so 
intense that its positive existence is undeniable: nobody could seriously think that the most 
painful torture is on a par with being unconscious! 
Speaking of happiness and suffering of ‘equal intensity’, Jamie Mayerfeld maintains that 
‘the intense suffering would not be compensated by an episode of the intense happiness 
lasting for a considerably longer amount of time.’ (1999, 133).1 This is explicitly a claim 
about a moral asymmetry between suffering and happiness in the intrapersonal domain, so 
it apparently entails that we could be acting morally wrongly if we intentionally suffer a pain 
in order to enjoy an equally intense pleasure that lasts longer. I find this baffling.  
On the other hand, we’ve seen evidence of an asymmetry in interpersonal cases: of there 
being more of a moral reason to prevent the pain of somebody who’s better off than to 
cause somebody who’s worse off to feel a pleasure of the same magnitude, even though 
the latter would do more to put them on the same welfare level. But it seems there’s no 
moral asymmetry within lives, no moral objection to either undergoing oneself, or letting 
somebody else undergo, a pain in order to experience an equally great pleasure, let alone 
a greater pleasure.2  
I can’t find any satisfactory explanation of such a discrepancy between interpersonal and 
intrapersonal domains. And the simplest view is that, irrespective of whether experiences 
are positive or negative, the moral (or prudential) value of them parallels the value they 
have for their subjects in virtue of their intensity and duration. We can stick to this view if 
we can find a debunking explanation of the intuitive moral negativity bias.  
My hypothesis is that, because there’s a psychological asymmetry to the effect that pains 
are as a rule more intense than pleasures, evolution could have equipped us with a general 
tendency to give priority to reducing pain to producing pleasure which we illicitly carry over 
to cases in which the pleasure we can produce is not only equal, but somewhat greater than 
the pain we could relieve. Such illicit transferrals of affective and/ or conative reactions 
against our better judgment are known to occur. For instance, if someone suffers from 
 
1 G. E. Moore seems to espouse a similar view (1903, 212), and Thomas Hurka develops more sophisticated forms 
of it (2010, 203-6).  
2 Since I believe such intrapersonal matters belong to the domain of prudence rather than morality, I would rather 
say that there’s no prudential objection to undergoing the pain.  
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arachnophobia, this might make them reluctant to touch even spiders they know are made 
out of some harmless material like rubber. 
We should expect that pains can be more intense than pleasures because, first, they’re gen-
erally signs of bodily damage which could be irreversible. This is true of loss of limbs, not to 
mention death through which all the value of life is lost for good. The bodily well-functioning 
which pleasure signifies can’t bring comparable gains because we’ll eventually lose every-
thing we could gain when we die, if not earlier.  
Irreversibility is, then, one reason why the extrinsic badness of the harmful conditions be-
hind pain is generally greater than the beneficial conditions behind pleasure, and so why 
it’s more important to reduce pain than to increase pleasure. A second reason for the 
greater extrinsic badness of harm is that, while loss of capacities excludes benefits that 
could accrue from exercising them, acquisition of capacities doesn’t by itself guarantee such 
benefits. This requires in addition advantageous external circumstances, such as good books 
in the case of the ability to read.  
Therefore, it seems evolutionary advantageous for us to be equipped with receptors that 
enable us to feel pains more acutely than pleasures. But if we’re used to pains being more 
intense and having causes of greater badness than the goodness of the causes of pleasure, 
this attitude could be transferred to situations in which we compare pains and pleasures 
that are stipulated to be equal, so that we erroneously judge it to be better to reduce the 
pains than to induce the pleasures. If this is the origin of our intuitive moral negativity bias, 
it doesn’t support nw-utilitarianism. We could stick to the straightforward, traditional utili-
tarian view that the intrinsic moral weight of pleasure and pain alike matches their intrinsic 
goodness and badness for subjects.  
Notice next that the psychological asymmetry between positive and negative feelings ex-
tends beyond painful and pleasant sensations and the suffering and enjoyment they bring. 
The negative emotion of fear is more widespread and could be considerably more intense 
than its positive counterpart of hope or longing: fear could be intensified to terror and hor-
ror, to which there’s no counterpart in the case of hope or longing. This isn’t surprising for 
life presents more grave dangers than golden opportunities. For instance, we could die at 
any moment and lose everything life has to offer, or be seriously crippled and lose a major 
part of it, but there are no comparable gains in store for us.  
For the same reason, sadness and sorrow can be more intense and long-lasting than their 
positive counterparts, gladness and joy. Depression can be paralyzing and debilitating, to 
which elation can put up no counterpart.  
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Furthermore, in a world in which most of the time we risk losing more than we could rea-
sonably hope to gain, and in which we compete with each other over scarce resources, it 
promotes our reproductive fitness if the negative reaction of anger is more widespread and 
stronger than its positive counterpart of gratitude, since it’s more important to scare off 
attackers than to return favours rendered by do-gooders. Consequently, it isn’t surprising 
that anger can be stoked up to fury and rage, but gratitude can’t grow correspondingly in-
tense.  
Finally, compassion with the suffering of others – the emotion that Schopenhauer took to 
be the basis of morality – is stronger than sympathy with the happiness of others. This is 
precisely what we should expect if we are subject to the moral negativity bias.  
Emotions differ from sensations in that they have propositional objects: we fear that we’ll 
die, we’re angry because we’ve been insulted, and so on. The propositional objects of emo-
tions could be any state of affairs that’s beneficial or harmful for us in some way. We can 
ask whether emotions are rational since, in virtue of having such objects, they involve be-
liefs that can be rational. Our emotion of fear is often irrationally strong, as exemplified by 
phobias like arachnophobia and agoraphobia. Daniel Kahneman provides a further relevant 
example by drawing attention to loss aversion (2011, 282-86) which might manifest itself in 
our fear of losing something valuable being greater than our hope of gaining something 
equivalent. A simple illustration of loss aversion is that people generally demand a signifi-
cantly higher price to sell an item they own than they offer to buy something of the same 
kind.  
The explanation of loss aversion might be that we’re disposed to grow attached to things 
we get to know intimately. It might seem irrational to prefer these well-known things to 
seemingly indistinguishable things that we don’t know intimately, but there might be some 
justification for this preference: in practice, we seldom know new specimen as well as those 
that are familiar, so it could reasonably be feared that the new specimen will be inferior in 
unobvious ways.  
Facts already explored provide an evolutionary explanation of why we generally fear losses 
more than we are attracted by gains. It’s a scaring fact about life that losses are often irre-
versible, while benefits never are. For instance, when we die, we’ll be dead forever, forever 
excluded from the goods of life. When we lose a limb, it can scarcely be restored, so we’ve 
lost for good the benefits to which it was a necessary means. A disease, if it doesn’t kill us, 
may mean that we never recover our former good health, but are left disabled, with chronic 
pain and a lower life-quality in general. These misfortunes may afflict us anytime, so it’s of 
great importance that we’re on our guard. In contrast, gains will eventually be ‘reversed’, 
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lost or consumed: whatever assets our genes or fortunate external circumstances enable us 
to collect, we’re destined to lose eventually.  
It was also observed that the loss of an ability rules out that we’ll enjoy the benefits its 
exercise could bring, while acquisition of an ability normally doesn’t ensure that we’ll enjoy 
the benefits that its exercise could bring: advantageous external circumstances are usually 
also necessary for such enjoyment. These two factors imply that the extrinsic badness of 
losing an ability is usually greater than the extrinsic goodness of gaining the ability. Further, 
the loss of an ability will often occasion pain, whereas the acquisition of an ability, e.g. by 
training, will typically not occasion pleasure. So no wonder if evolution has wired us up to 
be in general more strongly averse to losses than attracted to gains. This could spill over to 
cases in which we have every reason to believe that there’s no evaluative difference.  
Summing up this discussion of the moral negativity bias, the debunking explanation pro-
posed is that it’s a tendency with which we’ve been equipped because there’s a psycholog-
ical asymmetry to the effect that negative feelings are normally more intense than positive 
feelings. Generally, this asymmetry is justifiable, since negative feelings mark conditions 
whose extrinsic badness is greater than the goodness of conditions marked by positive feel-
ings, though there are exceptions to this rule, illustrated by loss aversion. Since our ten-
dency to prioritize reducing what’s bad, because it’s generally greater, is so deeply in-
grained, it’s extended to situations in which the good is stipulated to be as great as the bad.  
However, I’m far from certain that this debunking explanation is complete and correct in all 
details, though it seems certain that an explanation should refer to the psychological asym-
metry highlighted. Nonetheless, the fact that there’s at least in outline a debunking expla-
nation of the moral negativity bias is reassuring, since it’s hard to accept it at face value as 
a foundation for nw-utilitarianism because of the intuitive discrepancy between in-
trapersonal and interpersonal cases.  
III The Moral Negativity Bias, and Prioritarianism vs. 
Egalitarianism 
Our inclination to exhibit the moral negativity bias can be suspected of having served to 
support not only nw-utilitarianism, but also prioritarianism. For example, Derek Parfit 
(1995, note 35) praises Joseph Raz for putting the difference between egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism well in the following passage:  
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What makes us care about various inequalities is not the inequality but … the hunger of the 
hungry, the need of the needy, the suffering of the ill, and so on. The fact that they are worse 
off in the relevant respect than their neighbours is relevant. But it is relevant not as an 
independent evil of inequality. Its relevance is in showing that their hunger is greater, their 
need more pressing, their suffering more hurtful, and therefore our concern for the hungry, 
the needy, the suffering, and not our concern for equality, makes us give them priority. (Raz 
1986, 240) 
Notice that Raz talks about bad states, states that arouse our compassion: “the hunger of 
the hungry, the need of the needy, the suffering of the ill”. He claims it’s the fact that “their 
hunger is greater, their need more pressing, their suffering more hurtful” instead of the fact 
that they may be worse off than somebody else that “makes us give them priority”. Conse-
quently, Raz could be read as appealing to the moral negativity bias: the greater moral ur-
gency of reducing what’s bad for individuals instead of the prioritarian idea of attaching 
greater moral weight to improving the situation of the worse-off, regardless of whether this 
improvement consists in increasing goodness or reducing badness. Benefits to the worse-
off could be thought to have greater moral weight because they’re more likely to consist in 
reducing what’s intrinsically bad for individuals than boosting what’s intrinsically good.  
So, when prioritarians argue against the egalitarian reference to worseness relative to oth-
ers, we should check whether they’re relying on intuitions that could be accounted for by 
the moral negativity bias. Contrast the following two kinds of case. If there are individuals 
who are very badly off, e.g. who are very hungry, there’s clearly a strong moral reason to 
relieve their hunger, which is indeed bad for them. Now it mightn’t be obvious that this 
reason is strengthened if it’s added that there are other individuals who, unjustly, are less 
hungry, though egalitarianism implies this. Thus, this kind of case – Case 1 – appears to offer 
comfort to prioritarians against egalitarians. 
Consider instead – Case 2 – individuals who are well off but not very well off, say, they have 
enough wine, but of a rather mediocre reserva sort. The moral reason to increase their en-
joyment by providing them with gran reserva wine seems relatively weak. In opposition to 
egalitarians, prioritarians maintain that this reason isn’t strengthened by the addition of 
another population who’s unjustly better off by having access to gran reserva wine. But, at 
least according to my intuition, the egalitarian view that this additional population strength-
ens the case for providing the reserva people with better wine is more plausible. Of course, 
prioritarians could simply reject this intuition, but it does seem that when recipients are 
quite well off and benefiting them consists in injecting intrinsic goodness, it’s more difficult 
to deny that the presence of individuals who are unjustly even better off strengthens the 
moral reason to benefit those less well off.  
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Prioritarians have a hard time explaining why the addition of the better-off apparently am-
plifies our moral reason to benefit the worse-off in Case 2. On the other hand, egalitarians 
have an explanation why this egalitarian reason is seemingly absent in Case 1 when the 
worse-off of the two populations is very badly off and benefiting them consists in reducing 
what’s bad, namely the presence of a strong reason deriving from the moral negativity bias 
which ‘drowns’ it. This bias isn’t at work in Case 2 because there’s nothing intrinsically bad 
about the condition of the worse-off population here. As this bias has been debunked, egal-
itarians could happily appeal to it to undercut support for prioritarianism. By contrast, it 
would be awkward for egalitarians as well as prioritarians to accept this bias as evidence for 
nw-utilitarianism because it counteracts both views, for instance, by advising us to alleviate 
the pain of the better-off rather than augmenting the pleasure of the worse-off. For adher-
ents of egalitarianism, like myself, it’s important both that the moral negativity bias can be 
debunked and that it can still be employed to undermine support for prioritarianism. 
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About the Badness of Existence and the 
Prospect of Extinction 
Giuseppe Rocché, University of Palermo, Italy 
Abstract 
In this paper I consider the case of people who find The Mere Addition Principle counterintuitive. Their particular 
intuitions may be understood as instances of The Principle of Intrinsic Disvalue of Existence (PIDA). Following this 
idea, Contractualism seems to be an appropriate method to solve population ethics dilemmas. Still, I show that 
their rejection of The Mere Addition Principle – if understood as an instance of PIDA – is not enough to avoid these 
dilemmas and to reach a stable equilibrium among their intuitions. In fact, if their denial of The Mere Addition 
Principle is grounded on PIDA, the consequences which would follow are likely to be unacceptable for many of 
them. In particular, either they hold that we have a duty in favor of extinction, or they cannot take PIDA seriously 
enough. Rejecting the Mere Addition Principle without endorsing PIDA seems the best they can do in order to 
reach a stable equilibrium among their intuitions.  
 
According to the Mere Addition Paradox (Parfit 1984, 419-40; 2004) we cannot consistently 
hold both 
(i) The Mere Addition Principle: if a number of people with positive wellbeing is added with-
out affecting the original people’s wellbeing, the resulting population (A+) is at least not 
worse than the original population (A) (Arrhenius 2000, 250)  
(ii) Non-Antiegalitarianism: considered two populations of the same size, if in the first (B) 
there is both a higher average wellbeing and more equality than in the second (A+), the first 
is better than the second (Ng 1989, 238)  
(iii) The Principle of Transitivity and Substitution (Temkin 1987, 143-44) 
and 
(iv) The Denial of the Repugnant Conclusion – a population (A), of at least ten billion people, 
in which all its members have a high level of wellbeing is better than a much bigger popula-
tion (Z) in which all its members have lives that are barely worth living.  
Just what a solution to the Mere Addition Paradox consists in is a contentious issue. Speak-
ing of our intuitions about A+ and A, Parfit said that  
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To avoid the paradox we must believe, without considering the rest of the argument, that A+ 
is worse than A. […] To the extent that we find this hard to believe, we still face a paradox 
(Parfit 1984, 428; 2004, 16) 
These words may be taken to mean that we look for a psychological solution: solving the 
puzzle is finding a principle that – given our present attitudes – is intuitive (a substantive 
methodological choice as far as it rules out the use of bullet biting – a strategy that Parfit 
himself endorsed, see Parfit 2016, 120). In this framework, given a clash among the afore-
mentioned four judgments, we settle the issue by showing that, despite the appearances, 
we do not find one of them really intuitive. In this paper, I propose to wonder whether we 
feel psychologically compelled by The Mere Addition Principle. Is The Mere Addition Princi-
ple really engraved in our psychological outlook? Parfit exposed some natural properties of 
a Mere Addition – namely that additional people’s lives are worth living and that they do 
not lessen other people’s wellbeing. Now we should ask whether we happen to care about 
these natural properties or not.  
Some authors take on this challenge arguing that we attach intrinsic value to the existence 
of additional people. Hints of this axiological attitude are – for example – that we think it 
would have been bad if the happiest share of humanity of the past had never been born 
(Rachels 1998, 103); that we think would have been a terrible loss if some land on earth had 
never been populated (Ord 2014, 51); that we would regret being alone in the universe 
(Tännsjö 2004, 231-32; Rachels 1998, 103). Without discussing these arguments at length, I 
point out that in some cases our alleged recognition of the intrinsic value of existence is 
affected by what we may call – in the absence of anything better – aesthetic features of 
lives (Sumner 1996, 21-23). Insofar as we aim at a comprehensive ranking of possible pop-
ulations, aesthetic features should be taken into consideration, but if we are interested just 
in welfarist axiology, we should neglect them. My proposal is to ask whether we attach 
value to the creation of people with worthwhile but totally anonymous – devoid of aesthetic 
value – lives. 
Imagine a technological or biological machine capable to create additional people with pos-
itive wellbeing without affecting anyone. The machine is currently turned off, but we can 
easily turn it on so that it will start creating new anonymous lives. These will be long lives 
with many pleasures and some peaks of sheer bliss, interrupted by some pains, pain will 
increase as the end gets closer. What to do in this case? I conjecture that I would not turn 
the machine on. Without holding that this would be the reaction of many people, I assume 
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that there is a moral tribe1 which would share my same reaction. The question is whether 
the members of this tribe have a set of intuitions which avoid population paradoxes.  
The refusal to activate the machine could be explained on the basis of different principles, 
here I shall understand it as an instance of the idea that existence is bad – call it The Principle 
of Intrinsic Disvalue of Additions (PIDA). According to PIDA mere additions are all things con-
sidered bad, whereas additions are prima facie bad but their badness can be counterbal-
anced by other goods, above all the instrumental value of additions for existing people. Now 
a problem arises, i.e. that the Repugnant Conclusion is implied even though we recognize 
that additions of people with a positive wellbeing are intrinsically bad. For we can easily 
imagine additions, dubbed Benign Additions (Huemer 2008), which raise the wellbeing of 
the original population but lower the average wellbeing of the total population. 
Contractualism – choice under a veil of ignorance – offers an answer to this predicament. 
Imagine (Case 1) you have to choose in self-interested terms whether to be member of a 
world in which people have a welfare level of 100 or of a world in which those people have 
a welfare level of 105 and many more people have been added whose lives are barely worth 
living (level 5). It may be argued (Tännsjö 2004, 211-12) that a self-interested decision-
maker in different-number choices has to consider the risk not to exist at all and, therefore, 
could have reasons to choose the bigger population with a lower average wellbeing. Still, if 
PIDA is our starting point, parties rather than being averse to the risk to not exist, would be 
averse to the risk to exist. This idea does not imply the very radical conclusion that (Case 2) 
given two populations the first with a very high wellbeing, the second with a very low well-
being but slightly smaller than the first, parties would choose the second world. Parties con-
sider existence as a risk in itself, but not every existence is equally risky and they may be 
more averse to a low risk of existing and having a life which is barely worth living, than to a 
high risk of existing and having a life which is well worth living. Then in Case 1 parties would 
choose the less populated world with higher average wellbeing, whereas in Case 2 they 
would go for the more populated world.  
How much parties – who have been constructed on the basis of PIDA – want to avoid the 
risk of existing? Different answers to this question shape different conceptions of Contrac-
tualism in population ethics. A possible conception of Contractualism is the use of what we 
may call “The Same-Number Restriction” (SNR). According to SNR, parties who are about to 
choose between different-number scenarios – alternative populations of different sizes – 
ignore this feature of their choice, so that they think to be choosing between same-number 
scenarios. In Case 1 parties are facing the choice between two worlds one of them much 
 
1 I borrow this expression from Greene 2013.  
About the Badness of Existence and the Prospect of Extinction  
242 
more populated than the other. Anyway, they ignore this fact and know just that in the first 
world everyone has a very high level of wellbeing, whereas in the second a tiny share of 
people is even better-off than in the first world but the vast majority has barely worth-living 
lives.  
SNR gives horrible results when negative well-being is concerned. This can be easily proved 
through Parfit’s Hell 1 and Hell 2 thought experiment (1984, 392): a world in which a handful 
of people is suffering hellish torments for fifty years would be worse than a world in which 
billions of people are suffering the very same torments for fifty years minus a day. In fact, 
under SNR parties would ignore the fact that in the second world many more miserable 
people exist. Still, these problems may be avoided by introducing some exceptions into SNR. 
I do not discuss this point here.  
Other cases pose problems which are harder to be solved by means of exceptions. Imagine 
that – Case 3 – you have to choose between a world in which everyone has a very high 
welfare level – say 100 – and a world in which the welfare level of the people of the first 
world has been raised – to, say, 110 – and some people with a welfare level even higher – 
say, 111 – have been added. We can call these cases Fair Benign Additions (FBA), additions 
in which original people’s well-being is raised, so it is the average well-being, and – to ex-
clude cases like Case 1 – additional people have a positive welfare level higher than original 
people’s welfare level after the addition. For many people, intuitively, FBA are never bad, 
moreover thinking that they are never bad does not entail The Repugnant Conclusion – in-
sofar as the result of FBA is an increase of average well-being. For many people their intui-
tions about FBA are unproblematic because they do not yield counterintuitive results – as 
Mere Additions do – when they are put together with their other intuitions. 
Still, if we think that existence is somehow bad – see PIDA –, we may also think that some 
FBA are bad. Imagine – in Case 3 – that the number of additional people with a well-being 
level of 111 is huge. If – following SNR – we think that the addition should be performed, 
our endorsement of PIDA is somehow shaky. Actually, it seems one of the weakest endorse-
ment possible. We would recognize that it would be good adding every number of people 
in order to slightly improve the well-being of an already existing person – by, say, giving him 
an additional lollipop –, when the additional people are better-off than him. In other words, 
SNR mirrors the psychological outlook of those who are averse to the risk of existing but are 
lexically more averse to the risk of existing and living a life which is worse than the life they 
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could have lived2. If you endorse PIDA but not this lexical priority, then you should drop 
SNR.  
Hence, if you think that you would refrain from adding billions of people – whose lives would 
be full of pleasures but also with some pains, especially at their end – when by doing so the 
well-being of an existent person would be slightly improved – an additional lollipop –, then 
you feel the need to take the badness of existence – PIDA – more seriously than how SNR 
implies. Now a major risk is that, once we have found a principle which takes more seriously 
the idea of the badness of existence, we are bound to accept that we have the duty to stop 
procreating and to cooperate to realize the extinction of mankind. Some people think we 
have this duty. This duty is for them intuitive (Benatar 2006, 207), even though they pretend 
to prove it by means of considerations other than intuitiveness – namely, bullet biting and 
evolutionary debunking arguments (Benatar 2006, 202-7). Other people – who endorse 
PIDA – lack the intuition that we have a duty to bring about the extinction of mankind. A 
relevant question is whether these people’s intuitions are unstable like those of people who 
accept The Mere Addition Principle but want to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. 
Perhaps a solution could be provided by a plausible description of what would happen if we 
head towards extinction. The process realistically would determine that most of last peo-
ple’s lives would have negative well-being: the prospect of being the last people in the uni-
verse fills many of us with anguish. According to a moderate lexical account, the badness of 
FBA can overwhelm the disvalue of a decrease in existing people’s well-being when their 
well-being remains anyway high and positive, but the badness of FBA cannot overwhelm 
the disvalue of the production of tormented lives – as we postulate last people’s lives would 
be.  
Even this proposal may be unsatisfying for those who have the intuition that existence is 
intrinsically bad. Imagine a case – Case 4 – in which just a handful of people exists. If they 
do not reproduce, then they will have tormented lives. If they have children, their lives will 
be worth living but they will create billions of people whose lives will be barely worth living. 
In a case like this, taking PIDA seriously seems to imply that the relevant gain in existing 
people’s wellbeing cannot make up for the huge disvalue of the addition of billions of people 
with lives barely worth-living. 
 
2 Their attitude must not be confused with leximin. We can imagine three welfare level W1 slightly higher than W2, 
and W2 slightly higher than W3 and two populations P1 (W2) and P2 (W1,W3). According to the lexical principle 
expressed by SNR, parties could have reasons to choose P2 if the risk to have welfare level W3 is very low – because 
the corresponding subset of population is very small.  
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As a last option, perhaps we could cling to a peculiar feature of our condition. In general, 
we may grant that for every population with a certain welfare level, there is a number of 
possible people with a certain welfare level whose addition would be optimal. The more we 
add beyond that number – or we fail to add under that number – the worse is the outcome. 
In Case 4 there is a large relevant3 disproportion between the number of additional people 
and the number of existing people whose well-being is positively affected by the addition. 
But it may be argued, this is not our condition. To avoid to live tormented lives we are not 
required to create thousands of billions of people. We need just to add roughly as many 
people as we are: we need just to secure our replacement. Then, in cases like Case 4, where 
there is a relevant disproportion between additional people and existing people, extinction 
ought to be chosen; if, on the contrary, a generation can avoid a painful extinction by just 
“replacing” itself, this is what that population should do. Because our condition resembles 
this latter case, we have no duty to cause our extinction – on the contrary we should have 
children. 
Many people would find this reasoning nothing but a cunning casuistry. It is somehow true 
that a generation is directly responsible only for the addition of the next generation, but as 
far as we can foresee that our successors will have the same bitter alternative between a 
painful extinction and the addition of another generation, we are indirectly responsible for 
the addition of that generation as well. Because we will be indirectly responsible for their 
successors, and for the successors of their successors – and so forth –, our condition does 
resemble Case 5 in which there is a stark disproportion between the number of additional 
people and the number of existing people whose well-being is positively affected by the 
addition.  
Concluding, the members of the moral tribe, who share the intuition that would be bad to 
turn the machine on, may have discovered that their set of intuitions is as shaky as that of 
the supporters of The Mere Addition Principle. In fact, if they understand their response to 
the machine thought experiment in terms of the endorsement of PIDA, they are forced to 
accept principles like the lexical account, the moderate lexical account, or the restriction of 
our moral responsibility to our direct responsibility – the aforementioned “cunning casu-
istry”. If, on one hand, they are not glad to accept any of these principles, and, on the other 
hand, they are not psychologically led to revise their judgment in the machine case, they 
seem to be in a deadlock. My suggestion is that they should look upstream for an under-
standing of their response in that case different from PIDA. What about the case in which 
 
3 I.e. adjusted considering the welfare levels involved. 
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the machine would be operative and we could turn it off? If they conjecture that they would 
leave it working, can they make any sense of this answer?  
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Sidgwick, Reflective Equilibrium and the 
Triviality Charge 
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Abstract 
I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This 
claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted 
as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is 
that although the method of wide reflective equilibrium is compatible with coherentism (understood as a form of 
weak foundationalism) as well as moderate foundationalism, it is not compatible with strong foundationalism. 
Hence, the claim that a philosopher uses the method of wide reflective equilibrium is informative. In particular, 
this is true with regard to Sidgwick. 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to the debate whether Sidgwick used the method of reflective equi-
librium. “Reflective equilibrium” is the name of the method of justification which John Rawls 
suggests in his A Theory of Justice (1971). He claims that many other philosophers have used 
the method even before: Most prominently Nelson Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast 
(1955) and Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics (1907). Whereas Catherine Elgin – a 
scholar sympathetic to Goodman – endorsed Rawls’s suggestion and even worked out a 
better understanding of the methodology, from the very beginning there was a dispute over 
the claim that Sidgwick employed such a method. I argue that Rawls’s claim that Sidgwick 
used the method can be – in some sense – defended against certain strong criticisms. 
The following is divided into three parts. In the first part of this paper, I will provide some 
important background information: I will do that by referring to an article by Peter Singer 
published 1974 entitled “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium” in which he argued that re-
flective equilibrium is neither an adequate method of justification nor the method Sidgwick 
did employ. I will reconstruct Singer’s interpretation of Sidgwick and his argumentation 
against Rawls’s claim. 
This sets the ground for the second part. I will begin by sketching the reasons why Singer 
slightly revised his earlier criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium in his latest 
works. After considering the now predominant wide interpretation of the method Singer 
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now holds that it is indeed possible to claim that Sidgwick used it – but he still would refrain 
from saying so, because of one more charge he presses against the method and the claim: 
the charge that if it is understood in the wide sense, it is simply trivial to state that a philos-
opher makes use of it. According to the charge there is no alternative to the method of 
reflective equilibrium, if it is interpreted in such a wide way that its use involves all relevant 
philosophical background arguments, because then it includes all other rival methods. So, 
to state that someone uses the method settles nothing and is pointless. This is what I 
dubbed the Triviality Charge.1 
In part three I will assume that the wide interpretation of the method of reflective equilib-
rium, which Singer considers compatible with the method of Sidgwick, is the only plausible 
interpretation. I will argue that it is – even in the wide interpretation – not trivial to state 
that some philosopher and especially that Sidgwick did use it. Hence, by refuting the claim 
of the Triviality Charge, I will argue that it is informative and justified to state that Sidgwick 
used the method of reflective equilibrium, even if one takes granted that Singers interpre-
tation of Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics is the correct one or grasps the important methodo-
logical points adequately. 
I Different Interpretations: Sidgwick and Reflective 
Equilibrium 
According to Singer’s interpretation in “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium”, Sidgwick pro-
poses a top-down approach in the realm of normative ethics to justify moral propositions: 
one has to start with self-evident axioms (in the form of universal principles) and to see 
what follows from these. If our everyday moral judgments cohere with the ethical theories 
derived from the axioms, this can be used as an argument to convince common people to 
adopt the justified ethical theories – but this doesn’t show the justification of these theo-
ries, since they themselves are only justified by their status as being inferentially connected 
to the self-evident axioms, which have a privileged epistemic status. Yet, still one can be 
mistaken in holding an apparent axiom to be a real axiom. In terms of Laurence Bonjour 
widely used in epistemology one can call this a moderate foundationalism, where some 
basic beliefs – here the self-evident axioms – are themselves justified without being inferred 
 
1 I am borrwoing the name “Trivility Charge” from Julia Langkau. Langkau argues contra the charge against 
reflective equilibrium in a different (non-moral but epistemic) context and takes a different line of argument, 
though one could say, we share the same strategy. Cf. Langkau 2013. 
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from other beliefs. They can pass on by inference relation the justification to other beliefs 
and this suffices, given that we have true beliefs, that we also have knowledge – in our case 
moral knowledge (cf. Singer 1974, 498-501, 503-5, 507-8; cf. BonJour 1985, 26-30). 
So, according to Singer, the basic beliefs in Sidgwick’s moderate foundationalism are on the 
most abstract level of moral entities: Sidgwick’s basic beliefs concern ultimate ethical prin-
ciples – namely the principle of justice, the principle of prudence and the principle of benev-
olence –from which the morally right theories are deducible. So, in order to choose the right 
moral theory, it is essential to have an intuitive insight in the self-evidence of the axioms 
and to check if the self-evidence was merely apparent self-evidence by reflecting if there 
are any other self-evident axioms that conflict with the one under investigation, if there is 
an consensus on the axioms and if the principles corresponding to the axioms are ambiva-
lent or precise. As I see it, this interpretation of Sidgwick – which I tried to reconstruct here 
in a condensed form – remains Singer’s interpretation and hasn’t changed substantially in 
the other works I will refer to (cf. Singer 1974, 503, 507-8; cf. Sidgwick 1907, Book III, esp. 
Chapter XI, 2, and Chapter XIII).2 
He contrasts this moderate foundationalism in the realm of normative ethics with an inter-
pretation of the method of reflective equilibrium. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is 
that a theory and our common sense considered judgments should be brought into agree-
ment. And if they both support each other in the best available way the judgments as well 
as the corresponding theory are justified. Both are also open to revision in the process of 
adjustment.  
Although sometimes the method of reflective equilibrium is accused of being a form of dis-
guised common sense-intuitionism – which means that it is a bottom-up moderate founda-
tionalist approach that presupposes that one can do ethics analogue to (some common in-
terpretations of) empirical inquiry or science – mostly it is recognized as a form of 
coherentism, as it is by Singer. Importantly Singer seems to imply that the use of the method 
of reflective equilibrium would result not only in a coherence account of justification but 
also a coherence account of validity or truth (cf. Singer 1974, 492-5, esp. 493-4). 
Rawls, according to Singer, thus misinterprets Sidgwick when he suggests that they share 
the same method of justification. He thinks that this misinterpretation rests on the passages 
where Sidgwick tries to show that the utilitarian theory, which can be derived from the 
 
2 There are, of course, other interpretations: Rawls himself refers to Schneewind 1963. Skelton 2010 backs some 
of the points that lead to a rejection of the claim that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilibrium, Crisp 
2002 is as well critical on the suggestion that he used this method, but on different grounds, Sverdlik 1985 and 
Brink 1994 have interpretations that would in contrary back the claim of the direct use of the method. 
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principle of benevolence together with the principle of justice, is fitting best to the judgments 
of our common-sense morality But this ad hominem argument – as Singer calls it – (respec-
tively the coherence with our common sense judgments) is not what justifies this axiom (or 
any other). What justifies all possible axioms is, that they are self-evident and remain self-
evident after due reflection. 
Now if the method of reflective equilibrium were to be understood in the way Singer sug-
gested, and one accepts Singer’s interpretation of the Methods of Ethics it would clearly be 
inadequate to state that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilibrium. Sidgwick, ac-
cording to Singer, would have used a top-down moderate foundationalism and believed in 
objective moral truths, whereas Rawls would have used a coherentist approach, that in-
cludes not only a coherence account for justification but also for truth and thus he would 
be a subjectivist or cultural relativist concerning moral truth, so that their methodology is 
not consistent at all. 
II Singer’s Revised Position 
This brings us to part two of this paper. We can begin by asking the question: Was Singer 
right with this interpretation of reflective equilibrium? Most often reflective equilibrium is 
– as Singer rightly suggested – indeed considered a coherentist method of justification. But 
typically, this involves a form of weak foundationalism, which means that while there are 
no beliefs which themselves are already justified without inferential backing, there are 
some which have an initial credibility, because they are what we in fact believe before we 
start to scrutinize and criticize our system of beliefs. This initial credibility is – according the 
weak foundationalist interpretation of coherentism (which I want to presuppose hence-
forth) – not enough to grant an inquirer knowledge. Justification thus arises only if beliefs – 
initially held or not – can be incorporated in a system of held beliefs in the most coherent 
way such that they are mutually backed by inferential relations better than in any alterna-
tive system of beliefs that one could accept (cf. Rawls 1974, 8). 
But although reflective equilibrium is widely understood as a coherence method of justifi-
cation, that doesn’t mean that a proponent of it must embrace a coherence account of 
truth: There can be objective moral truth that is not created nor secured by a coherent 
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system of moral beliefs even if one thinks that this is what justifies these beliefs.3 Most 
proponents of the method of reflective equilibrium take coherence (combined with initial 
credibility of the beliefs that we actually accept) as a criterion of justification but not the 
criterion of truth and thus admit, contrary to Singers earlier assumption, that there is (moral 
or non-moral) truth or objectivity independent of its subjective justification. 
One of the most detailed accounts of reflective equilibrium originates from Norman Daniels 
(1996). He builds his account on the distinction between a narrow reflective equilibrium 
and a wide reflective equilibrium.4 If one is trying only to achieve a narrow reflective equi-
librium one just tries to achieve coherence only between our considered judgments and 
theories. But according to the method of reflective equilibrium in the wide interpretation – 
which we should use in philosophy – one has to incorporate in the weighing process all 
relevant background theories and arguments. These background theories are scientific or 
philosophic theories or arguments that would have an impact on the narrow reflective equi-
librium, were they to be considered. 
Thus, the method of reflective equilibrium in the wide sense is a method that enables us to 
be critical of our judgments and scrutinize our biased system of belief. It is also wide enough 
for background theories, that mandate for special areas of investigations special sub-meth-
ods. If, for example, a plausible theory casts doubt on our common sense moral judgments, 
it could be possible to discredit these judgments systematically in moral inquiry – just as 
Singer himself holds – with the possible result (if it also can be argued for the remaining 
beliefs to be basic) that one establishes for the realm of normative ethics a moderate foun-
dationalism. In this way, wide reflective equilibrium is indeed compatible with the method 
of Sidgwick the way Singer interpreted it. 
Weak foundationalism – according to this interpretation of reflective equilibrium – remains 
the “default setting” for inquiry unless a different sub-method is vindicated for certain areas 
of investigation. 
Also, Singer himself, who, of course, did follow the debate on reflective equilibrium, now 
explicitly accepts in his 2005 article “Ethics and Intuitionism” and his book The Point of View 
 
3 Indeed, Rawls himself leaves room for the idea that if we use the method of reflective equilibrium it might result 
in a convergence of out ethical belief systems what could indicate that we are getting closer to moral truths. That 
implies on the other hand, that we still can go wrong, even if we have reached a reflective equilibrium. Cf. Rawls 
1974, 9-10, 21. Cf. Daniels 1996, 33-40. 
4 According to Rawls’ terminology in his article “The Independence of Moral Philosophy” (1974) – Rawls suggested 
the use of wide reflective equilibrium already in A Theory of Justice. Cf. Rawls 1971, 49; 1993, 8-9. 
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of the Universe – jointly written with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2014) – that the method 
of wide reflective equilibrium is indeed compatible with Sidgwick’s method.5  
Admittedly, it is possible to interpret the model of reflective equilibrium so that it takes into 
account any grounds for objecting to our intuitions, including those that I have put forward. 
Norman Daniels has argued persuasively for this ‘wide’ interpretation of reflective 
equilibrium. If the interpretation is truly wide enough to countenance the rejection of all our 
ordinary moral beliefs, then I have no objection to it. (Singer 2005, 347)6 
II.a The Triviality Charge 
So, what is stopping us – granted that we do agree with Singer’s Sidgwick interpretation – 
from simply stating that Sidgwick indeed used something like the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium? According to Singer there is a price to be paid, if the method of reflective equi-
librium is understood as wide, as Daniels suggests: 
The price for avoiding the inbuilt conservatism of the narrow interpretation, however, is that 
reflective equilibrium ceases to be a distinctive method of doing normative ethics. Where 
previously there was a contrast between the method of reflective equilibrium and 
‘‘foundationalist” attempts to build an ethical system outward from some indubitable starting 
point, now foundationalism simply becomes the limiting case of a wide reflective equilibrium. 
(Singer 2005, 347) 
Singer claims that if the use of the method of reflective equilibrium is no means anymore 
to distinguish a priori, that some moral philosopher proposes rather a coherentism than a 
moderate foundationalism for ethical inquiries, then stating that the philosopher used the 
method of reflective equilibrium becomes meaningless. It’s just trivial to state, that a phi-
losopher used the method of reflective equilibrium understood in this wide sense, that in-
cludes the possibility of an ethical moderate foundationalism – so to say that Sidgwick used 
the method of reflective equilibrium is pointless and we shouldn’t state pointless utterances 
(at least, this seems to be implied). This is the core of the triviality charge: 
[…] whether wide reflective equilibrium and foundationalism can be distinguished depends on 
the substance of ‘the acceptable moral theory’ and on what the philosophical arguments allow 
us to conclude. Without knowing which moral theory is acceptable and whether there are 
 
5 He accredits the notion of wide reflective equilibrium to Daniels and not to Rawls – and I think he is mistaken 
here, Cf. Singer and de Lazari-Radek 2014, 11-114; cf. Singer 2005, 347. 
6 One could interpret the cited statement in a way that Singer now accepts a weak foundationalism in which certain 
beliefs are epistemically devalued, but I suggest that Singer’s position is still a moderate foundationalism. 
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philosophical arguments that reveal which moral judgments are objectively true, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that, once we have found the soundest moral theory and the best phil-
osophical arguments, we will be able to demonstrate that none, or virtually none, of our ex-
isting moral judgments are credible; such that we can confidently reject all, or virtually all, of 
our current moral judgments, and replace them with the judgments that follow from the 
moral theory. […] In that case, the distinction between wide reflective equilibrium and foun-
dationalism has narrowed to a vanishing point. It would then be true, but trivial, that when 
we do normative ethics, there is no alternative to the method of reflective equilibrium. There 
would be no alternative because wide reflective equilibrium is so wide that it includes all pos-
sible methods, including foundationalism. (Singer and de Lazari-Radek 2014, 112-3)7 
III Arguments against the Triviality Charge 
I will argue that it is not trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilib-
rium (understood as the attempt to achieve a wide reflective equilibrium). 
To support this thesis, I will advance one main argument and two further arguments.  
1. The main argument takes that fallibilism is a necessary condition for being able to 
support the method of reflective equilibrium. Fallibilism is roughly defined here as 
the presupposition that all beliefs without exception which we could use in our phil-
osophical argumentation are in principle questionable and open to scrutiny since the 
epistemic agent cannot be certain of their truth. Why is fallibilism a necessary con-
dition for the method of reflective equilibrium? If there were some beliefs which 
were not open to scrutiny, they would be totally fixed points in the process of ad-
justment when conflicts occur in our system of belief. And everything that could be 
brought in deductive inferential relation with them were as well as fixed (given that 
we accept some set of rules of logic as one of these fixed points). But fixed points are 
not open to weighing considerations if they conflict with other beliefs in a system 
that is to be brought in a reflective equilibrium. All the balancing process that lies at 
the core of the process of achieving reflective equilibrium is only possible if we ac-
cept fallibilism. Yet, fallibilism isn’t the only condition for the method of reflective 
 
7 A similar position is held by Sem de Maagt: “One problem is that by including just about any possible 
disagreement related to the justification of our moral beliefs into its methodology, reflective equilibrium runs the 
risk of becoming vacuous as a method of moral justification, because ultimately reflective equilibrium will simply 
be reduced to reasoning about ethics in general. That is, if any kind of disagreement is included in the search for 
reflective equilibrium it is not evident that it still can function as a method of moral justification.” (2017, 458). 
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equilibrium: A second further necessary condition is a (weak) holistic perspective of 
justification which includes inferential interdependence. A third condition consist in 
criteria of rational belief revision in case of inconsistent beliefs in a holistic system of 
beliefs – namely that a belief succeeds over another conflicting one in the case it has 
(in light of all supportive evidence) a higher degree of credence than the other be-
lief.8 A fourth condition would be the weak foundationalist assumption that all the 
beliefs we think to be true – the “considered judgments” or “commitments” – have 
an initial weak credibility that suffices to distinguish them from merely possible be-
liefs but that is not strong enough for granting us knowledge without further infer-
ential backing.  
But to challenge the triviality charge, I will only rely on fallibilism. 
Now there are, at least, two reasons why it is informative – rather than trivial – to state that 
Sidgwick was a fallibilist: 
i. The first reason is obvious: There are philosophers who are infallibilists and think 
that they have reached some unquestionable truths. Singer himself points to Des-
cartes to illustrate this position from which he wants to distinguish Sidgwick’s posi-
tion. This means obviously that Singer also thinks that pointing to Sidgwick’s fallibil-
ism is informative. In fact, if one wanted to classify that kind of infallibilism that 
Descartes seems to present, one would call it – according to BonJour – strong foun-
dationalism.9 So it is literally false to simply state that foundationalism might be in-
cluded in the method of reflective equilibrium: Some form of foundationalism might 
not be included, which shows us again, that to assign the method of reflective equi-
librium to some someone is informative. Granted – nowadays most philosophers 
seem committed to some sort of fallibilism but there still might be some who argue 
for infallible truths – in ethics as well as in other areas of philosophy. So even with 
the majority of contemporary philosophers being fallibilists it is not completely trivial 
to state that some philosopher is a fallibilist. This already counts for contemporary 
philosophers, but Sidgwick is a historic philosopher, so the claim that he used the 
 
8 This should normally lead to a maximal coherent set of beliefs, what could in itself be counted as another 
condition for reflective equilibrium. 
9 One could argue that Descartes only seems to present a strong foundationalism and if we were to reconstruct his 
position with the principle of charity in mind it would turn out that he too was a fallibilist. This might hold for other 
philosophers as well. If so, the claim that the method of reflective equilibrium is the method of philosophy could 
be true (generally speaking) – I leave this open to further investigation. But even if this were correct, it still would 
be informative to state that these philosophers were fallibilists because one had to debunk their apparent 
infallibilism and theoretically infallibilism would still be an option. 
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method of reflective equilibrium is even more informative and interesting, if we 
rightly can assume that there have been more infallibilists in the past (Crisp 2002, 
60-63). 
ii. The second reason is an exegetic one: In Sidgwick’s Methods the notion of self-evi-
dent axioms plays – as it is well known – a fundamental role. But how is the notion 
of self-evidence understood in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics? To state that the axi-
oms he proposes are based on a self-evident intuition (plus reflection) but still are 
fallible is an informative interpretation.10 
This is my main argument and I would like to turn to two additional arguments against the 
Triviality Charge 
2. The second argument concerns the meta-level on which the methodological design 
of a subdomain, i.e. certain areas of investigation with specific features, is justified. 
On this meta-level we are operating on coherentist or weak foundationalist stand-
ards even if there is a moderate foundationalist standard (or any other fallible stand-
ard) justified in the sub-domain. A sub-domain could be for example the area of nor-
mative ethics. If one does assume that Sidgwick proposed a moderate foundational 
method for normative ethics but was using a reflective equilibrium to justify this 
method on the meta-level of – let’s say – metaethics, then on this meta-level he was 
arguing in a coherentist or weak foundationalist way. I hold that the same pattern is 
true for externalist epistemologists. Since these claims could be more controversial 
than the precedent, I would like to build upon it only an additional argument against 
the Triviality Charge. Yet I think, it might be the philosophically more interesting 
claim. There seem to be – at least – two non-trivial statements connected with this 
claim: 
i. The arguments by which a moderate foundationalism in a subdomain like nor-
mative ethics is justified are establishing the methodological design of the sub-
domain in the first place and are thus superordinate. In other words, the “default 
position” of inquiry is coherentism or weak foundationalism and a change from 
the default position must be justified and held justified over time in coherentist 
or weak foundationalist terms.  
 
10 Singer himself emphasizes that Sidgwick is a fallibilist: Cf. 1974, 508. 
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ii. It follows then that the methodological design of a subdomain that changed from 
the “default position” is open to ongoing scrutiny in the always dynamic remain-
ing process of the method of reflective equilibrium. To change the method in a 
subdomain is always provisional, as every justification in reflective equilibrium is 
provisional and open to further scrutiny. Trying to achieve a reflective equilib-
rium remains always an ongoing task because there always can be new beliefs – 
for example through new experiences or evidence – that would have to be incor-
porated in the holistic system of beliefs. And there is always the possibility that 
one overlooked relevant background theories or arguments. There could be new 
inconsistencies at any time which we did or could not anticipate, such that trying 
to achieve a reflective equilibrium is an ongoing dynamic process. It seems that 
a perfect reflective equilibrium is a philosophical ideal, but even this ideal state – 
at a certain time – would be provisional. 
If this is all true, then it is clearly non-trivial. 
3. The third argument points to the fact that fallibilism is an ideal as well as an im-
portant attitude in important domains of civil society: for example, in science or in 
the political sphere of liberal democracies. This renders information about the use 
of the method of reflective equilibrium informative and valuable in a social sense – 
it is useful for us as citizens and epistemic agents if it is stressed that an important 
theory is fallibilistic. As this is a claim that must be explained and argued for in in 
detail (which I cannot do extensively here), I consider it only an additional possible 
argument, which I want to point to at the end of my argumentation. 
IV Conclusion 
To conclude: Is it misleading or inadequate to state that Sidgwick used the method of re-
flective equilibrium as his method of justification? Since the method is capable of justifying 
in the realm of ethics coherentism as well as moderate foundationalism, it is at least im-
portant to qualify how Sidgwick used the method exactly: Did he use it to establish a mod-
erate foundationalism for the area of normative ethics with his abstract universal axioms as 
fallible basic beliefs? Or did he treat his axioms merely as provisionally fixed points (like 
Rawls treats the judgment about the injustice of slavery as a provisionally fixed point) but 
not as basic beliefs in the sense that is needed for a moderate foundationalism? To decide 
the correct answer is a goal for experts on Sidwick’s philosophy. So far Singer’s position 
might be vindicated. 
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But the claim that he used the method of reflective equilibrium in general as his method of 
justification gives no preliminary decision to this question and is nevertheless quite informa-
tive.11 
And as Sidgwick wasn’t merely a fallibilist, but also tried to argue in a coherent way for his 
position with respect to personally held judgments, I would say it is also quite safe to sug-
gest that he made use of the method of reflective equilibrium. 
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Ist der Personenbegriff wirklich überflüssig 
für die biomedizinische Ethik? 
Shingo Segawa, University of Münster, Germany 
Abstract 
Der Personenbegriff spielt eine entscheidende Rolle in der biomedizinischen Ethik insbesondere im Kontext mor-
alischer Schutzwürdigkeit am Lebensanfang und Lebensende des Menschen (Abtreibung und Sterbehilfe). Den-
noch schlägt Dieter Birnbacher vor, dass wir den Personenbegriff vollkommen aus diesem Themenbereich 
ausschließen sollten. In diesem Beitrag weise ich darauf hin, dass sein Vorschlag nur zum Teil richtig ist. Hier 
möchte ich die These zum Ausdruck bringen, dass der Personenbegriff für die biomedizinische Ethik zum Teil 
hilfreich ist.  
Der Personenbegriff ist immer wieder umstritten, weil er auf verschiedene Weisen interpretiert wird, die wesent-
lich auf Kant bzw. Locke beruhen. Außerdem führt seine Einführung in die Debatte um Leben und Tod zur moralisch 
nicht leicht akzeptablen Konsequenz wie z. B. der moralischen Zulässigkeit der Kindestötung. Das Personsein ist 
untrennbar mit moralischer Schutzwürdigkeit verbunden, so dass es ausschließlich darum geht, ob ein menschli-
ches Wesen eine Person ist. Daraus folgt, dass keine moralische Schutzwürdigkeit dem menschlichen Wesen 
zugeschrieben werden kann, die nicht als Person anzusehen ist. Aber diese Konsequenz erscheint mit gesellschaft-
lich weitgehend geteilten moralischen Wertvorstellungen unvereinbar. Ein großes Problem liegt dabei meines Er-
achtens darin, dass der Personenbegriff konzeptionell zur Gradualisierung moralischer Schutzwürdigkeit nicht bei-
tragen kann.  
Vor diesem Hintergrund macht Birnbacher diesen Vorschlag. Birnbacher muss sich deswegen mit der Frage befas-
sen, wie wir ohne Berufung auf den Personenbegriff die moralische Schutzwürdigkeit des Menschen begründen 
können. Einer der wichtigsten Gründe dafür finde sich in der Empfindungsfähigkeit. Es ist unter normalen Umstän-
den moralisch unzulässig, Schmerzen menschlichen Wesen mit Empfindungsfähigkeit zuzufügen. Wenn man in 
dieser Weise die moralische Schutzwürdigkeit des Menschen begründen kann, ist der Personenbegriff unbrauch-
bar. Das soll heißen, dass Birnbachers Vorschlag völlig richtig ist. Aber im Hinblick darauf, dass dieser Begriff sehr 
hilfreich für die Debatte um das Lebensende (Sterbehilfe) ist, sollten wir Birnbachers Vorschlag nicht die völlige 
Zustimmung geben. Sonst verlieren wir eines der geeigneten Argumente in dieser Debatte. 
Einleitung 
Die Leitfrage meines Beitrags lautet, ob der Begriff der Person wirklich hilfreich für die bio-
medizinische Ethik ist. Dieser Begriff wird häufig in Debatten um Leben und Tod, z. B. im Fall 
von Abtreibung und Sterbehilfe, als Begründung verwendet. In der Abtreibungsdebatte 
spielen der kantische und Locke’sche Personenbegriff eine entscheidende Rolle. Die beiden 
Begriffe der Person in diesem Bereich scheinen mir jedoch nicht hilfreich zu sein. Denn Au-
toren wie Otfried Höffe (2002) und Michael Tooley (1983), die den kantischen und 
Lockeʼschen Personenbegriff als Begründung ihrer eigenen These verwenden, setzen das 
Personsein mit dem moralisch zu berücksichtigenden Wesen gleich, sodass die Frage nach 
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dem Umgang mit den Menschen, die noch nicht oder niemals als Personen betrachtet 
werden können, gar nicht zur Diskussion steht. In dieser Verwendung lässt sowohl der 
kantische als auch der Lockeʼsche Personenbegriff von seiner logischen Struktur her nur 
zwei Antworten zu: Ein menschliches Wesen ist entweder eine Person mit ausgezeichneter 
Schutzwürdigkeit oder nichts. Dieser Ansatz erscheint nicht hilfreich für die Untersuchung 
des Umgangs mit den menschlichen Wesen, die Personen weder im kantischen noch im 
Locke’schen Sinne wären, weil irgendeine moralische Schutzwürdigkeit auch ihnen zukom-
men sollte bzw. könnte.  
Damit lässt sich die Leitfrage meines Beitrags entwerfen, ob der Personenbegriff überhaupt 
hilfreich ist für die biomedizinische Ethik. Um die Frage einer Antwort zuzuführen, werde 
ich mich in meinem Beitrag mit den Beiträgen von Ludwig Siep und Dieter Birnbacher 
auseinandersetzen. Beide Autoren entwickeln diametral zueinanderstehende Ansätze dazu, 
sodass sie als ein pointierter Ausgangspunkt für die Beschäftigung mit meiner Leitfrage gel-
ten können. Siep und Birnbacher ist gemeinsam, dass sowohl der kantische als auch der 
Lockeʼsche Personenbegriff sich eher lähmend als fördernd auf den Diskurs auswirken. Der 
entscheidende Unterschied zwischen beiden besteht darin, dass Siep, auf der einen Seite, 
eine affirmative Antwort auf die Leitfrage gibt. Dazu sucht Siep durch die Entwicklung eines 
neuen Personenbegriffs, der sich insbesondere nicht auf den Lockeʼschen Personenbegriff 
beruft, diesen Begriff in der biomedizinischen Ethik zu retten. Auf der anderen Seite beant-
wortet Birnbacher die Leitfrage negativ und schlägt daher vor, dass der Personenbegriff aus 
allen biomedizinischen Debatten auszuschließen ist. Daraus ergeben sich die folgenden drei 
Antworten auf die Leitfrage:  
1: Ja, der von Siep entwickelte Personenbegriff ist für die biomedizinische Ethik geeignet. 
(Siep) 
2: Nein, der Personenbegriff ist für die biomedizinische Ethik überhaupt ungeeignet. 
(Birnbacher) 
3: Der Personenbegriff ist für die biomedizinische Ethik teilweise geeignet. (Segawa) 
Ich werde in diesem Beitrag die dritte Antwort vertreten und den Grund dafür erklären. 
Hierbei ist zu beachten, dass ich Birnbachers Diagnose nicht für völlig falsch, sondern nur 
für teilweise falsch halte. So lautet meine These: Der Personenbegriff ist für die bio-
medizinische Ethik hilfreich, insoweit er in den angemessenen Bereichen verwendet wird. 
Unter der Voraussetzung, dass allein Personen eine moralische Schutzwürdigkeit haben und 
allein Wesen, die im hinreichenden Maße über irgendwelche für das Personsein geforder-
ten Fähigkeiten bzw. Eigenschaften verfügen, als Personen anzuerkennen sind, scheint mir 
Der Rettungsversuch des Personenbegriffs 
261 
dieser Begriff für die Untersuchung eines moralischen Status von den menschlichen Wesen 
nicht hilfreich zu sein. Diese Verwendung sieht man typischer weise in der Debatte um Ab-
treibung. Aber der Personenbegriff kann meines Erachtens dennoch für die bio-
medizinischen Diskussionen geeignet sein, insoweit es vor allem um den Respekt vor Per-
sonen geht, wie etwa in der Debatte um die moralische Zulässigkeit aktiver Sterbehilfe.  
I Der Rettungsversuch des Personenbegriffs 
Besonders relevant ist für Siep die Frage, wie man mit menschlichen Wesen umgehen sollte, 
die weder im kantischen noch im Lockeʼschen Sinne als Personen anzusehen sind. Siep hält 
die Konsequenz, die sich aus der Einführung der beiden Personenbegriffe in die Diskussion 
über moralische Schutzwürdigkeit der menschlichen Wesen ergibt, für moralisch unzulässig 
und sie kann mit dem Begriff der Person gelöst werden. Deshalb wird ihm die Aufgabe 
auferlegt, einen anderen Begriff der Person als bei Kant und Locke zu entfalten. Ob dieser 
Personenbegriff zur Auseinandersetzung mit dem moralischen Umgang mit Embryonen 
dienen könnte, werde ich im nächsten Schritt im Verbund mit dem Beitrag von Birnbacher 
überprüfen (II). 
Aus der Sicht von Siep besteht das wesentliche Problem der Anwendung des kantischen und 
Lockeʼschen Personenbegriff auf die Debatte um den Umgang mit den menschlichen Wesen 
zu Lebensbeginn darin, dass zum einen Personalität (die Bedingungen für das Personsein) 
lediglich auf die kognitiven Fähigkeiten der Menschen wie Selbstbewusstsein oder Ration-
alität aufmerksam macht und dass sie zum anderen Gradualisierung zulasse (1993, 44; 2001, 
454). So macht Siep den folgenden Vorschlag: Die Personalität kann in dem Ausmaß abge-
stuft werden, in dem ein menschliches Wesen die Bedingungen für das Personsein erfüllt 
(2001, 453-55). 
Ein menschliches Wesen, so Siep, hat moralische Schutzwürdigkeit deshalb, weil es ein mor-
alisches Recht besitzt. Außerdem wird die Gradualisierung der Personalität bei Siep ges-
tattet. Dies erlaubt es, moralische Rechte einem menschlichen Wesen in dem Ausmaß 
graduell zuzuschreiben, in dem es die Personalität erfüllt. Hierbei lässt sich die Aussage 
nicht mehr folgen, dass lediglich Personen, die als vernünftig bzw. selbstbewusst gelten, 
über moralische Schutzwürdigkeit verfügen, weil auch die menschlichen Wesen, die weder 
vernünftig noch selbstbewusst sind, als Personen mit irgendwelchem moralischen Recht 
anzusehen sind. Es geht nun darum, worauf sich die Abstufung der Personalität gründet.  
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Siep versteht den Begriff der Person als Ganzheit der “leiblichen, emotionalen, intel-
lektuellen und sozialen Leistungen” (2001, 457). Ausgehend davon ist es unumstritten, dass 
diese alle graduell sind und unter normalen Umständen sich im Verlauf der Jahre entwick-
eln. Siep erfasst diesen Entwicklungsprozess als ein moralisch zu berücksichtigendes Merk-
mal. Daraus folgt nicht nur, dass die Personalität nach dem Ausmaß abgestuft werden kann, 
in dem ein menschliches Wesen den Weg von noch-nicht-Personen zu Personen geht, 
sondern auch gleichzeitig, dass Ansprüche auf eine moralische Schutzwürdigkeit nicht als 
ja-oder-nein, sondern als stufenförmig aufzufassen sind. Mit dem Verweis darauf, dass sich 
das Personsein als graduell verstehen lässt und der Entwicklungsprozess der Menschen als 
moralisch wichtig gilt, versucht Siep die Geltung der Einführung des Personenbegriffs in die 
biomedizinische Ethik aufzuzeigen.  
II Der Ausschluss des Personenbegriffs aus der 
biomedizinischen Ethik: Birnbachers Vorschlag 
Gegen Sieps Rettungsversuch des Personenbegriffs wirft Birnbacher die Frage auf, ob der 
Personenbegriff für die biomedizinische Ethik wirklich hilfreich ist. Aus Birnbachers Sicht 
verbaut Sieps Strategie des Festhaltens an diesem Begriff nicht nur andere Formen der 
Zuschreibung moralischer Rechte, sondern bringt auch weitere Problematiken mit sich. 
Daher lautet Birnbachers These: Der Begriff der Person ist überflüssig für die bio-
medizinische Ethik, sodass wir auf diesen verzichten sollten.  
Auf dem Hintergrund der beschriebenen Dilemmata spricht viel dafür, bioethische 
Diskussionen ohne den Rückgriff auf den Personenbegriff zu führen oder ihm zumindest eine 
weniger zentrale Funktion zuzuweisen, als ihm gegenwärtig zugewiesen wird. (Birnbacher 
2005, 73) 
Birnbacher stimmt mit Siep überein, dass auf der einen Seite der Versuch, moralische 
Rechte durch die Anwendung sowohl des kantischen als auch Lockeʼschen Personenbegriffs 
zu begründen, inakzeptable Konsequenzen nach sich zieht und dass auf der anderen Seite 
diese Konsequenzen in irgendeiner Weise umgangen werden sollten. Aus Birnbachers Sicht 
scheint jedoch Sieps Rettungsversuch durch die Abstufung der Personalität mit zwei 
schwierigen Problemen belastet zu sein. Einerseits muss die Grenzziehung zwischen Perso-
nen im vollkommenen Sinne und Personen im unvollkommenen Sinne und Nichtpersonen 
willkürlich gewählt werden und folglich ein tiefgreifender Dissens darüber herrschen, wo 
bzw.  auf welcher Basis die Grenze zu ziehen ist (Birnbacher 2005, 73-75). Andererseits ent-
fernt dieses Personenverständnis sich sehr weit vom Alltagssprachgebrauch, nach dem die 
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Aussage “eine Person ist zu 20 Prozent-Person und eine andere Person ist zu 80 Prozent-
Person” nicht folgen kann. Aus diesen Gründen muss eine Person Birnbacher zufolge alles 
oder nichts sein. Die Problematik der Anwendung dieses Personenverständnisses auf die 
Debatte um moralische Schutzwürdigkeit eines menschlichen Wesens, wie etwa Embryo-
nen, ist aber bereits von Siep hingewiesen worden. Daher besteht das Ziel Birnbachers 
selbstverständlich darin, ohne den Personenbegriff moralische Rechte solcher menschli-
chen Wesen graduell zu begründen. Birnbacher schreibt wie folgt: 
… man bestimmte moralische Rechte haben kann, ohne jedes mögliche moralische Recht zu 
haben. […, S.S.] Man braucht Wesen, die Personen sind, nicht alle möglichen Rechte 
zuzusprechen, und man braucht Wesen, die keine Personen sind, nicht bestimmte oder alle 
moralischen Rechte abzusprechen. (2005, 74) 
Es geht bei Birnbacher deshalb darum, wie moralische Rechte abgestuft werden können. 
Als Beispiel hierfür gibt es ein moralisches Recht auf Leidensvermeidung. Birnbacher nach 
lässt sich dieses Recht unter Rückgriff auf die Empfindungsfähigkeit auch Embryonen 
zusprechen, die zu einem bestimmten Stadium entwickelt sind. Wenn die Embryonen mit 
der Empfindungsfähigkeit ausgestattet sind, sollten sie als moralisch zu berücksichtigende 
Wesen betrachtet werden, wobei es nicht darum geht, ob sie als Personen anzusehen sind. 
Birnbacher erachtet tatsächlich die Empfindungsfähigkeit als Begründung eines der grund-
legendsten moralischen Rechte für hinreichend. Können wir uns ohne Berufung auf den Be-
griff der Person mit der Diskussion über moralische Schutzwürdigkeit der menschlichen 
Wesen beschäftigen, spielt der Personenbegriff keine Rolle dabei. Wie Birnbacher 
herausstellt, öffnet die Aufgabe des Begriffs der Person einen anderen Weg dafür, eine mor-
alische Schutzwürdigkeit der menschlichen Wesen zu Lebensbeginn auf die verschiedenen 
Weisen, wie z. B. Gattungsethik von Siep (2002) oder Pietät von Birnbacher,1 veranschlagen 
zu können. Auch wenn diese Arten und Weisen noch nicht als Begründung in dieser Debatte 
garantiert sind, ergeben sich tatsächlich aus dem Verzicht auf den Personenbegriff die an-
deren Möglichkeiten nicht in der Weise eines Alles-oder-Nichts. Ich stimme daher Birn-
bacher nur darin zu, dass der Begriff der Person nicht hilfreich für die Debatte um mor-
alische Schutzwürdigkeit der menschlichen Wesen zum Lebensbeginn ist. Aber anders als 
 
1 Vgl. Birnbacher 2005, 300: „Ähnlich wie die Pietätspflichten gegenüber menschlichen Leichnamen werden diese 
Pflichten deshalb stets nur schwache oder Prima-facie-Pflichten sein können, d. h., es werden Pflichten sein, die 
eine Abwägung mit konkurrierenden Pflichten und Rechten erlauben und gegebenenfalls hinter diesen 
zurückstehen müssen - so wie im Fall einer gerichtlich angeordneten Obduktion die Pietätspflichten gegenüber der 
konkurrierenden Pflicht zur Sicherung des Rechtsfriedens zurückstehen müssen. Darüber hinaus sind diese 
Pflichten zeit- und kulturrelativ. Falls die Vermutung berechtigt ist, dass die Einstellungen zur Embryonenforschung 
in Deutschland deutlich ablehnender sind als etwa in den USA, können wir nicht davon ausgehen, dass die 
Forschungsbeschränkungen, die hier zu Recht bestehen, auch dort moralisch verpflichtend sind.“ 
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bei Birnbacher folgt bei mir nicht, dass dieser Begriff aus der biomedizinischen Ethik ausges-
chlossen werden sollte, weil meines Erachtens es bestimmte biomedizinischen Prob-
lematiken gibt, zu denen der Personenbegriff doch beitragen kann. Aus diesem Grund halte 
ich Birnbachers These nur teilweise für richtig.  
III Ist der Personenbegriff wirklich überflüssig für die 
biomedizinische Ethik? 
Ob mein Versuch dieses Beitrags gelingt, hängt von den folgenden Überlegungen dieses Ab-
schnittes ab. Um meine These plausibel zu machen, dass der Personenbegriff für die bio-
medizinische Ethik hilfreich ist, behandele ich das Prinzip des Respekts vor Autonomie und 
weise auf die Rolle des Personenbegriffs dabei hin. Das Prinzip des Respekts vor Autonomie 
zählt zu den relevantesten Prinzipien in Diskussionen über die biomedizinische Ethik (Beau-
champ and Childress 2013). Dieses Prinzip steht typischerweise im Vordergrund der Diskus-
sion über die moralische Zulässigkeit der Sterbehilfe, die in vier Kategorien einzuteilen ist: 
Passive, indirekte, aktive Sterbehilfe und ärztlich assistierter Suizid. Da es bei meinem Bei-
trag nicht um die moralische Zulässigkeit der Sterbehilfe an sich geht, fokussiere ich mich in 
diesem Abschnitt nur auf die Rolle des Personenbegriffs in der Debatte um die moralische 
Zulässigkeit aktiver Sterbehilfe. Darüber hinaus beschränken sich die folgenden Über-
legungen auf einen Fall: Einerseits leidet der Patient an einer unheilbaren Krankheit und an 
unerträglichen Schmerzen (z. B. Krebs in späten Stadien) oder der Patient ist nicht mehr in 
der Lage, ein verschriebenes tödliches Medikament selbst einzunehmen (z.B. vollständige 
Lähmung). Andererseits befindet sich der Handelnde, d. h. in diesem Kontext der Arzt, in 
der Lage, mit Sicherheit zu erwarten, dass sein Handeln in jedem Fall zum Tod des Patienten 
führt.  
Passive Sterbehilfe zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass eine lebensverlängernde medizinische 
Behandlung nach Einsetzen des Sterbeprozesses, etwa die Wiederbelebung, unterlassen 
wird und dadurch der Eintritt des Todes beschleunigt wird.2 Dabei liegt die Annahme 
 
2 Der Nationale Ethikrat schlägt vor, dass statt von passiver Sterbehilfe der Terminus von Sterbenlassen in diesem 
Kontext gebraucht werden sollte. Vgl. Nationaler Ethikrat 2006, 53. 
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zugrunde, dass der Sterbeprozess bereits eingesetzt hat und folglich das absichtliche Unter-
lassen nicht mit der absichtlichen Herbeiführung des Todes verbunden ist.3 Diese zwei Bed-
ingungen machen das Merkmal für ihre moralische Zulässigkeit aus. 
Indirekte Sterbehilfe ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass der Eintritt des Todes von dem an z. 
B. unerträglichen Schmerzen leidenden Patienten als Nebenfolge der Überdosis bes-
chleunigt wird. Es ist besonders relevant, dass ein solches Handeln weder direkt noch indi-
rekt vorsätzlich auf den Tod des Patienten zielt, sondern sein Tod nur in Kauf genommen 
wird.4 Dieses Merkmal liefert das Argument für die moralische Zulässigkeit der indirekten 
Sterbehilfe. 
Im Gegensatz zu den ersten beiden Formen der Sterbehilfe geht aktive Sterbehilfe mit der 
gezielt ausgeführten absichtlichen Herbeiführung des Todes vom Patienten einher. Die ak-
tive Sterbehilfe, die sich durch absichtliche Handlung der Herbeiführung des Todes vom Pa-
tienten und durch ein fehlendes Einsetzen des Sterbeprozesses auszeichnet, steht dann den 
zwei Bedingungen für die moralische Erlaubtheit von Sterbehilfe gegenüber. Die Frage hin-
sichtlich der moralischen Zulässigkeit von Sterbehilfe fokussiert sich darauf, ob der ethisch 
radikale Unterschied zwischen den drei Formen aus der Differenzierung vom absichtlichen 
Handeln, das zum Tod führt (aktive Sterbehilfe), der Inkaufnahme des Todes (indirekte 
Sterbehilfe) und des absichtlichen Unterlassen der Behandlung (passive Sterbehilfe) 
abgeleitet werden kann. Hiergegen wird der detaillierte sowie umfassende Einwand durch 
die Analyse der Handlungstheorie vorgebracht (Birnbacher 1995). Unter der oben genan-
nten Voraussetzung dieses Beitrags kann die Trennung zwischen dem absichtlichen Tun, 
dem in Kauf genommen Tun und dem als ein Handeln verstandenes Unterlassen aus Sicht 
des kausal-relationalen Verhältnisses nicht mehr gesichert angenommen werden.5 Daraus 
folgt, dass der ethisch radikale Unterschied zwischen den drei Formen der Sterbehilfe nicht 
mehr haltbar ist. Der wesentliche Grund für die moralische Zulässigkeit der Sterbehilfe, un-
abhängig von ihren drei verschiedenen Formen, liegt darin begründet, dass der Patient sich 
 
3 Das absichtliche Unterlassen entspricht dem von Birnbacher ausgelegten „Geschehenlassen“. Birnbacher erklärt 
den Unterschied zwischen Unterlassen und Geschehenlassen folgendermaßen: „Während ein Unterlassen (wie 
auch Handeln) auch unwissentlich erfolgen kann […, S.S.], kann ein Geschehenlassen immer nur wissentlich [im 
Original] sein“ (1995, 104 und 2016, 90). 
4 Aus dieser Sicht soll der Terminus von indirekter Sterbehilfe aufgegeben werden: „Auf den bisher in diesem 
Zusammenhang verwendeten Begriff der ‚indirekten Sterbehilfe’ sollte verzichtet werden, weil der Tod des 
Patienten weder direkt noch indirekt das Ziel des Handelns ist“ (Nationale Ethikrat 2006, 54). 
5 Siep und Quante weisen darauf hin, dass nicht nur Tun, sondern auch „Unterlassung [an sich bereits unabhängig 
von willentlich oder unwillentlich, S.S.] ein raum-zeitlich reales Ereignis ist“ (1998, 46). 
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selbst für Sterbehilfe entscheidet. Der Schlüssel für die moralische Erlaubtheit der aktiven 
Sterbehilfe ist Selbstbestimmung.  
Es scheint mir jedoch selbstverständlich zu sein, dass jede Selbstbestimmung des Patienten, 
der nicht an einer unheilbaren Krankheit und an unerträglichen Schmerzen leidet, vor allem 
im Kontext der aktiven Sterbehilfe respektiert werden sollte. An dieser Stelle geht es darum, 
welche Selbstbestimmung des Patienten respektiert werden sollte. Meine Antwort darauf 
ist autonome Selbstbestimmung. Es stellt sich an dieser Stelle die Frage, wodurch sich au-
tonome Selbstbestimmung auszeichnet. Mit Verweis darauf, dass das Konzept personaler 
Autonomie dazu beitragen kann, argumentiere ich für meine These. Denn für das Konzept 
personaler Autonomie ist der Begriff der Person notwendig.  
Der Begriff der Person setzt sich nicht nur aus der Personalität (die Bedingungen für das 
Personsein), sondern aus der Persönlichkeit zusammen. Die Persönlichkeit charakterisiert 
in unserem alltäglichen Leben ein individuelles Merkmal der Person, sodass sie sich implizit 
oder explizit in ihren bestimmten ethischen Ansprüchen widerspiegelt. Damit wird 
verständlich, weshalb sich ein gewisser ethischer Anspruch für eine Person als ziemlich rel-
evant darstellt, aber für eine andere Person nicht in der gleichen Weise. Die Persönlichkeit 
ist relevant für die Untersuchung personaler Autonomie. Denn dem Konzept personaler Au-
tonomie zufolge ist eine Person in konkreten Selbstbestimmungen insofern autonom, als 
diese Selbstbestimmung ihrer Persönlichkeit entspricht. Wenn die Selbstbestimmung der 
Person nicht ihrer Persönlichkeit entspricht, ist sie nicht als autonom, d. h. nicht als mor-
alisch zulässig, anzusehen. Infolgedessen kann das soeben Problem durch die Berufung auf 
das Konzept der personalen Autonomie vermeidet werden. Im Hinblick darauf, dass das 
Konzept der personalen Autonomie auf dem Begriff der Person basiert, sollte der Perso-
nenbegriff nicht aus der biomedizinischen Ethik ausgeschlossen werden. Somit komme ich 
zu dem Schluss, dass der Begriff der Person teilweise geeignet für die biomedizinische Ethik 
ist.  
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Is Hedonism a Version of Axiological 
Monism? 
Adam Shriver, University of Oxford, UK 
Abstract 
Axiological monism refers to accounts of value that hold that there is just one type of goodness or value in the 
world. Hedonism is frequently taken to be one of the canonical examples of axiological monism since, according 
to hedonism, there is just one type of good: namely positive experience. However, hedonism is committed not just 
to the claim that positive experiences are the sole good, but also to the claim that negative experiences are the 
sole bad. And given that the goodness and badness of experience must be weighed against one another in order 
to reach an overall assessment of the welfare of an individual according to hedonism, we can ask whether hedon-
ism truly retains the purported theoretical advantages that are thought to apply to monism.  
I argue that pleasures and pains are sufficiently different such that hedonism cannot retain the advantages typically 
assigned to axiological monism. To make this case, I critically evaluate recent discoveries in the scientific study of 
pleasure and pain. The upshot of these two sets of evidence, I argue, is that the goodness of pleasure cannot be 
explained in the same manner as the badness of pain, and that there is no adequate way of trading the value of 
pleasure against the disvalue of pain interpersonally. As such, I argue that hedonism does not retain the advantages 
of axiological monism.  
Introduction 
Axiological monism refers to accounts of value that hold that there is just one type of value. 
Such views are typically contrasted with versions of axiological pluralism, which hold that 
there are multiple kinds of value. Hedonism about value has often been portrayed as a ca-
nonical example of a monistic account of value. However, Elinor Mason (2018), citing Shelly 
Kagan’s recent (2014) work on ill-being, has suggested that incorporating the disvalue of 
pain into an account of value may problematize hedonism’s status as a monistic account of 
value. This presentation expands on Mason’s brief suggestion and argues that that the dis-
value of pain complicates the view that hedonism possesses the theoretical advantages 
over pluralism that have traditionally been associated with axiological monism. 
Monism is frequently expressed in two different ways. One common way of expressing it is 
exemplified in the SEP article on Value Pluralism (Mason 2018), which suggests that monism 
is the view that there is only one fundamental value. But Chris Heathwood’s article “Monism 
and Pluralism” provides an example of a different way of describing monism. Heathwood 
writes that the oldest and simplest version of welfare monism is the view that “pleasure is 
the one thing of ultimate benefit to us and pain the one thing of ultimate harm” (2015, my 
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emphasis). So monism is sometimes expressed as “there is only one type of value,” and 
sometimes expressed as “there is only one type of good thing and only one type of bad 
thing.” However, the claim that there is only one kind of value is not equivalent to the claim 
that there is only one type of good thing and there is only one type of bad thing in the 
absence of further exegesis.  
Given these two ways of describing monism, answering the question “Is hedonism a version 
of axiological monism?” may seem to depend simply on which definitions are used. How-
ever, I will focus on a different type of question: does hedonism retain the theoretical ad-
vantages that have been traditional associated with axiological monism? That is, can the 
advantages ascribed to monistic accounts of value as used in reasoning about well-being 
and impersonal value be realized by hedonistic accounts of pleasure and pain? I will argue 
that they cannot, or at least that more theoretical work is required in order to show that 
they can. 
I Clarifying the Concept 
I have the following in mind when talking about value in relation to axiological monism. 
First, axiological monism of course refers to intrinsic value rather than instrumental value. 
Second, the type of value under discussion is about the goodness or badness of states of 
affairs of the type consequentialists would care about, rather than the “moral value” of 
rightness or wrongness of actions or virtuous and vicious characters. And finally, we can 
distinguish between value for a given individual, or welfare value, and value simpliciter (or 
impersonal value). My focus will be on value simpliciter, although as will be seen I very much 
think this type of value depends upon the welfare on individuals. 
II Advantages of Axiological Monism 
Axiological monism is thought to have certain theoretical advantages relative to axiological 
pluralism (Heathwood 2015). One purported advantage of axiological monism is that it pos-
sesses a type of explanatory adequacy lacking in pluralistic accounts where different 
sources of value are not unified by a common feature. If a pluralistic account claims that a 
certain number of properties have value, we can ask what makes it the case that those 
properties and only those properties have value. If there is a common explanation for why 
those properties have value, then it seems likely that the theory would collapse into value 
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monism. If there is not a shared explanation, then the theory fails to explain something 
important. 
Another purported advantage of monism is that it can account for the comparability of dif-
ferent values whereas forms of pluralism, arguably, imply that certain types of values are 
fundamentally incomparable. Consider the claim that pleasure is the only good. On this 
view, since all goods are pleasures, and since pleasures can be quantified by intensity and 
duration, it follows that all goods can in principle be compared to one another. In contrast, 
consider the pluralist view that both pleasure and achievement are goods. How does one 
measure a given amount of achievement against a given level of pleasure? It is not clear 
how such heterogeneous values can be comparable. Of course, numerous attempts have 
been made to explain how such comparisons can proceed, but there is at least a prima facie 
reason for thinking that a monistic account can more easily explain the comparability of 
value. 
III Disvalue Needs to Be Included in a Monistic 
Account of Value 
Were there no badness or disvalue in the world, a monistic account of goodness would be 
equivalent to a monistic account of value. Higher levels of the goodness would be better, 
and the world could be made “worse” only by preventing the more goodness from being 
realized, but things would never be worse than a state of neutrality. Unfortunately, how-
ever, it is the case that there are states that are worse than neutral; an existence of nothing 
but intense suffering is worse than having not existed at all. For this reason, we need more 
than just an account of goodness to provide a comprehensive account of value. 
Moreover, a monistic account of positive value that is silent on disvalue is practically use-
less. Consider a case where you need to compare the value of Situation A vs Situation B. If 
you only know how much positive value is present in each situation, but know nothing about 
how much disvalue is present, then you cannot evaluate which situation is preferable. This 
is true for both decisions about prudential well-being and for decisions about impersonal 
value. As such, the purported comparability advantage of monism is practically inert if it 
only applies to accounts of goodness or positive value and not to badness or disvalue. 
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IV Disvalue and Value Require a Shared Explanation 
The explanatory advantage of axiological monism is also lost if the monistic account does 
not include disvalue. Consider a discussion by Heathwood of a suggestion that we consider 
the following an account of monism: “X is good iff X is either a state of pleasure or a state 
of knowledge.” The reason such an account should actually be regarded as pluralistic rather 
than monistic is that the explanation for why pleasures are valuable is different from the 
explanation of why knowledge is valuable. There is no shared explanation for pleasure and 
knowledge and thus no monism. 
Now consider attempts to describe monism as follows: X is the only good, and Y is the only 
bad. Such accounts are monistic about goodness, and monistic about badness, but are they 
also monistic about value as a whole? Not without further argument. Here is an account of 
value inspired by my nephew: “Achievement is the only good, and suffering is the only bad.” 
Putting aside whether the view is plausible, would it be a monistic account of value? I think 
most would agree that it clearly is not. The reason it is not, I believe, is the same reason why 
pleasure and knowledge cannot be combined into a monistic account of goodness; achieve-
ment and suffering are not related to one another in the right way. In particular, there is no 
shared explanation for why achievement would be the good and suffering the bad. 
As such, theories that suggest that X is the only good and Y is the only bad are only monistic 
accounts of value if there is a shared explanation for why X is good and why Y is bad. Is 
hedonism such a theory? Of course, pleasures and pains are both experiences. But saying X 
has value iff X is an experience is inadequate in at least two ways. First, we can presumably 
have neutral experiences, and so the fact that something is an experience doesn’t automat-
ically entail that it has value. And second, it does not follow from the claim that “experiences 
can be good” that “experience can be bad,” so there’s still additional explanation required 
about how the claims about pleasure relate to the claims about pain. In what follows, I will 
consider whether a shared explanation can be provided for why pleasure is good and pain 
is bad. 
V Symmetry’s Discontents 
The intuition that pleasure and pain are related to value in similar (or opposite) ways is 
deeply entrenched. However, there is also a tradition of questioning this relationship. Nu-
merous philosophers, including Popper (1950), Hurka (2011), Mayerfeld (1999), Benatar 
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(2008) and Shriver (2014a, 2014b) have questioned, in various ways, whether pleasure and 
pain are symmetrically related to well-being or goodness. Many of these accounts have 
used intuitions about thought experiments to undermine the view that pleasures and pains 
can be treated similarly. In the sections that follow, I proceed with a different methodology; 
examining what we know about the science of pleasure and pain and attempting to build a 
theory about the value of pleasure and pain from the ground up rather than working back-
wards from intuitions. 
VI Is There a “Common Currency” of Value Shared 
by Pleasure and Pain? 
It has been suggested that the types of things we call “pleasure” are so dissimilar from one 
another that it is implausible to suggest that they are the same type of thing. In particular, 
Mill famously suggested that no amount of lower pleasures could, by themselves, ever 
equal the value of a higher pleasure. On such a view, hedonism’s status as a monistic theory 
is jeopardized by consideration even of the differences between, say, the pleasure of eating 
strawberries and that of reading philosophy. But in a recent article, Roger Crisp and Morten 
Kringelbach appeal to evidence from the neurosciences to resist such a conclusion. They 
write the following: 
Consider… the bolt-on view, according to which experiences become pleasurable through the 
activation of a certain pleasure circuit, or certain circuits, common to all pleasurable 
experiences … Much of the neuroscientific evidence is of course not yet in, but at present the 
tenor of research suggests that the neural substrate of pleasure in quite different kinds of 
activity is quite similar … In other words, current neuroscience seems to favour the bolt-on 
thesis, and hence the denial, for the present at least, of the higher/lower thesis. (Crisp and 
Kringelbach 2018, 213-14) 
The gist of their argument is that there is a well-defined set of brain regions that are active 
during the experience of pleasure, and that these same regions are active across different 
types of experiences that have been described as heterogeneous by critics of hedonism. As 
such, the argument goes, the idea that there is a qualitative difference between higher and 
lower pleasures seems at odds with what we currently know about the brain. 
Can a similar argument be made in response to the suggestion that pleasure and pain do 
not have a common currency? As I’ve argued elsewhere in more detail (Shriver 2014b), the 
core brain regions involved in pleasure and the unpleasantness of pain appear to be distinct, 
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even if there are some brain regions active during both. One cannot point to activity in par-
ticular brain regions as evidence of a common currency of positive and negative experi-
ences. 
Moreover, there is no consistent relationship that has been found in psychology research 
between the value people assign pleasure and the value they assign pain. Of course, indi-
viduals at particular times trade off pleasures and pains in their decisions, but there is no 
clear ratio that holds across individuals or even within individuals across time. We have no 
evidence of a consistent internal valuation of the relationship between pain and pleasure. 
As such, there is no more evidence of a common currency existing between pleasure and 
pain than there is of that existing between pleasure and achievement; in both cases, the 
only thing we can say is that, when forced to choose between two options, we make a 
choice. As I will argue below, I think the problem lies in our inconsistent evaluation of pleas-
ure. 
The above evidence only provides a response to a potential argument for a common cur-
rency of pleasure and pain. Are there any positive arguments suggesting that pleasure and 
pain are in fact related to value in fundamentally different ways? I now turn to an argument 
along these lines. 
VII Pain and Pleasure Are Structurally Different 
Types of Experiences 
The standard story for experiencing pleasure is as follows: one has a desire and acts in order 
to fulfill that desire. If the desire is successfully fulfilled, pleasure ensues. In contrast, con-
sider the case of pain: one has the experience of pain and the desire to escape the pain 
simultaneously. When the aversive desire is fulfilled, the negative hedonic experience goes 
away. These are oversimplified descriptions, of course, but I believe represent the canonical 
instances of these cases. And I will argue that these differences in fact are indicative of im-
portant features of pleasure and pain. 
One complication with the above story about pleasure is now familiar to many philosophers. 
Kent Berridge, a psychologist at Michigan, has demonstrated that ‘wanting’ (or appetitive 
motivation) can be dissociated from ‘liking’ (or pleasure). Through direct interventions on 
the brain, Berridge and others were able to induce instances of liking a particular taste sen-
sation without wanting it, and instances of wanting without liking. Cases of addiction where 
addicts no longer get much pleasure from the drugs are also thought to be clear examples 
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where the ‘liking’ component has come apart from the motivation to pursue particular re-
wards. 
Can a similar story be told about pain? People given low doses of morphine, cancer patients 
who have undergone a procedure known as cingulotomy where the cingulate cortex is le-
sioned, and people with a rare condition known as pain asymbolia all report instances of 
feeling pains but not finding the pain unpleasant (Aydede 2005; Shriver 2006). Thus, there 
seems to be a dissociation between “having a pain” and “having an unpleasant sensation” 
that may initially seem to mirror the case of pleasure. 
However, this appearance of similarity is misleading. In typical cases of pleasure and pain, 
there are not just two relevant components of the phenomenon (the experience itself and 
the motivational signal), but actually three: the sensory components (SC) of the experience, 
the hedonic components (HC) of experience, and the motivational component (MC). In the 
case of getting a pleasurable shoulder massage, the sensory component would consist of 
details about the representation of touch in a particular location, the hedonic component 
would consist of the accompanying pleasure, and the motivational component would con-
sist of one’s desire for the experience to continue. In the case of a painful experience of 
stepping on a tack, the sensory component would consist of a representation of a puncture 
in a particular region of the body with a certain intensity of pain, the hedonic component 
would consist of the unpleasantness of that experience, and the motivational would consist 
of the urge to pull one’s foot away from the tack. 
With pleasure, evidence from the sciences has shown that all three components can be 
dissociated from one another. One can have a representation of rubbing on one’s shoulder 
(SC) without any pleasure (HC) and without any motivation for it to continue (MC). And, as 
was mentioned above, research has shown that the hedonic and motivational components 
can also be pulled apart from one another. In both humans and other mammals, certain 
brain states can result in motivation signals even without hedonic tone (‘wanting’ without 
liking’). Conversely, other states produce changes in hedonic tone without influencing mo-
tivational signals (thus influencing ‘liking’ but not ‘wanting’). As such, the sensory, motiva-
tional, and hedonic components of pleasure all appear to be separate from one another. 
In the case of pain, experiments have shown is that the sensory components of pain can be 
dissociated from its hedonic tone and from the desire to escape, but it has not been shown 
that unpleasantness of pain can be separated from the motivation to avoid the experience. 
In fact, there is good evidence that precisely the same processes involved in generating the 
unpleasantness are also crucial for the motivational component of pain. Administering mor-
phine to rats or lesioning their anterior cingulates in conditioned place preference tasks 
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produces similar dissociations as in humans: they still show pain behavior but no longer are 
motivated to escape the situation nor to avoid it in the future (LaGraize et al. 2004, 2006). 
Furthermore, glutamatergic activation of the anterior cingulate in rats can induce place 
avoidance even in the absence of noxious stimulation, while inhibiting activation in the an-
terior cingulate can block place avoidance even in the presence of noxious stimulation (Jo-
hansen and Fields 2004). Likewise, direct stimulation of the insula has produced pain sen-
sations (Ostrowsky et al. 2002), while patients with certain insula lesions are characterized 
by an indifference to potentially harmful stimuli (Grahek 2001). Thus, in the case of pain, 
unlike in that of pleasure, there is evidence that the key neuronal substrates of unpleasant-
ness are the same substrates that produce motivational signals. This evidence suggests that 
the feeling of unpleasantness cannot be separated from a motivating signal to avoid the 
experience (though this signal, of course, can be overridden by other, competing motiva-
tions) 
There’s also a good supporting evolutionary story that can be told about why pain and pleas-
ure have different relationships to motivation. In general, an organism failing to immedi-
ately respond to painful events in the environment can have catastrophic consequences 
including death. As such, it makes sense for the relationship between pain and motivation 
to have evolved to be direct and urgent. In contrast, failing to pursue pleasures can lead to 
disadvantages related to evolutionary fitness, but in general are not catastrophic. Thus, a 
contingent and weaker relationship between pleasure and motivation would be consistent 
with evolutionary fitness. 
So, to summarize, pleasure and pain are related to our motivation systems in importantly 
different ways. In particular, aversive motivation is intrinsically linked to the unpleasantness 
of pain, whereas appetitive motivation is only contingently linked to the pleasantness of 
pleasure, and can in some cases be separated from it altogether. This is consistent our eve-
ryday experiences where appetitive desire and pleasure often occur at separate times 
whereas the unpleasantness of pain is always accompanied by aversive desire. In the final 
sections, I explain why these differences undermine hedonism’s claims to the advantages 
of axiological monism. 
VIII Are Pleasure and Pain Comparable? 
Recall that one of the purported advantages of axiological monism over pluralism is that 
monism can account for the comparability of different values whereas pluralism may sug-
gest that certain values are incomparable. From the previous section, then, we may ask 
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whether pleasure and pain are comparable on a single scale of value. For example, we can 
ask whether avoiding a certain quantity of pain is equally valuable to experiencing some 
particular quantity of pleasure. 
I have already provided some hints as to why there are reasons to doubt that pleasure and 
pain are comparable in the right way. It is useful to consider the comparison of pain against 
pleasure with that of pleasures against other pleasures and pains against other pains. Recall 
the evidence for neural correlates of pleasure in the discussion of Crisp and Kringelbach. 
Not only does activation in particular brain regions track whether pleasure is present or not, 
it is correlated with the intensity of the pleasures involved. When comparing the pleasure 
of eating strawberries with that of hiking up a mountain, for example, we can in principle 
track the intensity of these different types of pleasure by looking at activation in these re-
gions and can compare the pleasures accordingly. 
Similarly in the case of pain, significant progress has been made in recent years in develop-
ing what has been called a “neural signature of pain.” At Colorado, Tor Wager’s group used 
a machine learning algorithm to develop a system that could use brain imaging data to pre-
dict, with 95% accuracy, not only whether a person was in pain but also how intense the 
pain is (2010). In other words, pain intensity, as well as pain unpleasantness, can be quan-
tified quite straightforwardly and can be used to compare the disvalue of different pains. 
However, when it comes to comparing the value of pleasure against the disvalue of pain, 
there is no similar measure we can use. As I noted previously, there’s no consistent tradeoff 
between pleasure and pain across individuals, or even within individuals across different 
times. Moreover, I believe the discussion of the previous section provides us with reasons 
for being skeptical that such a tradeoff function could ever be produced. The unpleasant-
ness of pain is directly related to motivational urges. However, the relationship between 
pleasure and motivation is only contingent, and turns out to be quite variable. As Mayerfeld 
suggested, and as was apparent in some of the other examples, it is possible to be indiffer-
ent to future pleasures. The full story about the relationship between reward, desire, and 
pleasure is more complicated than I have described here,1 but the upshot of the previous 
discussion is that different people can and do assign different value to pleasure. As such, 
there is reason to be skeptical that it is possible to trade pleasures for pains across individ-
uals in a principled manner since different people will care about pleasure to different de-
grees. 
 
1 See Schroeder 2004 for a helpful overview. 
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Without the ability to “trade off” pleasure and pain, the explanatory advantages of hedon-
ism are lost. We might believe that pleasure is the good, pain is the bad, and know all of the 
facts of how much pleasure and pain will be produced by a given decision between choice 
X and choice Y, but if we don’t know how pain and pleasure can be traded against one an-
other we will be unable to know which outcome is preferable. As such, the theoretical ad-
vantages of comparability seem lost.  
IX Is There a Shared Explanation for the Goodness of 
Pleasure and the Badness of Pain? 
Given that pleasure and pain evolved to solve separate problems, have dramatically differ-
ent influences on our behavior, and are structurally related to our brain’s capacity to value 
and our perceived valuations in fundamentally different ways, I answer “no” to this section’s 
title question. 
The comparability advantage of monism and the explanatory advantage have been pre-
sented as separate from one another. However, as we saw in Heathwood’s discussion of 
the hypothetical view that pleasure and achievement are good, these two advantages are 
in fact inextricably linked. The explanation for why a given state is good or bad is what allows 
us to sort the different types of value in the world. If there is only one explanation of what 
makes something valuable, then there is only one type of value. If, on the other hand, we 
require different explanations for why pleasure and achievement are valuable, and we think 
they are both valuable, then we are forced to adopt a pluralist position. 
However, part of explaining which states provide value is involves giving us some idea of 
how to measure the given level of value. Saying that pleasure is the good implies that more 
pleasure adds more goodness. Saying that pain is bad implies that more pain adds more 
badness. But stating that pleasure is good and pain is bad, without providing some idea of 
how they can be traded off against one another, does not provide a full story about how 
experience contributes to the value of the world. As such, I suggest that there is no more 
reason to suppose that there is a shared explanation for how pleasure and pain are related 
to value and disvalue then there is reason to think that a common explanation can be pro-




The upshot of my argument is as follows: first, the badness of pain and the goodness of 
pleasure do not share a similar explanation, since the unpleasantness of pain cannot be 
dissociated from a motivational urge to avoid the pain, whereas the pleasantness of pleas-
ure can and does come apart from the desire for the relevant experiences. Second: there is 
no reliable way of trading pleasures for pains between individuals, as the value of pleasure 
assigned by individuals varies more dramatically than the disvalue assigned to pains. As 
such, I argue that hedonism does not retain the advantages of axiological monism. This does 
not mean that hedonism is an incorrect account of value, but it does suggest that additional 
work is required in order to explain how positive and negative experiences are related to 
one another. 
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Neurofeedback-Based Moral Enhancement 
and Moral Reason 
Koji Tachibana, Kumamoto University, Japan 
Abstract 
Some neuroethicists criticize the very possibility of moral bioenhancement techniques because a moral state ac-
quired through bioenhancement techniques is not actually moral; such a state is neither reached through moral 
reasoning nor accompanied by moral reason. I will examine this criticism and argue that neurofeedback-based 
moral enhancements can overcome the criticism. Neurofeedback-based moral enhancements may not directly 
endow individuals with moral reasons, but it can do so indirectly. Furthermore, even if these enhancements cannot 
occur even indirectly, this device can be a tool for moral education because a person need not provide a moral 
reason to be/become legitimately moral. Therefore, neurofeedback-based moral enhancements can be acceptable 
tools for moral education, even if they do not enhance any moral reason or reasoning. 
I A Critique of Moral Bioenhancement in General 
The possibility of moral bioenhancements has been subject to criticism on the grounds that 
any proposed bioenhancement technique cannot be called moral because it cannot endow 
individuals with moral reasons. For example, John Shook and James Giordano (2016, 118–
19) write that 
a subject can produce different moral judgments without anyone, including experimenters, 
understanding which components of moral cognition have been adjusted and why those 
adjustments caused differing moral judgments. Subjects would be unable to say why they 
think differently about moral matters, even in the ordinary terms of folk moral psychology 
[...]. There is no promise that the subject will introspectively grasp why.  
Similarly, John Harris (2016, 270) rejects the possibility of moral bioenhancements, claiming 
that 
morality was basically a matter of choosing what is for the best all things considered, not 
simply being well motivated or pro-social; in short that to be good is not simply happening to 
do no evil but choosing for a reason, choosing on the basis of evidence and argument, not to 
do wrong. 
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This criticism is comprised of the following two-fold assumption. First, moral facts contrast 
with moral reasons—i.e., moral facts concern the fact that a particular emotion, judgment, 
or behavior is morally appropriate in a certain situation, whereas moral reasons concern 
the understanding why such a particular emotion, judgment, or behavior is morally appro-
priate in the situation. Second, morality must contain moral reasons as well as moral facts—
i.e., for a person’s emotion/judgment/behavior to be moral, it must be based on his/her 
own moral reasoning or moral reason(s). Variations on those assumptions can be observed 
widely in the history of moral philosophy. For example, when distinguishing between Legal-
ität (legality) and Moralität (morality), Immanuel Kant (1788) states that a moral behavior 
must be something that not merely corresponds with what to do but also derives from the 
respect for moral law or from duty to the behavior—the Kantian notion of moral reason. 
Another example can be found in Aristotle (1998), who says that one can conduct a right 
behavior based on a wrong reason/reasoning; accordingly, virtue requires ho orthos logos 
(a right reason/reasoning). Even though traditional moral philosophers have not reached an 
agreement on what kind of reason is moral, they seem to agree that moral facts are differ-
ent from moral reasons and that morality requires moral reasons. (However, in the later 
sections, I will refine the view on Aristotle's notion of moral reason.) 
The internal link between morality and moral reason can imply the deservingness of moral 
education. For an educational practice to deserve to be called moral education, it must en-
dow individuals with moral reasons or the skill of moral reasoning: even if a practice teaches 
them moral facts, it does not deserve to be called moral education if they cannot come to 
understand the reasons for the moral facts. Hence, inflicting corporal punishment on chil-
dren to enforce moral behaviors is not a moral education because such behaviors are the 
result of fear rather than of moral reasons. Since this implication applies not only to tradi-
tional teaching methods and aids but also to novel techniques (e.g., moral bioenhance-
ments), proposed moral bioenhancement techniques, such as pharmaceuticals or surgical 
operations, do not deserve to be called moral enhancement nor the tools for moral educa-
tion if the techniques do not endow individuals with moral reasons.  
Three options are available to rebut such a criticism. The first option is to claim that moral 
bioenhancement techniques can directly endow individuals with moral reasons, as some 
claim (see, e.g., Kabasenche 2016; Persson and Savulescu 2016). This claim can only be ver-
ified with evidence showing that a moral bioenhancement technique does endow individu-
als with moral reasons. This is purely an empirical issue and not supported at present be-
cause such a technique has yet to be realized. The second option is to claim that a proposed 
moral bioenhancement technique can be an authentic tool for moral education, arguing 
that such a technique can indirectly endow individuals with moral reasons. This option com-
prises several types of arguments, two of which I propose in Sections II and III of this paper. 
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The third option goes further and argues that a proposed moral bioenhancement technique 
can be a tool for moral education even if it cannot endow individuals with moral reasons 
even indirecty. I consider this option in Section IV of this paper. 
II Activating Moral Reasons by Overcoming the 
Weakness of the Will 
The first argument for authentic moral education through bioenhancements concerns the 
cases of the weakness of the will, in which a participant understands a relevant moral fact 
and even has a reason to act in accordance with that fact but cannot activate it due to the 
weakness of his/her will. Imagine a case in which a wife confronts her husband for his cru-
elty. He berates her whenever she does not complete the housework on her own, and he 
scolds their seven-year-old son whenever the latter does live up to his fatherly expectations. 
These conflicts make the husband/father worry that his family is becoming dysfunctional, 
and he knows that his wife and son do their best and that he should help them, but he never 
supports his son or helps his wife with the housework. Thus, he knows what to do and why. 
He wishes he were more sympathetic with his son and wife, wanting to help them more, 
but he cannot stop seeing them as weak when they fail to achieve his desired results. 
In this case, the husband/father understands the moral fact as well as the moral reason, but 
he lacks the will to activate that reason. To change himself, he may visit a clinic where a 
doctor prescribes oxytocin. As oxytocin is expected to enhance a patient’s tenderness, a 
constant absorption of this pharmaceutical could make him sympathize more with his wife 
and son (see Churchland 2011, ch. 3–4). He may also visit a “cosmetic and ethical neurosur-
gery” and receive a course on neurofeedback-based training to enhance his tenderness (see 
Moll et al. 2014) or to cognitively reappraise his cruelty (see Sarkheil et al. 2015). After a 
few weeks of training, he could successfully sympathize with others more than ever. 
Whatever the method he adopts, pharmacological or neurofeedback-based bioenhance-
ments, he would become more kind to his family, putting his supportive behavior into prac-
tice. Enhancing his sympathy for others, he uses such moral bioenhancement techniques to 
activate his moral reasons that leads to moral behaviors. He can also explain his helpfulness 
to his family by saying “because you are in a jam” in its true sense. This means that these 
techniques can endow individuals with a moral reason to act in the sense that a person can 
activate a reason that he/she already understands as morally right but could not previously 
practice due to the lack of related emotions that trigger the behavior the reason justifies. 
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III Endowing Moral Reasons through Existing 
Education Networks 
The second argument accepts the criticism that a proposed moral bioenhancement tech-
nique might not, in itself, be able to endow individuals with moral reasons in any sense. 
Although it can endow them with moral facts, this argument claims that those who acquire 
moral facts can also acquire moral reasons with the aid of teaching practices. For example, 
Glannon (2015, 1261) alluded to this:  
it is doubtful that pharmacological modification of our cognitive and affective capacities alone 
would make us more responsive to moral reasons when acting. [...] Yet the right type of 
education could complement psychopharmacology in making us more responsive to the 
interests of those who exist now and those who will exist in the future. The social environment 
also influences brain function and provides cues that prompt us to act in different ways. Moral 
enhancement would thus require a full complement of education, environmental 
modification, and psychopharmacological intervention. 
As Glannon expects, the traditional moral education network, including schools, churches, 
and local communities, are able to play the role of endowing individuals with moral reasons 
by teaching why a particular emotion or motivation is morally appropriate in a certain situ-
ation. 
However, the pharmacological moral enhancements that Glannon (2015) had in mind do 
not seem to be a good option because they have at least three defects as tools for moral 
education. First, chemical intervention, to an extent, is invasive to the human mind and 
body. Such invasiveness would not fit with the ideal of current educational standards due 
to the norm that morality must be educated through noninvasive and voluntary changes. 
Second, pharmaceuticals are a sort of automatic chemical modification. Such a modification 
is not compatible with social norms, including the value of effort and authenticity; we as-
sume that one’s authentic moral performance must be acquired through his/her own ef-
forts. Third, pharmacological moral enhancements do not contribute to moral diversity be-
cause they are not varied enough to meet our moral complexity. Rather, they tend to be 
limited to popular effects, such as sociability and cheerfulness. In short, pharmacological 
moral enhancements can threaten moral diversity and promote moral uniformity. 
Neurofeedback-based moral enhancements can avoid these problems because they have 
unique features, including noninvasiveness, the requirement of a participant’s effort, and 
flexibility in targeted moral faculties (Collura 2014). By virtue of these features, neurofeed-
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back-based moral enhancements can save morality and, accordingly, harmonize with exist-
ing moral education networks, being part of such networks (Tachibana 2017, 2018). It can 
also lead its participants to use other teaching methods for endowing them with moral rea-
sons because those who have learned moral facts through neurofeedback-based training 
will become more open to the opportunities to learn the reasons. Then, other teaching 
methods in the network, such as instructions from school-teachers or parents, can more 
easily lead subjects to understand moral reasons. Therefore, being part of the educational 
network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancements can, in itself, only indirectly and se-
quentially endow a subject with moral reasons. It is indirect because it needs to work in 
tandem with other teaching methods. It is also sequential because moral reasons are only 
learnt after the subject is endowed with moral facts. 
This sequence would not deprive neurofeedback-based moral enhancements of the title of 
moral education because, as is typical in upbringing and religious education, it often hap-
pens that a learner who does not understand the reason for a moral fact at first comes to 
understand the reason later by following orders or a doctrine. Because upbringing and reli-
gious education require time and experience to endow the subject with an understanding 
of moral reasons, it does not deprive him/her of authentic education; nor do neurofeed-
back-based moral enhancements. The indirectness is also acceptable, as Aristotle (1998, I4, 
1095b7) discerned when he compared “fact (to hoti)” with “reason (to dioti)”. For Aristote-
lian virtue ethics, we should learn the fact first through habituation or repetition of morally 
right behaviors; we then gradually understand the reason for the fact through teaching—
teaching here means a sort of lecture on ethics, such as “Aristotle’s lectures” (Burnyeat 
1980, 71–72).  
In the case of neurofeedback training, a trained person comes to understand firstly moral 
facts—feeling/recognizing/behaving in a certain way—without fully understanding the rea-
son why that particular feeling/cognition/behavior is morally desirable. However, he/she 
comes to understand the reason gradually through his/her everyday experiences and other 
teaching methods. Such experiences and methods fine-tune what was learned through the 
neurofeedback training to fit into actual social environments inasmuch as principles of up-
bringing or tenets of religion have been fine-tuned through actual social environments. 
Therefore, working as part of a traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based 
moral enhancements can endow individuals with moral reasons in an indirect but legitimate 
way. 
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IV Morality without Moral Reasons 
The third option doubts the very assumption that morality requires moral reasons. This op-
tion comprises at least three arguments. First, we can legitimately be moral even if we have 
moral facts without moral reasons for the facts. This argument can be seen in Hesiod’s 
words, as quoted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (I4, 1095b10–13 [Aristotle 1998, 6]): 
Far best is he who knows all things himself;  
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; 
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart 
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight. 
A person who listens to and remembers a virtuous person’s rational advice is said to be 
“good (esthlos)” though not “far best (panaristos).” Furthermore, just before this quote, 
Aristotle even declares that such a good person “will not need the reason as well” (NE I4, 
1095b6–7 [Aristotle 1998, 4–5]). Therefore, as Burnyeat (1980, 71) puts it, “Aristotle quotes 
the Hesiodic verses in all seriousness.” This quote does not deny that those who have moral 
reasons as well as moral facts are morally desirable. However, it also admits the latter are 
still legitimately moral. Consequently, an educational practice that can teach moral fact, but 
not moral reasons, is also a legitimately moral education. Following Aristotle’s notion of 
morality (and presumably also some sort of consequentialism at least), having moral rea-
sons is not a necessary condition for a person to be morally good. 
Second, emotions, also, can play the role of moral reasons. A German notion, Mitleid—an 
approximate English translation is “compassion”—which Schopenhauer (1819) formulates 
as the only basis of human morality, is a typical case; a behavior based on Mitleid is said to 
be morally good in all things. Sympathy is another example. As is typical in cases of eutha-
nasia or dying with dignity, the fact that a person suffering from a severe disease can arouse 
sympathy enough to give a moral reason to kill the person, whereas the fact that sunlight is 
blinding does not arouse any emotion which legitimately give a moral reason to kill a man 
(Camus 1942). In general, some emotions, such as compassion and sympathy, can thus be 
reasons for moral action. 
Third, moral facts do not necessarily require knowledge of moral reasons if correctly used. 
Imagine two cases in which students acquire theoretical knowledge without understanding 
the reasons for that knowledge. In one case, a student correctly writes the atomic symbol 
“He” next to “H” on a short examination about the periodic table of elements because he 
remembers a mnemonic device such as a pun; in the other case, a student mechanically, 
routinely, and correctly applies a formula, such as Pythagorean Theorem, to a question on 
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a mathematics test. If they were asked to explain why their answers were correct, they 
could say no more than “because a pun song says He is next to H” or “because I applied 
Pythagorean Theorem.” In these cases, the mnemonic device and the formula work as a 
black box that does not provide the reasons but conclude the correct answers in an accepta-
ble way. This suggests that theoretical knowledge can, to some extent, be approved to be 
legitimate without giving a reason for that knowledge. 
The same logic applies to the case of sociomoral knowledge. If you are invited to a house 
party that starts 6:00 p.m., your chosen time to arrive is culturally dependent. Supposedly, 
6:05 p.m. would be a correct time of arrival in the U.S., whereas in Japan, 5:55 p.m. would 
be correct. Table manners are another example: slurping pasta is ill-mannered in one cul-
ture, whereas eating pasta quietly can be relatively ill-mannered in another culture (e.g., 
soba noodles in Japan). In both cases, we have difficulty in explaining the reason why a 
certain manner is right (or wrong) in a given culture because understanding such reasons 
requires a broad  and complicated knowledge of cultures, religions, histories, and so on. 
However, the lack of understanding the reasons does not deny that we know what to do 
morally in each social situation. In this sense, sociomoral knowledge is exempt from provid-
ing reasons to some extent. It can lead to a radical form of the exemption—namely, to the 
point where we cannot give any better explanation than “that is what I/we do.” As Wittgen-
stein (1958, §217) puts it, we reach the “bedrock”. 
These three arguments suggest that we should doubt the assumption that morality requires 
moral reasons. If giving a reason is not a necessary condition for being/becoming moral, 
neurofeedback-based moral enhancements can be a tool for moral education.  
V Conclusion 
The possibility of moral bioenhancements has been subject to various criticisms. However, 
the criticism on the grounds that any proposed bioenhancement technique cannot endow 
individuals with moral reasons will be rejected for two reasons. First, neurofeedback-based 
training will be able to endow individuals with moral reasons in indirect ways. Second, this 
training can be a tool for moral education even if it cannot endow them with such reasons 
in any sense, because bestowing moral reasons is not a necessary condition for a proposed 
moral education to be a legitimate teaching method. These two reasons that this paper has 
sketched entitles neurofeedback-based moral enhancement to be a legitimate tool for cul-
tivating human's morality. 
Neurofeedback-Based Moral Enhancement and Moral Reason  
290 
References 
[1] Aristotle. 1998. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross. Revised by J. L. Ackrill 
and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[2] Burnyeat, M. 1980. “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good.” In Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 
edited by A. O. Rorty, 69–92, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
[3] Camus, A. 1942. L’Étranger. Paris: Gallimard. 
[4] Churchland, S. 2011. Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
[5] Collura, T. F. 2014. Technical Foundations of Neurofeedback. New York: Routledge. 
[6] Glannon, W. 2015. “Reflections on Neuroenhancement.” In Handbook of Neuroethics, 
edited by J. Clausen and N. Levy, 1251–65. New York: Springer. 
[7] Harris, J. 2016. “Moral Blindness—The Gift of the God Machine.” Neuroethics 9: 269–
73. 
[8] Kabasenche, W. 2016. “Moral Formation and Moral Enhancement.” AJOB Neuroscience 
7 (2): 130–31. 
[9] Kant, I. 1788. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Riga: J. F. Hartknoch.  
[10] Moll, J., J. H. Weingartner, Bado, R. Basilio, J. R. Sato, B. R. Melo, I. E. Bramati, R. de 
Oliveira-Souza, and R. Zahn. 2014. “Voluntary Enhancement of Neural Signatures of 
Affiliative Emotion Using fMRI Neurofeedback.” PLOS ONE 9 (5): e97343. 
[11] Persson, I., and J. Savulescu. 2016. “Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.” 
Neuroethics 9: 263–68. 
[12] Sarkheil, R., A. Zilverstand, N. Kilian-Hütten, F. Schneider, R. Goebel, and K. Mathiak. 
2015. “fMRI Feedback Enhances Emotion Regulations Evidenced by a Reduced 
Amygdala Response.” Behavioral Brain Research 281: 326–32. 
[13] Schopenhauer, A. 1819. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 
[14] Shook, J., and J. Giordano. 2016. “Moral Enhancement? Acknowledging Limitations of 
Neurotechnology and Morality.” AJOB Neuroscience 7 (2): 118–20. 
[15] Tachibana, K. 2017. “Neurofeedback-Based Moral Enhancement and the Notion of 
Morality.” Annals of the University of Bucharest: Philosophy Series 66 (2): 25–41. 
Conclusion 
291 
[16] _____. 2018. “Neurofeedback-Based Moral Enhancement and Traditional Moral 
Education.” Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (33): 19–42. 




Creating an Obligation: Bentham and the 
Normative Question 
Piero Tarantino, Sciences Po Law School Paris, France 
Abstract 
An unrecognized and unexplored development in the history of thought is the linguistic account of the normative 
character of standards of behaviour, practical norms, moral values, legal rules and religious principles provided by 
Jeremy Bentham. A recent and substantial attempt to fill this historical and theoretical gap is my research mono-
graph Philosophy, Obligation and the Law: Bentham’s Ontology of Normativity (2018), which offers a comprehen-
sive investigation into Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities, and – in particular – examines its application 
to the fields of morality and law. After providing a short account of the debate devoted to the presentation and 
discussion of Philosophy, Obligation and the Law: Bentham’s Ontology of Normativity, during the ISUS Conference 
2018 in Karlsruhe, the present paper aims to give a general overview of the book. In the first part, I will try to throw 
light on the Bentham’s contribution to the so-called normative question; I will then explain the methodology I 
adopted and, in connection with this, outline the structure and the content of the book; finally, I will focus on 
certain crucial aspects of my reconstruction and interpretation of Bentham’s view of the ontology underlying the 
normative realm. 
Introduction 
An unrecognized and unexplored development in the history of thought is the linguistic ac-
count of the normative character of standards of behaviour, practical norms, moral values, 
legal rules and religious principles provided by Jeremy Bentham. A recent and substantial 
attempt to fill this historical and theoretical gap is my research monograph Philosophy, Ob-
ligation and the Law: Bentham’s Ontology of Normativity (2018), which offers a compre-
hensive investigation into Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities, and – in particular 
– examines its application to the fields of morality and law.1 
The International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS) Conference 2018 in Karlsruhe was the 
ideal place in which to give the first official presentation of Philosophy, Obligation and the 
Law: Bentham’s Ontology of Normativity. The debate on this book served to draw attention 
to the normative aspects and implications of Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities 
from an interdisciplinary point of view. It was an occasion that brought together leading 
Bentham scholars who are specialists in different fields, more specifically philosophy, law, 
 
1 For more information about the book, please visit https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-Obligation-and-the-
Law-Benthams-Ontology-of-Normativity/Tarantino/p/book /9781138496576. 
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history, political science and English studies: (in alphabetical order) Malik Bozzo-Rey, Em-
manuelle De Champs, Gianfranco Pellegrino and Philip Schofield. This debate was of interest 
not only to those studying Bentham’s thought, but also to those wishing to understand the 
historical roots of the contemporary normative question as an investigation into the action-
guiding claim of the practical domain. 
Each speaker dealt with one of the four interrelated aspects, examined in my book, of Ben-
tham’s theory of real and fictitious entities: ontology, epistemology, normativity and moti-
vation: Schofield focused on the place of logic and language in the future direction of Ben-
tham studies; De Champs reconstructed the historical sources of Bentham’s theory of real 
and fictitious entities; Bozzo-Rey explored the function of norms and obligations in Ben-
tham’s theory of law; Pellegrino compared Bentham’s view of fictitious entities with the 
metaethical framework of contemporary fictionalism. 
After providing a short account of the debate devoted to the presentation and discussion 
of Philosophy, Obligation and the Law, during the ISUS Conference 2018 in Karlsruhe, the 
present paper aims to give a general overview of the book. In the first part, I will try to throw 
light on the Bentham’s contribution to the so-called normative question; I will then outline 
the structure and the content of the book; finally, I will focus on certain crucial aspects of 
my reconstruction and interpretation of Bentham’s view of the ontology underlying the nor-
mative realm. This paper makes continuous reference to Philosophy, Obligation and the 
Law, by summarizing its main topics, which are examined at length in the book. 
I Bentham and the Normative Question 
Bentham’s thought is in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British moral tradition, 
namely the philosophical context from which the current normative question, in the sense 
of an investigation of the foundations of practical reality, arose. In morality, law and religion, 
norms, rules, values and virtues do not merely express a belief about an action, but they 
recommend its approval and adoption. In this sense, practical notions entail an obligation, 
inasmuch as they exercise the prerogative to make a claim on their subjects’ conduct in 
order to influence it. Their normativity consists in this prerogative, namely in this guidance 
claim, having a binding force. 
The notion of obligation is at the heart of the concept of normativity. The understanding of 
the claim that an obligation makes on us to obtain compliance is the objective of the nor-
mative question. It requires the enlightenment of the roots of practical disciplines such as 
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morality, law and religion. It is important to clarify why moral, legal and religious rules have 
an action-guiding authority, thereby uncovering what endows them with a normative fea-
ture. The ultimate purpose of the normative question, therefore, is to explain and justify 
the claim of morality, law and religion to direct the agent’s behaviour. 
Bentham was deeply influenced by the view of an empirical basis of morality. Yet he recon-
ciled that sensory approach with the idea of the linguistic construction of ethical elements. 
Bentham understood the concept of obligation as a fictitious entity, i.e. a name, created by 
the human mind in relation to the feelings of pleasure and pain, which are regarded as real 
entities. The desire to enjoy pleasure and avert pain makes binding the action instrumental 
in fulfilling that desire. Obligation is thus the result of harmonious cooperation between 
sensibility and intellectual activity, including particularly the faculties of language and imag-
ination. 
The fictitious notion of obligation has meaning and truth only if it is referred to pleasure 
and pain: they are the pillars on which the human mind builds the practical domain. The 
binding and motivating force of an obligation, in which its character consists, springs from 
pleasure and pain, which are individually perceived. So, the investigation of the nature of 
an obligation is joined to an investigation of its normative foundations. The ontological and 
normative – as well as the epistemological and motivational – features of an obligation de-
pend on pleasure and pain. From these empirical roots the human mind can create a ficti-
tious ontology endowed with normativity. Ethical elements turn out to be human artefacts, 
anchored to physical reality: they can make a guidance claim on us by virtue of their consti-
tutive relation with pleasure and pain, which have the form of reward or punishment. 
Although fictitious, an obligation purports to direct human behaviour. Bentham’s ontology 
of the practical world, which is based on the distinction between real and fictitious entities, 
needs to be scrutinized in its normative and motivational facets. Bentham’s account of eth-
ics is intertwined with his theory of real and fictitious entities; consequently, his linguistic 
approach to ontology provides the key to interpreting his view on the constitution of mo-
rality and law. Moral and legal elements are fictitious entities, that is, experience-based 
products of the human mind, whose operations have to be identified and analysed in order 
to uncover the intimate nature of morality and law and their function in regulating human 
action. When conceiving of an obligation as a fictitious entity, one needs to explain how it 
can influence an agent’s conduct by obtaining his/her compliance. Dealing with such issues 
requires first a reconstruction of Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities and then 
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the examination of its application to the ethical field, in order to clarify the ability of morality 
and law to provide people with reasons for action.2 
II The Structure of the Book 
By focusing on the concept of obligation, Philosophy, Obligation and the Law explores Ben-
tham’s ontological and linguistic view, and aims to identify the specific features of ethical 
fictitious entities. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part I examine the ontolog-
ical and epistemological foundations of Bentham’s distinction between real and fictitious 
entities, whose interrelations provide the framework of the natural world and the ethical 
world, as they are represented by human beings. In the second part I seek to throw light on 
both the normative and motivational aspects of moral and legal notions, including an obli-
gation, according to Bentham.  
In pursuit of these aims, I focus on logic, theory of language, physics, metaphysics, 
metaethics, axiology, the doctrine of virtue, the freedom of the will, the structure of practi-
cal reasoning and action with reference to the law. Despite its richness and complexity, 
Bentham’s treatment of these topics is much neglected in philosophical literature. Only few 
scholarly works tackle it and most of these are not recent. Nevertheless it is important to 
show the centrality of these issues to Bentham’s legal reform. 
Understanding, from Bentham’s perspective, what an obligation is and how human beings 
become aware of it brings us to an investigation into the general nature of a fictitious entity. 
Only by throwing light on the framework of the human representation of the world, basi-
cally articulated according to the connection between real and fictitious entities, can the 
ontological and the epistemological character of the notion of obligation be identified and, 
consequently, the structure of ethics disclosed. Obligation is, in fact, the constitutive ingre-
dient of practical reality as a whole, characterizing with its normative force each single com-
ponent. Along with obligation, on which our present focus lies, practical concepts such as 
virtues, values, standards of behaviour and norms have a guidance function. They make a 
normative claim on us, which needs to be explored in the light of the distinction between 
real and fictitious entities. 
 
2 Cf. Tarantino 2018, 1-9, in which the relation between Bentham’s philosophy and the normative question is fully 
explained. 
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My work is committed to exploring Bentham’s ontology and theory of language with the 
purpose of identifying the general features that ethical fictitious entities, including obliga-
tion, share with other kinds of fictitious entities, and then of bringing out the particular 
aspects which distinguish the ethical domain. In this way, it is possible to trace, in Bentham’s 
philosophy, a path that guides us from the comprehensive definition of a fictitious entity, 
with reference to its relation to a real entity, to the characterization of its ethical specifica-
tions and, finally, to the grasping of the normative function of an obligation, which is the 
core element in the constitution of the practical sphere (Tarantino 2018, 11-12). 
III The Content of the Book 
Bentham maintained a lifelong commitment to assessing the nature of various practical do-
mains such as morality, law and also religion. As their distinctive property, the elements 
making up practical domains are characterized by a linguistic ontology, which is endowed 
with normativity, that is, with the property to make claims on the agents’ behaviour to re-
quire obedience. In other words, concepts such as duty, goodness, rightness and virtue have 
a directive or guidance function, because they prescribe or recommend the performance of 
the act to which they refer.  
The normative claim essentially characterizes ethical standards; therefore, any investigation 
into their authoritative feature is an investigation into the foundations of ethics and the 
obligation entailed by them. The distinction between real and fictitious entities provides 
Bentham with the ontological and epistemological framework to outline the structure of 
normative domain, with special reference to its constitutive relation with human motiva-
tion, and then bring about the reform of morality and law.  
We can single out certain crucial points in my reconstruction and interpretation of Ben-
tham’s ontology of normativity: (a) the constructive function of language, (b) the fictitious 
framework of human knowledge, (c) the naturalistic foundations of the normative domain, 
(d) the instrumental connection between normativity and motivation. Let us re-examine 
these points in short, thereby exploring how they are related to the controversy on the 
status of normativity.3 
 
3 Cf. Tarantino 2018, 219-24 for an overview of the main topics of the book, which are outlined in this section of 
my paper. 
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III.a The Constructive Function of Language 
Terms such as motion, quality, relation, cause, virtue, goodness, obligation, right and power 
represent mere artefacts characterized by a linguistic form of existence, as they are names 
produced by the activity of the human mind carried out on perceptual elements. On the 
other hand, real entities are names denoting empirical objects, whose existence lies in hu-
man perception. Bentham stresses the linguistic nature of real and fictitious entities which 
are, precisely speaking, names of real entities and names of fictitious entities included in a 
sentence on which their meaning depends. Real and fictitious entities, along with their re-
lations, are resolved in language which accounts for them as nouns. 
In Bentham’s philosophy then, language has an ontological and epistemological function, 
since it contributes to our representation and construction of the world. Our imagining of 
the external world is shaped by language which plays a performative role, by providing a 
form of existence, though fictitious, to the framework of the natural and the practical 
realms. This linguistic ontology, depending on the creative power of the human mind, is 
complementary to and interrelated with the empirical ontology captured by sense-percep-
tions and consisting in impressions and ideas. Bentham emphasizes the existence-confer-
ring ability of language, which enables human beings to consistently structure their 
knowledge and coordinate their behaviour in society (Tarantino 2018, 220-21). 
III.b The Fictitious Framework of Human Knowledge 
Bentham questioned the ontological and epistemological nature of the elements making up 
the mathematical, the physical, the moral, the legal and the religious domains of 
knowledge. In particular, he challenged the effective correspondence of beliefs and state-
ments to an alleged external reality, on which the idea of truth resides, thereby assuming 
that the human mind has through language autonomous constructive ability in conceiving 
of the world. 
Fictitious objects are contrivances with a theoretical and a practical function. From a theo-
retical standpoint, they are instrumental in our image of the world, giving an order to per-
ceptions and making sense of experience; consequently, our representation of it is the out-
come of an organizational process of the human mind. From a practical standpoint, fictitious 
objects make reasoning and decision possible, by orienting and directing people’s individual 
and collective behaviour. According to Bentham, the activity of the human mind consists in 
creating fictitious entities; without these entities knowledge and action, and more generally 
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social life, would be impossible. In other words, fictitious objects allow people to think, com-
municate and act. 
The relation between real and fictitious entities lies at the basis of Bentham’s account of 
the natural world and of the science of morality and law. It not only provides the basis for 
his political and legal reform, but also underpins the linguistic ontology characterizing the 
various fields of knowledge. Bentham’s approach to fictitious entities, thus, affords a critical 
point of view to rethink the constitution and the structure of the mathematical, the physical, 
the moral, the legal and the religious realms (Tarantino 2018, 220-21). 
III.c The Naturalistic Foundations of the Normative Domain 
The relation that a fictitious entity maintains with its empirical source, identified as a real 
entity, is constitutive of its import and truth. Divorced from reality, a fictitious entity is noth-
ing but falsehood and nonsense. Paraphrasis, as a linguistic method to disentangle the ob-
scurities and ambiguities of fictitious entities, reveals the empirical foundations on which 
the construction of the practical realm resides. So the fictitious phrase An obligation is in-
cumbent on a man should be explained as Pain is incumbent on a man if he does not act in 
compliance with an obligation. Pain then is causative of an obligation, that is, of the binding 
power in which it consists.  
Bentham conceives of values, duties, virtues and standards of behaviour as fictitious enti-
ties, namely as linguistic elements, whose import and truth depend on the empirical per-
ceptions of pain and pleasure, which are real entities. Ethical standards turn out to be hu-
man artefacts, related to perceptions; more precisely, their guidance claim on us lies in the 
constitutive relation ethical standards have with pain or pleasure. Indeed, pain and pleasure 
are the foundations of the ethical domain and of its peculiar normative claim. 
Normativity, as the distinctive property of the ethical area, consists in the ability to provide 
an agent with reasons for action. From Bentham’s perspective, a reason for action is nor-
mative inasmuch as it is based on pain or pleasure. Values, virtues, norms, commands and 
standards of behaviour purport to direct an agent if they are connected with pain or pleas-
ure; their normative, that is, their action-guiding prerogative derives from these percep-
tions. In Bentham’s view normativity has naturalistic foundations which, though external to 
the agent, rely on his/her psychological structure: his/her desire to enjoy or maximize pleas-
ure and his/her desire to avoid or minimize pain direct and guide the agent to choose the 
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course of action which leads him/her to the achievement of that pleasure or to the avoid-
ance of that pain.4 
IV The Instrumental Connection between 
Normativity and Motivation 
By putting forward his model of normativity, Bentham contributes to the shaping of the 
early modern idea of obligation as an internal requirement of a self-governing moral agent’s 
thinking. The creation of an obligation, along with the notions involving it, such as rights, 
values and virtues, depends on the ability of its issuing authority to arouse in the agent 
his/her desire to avoid punishment, deriving from disregarding that obligation, or his/her 
desire to gain praise, deriving from complying with that obligation. Punishment and praise 
are sanctions, consisting in pain or pleasure, which drive the agent to choose a course of 
action.  
The connection that an obligation has with motivation is crucial. In order to feel the pressure 
to conform his/her action to a standard of behaviour, a pressure in which the normative 
claim resides, an agent needs to perceive the pain and the pleasure related to that standard 
and, then, to be motivated to act from that perception. Ethical values provide the agent 
with guidance, by recommending him/her to behave in a certain way; their guidance func-
tion springs from the pain or pleasure that the conformity with these values is expected to 
bring forth. 
The agent’s sensibility to the pain and pleasure flowing from a sanction causes in the agent 
a motive for avoiding that pain and attaining that pleasure. This motive creates the obliga-
tion to adopt suitable means to that end. In Bentham’s outline of practical judgement, 
which is a form of instrumental rationality, desire generates requirements to act or to for-
bear from acting. The normative force of a sanction appears to be dependent on its moti-
vational power. Motivation has indeed a causative role in obligation and then action. Ac-
cording to Bentham’s principle of the determination of action, the agent constrains 
himself/herself to endorse a form of conduct when that form of conduct is instrumental in 
the achievement of his/her end. Put differently, an agent imposes on himself/herself a duty, 
compliance with which is aimed at the fulfilment of his/her interest. 
 
4 See Tarantino 2018, 221-22 and, for a full examination of Bentham’s method of paraphrasis applied to the notion 
of obligation, 98-104. 
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The relation between normativity and motivation, namely between duty and desire, is thus 
fundamental to understanding Bentham’s idea of ethics and of its decision- or action-guid-
ing claim. Something can bind an agent to adopt a certain behaviour inasmuch as this thing 
motivates the agent to behave accordingly. Motivation consists in the desire to achieve the 
pleasure or escape the pain stemming from the adoption of that behaviour. Therefore, one 
can say that desire makes an action binding. The agent’s volition and, thus, his/her behav-
iour is moved by his/her desire to avoid pain and to gain pleasure. As they are the motivat-
ing factors of deliberation and action, pain and pleasure can be considered the sources of 
normativity; in fact, obligation springs from desire for pleasure and aversion to pain. 
Bentham regards ethical entities and the normative phenomena characterizing them as re-
sulting from the agent’s motivation. Moral and legal obligation or, more generally, norma-
tivity is a linguistic creation based on the real entities of pain and pleasure, which excite 
individual motivation. The motivating aspect of pain and pleasure turns out to be the key to 
understanding Bentham’s ontology of normativity. 
An action is right and thus worthy to be performed inasmuch as it leads to pleasure or, at 
least, it entails the reduction of pain. The rightness of that action resides in its utility and 
this utility is measured by the agent himself/herself according to his/her receptiveness to a 
certain pleasure or a certain pain. Despite appearances, Bentham does not put forward a 
merely reductionist theory of normativity, according to which obligation depends on an ex-
ternal fact, i.e. a sanction. No doubt, it is true that sanction, as a source of pain or pleasure, 
is an objective event related, for example, to the compliance or non-compliance with a com-
mand prescribed by an authority. However, it is also true that the pain and the pleasure 
deriving from a sanction are subjective perceptions; in other words, pain and pleasure need 
to be felt by the agent so that they can make their normative claim. Bentham traces back 
normativity to the agent’s conative states, such as desires, interests, dispositions and 
wants.5 
V Conclusion 
Bentham rethinks this connection between normativity and motivation within a general fic-
titious context based on language. Bentham’s idea of obligation, as a fictitious construction 
 
5 See Tarantino 2018, 222-23 and, for an examination of the relation between obligation and sanction in terms of 
the relation between normativity and motivation, 199-210. 
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of the human mind depending on naturalistic foundations, is an original position in the de-
bates on normativity. By virtue of this, Bentham’s approach enables us to re-assess the 
premises of the normative question and to explore it from a new perspective. 
Bentham’s idea of the ontology of ethics as a linguistic creation of the human mind under-
pins his theory of normativity. The ethical domain, however, is not an arbitrary construction; 
this is the reason why Bentham levels his criticism against the deceptive use of fictitious 
entities which is aimed at the protection of the interests of the ruling few. On the contrary, 
ethics has a firm foundation in empirical reality or, more precisely, in the physiological and 
psychological constitution of human nature, which is naturally oriented to pursue happi-
ness, namely to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The empirical sources of the practical realm 
provide the guidelines for the legislator’s and judge’s decisions, so that they can achieve the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. (Tarantino 2018, 223) 
References 
Bentham’s Works 
[1] The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, general editors Burns J. (1961-79), Dinwiddy 
J. (1977-83), Rosen F. (1983-95), Rosen F. and Schofield P. (1995-2003), Schofield P. 
(2003-), London: The Athlone Press, 1968-81; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983- in 
progress. 
[2] De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions, texte anglais établi par Schofield P., 
traduction et commentaires par Cléro J.-P. et Laval C., Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997. 
[3] Bowring (abbr.): The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the Superintendence 
of his Executor, John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh: Tait, 1838-43. 
Studies 
[4] Bouveresse, J. 1993. “La théorie des fictions chez Bentham.” In Regards sur Bentham et 
l’utilitarisme, edited by K. Mulligan, and R. Roth, 87-98. Genève: Librairie Droz. 
[5] Bozzo-Rey, M. 2009. “Loi, fiction et logique dans la pensée juridique de Jeremy 
Bentham” Annales de Droit 3: 27-50. 
[6] _____. 2014. “Reducing the Limits of the Realm of Possibilities: Law, Action and Will in 
Jeremy Bentham’s Thought” in Tusseau: 338-57. 
Conclusion 
303 
[7] Cléro, J.-P. 1993. “La théorie des fictions chez Jeremy Bentham” Nouvelles de la 
République des Lettres 2: 47-71. 
[8] _____. 2000. “La valeur d’une théorie des fictions” Laval théologique et philosophique 
56: 439-61. 
[9] _____. 2014. Essai sur les fictions. Paris: Hermann. 
[10] Darwall, S. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640-1740. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
[11] De Champs, E. 1999. “The Place of Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Fictions in Eighteenth-
century Linguistic Thought” Journal of Bentham Studies 2: 1-28. 
[12] _____. 2015. Enlightenment and Utility: Bentham in French, Bentham in France. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[13] Haakonssen, K. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[14] Harrison, R. 1983. Bentham. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
[15] Hart, H. 1982. Essays on Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[16] Hume, L. 1981. Bentham and Bureaucracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[17] Jackson, B. 1998. “Bentham, truth and the semiotics of law” Current Legal Problems 51: 
493-531. 
[18] Kelly, 1990. Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[19] Korošec, G. 1994. “The Role of Fictions in Law: Hume, Adam Smith and Bentham” 
Filozofski Vestnik / Acta Philosophica 15: 151-68. 
[20] Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
[21] Laval, C. 1994. Jeremy Bentham. Le pouvoir des fictions. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France. 
[22] Ogden, C. 1932. Bentham’s Theory of Fictions. London: Kegan Paul. 
[23] Pellegrino, G. 2010. La fabbrica della felicità: Liberalismo, etica e psicologia in Jeremy 
Bentham. Napoli: Liguori. 
[24] Postema, G. 1983. “Facts, Fictions, and Law: Bentham on the Foundations of Evidence” 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 16: 37-64. 
Creating an Obligation: Bentham and the Normative Question  
304 
[25] _____. 1986. Bentham and the Common Law Tradition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[26] Raz, J. 1975/1990. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[27] Quinn, M. 2013. “Fuller on Legal Fiction: A Benthamic Perspective” International 
Journal of Law in Context 9: 466-84. 
[28] Rosen, F. 2003. Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. London: Routledge. 
[29] Schofield, 2006. Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[30] _____. 2009. Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. 
[31] Tarantino. 2018. Philosophy, Obligation and the Law: Bentham’s Ontology of 
Normativity. Abingdon/ Oxon/ New York: Routledge. 
[32] Tusseau, G. 2011. “Jeremy Bentham et les fictions du droit.” In L’imaginaire en droit, 
edited by G. Darcy, and M. Doat, 383-433. Bruxelles: Bruylant. 
[33] _____. 2011a. Jeremy Bentham: la guerre des mots. Paris: Dalloz. 
[34] _____, ed. 2014. The Legal Philosophy and Influence of Jeremy Bentham: Essays on “Of 
the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence”. London: Routledge. 
  
305 
Does Adam Smith’s Moral Theory Truly 
Diverge from Humean Utilitarianism? 
Hiroki Ueno, Hitotsubashi University, Japan 
Abstract 
In this paper, I argue that Adam Smith’s philosophical system is essentially dependent upon the principle of utility, 
and that the principle of justice should be regarded as being founded considerably on a utilitarian basis, in the 
same manner as ascribed to David Hume. This theoretical structure should, first of all, be detected in Smith’s moral 
theory, or ethics as the argument of human social/sociable nature. This view runs contrary to the majority of the 
literature on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which tends to emphasise that his moral argument should be inter-
preted as being in contrast with Hume’s utilitarian foundation of morality. This insertion and exaggeration of dif-
ferences between Hume and Smith is partly derived from the deontological interpretation of Smith’s moral theory, 
which usually confuses his explication of the moral motivation of the common people to do the right thing with 
the criterion for judging the social institution as a whole. The second purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that 
the relationship between public utility and justice that is latent within his ethics functions as the basis of his prac-
tical science of good policing, or political economy. Smith scrutinises the “invisible” mechanisms that enable each 
social action — referring solely to the natural sense of justice — to result in the most socially beneficial outcomes. 
And while he does emphasise that individual moral agents seldom regard the consequence of their specific actions 
upon wider society as a primary interest in their everyday life, this fact itself does not mean that there is no signif-
icant part played by the principle of utility within his theory; on the contrary, it has so essential a role that Smith is 
at pains to acknowledge the exceptional cases in which consideration of the public utility ought to take precedence 
over the common moral sense of justice. 
Introduction: The Exaggeration of Differences between 
Hume and Smith 
The first assertion of this paper is that Adam Smith substantially shares in what might be 
dubbed the ‘liberal utilitarian scheme’, among whose leading systematic formulators was 
David Hume. According to this theoretical framework, the liberal principle of justice is to be 
respected as much as possible, but could be regarded as subordinate to the principle of 
utility under certain special or exceptional circumstances. As such, particular attention will 
be paid to the implicit yet significant role of the “public utility” in Smith’s moral theory in 
order to illustrate what is fundamentally shared by these two Scottish Enlightenment fig-
ures. It must be acknowledged here that — though further investigation of the point lies 
beyond the scope of this paper — this notion of liberal utilitarianism nevertheless remains 
distinct from “Benthamite” utilitarianism. Hume’s scepticism regarding constructivism 
should be noted in this respect, despite often being attributed rather to Smith. This alone 
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signifies that Hume, in a similar manner to Smith, must be essentially differentiated from 
the particular type of utilitarian usually exemplified by Jeremy Bentham. While it is thus 
distinct from constructivist utilitarianism, however, Smith’s liberal moral theory, as well as 
Hume’s, should still be situated within another, separate utilitarian tradition of its own. 
I Adam Smith on the Principle of Utility1 
This section intends to demonstrate that even in Smith’s moral theory, let alone Hume’s, 
the principle of public utility actually plays a much more significant role than The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments might present to the casual reader; and that not only his political econ-
omy (which will be dealt with in the next section), but also his moral philosophy as a whole 
should be interpreted as being more intrinsically dependent on the principle of utility.2 
Smith is explicit in recognising that moral judgements from a utilitarian perspective should 
have priority over the natural sense of justice in some cases. This occurs almost immediately 
after the passage in which he asserts that the reasons for a “just/unjust” determination on 
the part of the common people are not founded on their rational consideration of the public 
good or interest. Shortly after maintaining that “it is not a regard to the preservation of 
society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against indi-
viduals” (TMS II.ii.3.10, 89), Smith somewhat unexpectedly acknowledges the limits of his 
argument as follows: 
Upon some occasions, indeed, we both punish and approve of punishment, merely from a 
view to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot otherwise be secured. Of 
this kind are all the punishments inflicted for breaches of what is called either civil police, or 
military discipline. (TMS II.ii.3.11, 90)3 
A “sentinel” (sentry) “who falls asleep upon his watch” is Smith’s primary example, offered 
to demonstrate that consideration of the common or public interest is sometimes necessary 
in order to justify certain instances of severe laws or administrations of justice.4 It is deemed 
 
1 In this paper, all references to Adam Smith are to The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondences of 
Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press and Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund). The references use the standard 
abbreviations as listed. 
2 Regarding how Smith himself explains the system of justice (as the fundamental component of the “commercial 
politics”) historically emerging from pre-commercial societies, based primarily on the principle of authority but 
gradually on the principle of utility, see Berry 2013, 94-96, 101-3. 
3 Cf. TMS II.ii.3.8, 89. 
4 The same example can also be found in LJA ii.92; LJB, 182. 
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entirely reasonable by Smith himself that the sentinel “suffers death by the laws of war, 
because such carelessness might endanger the whole army”5; yet, according to any natural 
sense of justice shared by the common people, this level of punishment is too severe to “go 
along with” in spite of Smith’s determination that it is not only necessary but just and proper 
in itself. He emphasises this gulf between the natural common judgement and what is ac-
tually required thus: 
The natural atrocity of the crime seems to be so little, and the punishment so great, that it is 
with great difficulty that our heart can reconcile itself to it. Though such carelessness appears 
very blamable, yet the thought of this crime does not naturally excite any such resentment, 
as would prompt us to take such dreadful revenge. (TMS II.ii.3.11, 90) 
If this is so, what renders this seemingly excessive punishment just and proper? Looking 
elsewhere, Smith elaborates that this level of severity, which a natural common sense can-
not abide, can only be justified in the “consideration of the general interest of society” (TMS 
II.ii.3.7, 88) or the “welfare of society” (TMS II.ii.3.9, 89).6 This is because crimes of this kind 
“do not immediately or directly hurt any particular person; but their remote consequences, 
it is supposed, do produce, or might produce, either a considerable inconveniency, or a 
great disorder in the society” (TMS II.ii.3.11, 90). 
What is of crucial significance in the discussion here is a recognition that the system of jus-
tice, including its apparently excessive but actually just and proper penalties, is, in these 
cases, supported and maintained only by identifying with the interests of the public as a 
whole. The special cases relating to civil police or military discipline cannot be subjected to 
nor approved by a natural sense of justice. In substance, this amounts to an admission by 
Smith that considering the principle of public utility is indispensable in maintaining justice, 
and that a sense of propriety is not in itself sufficient for this purpose. It is obvious, then, 
that the consideration of the public utility supersedes any natural basis for judging what is 
just or right in these cases. For this reason, the perceived distance between Smith and Hume 
should be regarded as being much less than is generally assumed by many scholars of the 
former. 
If Smith posits that what is just is primarily determined by a natural sense of propriety, with-
out reflecting the interests of society as a whole, but should sometimes be judged according 
to the public utility nevertheless, then the importance of the principle of utility in Smith is 
 
5 “This severity may, on many occasions, appear necessary, and, for that reason, just and proper” (TMS II.ii.3.11, 
90). 
6 In one of his Lectures on Jurisprudence, he says “this [severe punishment] is intirely founded on the consideration 
of the publick good,” that is, “the safety of a multitude.” (LJA ii.92). 
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not so different from that of Hume.7 Hume does not always relate justice to the conscious 
consideration of the public interest either. A further point to be made is that, particularly in 
the cases of maintaining justice within larger societies, it is necessary for people to have a 
wider appreciation of the public welfare, which is particularly emphasised in Hume’s An 
Enquiry concerning the Principle of Morals.8 Taking this aspect in Smith into account, it is 
thus almost disingenuous to suggest that Smith is entirely free of and independent from the 
Humean utilitarian perspective.9 
II Political Economy: Justifying the System of 
Justice in Terms of “Good Police” 
Smith uses the example of the sentinel to point out the difficulty with which a natural moral 
judgement can be made compatible with the severity of institutional justice, suggesting that 
a “man of humanity must recollect himself, must make an effort, and exert his whole firm-
ness and resolution, before he can bring himself to inflict it [the death penalty], to go along 
with it when it is inflicted by others.” Immediately following this, he adds a counter-exam-
ple: “It is not, however, in this manner, that he looks upon the just punishment of an un-
grateful murderer or parricide. His heart, in this case, applauds with ardour, and even with 
transport, the just retaliation which seems due to such detestable crimes” (TMS II.ii.3.11, 
90-91). Smith’s intention in juxtaposing these two cases is easy to appreciate, namely that 
he would like to show the plurality or variety of the principles on which different judge-
ments of justice are founded, and that he suggests it is rather rare cases that the actions 
should be judged in terms of their consequential impact on the public interest, instead of in 
 
7 Hume’s argument for the utilitarian basis of justice in his Second Enquiry is actually correspondent to what has 
been investigated here in regard to Smith. In the 3rd section titled “of Justice” he makes good use of several 
philosophical or hypothetical scenarios in order to demonstrate that few people would observe the laws of justice 
and equity under these circumstances, which totally deprive justice of its usefulness (this does not, however, 
necessarily denote that each member of the society is always aware of its utility to the public whenever they act 
in accordance with justice). See Hume 1998, 13-19. In addition, the notion that the state of emergency or necessity 
justifies the suspension of the laws of justice in the name of public welfare or safety (ibid., 15-6) is also shared by 
Smith. Cf. Hont 2005, ch. 5. 
8 Hume 1998, 23-25, 45-46. However, even in this Second Enquiry, significantly, this does not necessarily mean that 
Hume considers each person’s act of justice as being morally motivated by the conscious consideration of the 
public utility. See, for example, ibid., 26-27. 
9 What seems to be misunderstood in Hume by scholars of Smith can be said similarly with regard to Francis 
Hutcheson as well. The selfish passions and ego-centric human disposition (or “constitution”) are paid equally 
special attention to in Hutcheson, as well as benevolent or beneficent human inclination. See Hutcheson 2005, 6-
12; Hutcheson and Turco 2007, I.v.3, 82-84. 
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relation to their causes. This implies that the major reference for determining justice is still 
an appropriate balance between actions and their causes or circumstances; and any results 
of the actions are just a secondary factor to judge their morality. 
Smith’s portrayal of this discussion has the potential to be considerably misleading, how-
ever. What is demonstrated in the previous section is that Smith recognises some situations 
wherein consideration given to the public utility determines what is right even though it is 
contradictory to the natural sensibilities of the common people. It does not necessarily fol-
low, however, that on other occasions the principle of utility therefore gives way to the 
principle of natural justice. This section intends to demonstrate that the principle of utility 
is equally satisfied during these ordinary situations. Smith virtually admits that almost all 
moral actions and institutions suitable for the laws of justice — or judged reasonable from 
the sense of natural reason — are also appropriate when judged from the perspective of 
public utility. This denotes that, in ordinary situations, not only the natural principle of jus-
tice but also the principle of utility are satisfied even though each individual agent is not 
necessarily conscious of the fact. What is often ignored, from a deontological perspective, 
but is significant in itself, is the idea, characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment, that moral 
actions whose main intention is to fulfil the natural principle of justice consequently max-
imise the public utility at the same time. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of the former 
principle overriding the latter principle here. 
As Knud Haakonssen described in systematic fashion, Smith’s moral philosophy includes the 
so-called “historical jurisprudence”, or historical sociology in the modern sense, wherein 
the development of a legal system is analysed in relation to different stages of manners and 
modes of subsistence shared in common by each society. According to the “four stages” 
theory, while savage and barbarous nations dedicate themselves to hunting and herding, 
the majority of feudal societies are agrarian, with the European civilisation of Smith’s era 
seeing the genuine emergence of commercial societies during the Age of Enlightenment. In 
accordance with these social and economic stages, their laws and justice systems also 
change (albeit while the causal relation between the ways of life and the system of justice 
is not so much unilateral as reciprocal).10 Following the publication of Haakonssen’s land-
mark work, Smith’s historiography of Europe has been generally understood as a history in 
which the natural laws of justice are presented as having gradually developed based on 
human social and sympathetic nature, resulting in “the impartial spectator,”11 while the real 
 
10 For a simple outline of Smith’s historical jurisprudence and four stages theory, see, for example, Lieberman 2006, 
227-31. 
11 Haakonssen 1981. Cf. Haakonssen 2003. 
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positive laws, such as mercantile regulation policies,12 are criticised according to a develop-
ing natural sense and laws of justice. “The laws of police” are, from a perspective of this 
kind, looked upon as a typical example of the objects of Smith’s “legal criticism”. 
This interpretative framework, pioneered by Haakonssen (and partly by Donald Winch, 
1978) is problematic to some degree, however. There are at least two reasons for this. One 
of the reasons is that Smith does not ignore their public utility at all when deeming more 
than a few laws of police to be unjustifiable. It is certain that a large number of the irrational 
laws installed by the feudal governments were, according to him, the laws of police under 
the pretext of benefitting the public utility or welfare, and that they are criticised by Smith 
as being contradictory to natural justice shared by the people as impartial spectators (WN 
IV.viii.17; V.ii.k.64, 75). It should also be noted, however, that these unjustifiable laws are 
judged to be in opposition to the common cause of improving the public utility as well; they 
are criticised not just because they appear to the impartial spectator as violating the laws 
of natural justice, but because they are not sound laws of police either. With respect to the 
“institution of entails” and the “right of primogeniture” as a symbol of “oppressive” govern-
ment, as David Lieberman rightly posits: “whereas in the first part of the lectures (on jus-
tice), these institutions were condemned as the unjust remnants of an earlier and oppres-
sive political order, now [i.e. in Smith’s analysis of the causes of the slow progression toward 
opulence in the next part of the lectures on police] they were condemned as “extremely 
prejudicial to the public interest” on account of their “great hindrance to the progress of 
agriculture” (LJB, 289-95). In this example, as elsewhere, the “principle of law and govern-
ment” as applied to “justice” and to “police” offered two complimentary frameworks for 
the assessment on the same body of positive law” (Lieberman 2006, 238. Emphases added). 
The reasoning in Smith’s argument is thus completely distinct from cases where it is rea-
soned that the laws of police that are regarded as being useful for public utility can be dis-
approved of only by the criterion of natural justice. 
The second reason why Haakonssen’s interpretation is not acceptable without some reser-
vation is that Smith both possesses and emphasises a utilitarian point of view when evalu-
ating laws that are in harmony with natural justice. The dual perspectives characteristic of 
Smith’s “science of a legislator,” as shown above, should not be ignored here either, which 
make it possible to evaluate the same laws from two different angles: the principles of both 
natural justice and public utility. As seen in Lieberman’s argument, the distinction between 
 
12 For example, Smith describes the prohibition of the British woollen trade as a law of police introduced in the 
name of necessity or utility (that is, “the wealth and strength of the nation”) and that the death penalty for those 
who only exported wool cannot be sympathised with according to the natural sense of an impartial spectator (or 
“in naturall equity”), meaning that this law did not function well in practice. Cf. LJA ii.91-2; LJB 182; WN IV.viii.17. 
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justice and police should not be understood as representing the objective or substantial 
difference between the laws of justice and those of police. Ultimately this distinction should 
be attributed to the analytical observers who are attempting to morally evaluate legal insti-
tutions.13 As such, the same laws can be assessed according to the two different principles 
without any contradiction. And in reality, Smith discusses every law that has already been 
judged as just and appropriate by natural justice is simultaneously beneficial to the public 
utility in the second part of his jurisprudence (that is, theory of police). Naturally just and 
proper laws are therefore regarded as being also the best laws of police. 
To sum up, it is not strictly accurate to suggest that the civilising process evident in Smith’s 
historical jurisprudence is one wherein the laws of police have been gradually superseded 
by the laws of justice. More precisely speaking, a great many laws had been altered during 
this process to become ones that are endorsed by the natural sense of justice, and which 
maximise public utility at the same time; any truly civilised laws are good and just in terms 
of policing as well as in terms of justice. What should be added to this is a point examined 
earlier in this paper, namely that in some crucial instances the common people are required 
to consciously prioritise the public utility over the natural principle of judging justice, in or-
der to uphold the justice system. When we consider that the matter of public utility is a 
requirement that must be met in both cases, it is scarcely possible to argue that civil police 
or military discipline are the only cases in which the principle of utility comes to matter. The 
principle of utility must be satisfied — whether consciously or unconsciously — not only in 
cases of civil police, but in more ordinary circumstances as well (although this is often ig-
nored on the basis of a Kantian deontological standpoint).14 In contrast, the principle of 
natural justice is usually respected when determining morality on a daily basis, while in rel-
atively rare but critical instances this principle is suspended and must yield to the principle 
of utility. 
III Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed, Adam Smith’s moral theory should be, first of all, interpreted as 
a successor to “Humean” utilitarianism, which can be seen as somewhat distinct from so-
 
13 Cf. “The distinction between “justice” and “expediency” served to distinguish two distinct moral perspectives on 
law and government. However, it emphatically did not carve out two separate and autonomous regions of social 
life, each exclusively shaped by a single and different moral virtue” Lieberman 2006, 237. 
14 In reality, Kant himself seems to be fully aware of the aspect emphasised in this paper, when considering not 
only his ethics as normative theory but his political philosophy and anthropology as well. 
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called “classical utilitarianism” in the sense that there is more room for situating “sponta-
neous order” or “unintended consequences”. In Hume and Smith’s version of utilitarianism, 
individual actions will unconsciously result in satisfying the principle of public utility in most 
instances, although these natural judgements should sometimes be modified by and subju-
gated through direct referral to public utility. This even anticipates the role of the market 
economy as the “invisible hand” — wherein the social agent is typically motivated by a com-
bination of “private” utility and the natural moral sense shared by a “civilised” common 
populace — with “regular civil government” and occasional maintenance from legislators 
functioning as indispensable components, all of which serves to reconcile what is just and 
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Abstract 
It is typically believed that A.C. Pigou’s theories on welfare economics is the incarnation of utilitarian moral princi-
ple proposed by Bentham and Sidgwick. For instance, Y. Edgeworth once observed that Pigou drew inspiration 
from Sidgwick concerning wealth and welfare, and that the good which philanthropists and the public sector 
should seek to realize is defined by Pigou in accordance with Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. However, the interpretation 
of Pigou’s ethics has recently become rather controversial, since several recent studies have attempted to correct 
the typical understanding from their respective points of view.   
This presentation presents a new understanding of Pigou’s welfare theory as a whole system based on my own 
examinations of his works, which include points such as: (i) an investigation of Pigou’s extensive works (encom-
passing major and minor documents) and a reconstruction of his basic moral principle, ideal utilitarianism, (ii) an 
examination of the rigorous practical application of his ethics on his welfare economics, (iii) an analysis of his (im-
plicit) need concept and its close relationship to the idea of the national minimum (or “safety net,” to use a rather 
modern term), and (iv) a clarification of his opinion that the national minimum should take priority over any other 
expedience, comprised chiefly of subjective satisfaction (utility).  
Integrating the issues introduced above, this presentation proposes a notion of welfare economics in the narrow 
and the broader sense considering Pigou’s work. His welfare economics in the broader sense encompasses two 
major criteria: desire satisfaction and need satisfaction. Moreover, under certain conditions, Pigou admits that the 
satisfaction of needs takes priority over pleasure and utility, which means that the prescription of the safety net 
does not rely on utility maximization. How should we explain Pigou’s position? This article explores a new exposi-
tion of Pigou’s moral strategy in the light of the notion of indirect utilitarianism. 
Introduction 
This article presents a reconstruction and new interpretation of A.C. Pigou’s welfare theory 
as a whole based on the accumulated results concerning Pigou that I have made for the past 
few years. The concept of the presentation can be summarized as an interpretation of 
Pigou’s welfare economics in the narrow and the broader senses. First, as I have mentioned 
previously (Yamazaki 2011, 1n), defining his work on welfare economics could be problem-
atic. It seems slightly nearsighted for us to identify his economic thought based only on his 
major works such as Wealth and Welfare (1912 (WW)) and Economics of Welfare (1932 
(EW)). Reflecting on his original intention—his notion that economics is merely instrumen-
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tal to national well-being and welfare—we should not commit ourselves to such a near-
sighted view. We can certainly address welfare economics in the broader sense as well as a 
narrower sense based on Pigou’s works, since he based his entire economic thought on not 
only his major works, but also minor works including his essays and discourses, which are 
not necessarily systemized. In this article, we endeavor to explore Pigou’s welfare econom-
ics in both senses.  
I A Brief Review of My Preceding Studies on 
Pigou’s Ethics and Welfare Economics 
As a preliminary study to lead into the main argument in the next section, we briefly survey 
the points that I have previously made concerning Pigou in my previous articles. 
First, Pigou’s ethics were examined based on his early—but critical—documents, which had 
rarely been referred to in other studies of his theories (Yamazaki 2002). Until recently, his 
ethics have been more or less regarded as traditional and as typical hedonistic utilitarian-
ism. For instance, Edgeworth (1913), Hutchison (1953), Schumpeter (1954), Blaug (1978), 
O’Donnell (1979), and Collard (1981, 1996) placed Pigou in the utilitarianism stream of the 
Benthamite or Sidgwickian traditions. However, these scholars did not necessarily consider 
Pigou’s thought from a strictly ethical or philosophical point of view. Their arguments seem 
to merely be supplementary observations incidental to economics. I have shown that—con-
trasting to conventional understanding—Pigou’s utilitarianism differs from that of Ben-
tham, J. S. Mill, or Sidgwick in some crucial respects, and that Pigou should be regarded as 
an ideal (non-hedonistic) utilitarian, a position held by G.E. Moore and H. Rashdall. 
Second, his theories concerning economic and non-economic welfare – the key concepts in 
his work on welfare economics – were re-examined (Yamazaki 2011, 2012). According to 
Pigou, economic welfare forms part of overall welfare. This begs the question; what are the 
contents of his theories on non-economic welfare? It is generally accepted that non-eco-
nomic welfare is indirectly related to economics through economic welfare. Nevertheless, 
is there any direct relationship between them? This is the second problem I have also ad-
dressed. It is generally assumed that economic welfare is obtained through the desire sat-
isfaction principle. However, I have shown that the contrasting need satisfaction principle 
exists in Pigou’s thinking. Additionally, crucial aspects of his welfare economics theory de-
pend on this second principle. From a theoretical perspective, those parts of welfare that 
are accomplished through the satisfaction of needs do not completely coincide with eco-
nomic welfare (utility or subjective satisfactions). Contrary to conventional understanding, 
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I argued that certain aspects of non-economic welfare are intended to be promoted directly 
in Pigou’s welfare economics (Yamazaki 2011). 
Third, I observed that Pigou’s concept of needs is closely related to his concept of the na-
tional minimum—or safety net—in welfare economics (Yamazaki 2011, 2012). Although this 
is not clear from studying his main works (e.g. WW and EW) alone, a broader investigation 
indicates that his argument concerning the national minimum is not so much based on de-
sire satisfaction, but on need satisfaction, by which he intended to promote people’s non-
economic welfare (e.g. character and ethical personality). Overall, we can interpret Pigou’s 
concept of the national minimum to be founded on the satisfaction of objective needs, ra-
ther than on individuals’ subjective satisfaction represented by economic welfare. This con-
stitutes quite a different understanding of Pigou’s work from conventional thinking. 
Lastly, some practical issues were addressed, for instance the priority of enforcing the safety 
net for the poor in social policy (Yamazaki 2012). Taking a rough view, welfare economics 
based on utilitarianism does not secure the safety of the weak or of social minorities, but 
rather, a sacrifice on their part for an increment in social welfare may be acceptable, since 
its ultimate criterion is mere summation of the total utility. Surely this is a typical denunci-
ation, but I have already stated that this pattern does not hold true for Pigou’s work in terms 
of the interpretation of the indirect strategy of utilitarianism. Since this last point is of ex-
treme importance, let us briefly revisit my previous exposition (Yamazaki 2012) below.  
Figure 1 presents Pigou’s distribution criterion as described by Collard (1981, 111-12) based 
on Pigou’s double propositions (production and distribution in EW).1 The society consists of 
the poor and the rich only. The vertical and the horizontal axes represent the income level 
of the poor and the rich respectively. The intersections of these axes and the oblique line 
indicate the amount of social income, and each point on the oblique line represents a cor-
responding pattern of social income distribution for both sides. The intersection of the 
oblique line and the 45-degree line from the origin of the coordinate axes indicates equal 
distribution. We can now set an arbitral point K0 (a typical economic disparity) on the 
oblique line (distribution pattern) and consider a socially better set than K0 based on Pigou’s 
prescriptive criteria. Pigou’s specific distribution standard lies in his second proposition in 
EW: other factors (especially the amount of national income) being unchanged, a more 
equal distribution of wealth is conducive to the aggregation of social economic welfare (so-
cial betterment). Notably, interpersonal comparison and the law of diminishing marginal 
 
1 Figure 1 is quoted from Collard (1981, 112), while Figure 1-a and 1-b are my own modifications of the original 
Figure 1. Although I do not address these here, Collard also represents Pareto’s and Rawls’s distribution criteria 
using similar figures. 
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utility underlie this statement. If other factors change, a so-called “disharmony” (i.e. the 
more equal distribution hinders the growth of national income) may occur (Pigou 1932, 
645), which creates uncertainty concerning whether we can obtain resultant social better-
ment.  
The shaded areas including the edges—except K0—in Figure 1 shows Pigou-superior set to 
the initial K0 (Collard 1981, 111-12). The “?” inside the triangle corresponds to the foregoing 
“disharmony,” which does not necessarily guarantee social improvement due to the trade-
off between the reduction of national income and the enhancement the poor’s welfare. As 
I have already pointed out, the Pigou-superior distribution in Figure 1, as drawn by Collard, 
is based upon the criterion of economic welfare (subjective desire satisfaction) alone. Nei-
ther objective needs nor the national minimum are considered. Contrastingly, noticing 
Pigou’s contentions that “a national minimum is understood as an objective minimum of 
conditions in all departments of life, below which the fortunes of no citizen are allowed to 
fall” (Pigou 1912, xxvi. Italics original), that “It is the duty of a civilized state to lay down 
certain minimum conditions in every department of life, below which it refuses to allow any 
of its free citizens to fall” (Pigou 1914, 36), and that “It is generally agreed in modern com-
munities that some minimum standard of life must be established … below which no citizen 
or family shall be allowed to fall” (Pigou 1952, 203), I introduced such an income level, which 
just satisfies the objective needs or the minimum standard represented in the diagram as 
the dotted horizontal line. As can be seen, there are two cases to be examined: in one case, 
the dotted line is under K0 (Figure 1-a), while in the other, it is above K0 (Figure 1-b). Con-
cerning the former case, the initial K0 standard—even though it is applicable to the poor—
is beyond the minimum requirement. Therefore, the welfare situation of the poor does not 
seem to be an object of social mandatory relief. Therefore, the result of Figure 1-a is iden-
tical to the original Figure 1. However, Figure 1-b, in which the initial K0 is beneath the dot-
ted line, is completely different. As stated above, Pigou claimed that the level under the 
dotted line corresponds to such a condition that no one is allowed to fall into. Therefore, if 
the need criterion in Pigou’s work is adequately considered, Pigou-superior distribution cri-
teria can be reasonably modified from the original in Figure 1 and expanded to accommo-
date social justice more than naïve utilitarianism prescribes. However, Figure 1-b implies 
that we are ready to admit to a possible reduction in national income to benefit the unfor-
tunate who fall under the minimum. Considering naïve utilitarian calculation, such a case 
cannot be approved, as it may entail a consequential shrinkage in the social summation of 
utility. Pigou, however, eloquently asserts:  
After all … so long as progress in technique continues, production may be expected to expand 
in any event. The offset to increased fairness in distribution is thus likely to be, not a 
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catastrophe for production, but at the worst, some slowing down in its rate of increase; and 
that is not a disaster. (Pigou 1955, 87) 
 
In summary, the above indicates that in a case where the satisfaction of basic needs and 
other interests (or preferences) compete with one another, the former must be socially pri-
oritized. This is called Pigou’s “basic rule” in welfare economics. However, how can this basic 
rule be demonstrated, and how it is compatible (or incompatible) with the utilitarian prin-
ciple? Presumably, as I have indicated, Pigou’s argument can be placed under the heading 
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of indirect utilitarian prescription.2 Essentially, Pigou does not acknowledge that every good 
must be accompanied by obligation (Pigou 1965, 13). Obligations are not directly linked to 
the amount of welfare (intrinsic good). Even according to a certain interpretation of utilitar-
ianism, moral obligations are not necessarily and directly prescribed by reference to the 
simple summation of utility. For instance, Kelly stated the following: 
While it is correct to argue that all authoritative reasons for action must be reducible to act-
utilitarian ones, this does not imply that either individual or legislator is under a direct 
obligation to pursue the maximum social well-being in all circumstances. (Kelly 1990, 254) 
Moral obligation directly concerns “vital interests” (such as security) for well-being. Such an 
item “is distinguished on the grounds that it is a necessary condition of the formation of any 
conception of well-being” (Kelly 1989, 75). Naturally, in Pigou’s work, vital interests corre-
spond to needs and the national minimum. Arguably, that “necessary condition” indicates 
that it is irrelevant to the amount of the intrinsic value. Even if the value of the necessary 
condition is trivial (compared to, for instance, other sublime virtues), neither preference 
satisfaction nor a virtuous life can be realized without the condition. Therefore, it must be 
prioritized for everyone, regardless of its degree of value. While the “rightness” of actions 
is determined by the consequential outcome (welfare or utility), the obligatoriness is not. 
Since the minimum (need satisfaction) is defined as a moral obligation, it needs to be prior-
itized before other considerations that merely maximize total utility (expedience). As an 
example, J.O. Urmson once observed:  
… though there can be very tricky problems of duty, they do not naturally present themselves 
as problems whose solution depends upon an exact determination of an ultimate end; while 
the moral principles that come most readily to mind—truth-telling; promise-keeping; 
abstinence from murder … and the like make a nice discrimination of the supreme good seem 
irrelevant. We do not need to debate whether it is Moore’s string of intrinsic goods or Mill’s 
happiness that is achieved by conformity to such principles; it is enough to see that without 
them social life would be impossible and any life would be indeed solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short … Such considerations … have led some utilitarians to treat avoidance of the 
summum malum rather than the achievement of the summum bonum as the foundation of 
morality. (Urmson 1958, 208-209. Italics original) 
Therefore, Urmson has an affinity for utilitarianism (it is more suitable to accommodate his 
claims than any other moral principle). Pigou recognized that the policy of the minimum 
 
2 This observation is an extension of the corresponding parts of my work (Yamazaki 2012). 
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standard can eventually be justified by considerations of “the compelling obligation of hu-
manity” (Pigou 1914, 37) which is likewise irrelevant to direct maximization of welfare.3 
II The Structure of Pigou’s Welfare Economics in 
the Narrow and the Broader Senses 
Next, we are approaching the culmination of this article.  
Figure 2 shows a conceptual framework of the whole system of Pigou’s welfare economics 
based on my own interpretations and findings concerning his works. We now review each 
point in the figure while referring to the observations provided above. 
 
3 Although Urmson holds the affinity with utilitarianism, his reasoning of justification of obligation appears to 
somewhat differ from that of Kelly’s. For while Kelly tries to found the validity of an absolute and prioritized 
obligation within utilitarian axiology (welfarism) at the level of normative ethics, Urmson’s reasoning of foundation 
seems to go beyond normative ethics and extend to meta-ethics. In that sense, the foundation like Kelly’s may be 
called an intrinsic justification to utilitarianism, whereas Urmson’s, an extrinsic one.  
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The vision refers to his basic moral principle, which we argue is non-hedonistic with multiple 
ingredients of welfare, called “refined hedonism,” using Baldwin’s term (Baldwin 1990, 
132). 
As Pigou stated, the purpose of welfare economics is to create measures to promote wel-
fare in an easier way, and there are clearly at least two major practical principles in his sys-
tem: desires and needs. 
However, almost all existing studies concerning his welfare economics theories have thus 
far only featured the former aspect. We call this welfare economics in the narrow sense, 
the criterion of which is exclusively subjective utility (economic satisfaction). 
On the other hand, Pigou’s welfare economics can be conceived in the broader sense by 
exploring his implicit but firm concept of needs satisfaction. This is one of the most crucial 
points of this presentation. 
Of course, the satisfaction of both needs and desires are mere practical measures, and are 
therefore not intrinsically but instrumentally crucial. Pigou’s final aim is the consequences 
of those prescriptions. Desires are supposed to achieve economic satisfaction, while needs 
are intended to lead to non-economic welfare, including certain virtuous elements. How-
ever, of all basic human needs, the primary needs in particular refer directly to existence or 
security or health, which are necessary conditions for a formation of welfare. From that 
perspective, the satisfaction of the primary needs should be considered as an indirect pre-
scription to the promotion of welfare. On the other hand, of course, Pigou intended to re-
alize certain welfare elements directly according to the need principle (say, moral character 
or quality of people through education and training). Moreover, as has been clearly illus-
trated, Pigou actually prioritizes needs satisfaction over other considerations. 
A remaining problem is how to incorporate this need principle into his utilitarian frame-
work. For this task, we suggest referring to the indirect strategy of utilitarianism. By refer-
ring to Kelly and Urmson, we focused on the notion of necessary conditions for welfare. 
That essentially means no security, no happy life. These necessary conditions that Pigou 
regards as primary needs may be—in themselves—less valuable than other supreme factors 
(either virtuous or aesthetic factors). However, when a concept is obligatory, it does not 
necessarily proportionally correspond to its holding value. It is clear that Pigou has consid-
ered this.  
To conclude, everyone’s primary needs ought to be socially prioritized over any other con-
siderations, and the justification for this is not subject to simple direct welfare maximiza-
tion. Pigou has introduced a lexical order between obligation and non-obligation, and the 
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former corresponds to basic needs. We may call this his indirect strategy of utilitarianism, 
of which his broader welfare economics is constituted.  
Eventually, according to Pigou’s notion, if all citizens are well-educated, we do not need to 
consider welfare economics in the broader sense. For educated people would arrange eco-
nomic decision so that their subjective satisfaction will be concurrent with their needs sat-
isfaction (there are little gulf between desires and needs (or, economic virtue and human 
virtue) in Pigou’s (1906, 1907) terms). However, as Pigou (1906, 379-80) has asserted, even 
if non-educated people generally could be the best judge of what they do want, they might 
not be the best judge of what they ought to want. In order to reduce the gap between 
subjective desires and objective needs, Pigou implicitly recourses on needs principle and 
prescribes those priority, which has led us to conceive his welfare economics in the broader 
sense.  
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Two Ways to Satisfy (and No Way to Satisfy 
Utilitarians) 
Alexandra Zinke, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany 
Abstract 
Preference utilitarianism holds that an action is morally good iff it maximizes overall preference satisfaction. In 
principle, there are two ways to satisfy preferences: either you alter the facts such that they fit the subject’s pref-
erences, or you change the subject’s preferences such that they fit the facts. While standard preference utilitari-
anism focuses on the first strategy, the present paper will explore the prospects and limits of the second strategy. 
I will firstly argue that there are cases in which it seems morally right to aim at preference satisfaction by prefer-
ence change, but secondly acknowledge that an action that induces a global change of preferences doesn’t neces-
sarily seem morally right. The real philosophical challenge is to distinguish those cases where altering a subject’s 
preferences is morally right from those where it isn’t. The paper ends with a skeptical outlook on the possibility of 
justifying the distinction on purely preference-utilitarian grounds. 
Introduction 
Rationality demands the maximization of one’s own welfare. According to utilitarianism, 
morality demands the maximization of overall welfare. Preference utilitarianism subscribes 
to a desire-fulfillment theory of welfare (also known as preferentism): a subject’s welfare 
increases with the fulfillment of her desires / the satisfaction of her preferences. Thus, the 
core idea of preference utilitarianism can be stated as follows: an action is morally good iff 
it maximizes overall preference satisfaction. Or, in its prescriptive reformulation: One 
should choose an action that maximizes overall welfare.1 Preference utilitarianism will be 
presupposed throughout this paper.  
Let us begin by examining the central notion of preference utilitarianism, satisfaction (or 
fulfillment) of preferences. We will say that a preference is satisfied iff the content of the 
preference is realized: S’s preference that p is satisfied iff p. The subject need not know 
about the satisfaction of the preference or experience any feelings of fulfillment. The notion 
of satisfaction is of course not restricted to the satisfaction of preferences but also applies 
 
1 Here and in what follows, I use “should”, “right”, etc. in their moral, not their prudential reading. 
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to all other pro-attitudes, e.g., to wants, desires, wishes, etc.2 A pro-attitude is satisfied iff 
it its matched by the world. Preference utilitarianism thus says that actions should establish 
a match between the content of a pro-attitude and the world. How can they do so? Prima 
facie, there are two ways to establish this fit: one could change the world such that it fits 
the pro-attitudes, or one could change the attitudes such that they fit the world.3 
Usually, preference utilitarianism is read in the manner of world-to-preference direction of 
fit: we should change the (objective, not preference-related) facts such that the world fits 
the actual preferences of the subjects. If Ann prefers the apple to the banana, we should 
offer her the apple rather than make her prefer the banana. And, to take a somewhat more 
serious example, if Ben is starving to death, we should give him food rather than make him 
want to die. Let me call this reading of the initial utilitarian thesis world-directed utilitarian-
ism.4 More precisely, according to radical world-directed utilitarianism, an action is morally 
good iff it maximizes the overall satisfaction of the given, i.e., actual, preferences. We call 
this theory radical world-directed utilitarianism as it exclusively values preference satisfac-
tion by changes of the objective facts. 
It is important to stress, however, that preference utilitarianism as initially stated is neutral 
with respect to the two strategies of preference satisfaction: nothing but the overall 
amount of preference satisfaction counts. Utilitarianism itself is silent about how the fulfill-
ment of preferences should be achieved. As John Rawls says, if preference satisfaction is all 
that matters, then we must be “ready to consider any new convictions and aims, and even 
to abandon attachments and loyalties, when doing this promises a life of greater overall 
satisfaction” (Rawls 1982, 181). If all that matters is the amount of preference satisfaction, 
we could make Ann prefer the banana she already has, instead of supplying her with the 
factually desired apple. And, instead of giving him food, we can at least try selling to Ben 
the relief found in finally experiencing the eternal tranquility that only death can yield. Let 
radical preference-directed utilitarianism be the thesis that an action is morally good iff it 
 
2 Talk of satisfied preferences seems a bit awkward, as preferring appears to be a three-place relation between a 
subject and two objects: S prefers a to b. However, in this paper I will be a bit sloppy and sometimes use “prefer” 
as a binary relation (“S prefers that p”) and sometimes as a three-place, comparative relation (“S prefers a to b”). 
Furthermore, I will use “S desires/wishes/wants that p” interchangeably with “S prefers that p”. Nothing of 
significance will hinge on this. 
3 Of course there is also a third way: one could combine the two strategies and change both. However, I will here 
concentrate on the two more conservative strategies of manipulating only one side. 
4 As mental attitudes in general, and preferences in particular, are also ‚parts of the world’, this label is not quite 
accurate. It is intended to stress the contrast between changing the preferences (i.e. mental entities) themselves 
and changing the facts at which the preferences are directed (which are often, though not necessarily, non-mental 
facts).  
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maximizes overall satisfaction of preferences by changing the preferences such that they fit 
the actual facts. Again, the theory is radical as it exclusively values the generation of pref-
erence satisfaction by change of preferences, not by change of objective facts. 
Radical preference-directed utilitarianism seems to be a nonstarter. If there is a way to sat-
isfy a given preference (without violating any other preferences), then that action seems 
morally good – at least from the assumed utilitarian perspective. I will not attempt to de-
fend radical preference-directed utilitarianism. But we can think of a weaker form of pref-
erence-directed utilitarianism, liberal preference utilitarianism, which allows for both ways 
of maximizing preference satisfaction: it says that an action is morally good iff it maximizes 
overall preference satisfaction – independently of whether this is attained by changing facts 
or preferences. Liberal preference utilitarianism will be the view defended here. 
The first section will argue by way of example that radical world-directed utilitarianism is 
wrong: there are at least some cases in which it seems morally good to change an agent’s 
preferences to ones that are satisfied by the world as it is. The second section addresses 
some potential problems for preference satisfaction by preference change. It defends lib-
eral preference utilitarianism, but also argues that the theory must be supplemented by a 
principle that distinguishes cases in which preference satisfaction by preference change is 
a legitimate option from those where it isn’t. The paper ends with the skeptical worry that 
a distinction of these cases cannot be motivated by purely preference-utilitarian means. 
Preference utilitarianism thus provides at best an incomplete theory of morally good ac-
tions. 
I A Case for Preference-Directed Utilitarianism 
I will present two types of cases in which it seems intuitively morally good to establish pref-
erence satisfaction by preference change. A note of clarification: There is a huge debate 
about whether the satisfaction of all preferences or only of the intrinsic ones counts, and 
about whether actual or ideal preferences are the target. I bracket this discussion as I think 
that my cases apply also to versions of preference utilitarianism that concentrate on intrin-
sic and ideal preferences: we should sometimes even change ideal intrinsic preferences.5 
 
5 We lack a precise account of ideal preferences, but the following characterization by Arneson might be helpful: 
“My ideally considered preferences are those I would have if I were to engage in thoroughgoing deliberation about 
my preferences with full pertinent information, in a calm mood, while thinking clearly and making no reasoning 
errors.” (Arneson 1989, 83) 
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I.a Unrealistic Preferences 
Ann, your beloved teenage daughter, deeply desires to become the next big pop star. Un-
fortunately her voice is terrible rather than terrific. Whenever you listen to her, you become 
more convinced that her dream will forever remain unfulfilled. What should you do? It is 
practically impossible for you to change the worldly facts such that your daughter’s prefer-
ences have a chance of becoming satisfied. No singing lessons will help. The only possible 
way to make her have fulfilled preferences is by changing them. If you are still aiming at 
maximizing preference satisfaction, you should try to alter her preferences.6 You could show 
her different aims in life, foster her interest in painting or sports so that she will forget about 
the pop star business, or maybe you should introduce her to punk music.  
If it is practically impossible to satisfy a given preference, we should try to reach preference 
satisfaction by changing preferences. Unrealistic preferences provide the first sample case 
in which is seems right to change a subject’s preferences.7 
I.b Conflicting Preferences 
Ann has grown up and is now planning her honeymoon. Her true love Ben wants to go to 
the sea, while she prefers the mountains. Money is sparse, so they cannot do both; love is 
intense, so they definitely want to go together. They consult you about what to do. What 
should you do? 
Given the circumstances, it is metaphysically impossible to satisfy both Ann’s and Ben’s 
preferences. If you are striving for a maximization of preference satisfaction, you should try 
to change Ann’s or Ben’s preferences (or both). This will probably be no easy task, but it 
seems to be the way to go. Only once Ann’s and Ben’s preferences are in harmony will it be 
possible to satisfy those of both of them. Conflicting preferences, i.e., preferences that can-
not be satisfied simultaneously, provide my second sample case in which it seems morally 
right to change a subject’s preferences.8 
 
6 For reasons of simplicity, we here ignore the preferences of all other moral subjects, e.g. your possible 
preferences about Ann’s preferences. 
7 What should Ann herself do in the above situation? If we follow the above line of reasoning, she should adapt 
her preferences. See also Bruckner 2009 for a defense of this intuition with respect to a similar case. 
8 Typical cases involving “ill preferences” or “perverse desires” can also be described as cases of conflicting 
preferences: if Cen desires to torture the cat, Cen’s and the cat’s preferences are in conflict. 
Objections to Preference-Directed Utilitarianism 
329 
I think that the two presented cases support the view that it is sometimes morally right – at 
least from a utilitarian perspective – to strive for preference satisfaction by preference 
change. If that is correct, radical world-directed preference utilitarianism is wrong. As al-
ways, however, moral intuitions might diverge. Some readers might have different views on 
some or all of these cases. Let me observer however, that a defense of radical world-di-
rected utilitarianism requires some justification for the primacy of actual or given prefer-
ences over not-yet-actual ones. The core principle that preference satisfaction is of (moral) 
value has an immediate intuitive appeal that the more sophisticated principle, which exclu-
sively focuses on, and holds fixed, given preferences, lacks. From a purely preference-utili-
tarian perspective, what should be wrong with adapting preferences to the world – at least 
sometimes? 
In the next section, I will discuss two possible objections to preference satisfaction by pref-
erence change. I will reject the first objection, but acknowledge that the second objection 
points to the limits of preference satisfaction by preference change. We end up with a mod-
est form of liberal preference utilitarianism. 
II Objections to Preference-Directed Utilitarianism 
The first objection to preference-directed utilitarianism employs the notion of higher-order 
preferences, i.e., preferences about one’s own preferences. We can think of preferences as 
ordered in a (possibly infinite) hierarchy. The preferences of order 1 are directed at the 
world. Preferences of order 1 are, e.g., the preference for an apple, the preference for be-
coming the next big pop star, or the preference to spend time in the mountains. But the 
subject will possibly also have preferences that have preferences of order 1 as their con-
tents. For example, the subject might have the second-order preference that her first-order 
preferences will soon be satisfied, or the second-order preference that no one changes her 
first-order preference to go to the mountains. Then again, there can be preferences of or-
der 2, etc., ad infinitum. In general, preferences of order n + 1 will concern preferences of 
at most order n. (Real agents will often not explicitly entertain many higher-order prefer-
ences. However, first, we can also allow for implicit preferences; second, we here consider 
somewhat idealized agents; and third, and most importantly, we aim at making the prima 
facie objection to preference-directed utilitarianism as strong as possible.) 
Objection (higher-order preferences): It is plausible to assume that at least some agents 
have higher-order preferences that (at least some of) their lower-order preferences are not 
to be interfered with. Ann wants to become the next big pop star and wants nobody to 
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change that preference of hers. And I have a very strong preference that no neuroscientist 
changes my preference not to commit suicide today. Thus we can usually not improve over-
all preference satisfaction by changing preferences of a lower order as this will violate 
strong higher-order preferences. 
Reply: This objection to preference-directed utilitarianism applies only to an impoverished 
version of the theory. Of course, if an agent has relevant higher-order preferences, e.g., the 
second-order preference B not to change the first-order preference A, then one should not 
interfere with A in isolation but change B first. We must always begin by changing the rele-
vant preferences of the highest order. Thus, before changing Ann’s first-order preference 
to become a pop star, we must change her second-order preference that no one interfere 
with her first-order pop star preference. (If the hierarchy of preferences is infinite and there 
is no highest preference to begin with we should change all relevant preferences simulta-
neously.)9,10 
Preference satisfaction by preference change, understood correctly, does not violate any 
higher-order preferences: they are not violated, because they are changed first. However, 
let me now develop another, more fundamental, objection to preference-directed utilitari-
anism. It shows that in many cases, realizing preference satisfaction by preference change 
seems intuitively morally wrong (or at least not morally right). 
There is a trivial two-step way to maximize preference satisfaction by preference change: 
we first delete all unsatisfied preferences – this eliminates any mismatch between prefer-
ences and facts – and then generate maximally strong preferences such that they are satis-
fied by the world as it is, thereby maximizing the overall amount of preference satisfaction. 
Thus we make the agents maximally desire whatever is actually the case – and only this. If 
the number of fish in the Amazonas is even, then we should make Ann strongly desire this; 
if the last dinosaur died on a Tuesday, we should make Ann have a strong preference for 
 
9 Of course, from a practical perspective this is quite demanding. However, overdemandingness objections seem 
irrelevant as long as we are discussing only evaluative, not prescriptive, moral principles. 
10 Let me point out a remaining worry: I have assumed that our preferences are ordered in a hierarchy. This 
excludes the possibility of self-referential preferences like the preference that this very preference not be 
interfered with, or the very general preference that there be no interference with any preference – including this 
one. Such self-referential preferences cannot be located at any level in the hierarchy. If the conception of self-
referential preferences makes sense and an agent has the preference that there be no interference with this very 
preference, one cannot change it without violating it. Nevertheless, the negative impact of violating this one 
preference might be countervailed by the satisfaction of all other preferences, so that even self-referential 
preferences do not necessarily block maximizing the total amount of preference satisfaction by preference change. 
Objections to Preference-Directed Utilitarianism 
331 
this fact, and so on. I suspect that this seems counterintuitive to many proponents of pref-
erence utilitarianism. Let me trigger intuitions a bit with the help of a variant of a well-
known thought experiment. 
Objection (the preference adjustment machine): Let there be a machine, call it the prefer-
ence adjustment machine, that changes all preferences of an agent such that they fit the 
facts: it deletes all unsatisfied preferences and creates all preferences that fit the facts. Once 
an agent is plugged into the machine, she prefers maximally whatever is the case. If every-
body is plugged to the machine, the machine creates a brave new world with beings who 
all maximally desire the same: the world as it is. The result is a maximum total amount of 
preference satisfaction.11 Thus, according to liberal preference-directed utilitarianism, we 
should all plug or be plugged into the machine. Even more: you are morally obliged to plug 
to the machine, not only yourself, but anybody. Again, this consequence might seem coun-
terintuitive to many. At least, it often does so to me.12, 13 (If this consequence doesn’t seem 
devastating to you, that’s fine! You seem to be a proponent of liberal preference-directed 
utilitarianism, and the rest of the paper will be of no interest to you.) 
Reply: I do not want to reject this objection to liberal preference utilitarianism, but rather 
wish to make precise what exactly it shows. It does not show that we never value preference 
satisfaction by preference change, but it suggests that we sometimes, or typically, tend to 
value preference satisfaction by a change of worldly facts higher than by preference change. 
If this is correct, then liberal preference-utilitarianism must be supplemented by a principle 
that distinguishes between cases in which we can maximize preference satisfaction by pref-
erence change from cases in which we shouldn’t do so. We need a choice principle, or Pref-
erence Principle, telling us in which cases preference satisfaction by a change of worldly 
facts is to be preferred over preference satisfaction by preference change. Without such a 
Preference Principle, liberal preference utilitarianism provides only an incomplete theory of 
morally good actions. 
 
11 Of course the total amount of preference satisfaction grows further if the machine additionally creates new 
bearers of preferences (i.e., new subjects), but let us here concentrate on maximizing the amount of preference 
satisfaction for already existing beings. 
12 Note that this intuition doesn’t fade even given a more restrictive notion of preference change that only allows 
for changing the content of already existing preferences and does not allow the creation of new preferences. 
13 For a similar, though less radical though experiment, see Parfit 1984, 496: “I am about to make your life go 
better. I shall inject you with an addictive drug. From now on, you will wake each morning with an extremely strong 
desire to have another injection of this drug. […] This is no cause for concern, since I shall give you ample supplies 
of this drug. Every morning, you will be able at once to fulfil this desire.” 
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We cannot here discuss different proposals for a Preference Principle. Yet let me exempla-
rily introduce one, if only for the purpose of illustration. The following Preference Principle 
suggests itself: 
Preference Principle: Satisfy the actual (intrinsic and ideal) preferences first. If impossible 
(e.g., because of highly unrealistic or contradicting preferences), change the preferences. 
The suggested Preference Principle gives priority to the satisfaction of given preferences, 
but suggests changing the preferences if this is the only plausible possibility leading to pref-
erence satisfaction. It thereby captures both the intuition that there are cases in which we 
can, or should, attain preference satisfaction by preference change, and the intuition that 
we need not plug ourselves or others into the preference adjustment machine. Thus there 
seems to be an easy way to complete liberal preference utilitarianism with a suitable Pref-
erence Principle. 
However, let me stress that the above Preference Principle (and, I fear, most variants of it)14 
does not seem to allow for a justification within preference utilitarianism. From the per-
spective of preference utilitarianism, there is no reason why we should opt for the satisfac-
tion of actual preferences first. Preference utilitarianism, as stated above, exclusively aims 
at maximizing welfare, where maximizing welfare is understood as maximizing preference 
satisfaction. The source of a rationale for the Preference Principle, however, seems to rely 
on considerations surrounding the “autonomy of the subject” the “subject’s identity”, “one-
self being the author of one’s preferences”, or something along these lines. In a purely pref-
erence-utilitarian worldview, there is no place – or at least no natural place – for valuing 
autonomy or the like; the only moral good is proclaimed to be a maximization of satisfied 
preferences. 
III Conclusion 
There are two ways to obtain a satisfied preference: by changing the world such that it fits 
the actual preferences, or by changing the preferences such that they fit the worldly facts. 
The common reading of preference utilitarianism focuses on changing the world and leaving 
the preferences intact. I have defended liberal preference utilitarianism, which allows for 
 
14 For instance, one could suggest a principle employing the distinction between deliberate and unconscious 
preference adaption (see, e.g., Elster 1983 and Bovens 1992), or propose a principle referring to Bruckner’s notion 
of “reflectively endorsed” preference change (Bruckner 2009). 
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both ways of preference satisfaction. More precisely, I have suggested that there are cases 
in which preference satisfaction by preference change seems morally right, but also 
stressed that a universal adjustment of preferences to reality doesn’t seem morally right. If 
you share these intuitions but still want to stick to preference utilitarianism, you must sup-
plement your theory with a Preference Principle that distinguishes these situations. I doubt 
that such a principle can be justified within a purely preference-utilitarian framework. 
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Hare’s Utilitarianism, Varner’s Animals 
A Panel Discussion of Gary Varner: Personhood, Ethics, 
and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-
Level Utilitarianism (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Abstract 
This panel discussion of Gary Varner’s book, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s 
Two-Level Utilitarianism (2012), consists of commentaries by four critics: Gary Comstock, Susana Monsó, Alastair 
Norcross, and Adam Shriver; followed by a response from the author. Varner’s book is a detailed application of 
R.M. Hare’s two-level version of utilitarianism to thinking about issues in animal ethics. Although Hare was Peter 
Singer’s dissertation advisor, Hare never published a systematic discussion of what his theory implied about animal 
ethics. In the book, Varner examines how far Harean, two-level utilitarianism supports conclusions that Singer has 
argued for. A central theme of the panel discussion is how the cognitive capacities of individuals affect the relative 
“moral significance” of their experiences and their lives. 
In this panel, the comments of three critics were followed by a response by the author. After 
a brief overview of the book’s contents, the comments of the critics are reproduced below 
in the order that they were presented: Alastair Norcross, Adam Shriver, Susana Monsó, and 
panel organizer Gary Comstock. The references from the commentaries and the author’s 
response are gathered together at the end. 
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Overview of the Book  
Gary Varner, University of Texas, USA 
The inspiration for my 2012 book Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Ani-
mals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism was a graduate seminar that I taught many years 
ago on the work of Peter Singer. In that seminar, we began by reading R.M. Hare’s Moral 
Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (1982), and during the semester I repeatedly asked 
us to consider carefully to what extent Hare’s two-level utilitarianism would have the impli-
cations for animal ethics that Singer argues for (since Hare himself never systematically ex-
plored that question).  
There are three parts to the book. The first gives an overview of Hare’s version of two-level 
utilitarianism, reconstructs his argument to the principle of utility from the logic of moral 
discourse, and expands on his treatment of various “intuitive level system” rules that real-
world utilitarians need for the conduct of daily life (which I refer to as “ILS rules” and which 
include laws, codes of professional ethics, a societal “common morality,” and “personal mo-
ralities” of individuals). Part one also provides Harean responses to a range of standard ob-
jections to utilitarianism.  
In part two, I argue that good utilitarian reasons can be given for recognizing a distinction 
among “persons,” “near-persons,” and “the merely sentient,” where “persons” are defined 
as individuals with a biographical sense of self, and “near-persons” are defined as lacking 
that biographical sense of self, but as having a fairly robust, conscious sense of their past 
and future.  
Finally, part three discusses various complications that would be involved in modifying a 
society’s various types of ILS rules over time, as background ecological, technological, eco-
nomic, and social conditions change, and gives one topical illustration: How conceptions of 
“humane sustainable agriculture” can and should change over time.  
On that note, let me add that I have a sequel in the works, with the working title Sustaining 
Animals: Envisioning Humane, Sustainable Communities, which will discuss alternative de-
velopments of ILS rules regarding other areas of animal ethics, such as pets and working 
animals, wildlife scientific research on animals, and so on. 
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On the Moral Significance of Persons, Near-
Persons, and the Merely Sentient 
Alastair Norcross, University of Colorado, USA 
 
Gary Varner’s Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition is a thorough, clear, and persuasive 
defense of Hare’s two-level utilitarianism, and an exploration of that approach with respect 
to what morality, both at the critical and intuitive levels, has to say about animals. I have 
long been a fan of the approach, and have defended a closely related approach (Peter Rail-
ton’s (1984) “sophisticated consequentialism”) in several places (Norcross 1997, 2010, and 
2012). Because space is short, I will not linger over exposition, but will assume that my read-
ers are familiar with at least the basic idea of the two-level approach. My concern in this 
short piece is with what Varner has to say about how the different cognitive abilities of 
different sentient creatures (including humans) should shape the intuitive-level system (ILS) 
rules concerning those different creatures. 
In chapter 7, Varner argues that autonoetic consciousness gives the lives of those who pos-
sess it both “special moral significance” compared with the lives of those who are merely 
sentient, and “greater moral significance”. Furthermore, different degrees and kinds of au-
tonoetic consciousness give greater or lesser moral significance to the lives of those who 
possess the various degrees and kinds. So, the paradigm case of a creature with autonoetic 
consciousness is a person, who possesses a biographical sense of self. Other creatures, with 
lesser degrees of autonoetic consciousness may be “near-persons”, whose lives have 
greater moral significance than the “merely sentient”, but lesser than those of persons. So, 
what is the moral significance of autonoetic consciousness? 
From a utilitarian perspective, the most basic reason for thinking that autonoetic 
consciousness adds value to the life of an individual turns on the fact that the abilities to 
consciously remember the past and to consciously anticipate the future allow the individual 
to reexperience good (and bad) states of consciousness and to anticipate (and dread) future 
experiences. (Varner 2012, 162) 
As I said, Varner’s account of personhood centers on the possession of a biographical sense 
of self. He largely adopts Schechtman’s “narrative self-constitution” view, which is a version 
of the view that persons are “storytelling beings” whose lives “can be richer and more com-
plex than those of beings that lack the ability to tell stories” (Varner 2012, 139). So, roughly 
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(given space constraints), the idea is that the lives of some creatures possess greater moral 
significance (and special moral significance) than the lives of others, because there are more 
ways (respects) in which those creatures can be both benefitted and harmed than can oth-
ers. This appeals to a “principle of inclusiveness”, that Varner explains as follows: 
if we know that an experience A contains some value, and that experience B contains all of 
that value and more, then we know that experience B contains more value than experience 
A. (Varner 2012, 163) 
There is obviously a lot to be said about Varner’s nuanced and detailed account of the nar-
rative self-constitution view of personhood, and the significance of various degrees of au-
tonoetic consciousness. I want to focus here on a couple of worries about critical-level dis-
tinctions between kinds of moral significance, and a worry about justifying particular 
intuitive-level rules concerning different sentient creatures. 
First, there is Varner’s claim that the lives of persons, for example, possess “greater” moral 
significance than the lives of non-persons. He stresses, in chapter one, that he doesn’t mean 
by this that their lives are preferable, but merely that they can be harmed and benefitted 
in ways that non-persons cannot, and thus that we should take “special care” in our dealings 
with them. I don’t take issue with the underlying point, but I don’t think it justifies the claim 
of “greater” moral significance. After all, there are many differences between different sen-
tient creatures that affect the ways in which they can be harmed and benefitted. Birds, for 
example, can be harmed by having their wings clipped. We, not having wings, cannot be 
harmed in that way. Various forms of color-blindness can render certain kinds of aesthetic 
pleasures and pains inaccessible to some people. We wouldn’t want to say that the lives of 
people with those forms of color-blindness had less moral significance than the lives of 
other people, even though it would be true that certain combinations of colors that might 
give pleasure or pain to other people would have no effect on them, and thus that we 
needn’t take the same care in exposing them to these combinations as we would with oth-
ers. This might seem like a terminological quibble. As I said, Varner doesn’t claim that 
“greater moral significance” implies “more valuable.” But I think there is a real danger that 
talk of greater moral significance will lead us to assume precisely that. It would be prefera-
ble to claim, simply, that the lives of persons have different moral significance from the lives 
of non-persons. 
Second, I have a worry about Varner’s appeal to the principle of inclusiveness. The idea 
seems to be that persons have the same range of valuable and disvaluable experiences as 
near-person, and more besides, and likewise for near-persons compared with non-persons. 
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That is, the greater cognitive abilities of persons serve to add to the range of morally rele-
vant experiences. But couldn’t a heightened degree of autonoetic consciousness also de-
tract from a range of morally relevant experiences? Varner describes merely sentient crea-
tures as beings who “live in the present.” Perhaps the experiences of such creatures have a 
kind of value or disvalue that is utterly unlike anything we experience, and is, in fact, inac-
cessible to us, precisely because we possess the degree of autonoetic consciousness that 
we do. This is similar to a worry I have regarding John Stuart Mill’s appeal to “competent 
judges” in evaluating different kinds of pleasure (1957, ch. 2). On Mill’s account, the prefer-
ences of those who have experienced both kinds of pleasure are a reliable guide to the 
comparative values of two pleasures. But, it is possible (and, judging by my own experience, 
actual) that the experience of one kind of pleasure can itself change the experience (and 
maybe even the memory) of a different kind of pleasure. Thus the experience by me of both 
pleasures A and B may render the experience of pleasure A by someone who has only ex-
perienced A inaccessible to me. The same may be true of the mere ability to experience 
various kinds of pleasures (and pains). It is tempting, and certainly pleasing to our own sense 
of importance, to talk of the added “richness” and “complexity” of our mental lives as mak-
ing possible greater value (while also recognizing the possibility of greater disvalue). But if, 
as I have briefly here suggested, the principle of inclusiveness doesn’t apply, we simply have 
no reason to believe that our “richer” or “more complex” experiences possess more value 
(either positive or negative) than the (we assume) simpler experiences of creatures without 
autonoetic consciousness (or with a lesser degree of it than we possess). 
Finally, when it comes to ILS rules regarding animals, Varner suggests that “With regard to 
merely sentient animals, … good intuitive level rules will generally treat them as replacea-
ble” (Varner 2012, 288), and thus will allow what Varner calls “humane, slaughter-based 
agriculture.” Singer, on the other hand, despite agreeing that our critical-level principles 
should regard merely sentient animals as replaceable, argues that the best ILS rules will 
forbid even humane, slaughter-based agriculture, on the grounds that this would foster the 
kind of attitude towards animals (regarding them as resources for our exploitation) that 
would likely encourage (or rather reinforce) a lack of consideration of the interests that such 
animals do have. It would be very difficult, in other words, for most people to maintain the 
view that animals are replaceable, without also failing to consider the interests they do have 
in not being made to suffer. Varner’s response is that this move is in tension with Singer’s 
dismissal of what he (Varner) sees as a similar objection to euthanasia for certain human 
infants. Singer argues that humans have shown themselves to be perfectly capable of rec-
ognizing important distinctions amongst different humans. But there are clearly important 
disanalogies here. In the case of allowing the killing of certain categories of humans, we are 
(certainly in modern societies) going against a strong presumption against killing all humans. 
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The burden of proof is on those who wish to carve out an exception to the rule against 
killing. In the case of killing animals, even now, the burden of proof is usually assumed to be 
on those who argue for the impermissibility of such killing. So ingrained is the attitude that 
killing animals is a morally trivial matter, that even a philosopher such as Don Marquis re-
cently revised his famous argument against abortion (1989), on the grounds that the origi-
nal argument might (just might) imply that the killing of squirrels was a morally serious mat-
ter (2015). Slippery slope arguments depend on the plausibility of the empirical claims that 
underlie them. Though I don’t have the space to explore the issue here, it seems pretty clear 
to me, at least, that Singer is correct to claim that the slippery slope argument against cer-
tain limited forms of infant euthanasia rests on shaky empirical grounds, and also correct to 
claim that the slippery slope argument against ILS rules permitting humane slaughter-based 
agriculture rests on solid empirical foundations. I will add, as one final point, that the envi-
ronmental and health-based reasons against animal agriculture seem to me to be individu-
ally decisive in any case, so the issue is overdetermined in favor of ILS rules prohibiting the 
practice. 
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Commentary on Varner’s Personhood, 
Ethics, and Animal Cognition 
Adam Shriver, University of Oxford, UK 
 
Gary Varner’s Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition expands upon ideas expressed in 
earlier essays and his first book In Nature’s Interests? (2002) to more fully develop (and 
partially revise) a moral hierarchy that nicely captures several deep-seated intuitions about 
the value of sentience and personhood for moral status. His discussion in both books of the 
evidence for sentience and interests in different species is among the best in combining 
careful analytic thought with relevant scientific evidence, and due to the clarity of thought 
his work provides a useful starting point for those discussing sentience across species and 
its moral implications.  
But sentience is only the baseline for moral considerability, and Varner applies a similarly 
careful analysis to the concept of personhood and a new category he introduces, near-per-
sonhood, in hopes of explaining the widely-shared view that there is something unique 
about the value of human life. Since speculating on the specialness of humans is a frequent 
theme of Western philosophy, it’s important to be clear exactly what Varner is arguing. 
Some might believe that the pain of a human being is more morally important than a similar 
pain in a nonhuman animal; this, however, is not Varner’s position. Rather, while essentially 
accepting something along the lines of Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, 
which would entail that similar hedonic experiences should be treated similarly regardless 
of whom they occur in (and regardless of the species of the experiencing being), Varner 
nevertheless suggests that the overall life of a typical human has more value than that of a 
typical nonhuman because such a life is more “morally charged” in both positive and nega-
tive directions due to unique types of interests possessed by persons that can be layered on 
top of those available to near-persons and the merely sentient. 
Though I am broadly sympathetic to Varner’s arguments and overall project, I want to chal-
lenge one particular aspect of his account; namely, the suggestions that near-personhood 
and personhood can make a life go worse for an individual than the lives of merely sentient 
organisms. I believe that the “moral charge” is only in one direction; the capacities Varner 
discusses can make lives go morally better, but since the badness of suffering is what ulti-
mately determines how badly bad lives can go and since there’s no reason to believe that 
persons can suffer more than nonpersons, it follows that persons do not have lives that are 
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more “charged” in the negative direction. I’ll briefly mention later why I think this is im-
portant.  
Varner gives several different arguments for the claim that persons’ lives are more morally 
charged than near-persons, which are in turn more morally charged than the merely sen-
tient. We can divide these arguments into what I’ll call experiential arguments and de-
sire/interest-based arguments. The experiential arguments fail to establish that person-
hood increases the charge in either a positive or negative direction. Varner suggests that 
due to the capacity to project oneself into the future and past in the case of near-persons 
and to conceive one’s life as a whole in the case of persons, these groups can consciously 
remember positive or negative experiences as well as consciously anticipate positive or neg-
ative experiences, thus “layering” an additional level of morally significant valance on top 
of already existing experiences.  
However, the idea of layering doesn’t capture how our experiences typically go. At any par-
ticular time, I have a limited capacity of attention which also limits my capacity for hedonic 
experience; if I direct my attention towards a pleasant memory, I will have less attention 
available for focusing on current experiences. Isn’t this, after all, why so many self-help 
practitioners encourage us to “live in the moment”? If I’m eating a tasty vegan meal, but 
then start remembering a day at the beach, I will presumably start enjoying the meal less 
than if I had just focused on the experience of eating. There are some cases where having a 
memory of something similar to a current activity can help to enhance the experience of 
that activity (and Varner gives a few examples in the book), but it doesn’t seem to me that 
the “pleasure enhancement” of such cases are strong enough that it can’t simply be out-
weighed by very intense experiences that lack layering. So there’s reason to be sceptical 
that conscious rememberings or anticipations importantly expand the overall capacity for 
positive or negative experiences in sentient beings at any particular moment and in aggre-
gations of such moments.  
That leaves the preference and interest based arguments, of which there are two types. 
One type of argument, similar to that above, suggests that both the capacity to anticipate 
the future and an autobiographical sense of self can give organisms additional types of de-
sires that can be layered on top of the types of desires shared with the merely sentient. The 
other argument, which is unique to persons, is that only persons have “lives as a whole” 
which constitute a radically different type of interest from that possessed by non-persons.  
As noted above, I’m broadly sympathetic to these arguments. But it’s worth examining how 
these additional types of interests relate to the overall well-being of organisms. I agree with 
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Varner that being able to choose what type of life as a whole one pursues and to live ac-
cording to that choice can make a life go better overall than it could for an organism that 
lacks that capacity. Moreover, I follow him in thinking that because persons have more to 
aspire to, it can be more “tragic” for a human life to be terminated prior to reaching its full 
potential compared to a non-person. However, it does not follow from these ideas that a 
person’s life is in fact more “morally charged” in both positive and negative directions rather 
than just one.  
To see this, imagine a world full entirely of persons who are incapable of having negative 
experiences. Their overall experiences are generally positive, but they have intense hopes 
and aspirations that they often fall short of achieving. In other words, they have many de-
sires about the short and medium term future and about their lives as a whole that go un-
fulfilled, but they never feel negative experiences as a result of these desires being 
thwarted. Can these persons’ lives ever reach a point where they fall below the threshold 
of a life worth living? Is it ever the case that it would be better, from their own perspective, 
for them not to have existed at all despite their overall pleasure?  
I think the answer to both of these questions is “no.” The badness of our desires about the 
future and about our lives as a whole being thwarted depends on (A) the loss of the good-
ness that would have obtained if they had been satisfied and (B) the negative feeling that 
results from knowing that the desires were thwarted. But if you take away (B), the feeling, 
then this thwarting is no longer the type of thing that pushes a life below a neutral point by 
itself. And we should remove (B) from consideration since, as I argued above, rememberings 
and anticipations don’t seem to expend the overall capacity for valanced positive or nega-
tive experiences and there’s no reason to believe that persons overall moment-to-moment 
experiences are more intense than those of the merely sentient.  
In other words, while I agree that the types of capacities persons and near-persons have 
can make lives go better, I’m sceptical that they can make lives go worse than those of the 
merely sentient. Suffering is what makes life go badly, and—as Singer (1990) puts it—in 
suffering the animals are our equals. More sophisticated cognitive capacities may lead to 
different causes of suffering, different reasons for suffering, and perhaps even different fla-
vors of suffering, but not to different magnitudes of suffering.  
This is important when we think about the practical implications of Varner’s view. Modern 
animal research is based on the claim that the harms caused to animals by invasive research 
is outweighed by the potential benefits to humans. In particular, consider the use of animal 
models in biomedical research for negative hedonic experiences such as pain, anxiety, and 
depression where it is clear that as a society we would not accept these experiences being 
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induced in humans merely for the sake of potential medical breakthroughs. Varner’s claim 
that persons’ lives have additional value beyond that of the merely sentient and that of 
near-persons has some implications for how we think of these tradeoffs, but even more 
dramatic implications in contexts such as these would follow from the claim that humans 
are capable of living far worse lives than those of other organisms. As such, I think it’s im-
portant to pay attention to whether the moral charge truly increases in both directions, or 
only increases the potential for the goodness of lives. We can acknowledge that there’s 
something special about the positive value of persons without making the (in my view mis-
taken) claim that persons’ capacity for ill-being is also greater than that of other sentient 
animals. 
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Treating Animals as the Sort of Thing They 
Are: Commentary on Gary Varner’s 
Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition 
Susana Monsó, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, 
Austria 
 
Gary Varner’s Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition has been my first encounter with 
Hare’s ethical theory. As a convinced anti-utilitarian, I found Hare’s views as unappealing 
and counter-intuitive as I expected to find them. However, the descriptive aspect of his the-
ory makes it especially difficult to argue against him. After all, the reactions Hare’s claims 
trigger in me are exactly the ones he would have predicted me to have, given the sort of ILS 
rules that I have been educated into adopting. How can you argue against someone whose 
theory predicts and incorporates the very objections you would like to raise? 
In this commentary, I cannot do proper justice to the complexity and argumentative detail 
of Varner’s Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition, let alone attempt to refute Hare’s 
ethical theory. Instead, I would like to accept the game that Hare and Varner are proposing, 
and attempt to raise an objection ‘from within.’ The idea is to capture one of the things that 
I find lacking in Varner’s account of how we should treat animals, while at the same time 
avoiding the Harean standard response to objections. Thus, I will try to avoid any appeal to 
my intuitions and instead argue from the logic of moral discourse.  
According to Varner’s account of Hare, this author derived his ethical theory from the logical 
properties that all moral judgements share, namely, universalizability (the requirement to 
judge similar cases similarly), overridingness (the idea that moral norms override other 
types of norms), and prescriptiveness (the notion that sincerely assenting to a moral judge-
ment implies acting accordingly and approving of others acting accordingly;  Varner 2012, 
12–13). From these three properties, Hare derives the principle of utility, the idea that the 
right thing to do in any circumstances is whatever would maximise aggregate happiness 
(Varner 2012, 71). I believe that this principle does not follow from these three logical prop-
erties (or, at least, I was not convinced by Varner’s arguments to the effect), but what I want 
to focus on is the idea that happiness should be viewed as the sole prudential value that 
must be maximized. I will argue that pain and suffering, as well as pleasure and enjoyment, 
do not exhaust the harms and benefits that humans and other animals can be subjected to. 
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And I will argue that further harms and benefits can be derived from the very logic of moral 
discourse. 
To see this, let me begin by pointing out that there is another logical requirement that moral 
judgements must accommodate, and which is not mentioned by Varner, even though he 
implicitly follows it. This is the requirement that I, for want of a better term, shall call moral 
appropriateness, and it consists of the idea that the treatment that is morally appropriate 
for each being depends on the sort of being it is, that is, the treatment of a being prescribed 
by moral judgements must take into account the morally relevant properties of that being. 
Moral appropriateness is a very basic notion in ethics. Regardless of whether one is a deon-
tologist, a utilitarian, or a virtue ethicist, what one must do is considered to be intimately 
related to whether what one is dealing with is an inanimate object, a sentient being, an end-
in-itself, and so on. The moral appropriateness requirement can even be seen as implicit in 
the logical requirement of universalizability. Indeed, the commitment to judge similar cases 
similarly incorporates the idea that beings with different morally relevant properties may 
call for different treatment, and that the properties that are deemed morally relevant in 
one case should be deemed morally relevant in all other cases.  
As noted, Varner himself incorporates the moral appropriateness requirement. It is present, 
for instance, in the schema of the notion of person that he adopts: “an individual who de-
serves special treatment or respect ... because he, she, or it has some capacity or capacities 
...” (Varner 2012, 6, emphasis in the original). The emphasis on the word ‘because’ suggests 
a commitment to the idea that the possession of certain capacities that are morally relevant 
grounds an entitlement to special treatment—an entitlement that is not present in beings 
that lack these morally relevant capacities. And indeed, Varner devotes a large portion of 
his book to distinguishing between persons, near-persons, and the merely sentient, pre-
cisely because he believes that these are morally relevant properties, and that the treat-
ment that is morally appropriate is different for beings with different morally relevant prop-
erties. 
The logical requirement of moral appropriateness is so fundamental that one can consider 
it to entail what Varner, following Hare, calls an ILS principle. This is an ILS rule that is not 
overrideable, and so functions as a deontological principle. Varner only speaks of two ILS 
principles in relation to animals: the universalizability principle (similar cases must be 
treated similarly) and the principle of respect for sentient life (sentient animals should not 
be killed unnecessarily). However, we could speak of a third ILS principle that would be in-
tended to incorporate the moral appropriateness requirement. It could be formulated as: 
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all beings have a right to treatment that is appropriate to the sort of thing they are, or al-
ternatively: all beings have a right to have their morally relevant properties taken into ac-
count.  
With the moral appropriateness principle at hand, I can begin to articulate what I consider 
to be lacking in Varner’s account of how we should treat animals. I will concentrate on the 
case of farm animals, which is the one that Varner deals with most extensively. Varner con-
siders that the available evidence — at the time he wrote this book — suggests that farm 
animals are merely sentient animals, and so that they do not qualify as near-persons. 
Whether or not this corresponds to the current state of the evidence is unimportant for 
present purposes, for Varner’s distinction between near-persons and the merely sentient 
has no real practical implications. This is because Varner considers that the well-being of 
both near-persons and the merely sentient is “purely a function of how much positive and 
negative conscious states they contain” (Varner 2012, 172). This means that Varner is as-
suming that the well-being of these animals can only be improved or worsened by the pres-
ence or absence of positive and negative subjective experiences. Now, when one treats an 
animal as though she could only be benefitted or harmed by the presence or absence of 
positive or negative experiences, one is effectively reducing that animal to a container of 
experiences, a ‘mere receptacle of value,’ as Tom Regan would put it (see, for instance: 
Regan 2004, 208-10.). If the animal in question is more than this, if she has other morally 
relevant properties, this means that we are not treating her as the sort of being she is—we 
are failing to follow the moral appropriateness principle. 
This appears to be the case for farm animals, or at least those who are slaughtered in the 
largest numbers: pigs, cattle, and chickens. The available evidence suggests that these ani-
mals can not only feel pleasure and pain, but that they also have distinct personalities, pref-
erences, tastes, feelings, complex social relationships — in short, they have individuality 
(see Marino 2017; Marino and Allen 2017; and Marino and Colvin 2015 for an up-to-date 
review of the relevant evidence). This individuality is a morally relevant property, for it is 
what makes them non-replaceable in a very literal sense: they are unique individuals and 
no other animal can fill their specific place. Their individuality grounds their non-replacea-
bility in the same way it does for us. Indeed, as soon as we consider ourselves as individuals, 
rather than receptacles of positive and negative experiences, our non-replaceability be-
comes rather obvious. If I were to be killed because, say, a doctor decided to harvest my 
organs to save five different patients, my replacement with another human who would lead 
a happy life would be no consolation to any of those who know me and love me, because 
my uniqueness, my individuality, is lost and will never come back. 
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This individuality opens the door to a specific type of harm that is not captured in terms of 
experiential welfare: this is the harm that comes from objectifying or commodifying an an-
imal who is a subject, an individual. This is a harm that farm animals are routinely subjected 
to. Indeed, the treatment of farm animals exhibits the seven symptoms of objectification 
identified by Martha Nussbaum (1995, 257): 
1. Instrumentality: farm animals are treated as tools for the satisfaction of our food 
preferences. 
2. Denial of autonomy: we determine the contents of farm animals’ lives from begin-
ning to end, denying them any opportunity for self-determination. 
3. Inertness: farm animals are constrained in their movements and interactions with 
one another, as though they lacked agency and activity. 
4. Fungibility: farm animals are treated as interchangeable with one another. 
5. Violability: farm animals are treated as though they lacked boundary-integrity, as 
something that it is permitted to break up or break into. This is most obvious in the 
practice of slaughter, but is also present in other practices such as the castration of 
piglets or the de-beaking of chicks. 
6. Ownership: farm animals are treated as things that can be owned, bought, and sold. 
7. Denial of subjectivity: farm animals are treated as something whose experiences and 
feelings need not be taken into account, at least not for their own sake and only in 
those cases in which negative welfare impacts on productivity or on profitability. 
The objectification of farm animals constitutes a form of harm because the animals’ individ-
uality is a morally relevant property that is not being taken into account, let alone respected. 
The animals are not being treated as unique, irreplaceable individuals with their own pref-
erences and personalities, but as mere objects, as interchangeable units in the food produc-
tion process. They are not being treated as the sort of thing they are, thus violating the 
moral appropriateness principle. Further, objectification is an objective form of harm that 
is not dependent on the presence of certain negative mental states. This is one of the rea-
sons why the cognitive disenhancement of farm animals to deprive them of the capacity to 
feel pain or to see is not, contrary to what Varner (2012, 276-78) says, entirely beneficial for 
the animals. While cognitive disenhancement eliminates one dimension of harm (negative 
mental states), it is another form of objectification, since these animals’ negative mental 
states also contribute to their individuality, and by eliminating them we are stripping them 
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of some of their uniqueness. Thus, such cognitive disenhancement would also be a harm 
imposed on these animals, even if it doesn’t result in any specific negative mental state. 
Typically, utilitarians do not accept that objective harms exist. However, I suspect that Var-
ner needs to incorporate objective harms for his theory to work. If only subjective harm 
counts, then nothing can ensure that the lives of persons are more ‘morally charged’ than 
those of animals. While Varner argues strongly for the idea that our biographical sense of 
self entails that we have more value and disvalue in our lives than animals do, if we think of 
value and disvalue as merely a function of positive and negative mental states, then nothing 
guarantees this. If the value of achieving my life-long dream is merely a function of how 
content it makes me feel, there is no way for me to know whether this value is superior, 
equivalent, or inferior to value of the pleasure of my dog as he basks in the sun with not a 
care in the world. The way for Varner to escape this is to incorporate an objective dimen-
sion, which indeed he seems to do. He asserts, for example, that for a person, “how well his 
life goes is not completely addressed by asking how good it felt, on the whole, to live that 
life” and that what is in a person’s best interests is “to live a good story, to be a certain kind 
of person, to achieve certain things” (Varner 2012, 172). But if we accept the existence of 
objective harms and benefits in the case of humans, why not accept it in the case of ani-
mals? 
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Varner on Animals: Room for Far-Persons? 
Gary Comstock, North Carolina State University Raleigh, USA  
 
In distinguishing near-persons from persons and the merely sentient, Gary Varner (2012) 
supplies an important set of categories to classify the moral statuses of three different kinds 
of animals:  
Persons, such as typically developing adult humans 
Near-persons, such as the great apes, cetaceans, elephants and perhaps corvids, par-
rots, scrub jays and others 
The merely sentient, such as, perhaps, fish 
In which category should we put companion and so-called “food animals:” dogs, cats, cows, 
pigs, and chickens? Varner thinks there is not yet enough empirical evidence to decide the 
question. He asserts, and I agree, that domesticated animals lack the more complex 
psychologies of the great apes. Does this mean, then, that cows are merely sentient? Given 
the gaps in our current state of knowledge, Varner hesitates, and does not place 
domesticated animals in any category. Should he have included domesticated animals as 
near-persons? 
I think not. Domesticated animals have their own space, somewhere between near-persons 
and the merely sentient. We need a new category, which I’ll call far-persons (Comstock 
2017b). To define far-persons I’ll help myself to Varner’s conceptual tools. In so doing, I take 
myself to be filling in part of the middle of what he describes as a continuum. 
A person, writes Varner, is an individual whose biographical sense of self entitles them to 
special treatment. A near-person lacks a biographical sense of self but has a robust 
autonoetic consciousness: a rich sense of their past, present, and future. Near-persons do 
more than simply respond to stimuli, the defining characteristic of the merely sentient. 
Near-persons lack ground projects, the hallmark beliefs and desires persons have with 
which they aspire to make something out of their lives as a whole. But near-persons have 
conscious beliefs and desires, and executive control of them. In this regard they differ from 
the merely sentient who have only the ability to enjoy pleasant stimuli while responding 
defensively to noxious stimuli. 
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If I’m right, domesticated animals are neither near-persons nor merely sentient. Take cows, 
for example. Cows, unlike chimpanzees and other near-persons, lack a robust autonoetic 
consciousness. They are not able to think about themselves, remember the past 
episodically, or make plans for tomorrow. They are not near-persons.  
However, neither do they seem to be merely sentient. They do not seem to live entirely in 
the moment. They seem to have concepts, cognitive representations, beliefs and desires 
with which to form explicit, if short-term, memories and prospections. They are able to look 
forward as far as several minutes into the future, to form hypotheses about how to achieve 
goals within that timeframe, and flexibly to change strategies if pursuing one strategy 
initially fails (Comstock 2017a). If cows are not simply pushed or pulled in this or that 
direction by external forces, if they have executive control and the ability to inhibit urges, 
then their behavior cannot be explained in terms of stimulus and response.  
I think cows are far-persons, individuals with lyrical experiences, experiences with “minute” 
temporal horizons that last at most two or three minutes. Lyrical experiences can be intense 
and profoundly pleasurable or painful, but they do not persist in memory and cannot be 
achieved by long-term planning. Far-persons have four basic emotions: happiness, sadness, 
anger, and fear or surprise (Jack, Garrod, and Schyns 2014). They can take pride in their 
successes (or be frustrated by their failures) to learn simple new skills. They are sentient 
beings who can recognize faces and vocalizations of conspecific friends and enemies, and 
human friends and enemies. That is, they know their foes and how to avoid them, and they 
know their friends and how to please them (think licking and grooming). Far-persons have 
a unified perspective—a point of view of their own—but they lack long-term conscious 
memories and aspirations. They lack second-order beliefs about their own minds, and have 
no beliefs about the beliefs of others. Their beliefs are all “first order,” that is, directed 
outward at objects in the world. They can exercise executive control over some of their 
desires on the basis of reasons, act autonomously as they pursue their aims, communicate 
their desires to others, and deceive others. But they cannot read others’ minds. Although 
they lack explicit memories of things that happened weeks or months ago, they have explicit 
memories of what happened a few seconds or minutes ago.  
Varner does not address the moral status of domesticated animals in detail. He observes 
that he has not yet seen behavioral evidence that these animals have a robust autonoetic 
consciousness, and he advises that we err on the side of caution when adopting policies 
about how to treat them. Given the state of inquiry, Varner’s position is reasonable; 
domesticated animals should not be listed among possible candidates for near-personhood. 
But in what category should we place them? If we take our clues from Varner’s analysis of 
wild squirrels, we might infer that he thinks domesticated animals are merely sentient.  
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Varner argues that squirrels do not plan consciously for the future, do not have episodic 
memories, and lack theory of mind. There is no evidence he writes, and I concur, that 
squirrels recognize themselves in mirrors or have any other of the distinguishing behavioral 
features of near-persons. They have implicit memories and unconscious anticipations of the 
future, but these capacities are not sufficient to sponsor explicit, conscious future planning. 
A squirrel hoarding acorns, Varner writes, consciously desires “to get each acorn into its 
stash” but “is completely unconscious of the purpose of its hoarding behavior” (Varner 
2012, 164). Since it is not conscious of the long-term goal it  
can achieve no sense of satisfaction when it has stashed enough acorns. It cannot, in effect, 
say ‘There, I’ve accomplished that! Since that (the goal of laying up enough acorns for the 
winter) is something of which it is not conscious. (Varner 2012, 164) 
I think Varner’s right that the squirrel does not consciously plan for the long-distance future, 
but what about the short-term? Varner allows that the squirrel can “achieve a sense of 
satisfaction” from achieving a short-term objective, for example, getting this acorn into that 
stash. A squirrel cannot get satisfaction at the end of the day from having put in an honest 
day’s labor, as it were, because it does not possess the concept of “a day’s labor.” But the 
squirrel may well have these three mental states (Carruthers 2008):  
[BELIEF] if this acorn is cached, then it can be eaten when hungry 
[BELIEF] if this acorn is not cached, then it cannot be eaten when hungry 
[DESIRE] eat this acorn when hungry 
These three mental states automatically produce caching behavior. If the caching behavior 
is blocked by, say, a heavy rock that has fallen on the cache, the squirrel may acquire 
another set of relevant beliefs and desires and this subsequent set may enable the squirrel 
to negotiate the obstacle and complete the task. Perhaps forming and acting on the novel 
hypothesis enables the squirrel to succeed in achieving its original goal (to eat this acorn 
when hungry). If so, and if the squirrel recruits frontal cortical brain structures to inhibit and 
control its thoughts—as does the squirrel’s close rodent cousin, the rat (Narayanan and 
Laubach 2017)—then there is little reason to deny that the behavior is conscious.  
And that would be a lyrical experience: autonomously adopted, intentionally planned, 
rationally executed, potentially involving emotions and facial recognition, a potential source 
of pleasure. Even if the experience is short-term and stretches little more than two dozen 
seconds from beginning to end, it may be a conscious plan that requires the animal to 
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employ concepts, beliefs, and desires. Table 1 summarizes my proposal about far-persons’ 
mental capacities. 
I have argued for what I initially thought was a friendly amendment to Varner’s insightful 
three-fold scheme. However, upon reflection, the argument now seems to me to require a 
significant revision of Varner’s lowest category. For, if I am right, there are no “merely 
sentient” animals. The animals I had previously thought would fall into this category are, I 
now think, either far-persons or not sentient at all. Dogs and cats, for example, are far-
persons, not merely sentient. Worms and insects (and perhaps mollusks and even fish), on 
the other hand, probably lack a standpoint from which to integrate inputs or characterize 
the various aspects of the world. Lacking a unified perspective, they cannot coherently be 
said to desire that their future be free of any present noxious stimulus. For without a 
perspective, they cannot have desires, beliefs, or temporal horizons. If there are such 
animals, as there certainly appear to be, then all of them drop out of the “merely sentient” 
category because they are only “merely responsive” not “merely sentient.” And if, as I 
suspect, all of the other animals in the merely sentient category (such as cows and pigs) are 





Centrally integrates multi-modal perceptual inputs from the 
immediate environment providing a characterization of the 
various aspects of the external world, information that be-
comes the basis for beliefs about how objects are arrayed 




2. Short temporal 
horizons 
Has conscious short-term prospections stretching no more 
than a few dozen seconds into the future; unconscious or 
procedural long term memories reaching back weeks into 
the past; and conscious or episodic intermediate term mem-





Has first-order beliefs, that is, positive and negative attitudes 
toward the contents of propositions (if the bee believes “this 
is the hive” then it has a positive attitude toward the propo-
sition “this is the hive”); has desires, that is, a disposition to 
take pleasure in some immediate future state of the world; 
can receive and express information (e.g., invitations, warn-
ings) visually or orally; can identify some others as friend or 
foe (e.g., facial recognition) 
 4. Causal reasoning, 
reversal learning 
Has object permanence; understands cause and effect; able 
to form alternative hypotheses and choose rationally among 
them to achieve a goal; adapts behavior relatively quickly in 
response to changes in familiar reward patterns 
 5. Sentience and 
emotion 
Has phenomenal experiences; feels pleasure, pain, and basic 
emotions (anger, happiness, surprise, disgust, sadness, and 
fear); takes an egoistic interest in one’s immediate welfare 
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TABLE: FAR-PERSONS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPACITIES 
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Has feelings of freedom; feels frustrated when one’s desires 
are thwarted; feels one has executive control of one’s deci-





Conscious intermediate term prospections stretching no 
more than a few hours into the future; conscious or episodic 
long-term memories of a few days into the past 
Complex minds 8. Grammar (syntax) Understands changes in semantic meaning when the same 
concepts in one expression are re-arranged into a second ex-
pression 
 9. Theory of mind, 
self-conscious 
Understands the behavior of other selves as motivated by 
psychological states similar to one’s own; recognize one-
self as a conscious individual extended temporally across the 
hours; pass the mirror mark test 
 10. Empathy, altru-
ism 
Shares others’ feelings, engages in social relationships; takes 
an allocentric interest in the welfare of others in one’s in-






Has ground projects, can shape long stretches of one’s life 
into stories of one’s own making 
Narrative con-
sciousness 
12. Long temporal 
horizons 
Has conscious long-term prospections stretching years into 
the future; and conscious long-term memories stretching 
decades into the past 
 
Moral minds 
13. Narrative Understands oneself in narrative terms, as a character in a 
plot with moods and settings; employs one of three mecha-
nisms to control and enact one’s chosen story: language, pic-
tures, or music 
 14. Moral rights Has moral self-governance, the feeling that one is in control 
of oneself; can inhibit “instinctual” impulses to act on princi-
ples no rational and fair-minded person could reject; pos-
sesses negative rights against others that they not violate 
one’s life or liberty 
 15. Moral obliga-
tions 
Has a sense of justice; takes a universalizable interest in the 
welfare of those outside one’s in-group; assumes the sec-
ond-person standpoint, recognizes that many individuals 
outside one’s in-group deserve equal respectful treatment 
and should not be used only as a means to one’s ends; un-
derstands actions as blameworthy or praiseworthy 
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Replies to Norcross, Shriver, Monsó, and 
Comstock 
Gary Varner, University of Texas, USA 
 
Given the limits that the commentators and I all agreed to for our contributions to this 
panel, I will focus on a limited number of the points that the four commentators have made.  
A theoretical concern that Alastair Norcross raises is an argument against my use of Ralph 
Barton Perry’s principle of inclusiveness. He doubts that the principle applies to compari-
sons of the experiences of persons and non-persons for the same reason he doubts that it 
applies to John Stuart Mill’s comparison of the experiences of “the competent judges” to 
those who are not currently “capable of appreciating” what Mill concludes are qualitatively 
superior pleasures. The reason is that acquaintance with new experiences can alter how 
one experiences previously enjoyed activities, and Norcross says that introspectively, he 
thinks that this is true. The extent to which this is true is, I think, an empirical question, and 
my own introspection doesn’t jibe with Norcross’. I tend to think that if I shed what Mill 
referred to as “any feeling of moral obligation to prefer one pleasure to another” (Mill 1957, 
12), then I can immerse myself in the previously enjoyed activity and not have my appreci-
ation of it perverted. I often find my students saying that they think that they prefer the 
dissatisfied human’s life because they’re expected to, and that’s what I say in response. But 
whether or not one really can shed the socialization in question is a very big if!  
Norcross also worries that allowing humane slaughter of merely sentient animals will “likely 
encourage (or rather reinforce) a lack of consideration of [their] interests,” a point that Su-
sana Monsó also worries about. When I responded to this line of argument in the book, I 
noted that Singer replies to such slippery slope arguments against human euthanasia by 
saying that, as Norcross puts it, “humans have shown themselves to be perfectly capable of 
recognizing important distinctions amongst different human beings.” But, Norcross sug-
gests, in the case of humans, this is because  
the burden of proof is on those who wish to carve out an exception to the rule against killing, 
[whereas] in the case of animals, even now, the burden of proof is usually assumed to be on 
those who argue for the impermissibility of such killing.  
I take this kind of worry seriously, and to the extent that it is well-founded, I agree that it 
should push us in the direction of erring on the side of caution in the formulation of ILS 
Replies to Norcross, Shriver, Monsó, and Comstock  
360 
rules. Hare’s type of utilitarianism acknowledges that the weaknesses of human beings 
should be taken seriously when formulating ILS rules, and I may be dead wrong about our 
abilities to resist this.1 
Adam Shriver raises issues about both of my arguments for the relatively “charged” nature 
of persons’ lives over those of near-persons, and of near-persons’ lives over those of the 
merely sentient.  
First, he argues that my “experiential” argument works in neither the positive nor the neg-
ative direction. This is because conscious organisms may have “limited capacity for atten-
tion available for focusing on current experiences,” so he is “sceptical that conscious re-
memberings or anticipations expand the overall capacity for [either] positive or negative 
experiences.” In response I will say only that he may well be correct, but I think this is an 
empirical question about human psychology and neuroscience. It is one that Shriver, among 
other scholars, is particularly well positioned to address in the future, however, given his 
strongly interdisciplinary preparation that includes the study of neuroscience. 
Regarding my “preference- and interest- based arguments” for increased moral charge, 
Shriver argues that they work in only the negative direction. He agrees with me that expe-
riencing the satisfaction of having what I call one’s interest in one’s life-as-a-whole can add 
value to one’s life, but, he says, “if you take away [that] feeling [of satisfaction], then this 
thwarting is no longer the type of thing that [decreases the value of one’s life.]” I wasn’t 
clear exactly what Shriver meant by this. For my point was that if one takes a conscious 
interest in how one’s life-as-a-whole goes, and it goes badly, then that layers dissatisfaction 
on top of the various dissatisfactions that a non-person (i.e. one incapable of taking an in-
terest in how its like-as-a-whole goes) the dissatisfactions that a non-person is capable of. 
But some of what Shriver says in that part of his commentary suggests another interpreta-
tion of Shriver’s concern that is explicitly raised at the end of Susana Monsó’s comments, 
regarding concerning what are commonly called “objective harms.” 
Monsó observes that “Typically, utilitarians do not accept that objective harms exist,” and I 
long thought (but notice the past-perfect tense there) I long thought that I wanted to say 
 
1 Norcross also argues that the fact that some individuals (e.g. color-blind people) can be harmed in ways that 
others (e.g. normally sighted people) cannot, doesn’t suffice to show that the former’s lives have greater moral 
significance than the latter. In the interests of time, I’m not addressing this directly. I think it may be of a piece 
with his concern at the end about slippery slope arguments and ILS rules.  
Replies to Norcross, Shriver, Monsó, and Comstock  
361 
that nothing harms an individual unless and until its valenced2 phenomenally conscious 
states are affected. So a tumor in my lung doesn’t harm me at all if I’m killed by a bus before 
it affects me (in the animal science literature, this is Ian Duncan’s (1996) conception of ani-
mal welfare as “all about feelings”). And although certain cognitive abilities allow one to be 
harmed by a diagnosis of cancer before the tumor adversely affects my physical health, an 
individual without the ability to understand the diagnosis isn’t harmed until it adversely 
affects their physical health. In a similar vein, I have also long thought that I didn’t want to 
endorse objective list views, according to which achieving certain things or exercising cer-
tain capacities is objectively good for an individual regardless of what attitudes the individ-
ual has towards those achievements or exercises. Achieving certain things, exercising ca-
pacities, and having biological functions in place are all things that show up on various 
“objective list theories” of the good. 
But I use the past perfect tense, because since I adopted a biographical conception of per-
sonhood for the first time in this book, I’ve been tempted to say that when it comes to 
persons, they can be harmed (and benefitted) by things that they don’t even know about. 
That does seem possible if one embraces a biography-based account of how well one’s life-
as-a-whole goes, by opening the door to saying that events after one’s death can affect that 
interest. In particular, as I noted at one point in the book, it could mean that events after 
one’s death can impact how well your life story played out. In the book, I didn’t try to sort 
this issue out any further, claiming that since the book is about our treatment of non-human 
animals, and I argued in the book that no non-humans have an interest in how their “lives-
as-a-whole” go, I could punt on the issue (Varner 2012, 137, fn. 2). But on reflection inspired 
by Monsó’s (and implicitly) Shriver’s comments, I can’t continue to punt. For if, as Monsó 
suggests, I’m committed to some kind of objective list view with regard to persons, then I 
can’t continue to ignore the type of objection that she raises: that there may be ways of 
harming non-persons that can’t be captured in terms of their subjective experiences. So I 
need to decide whether or not I want to stick to my idea that what is in persons’ best inter-
ests is a function of the life stories that they have chosen à la Marya Schechtman (1996). To 
be consistent, I need to either drop that account of why persons have a special kind of in-
terest that non-persons lack, or explain why objective list accounts make sense for persons 
but not for non-persons. 
 
2 I say “valenced” here, because I think it is possible to have non-valenced phenomenologically conscious states, 
e.g. an experience of seeing blue has a phenomenal feel, but in and of itself it has no positive or negative valence. 
Without positive or negative valences, however, I don’t think that such phenomenologically conscious states 
matter, morally speaking.  
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Finally, regarding Gary Comstock’s comments, in the book I said that “merely sentient” an-
imals, which live entirely in the present, might be a “hypothetical construct.” The reason is 
that there may be no animals that are sentient that do not experience physical pain,3 and 
pain is clinically defined as something that one desires to end. That is a desire for things to 
change in the future, if only the very immediate future (Varner 2012, 22). At the end of his 
commentary, Comstock speculates that the category of “merely sentient” animals may be 
empty for related reasons.  
I also emphasized in the book that there is probably a “continuum” of conscious awareness 
of the future and past (see Varner 2012, 165 and 22), so that a simple distinction between 
“near-persons” and “persons” cuts with too dull a knife. Comstock’s work on “far-persons” 
provides a more fine-grained distinction. In both his comments here, and in a 2017 paper, 
Comstock argues that, for reasons parallel to those that I gave for recognizing near-persons 
as a distinct category from both persons and the merely sentient, we should also recognize 
his category of far-persons. While far-persons lack autonoetic consciousness that is as “ro-
bust” as that of near-persons, far-persons have what he describes as “lyrical experiences” 
that transcend the immediate present of the merely sentient. He stipulates that the tem-
poral horizon of far-persons’ autonoetic experiences is less than “beyond the onset of the 
next sleep cycle” (2017b, 46), in contrast to near-persons’ autonoetic experiences that ex-
tend beyond the present day or (as he puts it in the 2017b paper) a given “sleep cycle.”4 
Just like near-persons, far-persons would lack an interest in how their lives-as-a-whole go, 
but just like near-persons, the autonoetic experiences of far-persons transcend the imme-
diate present, and this allows the same layering of value on top of merely sentient animals’ 
experience of the present. So if that is a good argument for the conclusion that near-per-
sons’ lives are more “morally charged” than those of the merely sentient, it’s also a good 
argument for recognizing that the lives of far-persons are more “morally charged” than 
those of the merely sentient, while they are less “morally charged” than those of both near-
persons and persons. Both the “experiential” and “preference- and interest-based argu-
ments” that Shriver described in his comments would apply to far-persons, so I definitely 
 
3 The one exception is humans with congenital insensitivity to pain (CIP). The condition is highly maladaptive, 
however, as documented in Melody Gilbert’s 2005 film A Life Without Pain (http://alifewithoutpain.com; Varner 
2012, 106), and this means that no non-human animals with the condition would survive to adulthood.  
4 He does this, I think, because in my book I discussed the “planning for breakfast” experiments that have been 
conducted on great apes and scrub jays.  
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agree with Comstock’s general argument for using his category of far-persons in the formu-
lation of ILS rules.5 
By way of concluding, I want to thank Comstock for organizing the ISUS panel on my book, 
and Norcross, Monsó, and Shriver for joining as additional commentators. As I trust will be 
apparent from my responses, their comments will be genuinely helpful to me as I continue 
working on the sequel, and I plan to acknowledge their help improving that book.6  
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